An empirical test of neutrality and the crowding-out hypothesis

This paper tests Warr's neutrality hypothesis that the voluntary provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income. Specifically, I test the null hypothesis of neutrality against the alternative that total contributions to a public good will be larger the less equally income is distributed. To test this hypothesis, a new data set is constructed by merging data on total voluntary contributions to individual public radio stations with 1990 Census data on the income distribution in each station's listening area. I find that voluntary contributions increase as income inequality rises.     

The calculus of voting: An empirical test

Abstract. According to the rational choice model, the calculus of voting takes the form of the equation R = BP − C, where the net rewards for voting (R) are a function of the instrumental benefits from the preferred outcome compared to others (B) and the probability (P) of casting the decisive vote that secures these benefits, minus the costs of becoming informed and going to the polls (C). Here, we provide a systematic test of this model. The analysis relies on two surveys, conducted during the 1995 Quebec referendum and the 1996 British Columbia provincial election, in which very specific questions measured each element of the model. As well, this study incorporates two other factors that can affect the propensity to vote — Respondents' level of political interest and their sense of duty. We find that B, P, and C each matter, but only among those with a relatively weak sense of duty. The feeling that one has a moral obligation to vote is the most powerful motivation to go to the polls. We conclude that the rational choice model is useful, but only in explaining behaviour at the margins of this important norm.     

Budget-maximizing governmental agencies: An empirical test

Niskanen's theory of government budgeting, involving powerful agencies interested in maximizing their budgets through bargaining with a weak, poorly informed governmental ‘Sponsor’, has received wide recognition. This paper presents the first direct empirical tests of Niskanen's ideas. One implication of Niskanen's model of budgeting is that the demand for public services will appear to be elastic. Niskanen's model also implies restrictions on the elasticity of the derived demand for labor in the public sector. Neither set of predictions is supported by existing empirical research on government activity.     

Common pool size and project size: an empirical test on expenditures using Danish municipal mergers

The paper examines the proposition from the law of 1 over n (Weingast et al. 1981) that project size tends to increase with common pool size. Comparable studies have tended, firstly, to focus on assets and debt rather than on expenditures and, secondly, on district population rather than on the number of districts as in the original formulation of the law. Both issues are sought to be remedied in this paper. The proposition is examined on Danish municipal expenditures from 1996 to 2006, using municipal mergers towards the end of this period as a quasi-experiment. A difference-in-difference identification strategy and a subsample strategy are used to identify the effect of the availability and size of a common pool on municipal expenditures. The paper finds positive, statistically and economically significant effects of the availability and size of a common pool in the final year of the treatment period. The importance of the number of districts over district population suggests a reappraisal of the law of 1 over n as originally formulated.     

Explaining politics: An empirical test of competing value measures

Abstract.  Values have long played a major role both in the analysis of political culture and as an explanatory concept relating to human attitudes and action: in fact, their scientific significance depends crucially on their explanatory function. After more than three decades of debate about the rise of postmaterialism and Inglehart's particular value measure, this rationale appears at times to be lost. This article examines the crucial issue of value's potential to explain political phenomena. How much can the postmaterialism-materialism instrument explain? Are there alternative operationalisations of values that have greater utility? The empirical analysis, based upon a representative survey conducted in Germany in 1992, leads to the surprisingly unambiguous result that among different value measures, Inglehart's variant explains the least.     

A dynamic test of the marginality hypothesis

The marginality hypothesis is an attempt to relate the voting margins of members of Congress to their subsequent legislative behavior. A major corollary of the hypothesis is that members of Congress with small victory margins will be more responsive to constituents than those with large victory margins. This has been assumed to mean that electorally secure representatives can afford to be more loyal to their congressional parties, since they have less cause to worry about their chances for reelection. Previous empirical studies have produced mixed results. We ask the question in a different way: Do changes in marginality affect party voting within Congress? If so, major shifts in the electorate potentially can have a fundamental impact on the behavior of Congress itself. We find that this is not true. Electoral margin is simply not related to party loyalty.     

The political economy of food pricing: An extended empirical test of the interest group approach

Several recent studies have documented the magnitude and impact of distortions in food pricing. However, little attention has been paid to the nature of the political agendas that determine the levels of direct and indirect protection granted to producers and consumers. This paper offers evidence that, regardless of the degree of economic development, the level of political pressure wielded by interest groups in food markets, and hence the level of protection they receive, is an inverse function of the relative size of their constituencies. The results recommend the application of collective action concepts to the understanding of agricultural policies in countries which are at different stages of development.     

Determinants of publication productivity: an empirical analysis

Academic performance is typically measured as some combination of teaching, publishing, and professional service. This paper focuses on the publication aspect of academic output, estimating the determinants of publication productivity using data for Robert D. Tollison (RDT). Robert Tollison published 433 articles and books, and collaborated with 524 coauthors while at a dozen institutions over thirty-eight years. Our findings indicate that RDT’s output is significantly correlated with several factors, including co-authorship, the diversification of his research portfolio, business cycles, and academic pay. To a lesser extent, his production pattern is influenced by non-work interests and specific institutional affiliations.     

Median voters,political systems and public policies: An empirical test

This paper tests the median voter hypothesis that variations in policies across political systems are caused by variations in median voter preferences. The context of the empirical analysis is the tax policies of three groups of sub-national governments in England in three time periods. The results of a median voter model of tax policy variation are compared to the results of a mean voter model in different party systems and different electoral systems. The evidence provides little support for the median voter hypothesis.     

Incorporating groups into rational choice explanations of turnout: An empirical test

This study examines the problem of voter turnout from a rational choice perspective. It reviews the “paradox of voting” and finds one model, which incorporates the role of intermediary social groups and leaders, to be a promising solution. It tests the hypothesis that leader mobilization increases voter turnout, using an ecological analysis of turnout in five Montreal ethnic communities during three recent elections: the 1993 Canadian federal, the 1994 Quebec provincial, and the 1994 Montreal municipal elections. Data on mobilization are taken from semi-directed interviews with association leaders in each community. The results compare predicted and actual rankings of turnout for each community and election. The overall results are weak, indicating that the model does a poor job of predicting voter turnout.     

Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 98 countries. Our results show that there is no robust relationship between corruption and the size of the shadow economy when perceptions-based indices of corruption are used. Employing an index of corruption based on a structural model, however, corruption and the shadow economy are complements in countries with low income, but not in high income countries.     

Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an empirical analysis

This paper presents econometric evidence on the relationship between campaign spending and office seeking motivations. Our results, using Spanish data, show that campaign spending per capita increases with the stakes for the winner, measured by the appointment power of the office. Moreover we find that campaign spending per capita increases with the level of self-government of the region. Our results concord with those reported for other countries with very different systems of campaign funding.     

Burden sharing in the NATO alliance: An empirical test of alternative views

This paper undertakes an empirical test of two opposing views of interdependencies among members of military alliances. The first view, associated with Olson and Zeckhauser, argues that the public good aspect of defense induces free riding behavior by smaller alliance members, which imposes a disproportionate burden of supporting the alliance on the larger members. A second view argues that NATO defense activities produce a mix of outputs, some of which are not purely public, and some of which may be complementary across nations. Furthermore, the nature of the weapons systems and their relative use by alliance members may induce substantial cooperation by allies. The test proposed here analyzes the relationship between defense spending shares of NATO members and their population and relative wealth shares. A simple model is specified and tested using pooled time series cross sectional data. The empirical results indicate more support for the cooperative view of ally relationships than the Olson-Zeckhauser non-cooperative model.