‘Huna Baghdad’: competing visions in television programming in Monarchic Iraq1

ABSTRACT

This article examines the formative years of the first television station in the Middle East and the Arab World: Baghdad Television. The Hashemite Monarchy recognized television’s potential as an effective tool of reconciliation with an increasingly disenchanted population and a means for homogenization and knowledge production. However, the professionals responsible for maintaining television came from social and economic backgrounds that suffered under or did not benefit directly from the Hashemites and their stakeholders. This specialized cadre opposed the undemocratic features of the government as evidenced in the content they created, produced, directed, or performed on Baghdad Television. Television specialists had their own vision of what the future of Iraq should look like. Their expectations manifested in a sociocultural attunement process facilitated through television wherein aired content, explicitly or tacitly, contradicted government messages and highlighted deeply rooted economic, political, and social problems in Iraq. This article relies on archival research, statistical reports, interviews, memoirs, televised performances, news segments, radio broadcasts, and newspapers to trace the history of Baghdad Television during Monarchic Iraq.     

Three difficult months in ‘Iraq

Though the build-up of China's blue-water fleet is causing consternation in foreign-policy circles, the country's on-going expansion into Russia and the former Soviet Union has scarcely garnered comment. For the past decade, China has used its foreign reserves to acquire strategic assets (principally infrastructure and natural resources) and tracts of sovereign territory along its existing borders and increasingly further afield. The impact on targeted countries (and, in turn, their own foreign policy) is extreme, with serious implications for security and economics far beyond their borders. This article provides an overview of China's acquisitions and investments in Eurasia, followed by more detailed discussion of recent developments and responses in Central Asia, Ukraine and Mongolia, and Siberia. It then looks at the impact of China's actions on Sino-Russian relations, discusses the importance of Russia and Central Asia as a resource corridor and buffer zone between Europe and China, and suggests how these manoeuvrings might result in long-term benefits for China.     

‘Saddam's Qadisiyyah’: Religion and History in the Service of State Ideology in Baʿthi Iraq

Rhetoric espoused by the Ba?thi regime of Iraq reflected a deliberate mix of nationalistic and religious elements, most clearly expressed in the discourse surrounding the war with Iran, termed ‘Saddam's Qadisiyyah’, after a battle during the Arab-Islamic conquests, which Saddam Husayn turned into a metaphor for Arab-Iranian relations. As the memory of the seventh century engagement was popularized in Iraq, Qadisiyyah nomenclature spread throughout the Arab world (and beyond) and Saddam's political paradigm found acceptance among Arab governments and western observers alike. Saddam used this propaganda campaign to three ends: (1) to portray the political conflict with Iran as an ancient ethnic clash; (2) to promote his cult of personality; and (3) to present a successful precedent for Arab victory over Iran. In doing so, Saddam forged a new ‘Arab-Islamist’ discourse, combining religious faith with nationalist sentiment, which he embraced with increasing reliance to the end of his rule. Today, radical Sunni Islamist groups have assumed the mantle of this rhetoric.     

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Iran–Iraq war: an unconventional military’s survival

Abstract

As Iraqi forces invaded the Iranian border shortly after the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) participated in the battle along with the debilitated Iranian Army. The IRGC was a young religious-revolutionary institution that lacked the resources that revolutionary armies and militias conventionally rely on. Nevertheless, it survived the battle pressure and even achieved relative military successes in the second year of the war. By examining personal narratives written by Iranian veterans, this article argues that in the void of conventional resources in the first year of the war, the Guards retrieved elements of their Shia background to recognize a religiously inspired charisma in every combatant who would devotedly step up for martyrdom. This shared understanding of the omnipotent charisma was then acknowledged in action—by commanders’ deployment of it to impose order and through frequently held Shia rituals on the battlefield. It thereby created an alternative source of cohesion and motivation that led to the IRGC’s survival and prepared them for further successful steps by the end of the war’s first year.     

Challenging the anocracy model: Iran’s foreign policy in Iraq as an obstacle to democracy?

ABSTRACT

Since America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the consequent partial collapse of the state Iraq has been undergoing a process of deterioration and disintegration mainly because America’s vision of establishing a new, more democratic political order there encountered a lack of readiness to understand what the structure of a democratic state should be. The political process that Iraq has been going through – that is the transition from autocratic dictatorship to adopting a kind of democratic system is called anocracy, which means a political system that is neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic.

Furthermore, the Iranian intervention into Iraqi politics that took place after 2003 has led to the creation of a virtually imperial model of regional power (Iran’s) that has turned Iraq into a kind of informal protectorate in ethnic and religious issues. This article wishes to offer a better understanding of the anocratic political shift that Iraq has been going through by adding the component of Iran’s influence and foreign policy upon it as an ambivalent factor that is both accelerating yet also preventing the process of democratization from properly establishing itself in Iraq.     

The ‘formal’ Marjaʿ: Shiʿi clerical authority and the state in post-2003 Iraq

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the name of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the Grand Shi?i cleric, has come to prominence. Sistani emerged as a key player in the processes that constituted and sustained the post-2003 Iraqi political order, as manifested in key events such as the writing of constitution or the mobilization against the Islamic State (I.S.). Nevertheless, Sistani did not have an official position in Iraq. Unlike the Iranian experience after the 1979 revolution which institutionalized the leading position of faqih (jurist), the Iraqi constitution set Iraq as a democratic, parliamentary state whose religious leaders held no formal offices. Indeed, Sistani rejected the Iranian model as unfit for Iraq’s conditions and societal fabric. Thus, given the absence of a constitutional status for Sistani, how do we understand his authority in Iraq? This article argues that although Sistani’s authority has not been constitutionalized, it was indirectly and roughly ‘formalized’ through practices and laws adopted after 2003. This formalization established a unique and unprecedented relationship between the state and the Shi?i religious authority in the form of arrangements that, to a degree, blurred the lines between formality and informality and created a shared space of governance.     

Echoes from below? Talking democracy in Baʿthist Iraq

Drawing on Iraqi print media published during the late 1980s and 1990s, this study contributes to the historiography of Ba?thist Iraq by offering a fresh reading into open sources that have long been used by scholars. It focuses on issues like democratization, freedom and the rule of law and how they were articulated in Iraqi print media. This discourse functioned as a strategic tool of communication to reproduce and stabilize the existing order. By moving beyond mechanisms of bureaucratic control, repression or cooptation, the study highlights a neglected element of the former regime's techniques of governance. The evidence presented in this study suggests that the Iraqi Ba'thist regime aimed to demobilize a target audience it suspected of harbouring oppositional feelings and pro-democracy ideas that went beyond what Saddam Hussein was willing to consider. It did so by installing, simulating or tolerating spaces of contestation that helped to ease the ‘cognitive dissonance’ Iraqis sensed between an official discourse of a people united in love for its leader, and the daily experience of brutal repression and deteriorating living conditions.     

‘Iraq: A note

Gordon Harmon was born in China in 1900 and after the First World War served in the Salt Revenue Guards for a number of years. After the outbreak of WWII he was posted in a liaison role to the centre of Chinese government in Chungking. There he worked with Chiang Kai Shek's Nationalist Intelligence Service. But he also had quite close links with Chou En-Lai, who was also in Chungking at that time. The extent of his more general relationship with the Communists is unclear, but he seems to have reported fairly extensively on their plans and intentions. Harmon has left a very detailed record of a conversation with Mao Tse-tung in 1946 which seems to suggest that he had met Mao a few times before.. It was Mao who apparently said to Harmon “I am not interested in Hongkong and I will certainly not allow it to become a bone of contention between your country and mine”