Appendix

Abstract

An unresolved controversy exists in development literature over the nature and function of the informal sector in urban areas of the Third World. The controversy revolves around the presumed relationship between the modern system of industrial production (often termed the “formal sector”) and that part of the urban economy operating outside it (the “informal sector”). The earlier view that the informal sector is a source of employment which can be realized if the linkages between the two sectors are improved through policies designed to regularize the informal sector, has been shown to be non-generalizable and even inaccurate. Increasingly, researchers have come to the conclusion that the modern industrial sector in the Third World is parasitic and detrimental to the development of the remainder of the urban economy. Their research implicitly or explicitly points out that a net transfer of value from the informal sector to the formal sector is occurring. The transfer is in the form of undervalued labor drawn from the informal sector, undervalued goods and services produced in the informal sector which are directly or indirectly consumed in the formal sector, and a transfer of the welfare burden to the informal sector. In the process, that segment of the population in a Third World city that earns a living primarily in the informal sector is moving toward a situation of increasing immiseration.     

Appendix: Lim Li-suat

Abstract

In his “Comments on Cham Population Figures,” Michael Vickery criticizes my 1988 article “Orphans of Genocide: The Cham Muslims of Kampuchea under Pol Pot.” “Kiernan has tinkered with the statistics in a tendentious manner in an attempt to prove the case for genocide,” he claims. Vickery accuses me of making “propaganda” and using “doctored evidence” to support it, of failing to make “honest use” of data, and of “fiddling with statistics to prove a particular political case, which cannot be made.”     

Appendix A: The DPRK's Debts

The global value chain concept has become one of the most influential frameworks used in the study of globalization. The paradigm, however, is deficient in explicating the exploitative nature of global value chain governance. Based on a study of soccer ball production in China and Pakistan, this article analyzes global production from three perspectives: the role of the state in shaping the host countries' mode of production and legal framework, the issue of how surplus value is created and distributed, and the use of child labor or prison labor to remain competitive in the chain. The article shows, in the case of Pakistan, how a country using a lower-labor-costs strategy to retain a place in a global value chain allows its workers to be exploited and pauperizes its people.     

Appendix B: Koreans in Japan and the DPRK

Abstract

It is not often that an entire group of people change their minds on a foreign policy issue, at least within a short space of time. On Kampuchea, this did occur around 1978, when most of those who had previously sympathized with the Khmer Rouge declared their disillusionment. It meant admitting that there was much truth to the militant anti-communists' well-publicized case against the Khmer Rouge, who were indeed one of history's most brutal regimes. In the same period, however, as Michael Vickery has shown in “Democratic Kampuchea—CIA to the Rescue,” many of the same anti-communists suddenly dropped their opposition to the Khmer Rouge, whom they now saw as a useful opponent of Vietnamese communism.