Electoral Institutions,the Personal Vote,and Legislative Organization

What is the relationship between electoral institutions and the internal organization of legislatures? Existing research on the U.S. Congress suggests that electoral incentives shaped by the candidate‐centered nature of congressional elections explain the emergence of strong committees in that legislature. Exploring the issue from a comparative perspective, it is argued that the impact of ballot structure on committee system structure is dependent on how legislators cultivate personal votes. Committees will be stronger when legislators supply fiscal legislative particularism (pork), but weaker when legislators cultivate support by delivering extra‐legislative constituency service. Statistical analysis, combining original data on committee design in 39 democratic legislatures with measures of ballot structure and mechanism to cultivate a personal vote (MCPV), confirms the expectation.     

Committee autonomy in parliamentary systems – coalition logic or congressional rationales?

Large-n comparative research on committee structures in legislatures is rare. This paper uses newly collected data to analyse committee structures across 30 legislatures of parliamentary systems which possess strong parliamentary party groups. It seeks to explain committee autonomy which reflects the degree to which committees are able to carry out their tasks independently. The variation in autonomy is accounted for by contrasting the ‘keeping tabs on coalition partners’ perspective with the congressional theories of legislative organisation (referred to as distributional, informational, and partisan theories). The results support the informational and the keeping tabs perspective. More autonomous committees tend to be found in legislatures with a relatively high workload and frequent coalition governments. For the ongoing discussion about the applicability of the congressional theories outside the US, this study provides support for the usefulness of the US theories in parliamentary systems of government.     

Structuring Committee Decision-Making: Rules and Procedures in US State Legislatures

The rediscovery of rules and procedures as an important element for understanding legislative decision-making has become very apparent in recent summaries of research on Congress and European Parliaments. Institutional factors are now seen as critical factors that structure and restrict how individual legislators can go about their decision-making responsibilities. The goal of this article is to provide a landscape of the evolution of committee system structure in US state legislatures so that future research will be able to test current theories of institutional change. The major conclusion of this research is that US state legislatures have formalised the structure of their committee systems over the course of the twentieth century and that many similarities and few differences exist in committee system structure between US state legislative upper and lower chambers. Further, this article discovers that four distinct dimensions - property rights, codification of basic structure, internal democracy and minority party rights - of committee system structures exist in US state legislative chambers.     

Informative Committees and Legislative Performance in the American States

The information theory of legislative organization suggests that legislative committees are designed to provide their parent chamber with necessary information to legislate. Despite empirical evidence for various aspects of the theory, we have limited knowledge of committees’ influence on legislative outputs. I argue that informative committees are more than information providers, that they also substantively impact legislative outcomes. With supportive evidence from the US state legislatures, this article shows that the presence of an informative committee system not only lowers the number of bills introduced to the legislature but also enhances the chamber's efficiency in transforming legislative proposals into laws.     

论后金融危机时代金融监管国际合作的组织机制——全球金融集体安全机制构建思考之一

金融全球化呼唤金融监管国际合作,而金融监管国际合作需要国际金融监管组织。鉴于目前的国际社会结构,国际金融监管组织只能是国家间组织,而非超国家组织。由于现有的国际金融组织都不足以担当金融监管国际合作的历史使命,国际社会需要创建一个全新的国际金融监管组织。这一全新的国际金融监管组织应该具有以下组织形态特征:第一,它应该是一个全球性的、开放性的、专门性的、政府间的金融监管组织;第二,它应该是一个能够凸显国际关系民主化的金融监管组织;第三,它应该是一个具有横向综合监管职能的金融监管组织。     

Mediator Settlement Strategies

Settling cases poses a challenging task for the mediator. Most disputes are hotly contested by both parties or they would not have progressed to the point of entering the court arena or mediation. Yet, despite differences in the nature of their cases, the organization of each program we have studied, and the style of mediation predominating in each, striking similarities exist in the techniques used by the mediators to settle cases. Observation of over 40 different mediators in 175 mediation sessions in three programs suggests that in order to do the job which they are charged with accomplishing—bringing mediation cases to settlement— mediators develop a repertoire of strategies employing a variety of sources of power. Mediator strategies fall into four principal categories: presentation of self and the program, control of the process of mediation, control of the substantive issues in mediation, and activation of commitments and norms. Mediators empower themselves by claiming authority for themselves, their task, or the program based upon values external to the immediate situation, or manipulate the immediate situation so that settlement is more rather than less likely. Based upon their differential use of these strategies, mediator styles fall along a continuum between two types: bargaining and therapy. Mediation seems to range between a bargaining process conducted in the shadow of the court to a communication process which resembles therapy in its focus upon exploring and enunciating feelings .     

Majority Party Change and Committee Jurisdictions in State Legislatures

Committee jurisdictions are important in legislative organization, but the reorganization of jurisdictions has received scant attention, particularly in state legislatures, where the fluidity of committee organization allows us to examine rationales for change. In this article, I examine whether new majorities use jurisdiction reorganization for agenda‐control purposes. Examining 39 state legislatures between 2003 and 2012, I test whether committee patterns are less stable in legislative sessions under new majorities and the extent to which reorganization reflects party priorities. I find that new majority parties eliminate committees that reflect the other party's policy priorities and create committees that reflect their priorities.     

Who's afraid of forensic psychiatry?

Forensic psychiatry has come under mounting criticism from the press and other medical professionals, largely for its participation in the insanity defense. The author argues that the expertise available from the specialty is of increasing importance to psychiatry as a whole, as more and more legal issues become relevant to the practice of general psychiatry, and should be actively encouraged and legitimized rather than ostracized. All psychiatrists should be exposed to forensic principles and practices during their training, and the ability of forensic psychiatrists to serve as transducers between the clinical and the legal/judicial should be increasingly used to present the clinical viewpoint effectively in courts and legislatures.     

Popular support for legislatures in Asia

Legislatures have long served as the fundamental organ of democratic rule. They bring together disparate views and competing preferences in one venue as an effort to introduce a equitable means of compromise to produce policies that affect those whom legislatures represent. They also check the authoritarian tendencies of other government actors, notably the executive, and create the conditions for institutionalised, rather than violent, debate. The legislatures of democratic Asia are no different. In this paper, I evaluate popular support for assemblies across the democracies of Asia, in terms of their legitimacy and use as a check on power. Traditional measures of support, including age, education, and liberal values, indicate growing support for legislatures. However, the significant effects of economic evaluations and the limited attachment to political parties suggest that the legislatures of Asia are still far from consolidating their role as assemblies that support democratic regimes in the region.     

On the structure of business incubators: de-coupling issues and the mis-alignment of managerial incentives

Business incubators are structurally complex and have resisted any major change to their internal structure, replicating throughout the world in large numbers, and delivering value through numerous models. A question, thus arises, what specific structural properties of incubators facilitate the organizational form’s replication and performance in a range of institutional contexts? In order to shed light on this question, an exploratory-inductive approach is adopted; and, utilizing the tools of organization theory, the internal environment of the business incubator is de-coded. This draws attention to attributes of the hybrid incubator-form’s internal structural properties that have not been discussed in the past, including de-coupling issues and the mis-alignment of managerial incentives with the actual role of incubating. These properties, rather than impacting incubators’ status, award incubators with ceremonial value and help their managements avoid close inspections of performance. This in turn, it is proposed, has allowed for their rapid replication in a variety of socio- cultural, economic and institutional contexts.     

Cohabitation,Registration, and Reliance: Creating A Comprehensive and Just Scheme for Protecting the Interests of Couples' Real Relationships

This paper argues that courts and legislatures should recognize and protect adult relationships other than marriage, in two ways. First, couples in committed, cohabitating relationships should be protected when their relationship dissolves—even if they are not formally married. The law in this area is currently inconsistent and confusing, and should be cleaned up to reflect the reality of the lives of committed couples in need of legal protection. Second, all states should establish a registration scheme along the lines of Colorado's designated beneficiary law, which allows couples to flexibly design their legal relationship. This status should include specific arrangements about the ownership of property over the course of a long relationship, and should also be expanded to allow people to enter into more than one such relationship at a time, as long as the rights and obligations are not inconsistent. Given the number of couples operating outside of traditional marriage today, these two reforms will increase certainty of legal outcome and better protect the reliance interests of those in committed relationships.     

法制现代化进程中的审判组织重构

审判组织改革是中国法制现代化进程的重要组成部分。探求其重构的实现模式 ,需要以体现审判组织的社会属性和社会功能为基本理念 ,对法院设置、审级制度、法院内部审判组织的结构 ,以及法院作为审判组织的整体运作机制等进行综合性的研究。在保持现有的四级法院构架的基础上 ,通过对各级法院职责的重新定位、调整审级制度、设立巡回法庭制度、理顺法院内部各职能部门间的关系等一系列措施来促进审判组织重构的多重价值目标的实现。     

Legislative Strengthening Meets Party Support in International Assistance: A Closer Relationship?

Recent reports recommend that international efforts to help strengthen legislatures in emerging democracies should work more closely with support for building stronger political parties and competitive party systems. This article locates the recommendations within international assistance more generally and reviews the arguments. It explores problems that must be addressed if the recommendations are to be implemented effectively. The article argues that an alternative, issue-based approach to strengthening legislatures and closer links with civil society could gain more traction. However, that is directed more centrally at promoting good governance for the purpose of furthering development than at democratisation goals sought by party aid and legislative strengtheners in the democracy assistance industry.     

Political structure,legislative process,and corruption: comparing Taiwan and South Korea

Taiwan and South Korea have the same constitutional system, approximate economic scale, and similar cultural backgrounds, yet they differ in degree of corruption. What political structures and legislative processes cause this outcome is the major question posed in this paper. The political structure in South Korea is a centralization-of-power model, while that in Taiwan is a separation-of-powers model. This paper proposes that Taiwan and South Korea have different types of corruption and different political structures, and the legislative process in South Korea is more compromising than that in Taiwan. These factors contribute to greater corruption in South Korea than in Taiwan. This study clarifies how particular institutional dynamics reduce or enhance the prospects for democratic governance and help to better understand how political structure and legislative process channel different types of corruption into different degrees of corruption. Studies on the relationship between constitutional structure and corruption have concluded that parliamentarism can help reduce corruption more than presidentialism. This thesis argues that a country with centralized power tends to be less corrupt than a country with separation of powers. If this argument and the rationale behind it hold true for countries with both parliamentary and presidential systems, we can expect that semi-presidential countries with a centralized system are less corrupt than those with a decentralized system, all else being equal. However, by comparing these two semi-presidential countries, we find that South Korea, with its centralized model, was more corrupt than Taiwan, with its decentralized model. This comparative case study provides a counterargument to the conventional wisdom of constitutional structure and governance.     

Electoral Budget Cycles in Legislatures

This article examines electoral cycles in legislative budget decisions. Where local structures play an important role in candidate selection and election, legislators' incentives to amend the executive spending proposal can depend on the proximity of elections, leading to more spendthrift behavior in the run‐up to popular votes. However, stringent budget institutions can counteract this tendency. Using a unique dataset of executive spending proposals and approved budgets in Sweden, I find strong empirical support for these predictions. Future studies of electoral cycles should pay greater attention to separating the contributions of the legislative and executive stages of the budgetary process and the conditions that foster electoral cyclicality in legislatures.     

DNA databanks: law enforcement's greatest surveillance tool?

All fifty states have laws requiring the collection of DNA samples from certain classes of criminals. Genetic profiles are gleaned from these samples and entered into DNA databanks, after which they then can be accessed by law enforcement personnel and others. DNA forensic technologies can be used to identify criminal offenders, but they can also be used in ways that reveal health and other personal information about the target and even about his or her relations. Moreover, the rapid introduction of ever-changing types of DNA forensic techniques creates a potential for error. Such errors may wrongly implicate some individuals for a crime and may wrongly exculpate others. This Article examines weaknesses in state DNA databanking laws regarding the protection of genetic privacy and imposition of quality assurance mechanisms and suggests policies which state legislatures should incorporate into the state DNA databanking scheme.     

Legislative Constraints on Executive Unilateralism in Separation of Powers Systems

Can legislatures effectively check unilateral executive power? One prominent and counterintuitive finding in previous work is that executives pursue unilateralism less often under divided government. While executives see greater potential policy gains through unilateral action during divided government, we argue that their likelihood of acting unilaterally depends on an opposed legislature's ability to retaliate. When polarization is high and majorities are marginal, executives are freer to act unilaterally given the difficulties legislatures have in statutorily responding. Unilateralism is also more likely when facing opposition if legislatures lack nonstatutory means of punishment, such as regulatory review. In the largest analysis of gubernatorial executive unilateralism to date, we use a new data set of 24,232 executive orders in the 50 American states between 1993 and 2013 to evaluate this argument and find strong support for its predictions. These results provide insights into how legislative policymaking capacity can influence the functioning of separation of powers systems.     

Scale,Scope, and Structure in the Community Chorus Industry

Choral music is the leading form of public participation in the arts in the United States. This article describes choral music from an organizational perspective, using a strategic management framework to examine total market scale, scope of activity, and internal structure. While many tens of thousands of choruses are embedded in educational and religious institutions, this article focuses on independent, community-based choruses. Data from public and private sources, including the leading national service organization for choruses, shows that an estimated 3,000 of these choruses operate in the U.S. They are typically organized along club models, with significant contributions to finances and governance made by chorus singers. Summary data in the article show variation in governance and program activity within budget ranges and among chorus types including professional, symphonic, volunteer, and children/youth.     

Examining Parties as Procedural Cartels: Evidence from the U.S. States

Procedural cartel theory states that the majority party exerts influence over legislative outcomes through agenda control. This research tests predictions from the party cartel theory in five state legislatures. I assess party influence through comparison of term‐limited and nonterm‐limited legislators. I argue that term‐limited legislators (who are not seeking elective office) are no longer susceptible to party pressure, making them the perfect means to determine the existence of party influence. The results demonstrate that party influence is present in these legislatures. I find that party influence is magnified on the procedural, rather than final‐passage, voting record which is precisely where procedural cartel theory predicts. I find lower levels of ideological consistency and party discipline among members for whom the party leadership offers the least—those leaving elective office. These results provide support for party cartel theory, demonstrating further evidence of how parties matter in modern democracies.