行业协会价格卡特尔反垄断法规制的比较研究

行业协会的价格卡特尔行为同时具有正负两方面的效应,但我国相应的法律规制却并未得以完全体现,美国与日本的反垄断法在该方面已经积累了一些重要的经验,这对于如何完善我国行业协会价格卡特尔行为的反垄断法规制提供了有益的参考.     

Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels

This paper considers enhancements of a comparatively new method to detect cartels, the System of Cartel Markers (SCM), introduced by Blanckenburg and Geist (Int Adv Econ Res 15(4):421–436, 2009). The aim of SCM is to find illegal collusion on legal markets with observable market data. It uses expected behavior patterns such as low level of capacity utilization, slackness of price adjustments to exogenous shocks, excess rates of return, nearly constant capacities, less price changes and lower variance of capacity growth rate. However, the testing of cost efficiency is lacking so far. Following Leibenstein’s (Am Econ Rev 56:392–415, 1966) X-inefficiency theory, we assume that cartel members face lower competition and hence, tend to be less cost efficient. Therefore, we enhance SCM and use cost efficiency as a further marker in order to detect cartels. We apply SCM to the German cement cartel and find empirical support for some markers. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.     

反垄断宽恕政策的理论分析与实证考察

宽恕政策是卡特尔执法的有效政策工具，它有利于破坏卡特尔的稳定性，有利于提高卡特尔的执法效率。设计合理的规则是宽恕政策有效发挥作用的基础，具体、确定、透明是宽恕政策的基本要求。宽恕政策的实施效果与卡特尔的立法、执法状况密切相关，严厉的法律制裁、坚定的执法态度和有力的执法措施能够有效促进宽恕政策的实施。为了加强卡特尔执法，我国反垄断执法机构应当根据《反垄断法》的有关规定尽快出台宽恕政策。     

竞争合规——以规制卡特尔为核心

卡特尔是公认的对市场竞争影响最为恶劣垄断行为。有效规制卡特尔除了加强公共执行和私人执行的威慑水平外,通过制度设计使企业产生自愿服从的内生性动机是一种新思路和新途径,这就需要将竞争政策融入公司治理,在企业内部建立竞争合规制度。     

Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption,Social Norms,and Collectivist Business Cultures

The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.     

论核心卡特尔中的宽恕制度及我国《反垄断法》对其规制和完善

核心卡特尔通过相同的定价、一致的行动、固定的份额来获取高额的利润,给竞争带来重大的危害,但是其隐蔽性强,难以为执法机关所侦破.宽恕制度,通过豁免卡特尔协议成员的方式以鼓励其对卡特尔协议的披露,成为西方国家打击卡特尔的重要武器.我国<反垄断法>虽对宽恕制度做了规制,但尚且不足.仍待完善.     

中国高等教育管理体制改革分析

新中国成立之后所形成的高等教育管理体制以中央集权、"条块分割"、政府办学等为主要特征.1980年代以来的改革打破了"条块分割",形成了"以块为主"的新的高等教育管理体制,高等学校办学自主权的不断扩大,也使高校与政府的关系发生了很大的变化.淡化高校与政府间的"行政关系",将高校与政府的关系置于法律的基础之上,这仍然是中国高等教育管理体制改革所面临的主要课题.     

Managing Cartels: how Cartel Participants Create Stability in the Absence of law

Firms enter cartels (e.g. price-fixing; bid-rigging) in order to control market uncertainties and gain collusive profits, but face challenges in controlling the cartel itself. A challenge for business cartels is how to organise collective illegal activities without the use of formal control, such as binding legal contracts or arbitration. While one might expect that a lack of formal legal control leads to mutual conflicts and opportunistic behaviour resulting in short-lived cartels, firms often manage to continue their illegal conduct for years. This raises questions as to how firms organise their cartels in the absence of legal means. This article addresses how informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope of formal legal control. Based on an in depth study of 14 Dutch cartels, this article shows the importance of informal social mechanisms to coordinate, monitor, enforce, and compensate for the longevity of business cartels. Furthermore, the results emphasise that in order to explain cartel stability, social mechanisms that induce trust need to be considered.     

Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions

This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.     

Estimating damages from price-fixing: the value of transaction data

We use a unique private data set of about 340,000 invoice positions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers to study the value of such transaction data for an estimation of cartel damages. In particular, we investigate, first, how structural break analysis can be used to identify the exact end of the cartel agreement and, second, how an application of before-and-after approaches to estimate the price overcharge can benefit from such rich data sets. We conclude that transaction data allows such a detailed assessment of the cartel and its impact on direct customers that its regular application in private antitrust cases is desired as long as data collection and preparation procedures are not prohibitively expensive.     

对农村“先富群体”竞选“村官”的法律思考

随着改革开放的深入和市场经济的发展,农村"先富群体"争当"村官"的现象十分普遍,已成为农村基层组织建设的显著特点;标志着村委会干部类型正在由道德权威型向经济能人型转变,是农村政治社会发展的一个方向。但其中也存在诸如贿选、选举纠纷的解决等一些问题。因此,必须健全法律制度,以期达到规范农村选举,加快农村法治化建设进程的效果。     

Cartels and regulation: effects on prices and real sales in sweden (1976–1990)

We estimate the effects of competition and regulatory policies on prices and real sales in Sweden during the period 1976?C1990. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that prices were higher on average in those markets affected by horizontal collusion, and therefore lower real sales. Market concentration and lower foreign trade are significantly associated with higher prices. We also observe how prices (output) tend to rise (fall) around cartel formations and fall (rise) around cartel termination as theories of cartels suggest.     

Delegations of authority to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs--FDA. Final rule

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is amending the regulations for delegations of authority to redelegate the authority of the Assistant Director for Health to make determinations to close advisory committee meetings to the public to the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (the Commissioner) and other agency heads. FDA is further redelegating this authority from the Commissioner to the Deputy Commissioner for Operations.     

检察机关内设机构设置改革问题研究

检察机关内设机构,近十多年来一直是检察改革的研究热点。研究内设机构改革,应从归纳设置现状,分析其存在的问题入手,评析当下各种改革方案之优劣,通过探讨检察职权在检察机关内部的二次分解,研究设置应当遵循的六个原则。借鉴域外法治经验,按照内设机构设置三分模式改革,对于领导决策机构,重点是完善检察委员会的决策机制;对于综合管理机构,建议参考国家行政机关大部制改革模式,大幅压缩机构数量;对于业务办理机构,根据检察权分解,科学界定部门权限,按照诉讼规律适度整合职能,精简机构。     

Suppliers to a sellers’ cartel and the boundaries of the right to damages in U.S. versus EU competition law

While customer damage claims against price-cartels receive much attention, it is unresolved to what extent other groups that are negatively affected may claim compensation. This paper focuses on probably the most important one, suppliers to a downstream sellers’ cartel. The paper first identifies three economic effects that determine whether suppliers suffer losses due to a cartel by their customers. We then examine whether suppliers are entitled to claim net losses as damages in the U.S. and the EU, with exemplary looks at England and Germany, delineating the boundaries of the right to damages in the two leading competition law jurisdictions. We find that, while the majority view in the U.S. denies standing, the emerging position in the EU approves of cartel supplier damage claims. We show that this is consistent with the ECJ case law and in line with the new EU Damages Directive. From a comparative law and economics perspective, we argue that more generous supplier standing in the EU compared to the U.S. is justified in view of the different institutional context and the goals assigned to the right to damages in the EU. We demonstrate that supplier damage claims are also practically viable by showing how supplier damages can be estimated econometrically.     

Black Hole of Responsibility: The Adjudication Committee's Role in a Chinese Court

How courts and judges in authoritarian regimes decide cases behind closed doors has rarely been studied, but it is critically important in comparative judicial studies. Primarily drawing on the minutes of the adjudication committee in a lower court in China, this article explores its operational patterns and decision‐making process. The data suggest that among the criminal cases reviewed by the committee, very few were difficult or significant, but a relatively high percentage of the suggested opinions of the adjudicating judges was modified. In contrast, many civil cases reviewed were difficult to resolve but the committee offered little assistance. Overall the operation and decision‐making of the committee were subsumed by the administrative ranking system inside the court and the authority of the court president was enormous. The analysis also demonstrates the limited role of the committee in both promoting legal consistency and resisting external influences. Instead of achieving its declared goals, the committee has degenerated into a device for both individual judges and committee members to shelter responsibility. The findings compel researchers to reevaluate the role of the adjudication committee in Chinese courts, and the relationship between judges and authoritarian regimes.     

转售价格维持的反垄断法分析

对于转售价格维持行为,传统反垄断法上强调其便利零售卡特尔以及生产商卡特尔等负面效果,因而长期适用本身违法规则。2007年美国最高法院的Leegin案判决则改而采用合理规则,这对我国《反垄断法》第14条、第15条的实施具有重大的启发意义。但另一方面,合理规则的适用十分复杂,因而应当在进行合理性分析之前,先对相关市场的情况进行考察,以明确该行为是否符合产生反竞争效果的结构条件,对于不满足这些条件的行为,则认定其合法,而不需要进行进一步的合理性分析。这样可以大大减少需要进行深入分析的案件的范围,简化合理规则的适用,并为经营者提供明确的指引。     

强化检察委员会司法属性之路径探析

在检察委员会的规范化建设已取得明显成效的情况下,应当更多地关注检察委员会的司法属性问题和决策机制的改革完善。检察委员会改革应遵循司法规律,将民主、高效、权威设定为基本目标,通过优化组织体系、改革决策模式、建立责任机制、提升委员司法能力等强化其司法属性。在决策模式改革上,应借鉴吸纳审判合议制和党委票决制的合理内核,保证委员的"民主"地位、严格检察长的"集中"机制,确立一级检察委员会定案机制,以此增强检察委员会决策机制的司法属性。     

我国反垄断法域外管辖制度初探

反垄断法域外管辖是对国外发生但是对国内市场产生限制、排除竞争影响的垄断行为适用国内反垄断法的制度。反垄断法域外管辖主要集中在国际卡特尔以及跨国并购领域,其本质是要通过反垄断法的域外管辖来规制跨越国界的垄断行为,维护国内市场的竞争秩序以及国家利益。反垄断法在实施域外管辖过程中会引起法律适用冲突。为了避免这种冲突,主要国家达成了反垄断双边合作模式。我国应该与相关国家签署反垄断双边合作协议,采取适合我国国情以及经济发展水平的反垄断法域外管辖制度。     

公共服务背景下再议村民委员会作为行政诉讼被告资格

作为自治组织——村委会能否成为行政诉讼的被告,争论很多。村委会虽然不是行政机关．但它是国家政治体系的有机组成部分,在正常的职责活动中履行着相应的行政管理职能,有相对独立的行政职权。在公共服务背号下,村委会办理公共事务和公益事业,以实现其“公共职能”为直接目的行为,是一种准行政行为。所以．村委会在履行某些行政职能并以自己名义作出具体行政行为,发生争议引起诉讼时,应当成为行政诉讼的被告。