Three difficult months in ‘Iraq

Though the build-up of China's blue-water fleet is causing consternation in foreign-policy circles, the country's on-going expansion into Russia and the former Soviet Union has scarcely garnered comment. For the past decade, China has used its foreign reserves to acquire strategic assets (principally infrastructure and natural resources) and tracts of sovereign territory along its existing borders and increasingly further afield. The impact on targeted countries (and, in turn, their own foreign policy) is extreme, with serious implications for security and economics far beyond their borders. This article provides an overview of China's acquisitions and investments in Eurasia, followed by more detailed discussion of recent developments and responses in Central Asia, Ukraine and Mongolia, and Siberia. It then looks at the impact of China's actions on Sino-Russian relations, discusses the importance of Russia and Central Asia as a resource corridor and buffer zone between Europe and China, and suggests how these manoeuvrings might result in long-term benefits for China.     

‘Saddam's Qadisiyyah’: Religion and History in the Service of State Ideology in Baʿthi Iraq

Rhetoric espoused by the Ba?thi regime of Iraq reflected a deliberate mix of nationalistic and religious elements, most clearly expressed in the discourse surrounding the war with Iran, termed ‘Saddam's Qadisiyyah’, after a battle during the Arab-Islamic conquests, which Saddam Husayn turned into a metaphor for Arab-Iranian relations. As the memory of the seventh century engagement was popularized in Iraq, Qadisiyyah nomenclature spread throughout the Arab world (and beyond) and Saddam's political paradigm found acceptance among Arab governments and western observers alike. Saddam used this propaganda campaign to three ends: (1) to portray the political conflict with Iran as an ancient ethnic clash; (2) to promote his cult of personality; and (3) to present a successful precedent for Arab victory over Iran. In doing so, Saddam forged a new ‘Arab-Islamist’ discourse, combining religious faith with nationalist sentiment, which he embraced with increasing reliance to the end of his rule. Today, radical Sunni Islamist groups have assumed the mantle of this rhetoric.     

The ‘formal’ Marjaʿ: Shiʿi clerical authority and the state in post-2003 Iraq

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the name of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Grand Shi?i cleric, has come to prominence. Sistani emerged as a key player in the processes that constituted and sustained the post-2003 Iraqi political order, as manifested in key events such as the writing of constitution or the mobilization against the Islamic State (I.S.). Nevertheless, Sistani did not have an official position in Iraq. Unlike the Iranian experience after the 1979 revolution which institutionalized the leading position of faqih (jurist), the Iraqi constitution set Iraq as a democratic, parliamentary state whose religious leaders held no formal offices. Indeed, Sistani rejected the Iranian model as unfit for Iraq’s conditions and societal fabric. Thus, given the absence of a constitutional status for Sistani, how do we understand his authority in Iraq? This article argues that although Sistani’s authority has not been constitutionalized, it was indirectly and roughly ‘formalized’ through practices and laws adopted after 2003. This formalization established a unique and unprecedented relationship between the state and the Shi?i religious authority in the form of arrangements that, to a degree, blurred the lines between formality and informality and created a shared space of governance.     

Echoes from below? Talking democracy in Baʿthist Iraq

Drawing on Iraqi print media published during the late 1980s and 1990s, this study contributes to the historiography of Ba?thist Iraq by offering a fresh reading into open sources that have long been used by scholars. It focuses on issues like democratization, freedom and the rule of law and how they were articulated in Iraqi print media. This discourse functioned as a strategic tool of communication to reproduce and stabilize the existing order. By moving beyond mechanisms of bureaucratic control, repression or cooptation, the study highlights a neglected element of the former regime's techniques of governance. The evidence presented in this study suggests that the Iraqi Ba'thist regime aimed to demobilize a target audience it suspected of harbouring oppositional feelings and pro-democracy ideas that went beyond what Saddam Hussein was willing to consider. It did so by installing, simulating or tolerating spaces of contestation that helped to ease the ‘cognitive dissonance’ Iraqis sensed between an official discourse of a people united in love for its leader, and the daily experience of brutal repression and deteriorating living conditions.     

‘Iraq: A note

Gordon Harmon was born in China in 1900 and after the First World War served in the Salt Revenue Guards for a number of years. After the outbreak of WWII he was posted in a liaison role to the centre of Chinese government in Chungking. There he worked with Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist Intelligence Service. But he also had quite close links with Chou En-Lai, who was also in Chungking at that time. The extent of his more general relationship with the Communists is unclear, but he seems to have reported fairly extensively on their plans and intentions. Harmon has left a very detailed record of a conversation with Mao Tse-tung in 1946 which seems to suggest that he had met Mao a few times before.. It was Mao who apparently said to Harmon “I am not interested in Hongkong and I will certainly not allow it to become a bone of contention between your country and mine”     

Sectarian Relations in Arab Iraq: Contextualising the Civil War of 2006–2007

Discussions surrounding sectarian relations in Iraq have often been reduced to extremes of either overemphasising the Sunni-Shiʿa divide to a near Manichean level or, the other extreme, reducing them to the point of irrelevance in Iraqi history and society. This paper challenges both views and attempts an examination of the dynamics of Sunni-Shiʿa relations in Arab Iraq and how these interact with Iraqi nationalism. As will be shown, sectarian identity advances and recedes depending on wider circumstances, often at the expense, but not to the exclusion, of national identity.

The post-2003 period in general and the civil war of 2006–2007 in particular offer us a wealth of highly charged sectarian discourse in the form of songs, poems, speeches and publications. I have relied on a considerable sample of such forms of public discourse to analyse the rising salience of sectarian identity in the period under consideration in a broader attempt at analysing the dynamics of Sunni-Shi‘a relations in Arab Iraq generally. It will be seen that sectarian relations are dynamic and responsive and that civil wars are not necessarily the end of the process; rather, in some cases, sectarian civil wars are merely a violent stage which many mixed communities around the world — including Iraq perhaps — have unfortunately gone through.     

Post‐war Iraq: an assessment

Sir Terence Clark is a Council Member of the Society. He retired from the Diplomatic Service after a distinguished career spent mainly in the Middle East, where he was Ambassador to Iraq and Oman. He is the author of many articles in specialist journals and co‐author of Oman in Time (2001). On 18 June 2003, Sir Terence, together with Sir Harold Walker, Chairman of the Society, spoke to the Society about the situation in Iraq as it then appeared. The following is an edited and updated version of Sir Terence's talk.