Narendra Modi’s Pakistan Policy: A Case of Old Wine in Old Bottles

This article examines India’s policy towards Pakistan since Narendra Modi became prime minister. At certain times, India has engaged in talks with Pakistan on various bilateral issues. At other times, it has adopted a hardline approach and canceled talks, stating that Pakistan had not demonstrated any sincerity in wanting to end cross-border terrorism against India. Modi’s critics have described his ‘on–off’ talks policy on Pakistan as flawed, confused and visionless. Is Modi’s Pakistan policy riddled with inconsistencies? Why has he not displayed the same pragmatism that is evident in his other diplomatic engagements when it comes to Pakistan? What explains his hardline approach? This paper argues that reconciliation with Pakistan remains a challenge due to persistent issues that adversely affect ties, namely the Pakistan army’s influence over the country’s foreign policy and meager bilateral economic ties. Expectations of a breakthrough in relations under the circumstances appear bleak. From the perspective of the Modi administration, adopting a cautious approach and maintaining a tough line, i.e. calibrating talks with action on cross-border terrorism by Islamabad, appears to be the more pragmatic option in the short term.     

DON'T MENTION THE (AFGHAN) WAR: BRITAIN'S CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN

The article is based on Professor Lieven's recent book, Pakistan: a hard case. He starts by contrasting British and American attitudes, emphasising that Pakistan is far more important to Britain than Afghanistan as a result of the sheer size of the diaspora. And British officials and soldiers spent decades dealing with the North-West Frontier. They would not have been surprised by the shifting loyalties of the tribes, which are simply a fact of life. But the basic point of the book is to explain how the Pakistani system works. Pakistan is a troubled, but not a failing state. It is tougher than we think. But the very reasons for its toughness inhibit change. The military are over-powerful and the tax system is grossly inadequate. Cooperation over the terrorist threat to the West is good, but Afghanistan is another story. Pakistan is making its calculation on the basis of a western withdrawal, which would be welcomed by the average Pakistani. At some point the West will need to cut a deal with the Taliban and only Pakistan can get them to the table.     

Civil-military relations in Pakistan: a case study of Sino-Pakistani relations and the port of Gwadar

This article analyses how the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan have ensured policy continuity towards China. By looking at the development of the port of Gwadar, which represents the flagship project of Sino-Pakistani cooperation during the last 15 years, this article contends that the continuity in Pakistan’s policies towards China in the post 9/11 period is explained by a broad-based consensus among the Pakistani elites, in which, however, the military plays a dominant role. Civilian control over the military is a concept that was never fully absorbed in Pakistan and, as the analysis ascertains, most of the policies introduced by General Pervez Musharraf have been adopted by the subsequent civilian regimes under indirect control from the military establishment. The ultimate aim of the Pakistani leadership, civilian and military alike, has therefore been to provide a safe ground for the Chinese investments in the country because of the key role that China plays in Pakistan’s strategic posture. Organised around semi-structured interviews conducted in Pakistan in early 2015, the article is grounded in the relevant literature on civil-military relations and assesses the level of civilian control in three key decision-making areas pertaining to the port of Gwadar: economic policy, internal security and foreign policy.     

Understanding the insurgency in Balochistan

The management and incorporation of ethnic identities in Pakistan has historically been far more problematic in Balochistan than other provinces and regions. With the killing in 2006 of Akbar Bugti, a leading political figure who was the head of the Bugti tribe and served as federal minister, chief minister and Governor of Balochistan, the province became politically polarised and has descended into a new cycle of bombings, abductions and murders. The rebellion has resulted in a major security operation pitting the security forces against the Baloch people, attacks against Punjabi settlers and sectarian violence against Hazara Shias that collectively threaten to derail major development projects and increase instability in Pakistan as a whole at a critical juncture. This article examines the insurgency in Balochistan and evaluates various perspectives that have been used to explain the present crisis: external intervention, resistance to social change, resource driven conflict theory, transnationalism and diaspora, and failure to manage difference. After examining the evidence it concludes by arguing that the primary cause for the insurgency in Pakistan is due to poor management of difference.     

ASIAN WAR MACHINES

ABSTRACT

The South Asian security landscape is increasingly dominated by a complex four-way dynamic between India, Pakistan, China, and the United States. The stresses and strains of the relationships between these states directly affect the prospects for peace and prosperity for almost half of humanity. This article describes some of the military contours of this landscape, with a focus on strategic postures, weapon acquisitions, and the role of nuclear weapons. It maps the India–Pakistan arms race over the past decade, the economic constraints on the two states, the role of China and the United States as weapons suppliers, and the risk and consequences for nuclear war. The authors then look at India's relationship with China, which is marked by both cooperation and competition, and the rise of China as a close military, political, and economic ally of Pakistan. While the United States has had long-standing cooperative relationships with both India and Pakistan, these relationships have been undergoing major shifts over the last two decades. U.S. concerns about China's increasing military and economic power have also intensified over this period as well. Of particular significance has been the effort to create a U.S.–India strategic partnership to balance and contain a rising China, which may become a central feature of the emerging global order. This article also offers a brief overview of what is publicly known about the nuclear arsenals of the four countries, ongoing production of weapons-usable fissile materials in Pakistan and India, as well as the race to build longer-range missiles.     

Elections and democratic transition in Pakistan: one step forward and two steps backwards

Expectations in Pakistan rose, when for the first time, in its history a political government in 2013 completed its full term of office and was replaced not by the military but by another political government after being defeated at the ballot box. It raises questions about what kind of democratic space is developing and what type of hybrid regime is emergent. The paper reflects upon the concept of hybrid regime and draws out key variables: turnover, tutelage and neo-patrimonialism and then considers how to categorise development in Pakistan. It concludes that Pakistan is in a ‘gray zone’ and that during the period there was evidence of it moving towards becoming an illiberal hybrid regime but the military went on the offensive and the democratic space contracted returning to being an illiberal tutelary hybrid regime. Unless tutelage and neo-patrimonialism are not challenged Pakistan will not progress in the democratic transition and remain a hybrid regime.     

Pakistan: Crisis of a Frontline State

For more than 50 years, Pakistan has functioned as imperialism's “frontline state.” The military has remained the country's dominant political player and the basic precepts of bourgeois democracy remain conspicuous by their absence. Since the military coup in October 1999, the configuration of power in Pakistan has become subject to serious internal contradictions, in large part because of the “war on terror” and the loss of public prestige of the military. These contradictions have intensified in the wake of a lawyer-led street movement sparked by the military top brass' dismissal of the country's chief justice in March 2007. Since then the country's most well-known politician, Benazir Bhutto, has been assassinated and her Pakistan People's Party has swept to power in general elections held in February 2008. However, the crisis of the frontline state has not ebbed, and the oligarchic system of power remains subject to rupture.     

Coming Together over Trade? A Study of the Resumed Dialogue between India and Pakistan

India and Pakistan were born into conflict in 1947 and their relationship has been among the world’s enduring rivalries ever since. In this historical context, the modest signs of progress since the resumed dialogue in February 2011 are of significance. How can these improved prospects for a more peaceful relation between Pakistan and India be explained? Departing from Liberal peace theory, this study develops an explanatory framework and investigates the impact of trade on dyadic peace processes. The empirical findings indicate that trade expectations indeed could have facilitated for a resumed dialogue between India and Pakistan. Future research may be able to attain more robust results through further specifications of the explanatory framework and additional empirical analysis.     

跨境民族因素对阿巴边境地区毒品问题的影响

随着1979年苏联入侵阿富汗和阿富汗抗苏战争的开展,阿富汗和巴基斯坦边境地区的罂粟种植面积迅速扩大,毒品产量迅速增加,成为世界毒品市场的重要来源地。阿巴边境地区的普什图人和俾路支人等跨境民族在"金新月"地带的罂粟种植和毒品生产中扮演着重要的角色。20世纪80年代后,阿富汗生产的鸦片主要来源于阿巴边境的普什图人村庄,巴基斯坦的罂粟种植也主要集中在以普什图人为主的西北边境省和联邦直辖部落地区。多年以来,尽管阿富汗和巴基斯坦政府在阿巴边境地区不断采取禁毒措施,发展替代种植,但是均未能清除该地区的罂粟种植和毒品生产。阿巴边境的普什图人、俾路支人等民族长期种植罂粟并参与毒品走私的原因包括历史、政治和经济等因素。从历史上看,阿巴边境的普什图人有种植罂粟的传统,出售鸦片是他们重要的经济来源之一。从政治上看,阿富汗和巴基斯坦两国政府不能对边境地区进行有效的管理和控制,从而为边境地区的普什图人和俾路支人种植罂粟和从事毒品走私提供了条件。此外,一些政党为了拉选票而支持当地人们种植罂粟也是重要的政治原因。从经济上看,种植罂粟的收入要高于种植小麦的收入,贩卖毒品的利润较高是吸引阿巴边境的普什图人、俾路支人等民族种植罂粟和从事毒品走私的重要原因。     

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO PAKISTANI AND IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A STUDY IN PARADOX

This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The paper posits that number of factors explain such differences; first, and at the theoretical level, Pakistan was never considered an “irrational” and “messianic” state like Iran, but regarded as a country with a certain degree of cold-war type nuclear rationality. Second and at the applied level, while Pakistan was a US ally with not having a history of challenging the United States, Iran has been considered enemy and a threat toward the US interest.

Third, while Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was viewed as a defensive mean against overwhelming strength of India, Iran's possible nuclear arsenal considered to be for offensive uses against the United States and Israel. The fourth factor pertains to the consequences of proliferation, which is what happens when Iran's neighboring countries may feel threatened by Iranian nuclear weapon and proceed to develop their own arsenal. Fifth factor deals with the possible Iran's temptation to give some nuclear material to a terror group in which made the United States serious in preventing Iran's weaponization. Last but not least, Israel was not involved to pressure and agitate against Pakistan, while it was applied a tremendous pressure against Iran to prevent it from achieving nuclear weapons.     

Conflict between social structure and legal framework: political corruption in Pakistan

There is a growing body of literature on the conflict between social environment and legal system. This article seeks to unravel the contradiction between Pakistan's anti-corruption laws and its social world. The study of this uncharted territory becomes even more urgent when the consequences of corruption are taken into account in the broader context of Pakistan's internal cohesion, democratic development and sustainable growth. Despite the fact that Pakistan inherited a British legal framework based on the division between public and private spheres, the article argues that a greater part of Pakistani society does not recognise such division. The split between public and private realms which provides a conceptual framework for any definition of political corruption seems culturally deficient. In particular, the paper attempts to demonstrate that ethnic loyalties by taking precedence over the public interest give rise to the ‘moral view of corruption', which explains why many people do not view the use of public office for ethnic gain to be an act of corruption. In these particular circumstances, the paper finds an underlying conflict in the treatment of corruption between the social and legal systems. The disparity between the legal system and social world has given rise to grave concern on the part of civil society.     

The Iraq treaty, 1930

India's relations with the Gulf countries started to flourish in the 1990s after India succeeded in de-hyphenating Pakistan from its policy toward the Gulf. Though Pakistan remained a factor as it continued to raise Kashmir and internal situation in India at multilateral forums such as OIC to evoke anti-India sentiments, it did not remain an underlying factor in as was the case during the Cold War era. In the contemporary dynamics, when India-Gulf relations are progressing toward strategic partnerships, Pakistan has re-emerged as a factor but its nature has changed. As highlighted in the joint statements issued during the Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visits to the Gulf countries since May 2014, India can now put pressure on Pakistan by highlighting its policy of sponsoring terrorism. This was evident when the Arab Gulf countries condemned the Pathankot (January 2016) and Uri (September 2016) terrorist attacks. India's relations with the Arab Gulf and other Middle Eastern countries are independent of their engagements with Pakistan and India-Pakistan tension, but New Delhi has stepped up efforts to raise the issue of cross-border terrorism and use of religion to incite terror activities against India during its engagements with these countries. It underlines the growing convergence between India and Arab Gulf countries over regional issues and the ability of India to isolate Pakistan over issues related to terrorism.     

A short journey through North‐Western Kansu and the Tibetan border country

Kashmir, at present, is not being treated as a priority by politicians or policy makers. The author argues that this is a grave mistake. The ground realities which have continued to blight the lives of millions in the region for decades have not been resolved. Not only do they demand resolution, but leave the region fragile and unstable, a danger exacerbated by the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan. The domestic narratives within India and Pakistan which lead to heightened hostility have been exacerbated by recent events such as the Mumbai Hotel attacks and cross-border skirmishes. A resolution of Kashmir would reverse these inherent tensions. The unresolved situation also undermines the human rights of the inhabitants of Kashmir. Likewise, it leads to an unconscionable waste of the natural resources of the region, as well as needless restrictions in Indo-Pakistani trade and money being tied up in military conflict. A resolution of the conflict would also have wide-scale benefits in the region, reaching to Afghanistan and China. In conclusion, the author surveys what might be practical ways of resolving the Kashmir problem.     

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,trade, and the roles of Iran,India and Pakistan

This article seeks to explore the implications of Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran. Not in terms of power-politics or as a counterbalance to the USA as this has been explored elsewhere, but what practical problems such an expanded organization could help solve, what opportunities it could realize, and how SCO's engagement in trade is a function of favourable political and bilateral developments in the region. It is argued here that the trade, infrastructure and energy sectors are of particular importance and that substantial potential gains could be realized if coordination is improved. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that China, Russia, Pakistan, India and Iran may have lower standards of democratic development and economic transparency than the West. What is the motivation behind the SCO's engagement with India, Pakistan and Iran? Should this engagement be conceived only in terms of balancing US unipolarity or are there legitimate concerns of increasing regional cooperation in Eurasia?     

THE CIA'S SECRET POWERS

The secret powers conferred by the National Security Act of 1947 have been used over the years to train, arms, and develop the terrorist enemies, such as al-Qaida, that are now the chief justification for those powers in the public mind. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, CIA programs have shifted power from moderate to Islamist Muslim groups, contributed to vastly increased heroin production in the area, and helped consolidate the ISI as Pakistan's drug-financed intelligence agency a “state within a state” that has promoted both al-Qaida and terrorism in other areas such as Kashmir. The secret powers, by preventing rational discussion, have spawned disastrous policy decisions that even the CIA itself has opposed, notably the decision to supply Stingers to the Afghan rebels. The most conspicuous deep political consequence of these policies in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been the indirect training and arming of cadres who eventually participated in the specific events of 9/11: the culmination of a series of terrorist attacks against the territorial United States for which the CIA itself had already, in 1998, secretly admitted partial responsibility. This responsibility is reflected in the present inability of the U.S. government and media to report honestly on what actually happened in the 9/11 attacks.     

PAKISTAN’S CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE AND THE RESURGENCE OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE SINCE AUGUST 2016

Fifteen years since joining the US-led anti-terrorism coalition, Pakistan’s response to the challenges of terroristic violence and extremist indoctrination and propaganda remain military-centric and kinetic. Since August 2016, after a brief lull, Pakistan has experienced a resurgence of terrorist activity and violence that has struck all of its provinces and placed its capital on high alert. The re-escalation in the level of terrorist violence began with the August 8, 2016, attacks in Quetta, which left over 70 dead and more than 100 injured. The lack of response from the provincial and federal governments to this carnage, led the Supreme Court of Pakistan to exercise its authority under Article 184(3) of the Constitution and establish an Inquiry Commission to examine the state of the investigation and report on the challenges faced in the struggle against terrorism and extremism. This inquiry assumed the form and substance of an audit of the performance of Pakistan’s institutions and exposed the link between the country’s crisis of governance and its incoherent response to terrorism and extremism at all levels of government. The implications of the inquiry report are both broad and deep, and reveal that Pakistan’s trajectory remains that of civilian administrative breakdown and institutional exhaustion. This indicates that Pakistan’s civilian-military balance continues to shift in structural terms in favour of the latter and that beneath a veneer of constitutional democracy, the arbitrary, unwise, and inefficient, exercise of power by the political class continues to hollow out the country’s administrative institutions.     

Islamic Shariah and Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan

The arbitrary, discriminatory and oppressive application of blasphemy laws in Pakistan has been the cause of much discord and violence in recent years, affecting the non-Muslim population particularly harshly. This article traces the history of such laws and argues that the courts have done little to mitigate the adverse effects of their use by successive governments. The article calls for urgent and concerted international pressure to ensure that the Pakistani authorities respect their obligations under relevant legal instruments.     

Building Trust: Cooperation between Rivals India and Pakistan

ABSTRACT

This article uses the case study of India–Pakistan to explore how rivals build cooperation over time. India and Pakistan have shared an intense rivalry since their independence and subsequent partition in 1947, having fought three major wars and several militarised disputes over the last 70 years. The authors use network analysis to study the pattern of all treaties between the two countries between 1947 and 2017. This expects rivals to focus on non-security issues such as trade as they work to build trust and patterns of cooperation. The article finds that given the long and intense rivalry between the two neighbours, and the subsequent lack of trust, India and Pakistan have adopted a functionalist approach towards building cooperation; most of their bilateral treaties are related to non-security issues such as trade, telecommunications, transport and technology. Only a few of their treaties are nested within prior treaties, indicating ad hoc rather than institutionalised cooperation. The authors also find that efforts by the two states to build cooperation has not spilt over into areas related to security, pointing to a continued lack of trust between the two states. The article notes the implications of this approach for the future of Indo-Pakistani ties as well as peace on the subcontinent.     

Ideas and ideals of modern Islam

With Partition and the rise of various different nationalisms there came the need to find a new name for what used to be called “British India”. A framework for co-operation between the new countries was also needed. Initially regionalism was fashionable. But the regional organisation, SAARC, embodied cooperation between all the nation-states of the region, a veritable lowest common denominator rather than an additional layer of an inclusive regional identity for all the citizenry. The increasing use of “Southasia” is based on a recognition that even though India looms large, the region contains other countries with sizeable populations in a global context. But flesh must be put on the bones of the concept. The key is sub-regional commercial cooperation between viable units. There are many opportunities for cross-border economic activity, but what is needed is a porous border like the India/Nepal border, not a militarised border like the India /Pakistan border. Connectivity and bilateral free trade agreements will bring results and the Indian state of Punjab and the Pakistani province of Punjab are perhaps best placed to give an example of cooperation.