"9·30事件"与约翰逊政府的印尼政策

1965年“9·30事件”前后,约翰逊政府通过培植与以陆军为首的印尼军人集团以及军人政权的特殊关系力图影响乃至操纵印尼的国内政治和对外政策走向,从而深刻地介入印尼的内部事务。对印尼陆军的政策构成了美国印尼政策的一个重要组成部分。     

Australian Reporting of the Indonesian Killings of 1965–66: The Media as the “First Rough Draft of History”

This article examines Australian press coverage of the Indonesian killings of 1965–66, and considers its legacy for the historical consciousness of events in Indonesia. The Indonesian killings of 1965–66 occurred on Australia's doorstep, at a time when the Cold War dominated the front pages of Australian newspapers. By examining articles from one of Australia's leading newspapers, The Sydney Morning Herald, we show that press coverage of the killings was both limited and distorted. Comments made by correspondents reporting from Indonesia at the time suggest reasons why this was the case. In the rush to write a “first rough draft of history”, the killings in Indonesia were treated as background to the story of leadership change in Jakarta and the defeat of Communism.     

The Department of External Affairs, the ABC & Reporting of the Indonesian Crisis 1965–1969

The Department of External Affairs took a keen interest in the manner in which Radio Australia reported events in Indonesia throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Radio Australia's high signal strength gave it a massive listening audience in the region. The attempted coup in Indonesia of 1965, its immediate aftermath, and the protracted power struggle that followed, triggered a period of cooperation and conflict between the Department and the Australian Broadcasting Commission over Radio Australia's reporting of events in Indonesia. During this time the Department received and acted upon advice from the Australian ambassador to Indonesia, Keith Shann, and, via Shann, received advice from the Indonesian Army on how it wanted the situation in Indonesia reported. This period is characterised by the Department's efforts to take over Radio Australia, and by cooperation between major western powers to coordinate information policy towards Indonesia. The Department also attempted to influence reporting of events in Indonesia by the Australian press and succeeded in convincing newspaper editors to report and editorialise in a manner sensitive to the Department's concerns.     

J.B. Chifley and the Indonesian Revolution, 1945–1949

This article traces the role of the Prime Minister, Joseph Benedict Chifley, in Australia's response to the Dutch‐Indonesian colonial conflict. It argues for Chifley's centrality to the formation of Australia's eventual policy to support Indonesian nationalist aspirations, a policy often in antithesis to the views of H.V. Evatt. This is significant because a focus on Evatt has distracted historians from ascertaining the causes of Australia's policy. Examining Chifley's attitude and role reveals that Australia's response to revolutionary Indonesia stemmed from an application to the Southeast Asian colonial question of a labourist and post‐war reconstructionist ethos, an idea of sweeping reform to rectify deep economic and social grievances.     

Challenging the Criteria of Significance: Lessons from Contemporary Indonesian Labour History

Non-governmental organisations' (NGOs) dominance of the Indonesian labour movement has been undermined by changes in the regulation of labour since the fall of Suharto. This article examines the effects of these changes on the form and discourse of labour representation in contemporary Indonesia. It is argued that while NGOs' renewed acceptance of unionism as the primary form of labour organisation demonstrates the strength of the 'trade union' as a criterion of significance, their (partial) execution of 'trade union functions' during the late New Order period demands that we re-examine the ways in which we perceive and measure organised labour activism.     

The relationship between Kenneth Koma and the Botswana Democratic Party, 1965-2003

This article assesses the weaknesses of opposition in Botswanathrough the case of Kenneth Koma, the influential Presidentof the Botswana National Front (BNF) from 1977 to 2001. Thisis done by examining the perception that from 1997 Koma's relationshipwith the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) destabilizedand weakened the opposition in the country. The article challengesa view, held by some of his detractors in the opposition, thathis leadership style was out of tune with global trends. Italso argues that what some people have viewed as ‘tribalism’— the domination of the BDP leadership by members of theBangwato tribe (of which Koma is also a member) — seemsto be primarily a matter of expediency. This alleged tribalismis used by Koma's critics as a smear. The article analyzes therelationship between Koma and the BDP at both political andpersonal levels. At the political level, Koma's failure to keepthe BNF united has been capitalized on by the BDP to tightenits grip on power. At the personal level, Koma has used hisconnections in the BDP to advantage in his business dealings.Koma's cult status and his personal and political choices havetherefore significantly contributed to de facto one-party rulein Botswana.     

Secret Intelligence And Escape Clauses: Australia and the Indonesian Annexation of East Timor, 1963-76

In September 2000 the Australian government declassified thousands of pages of documents concerning the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. Some 68,000 pages of documents were released. About 2,600 pages of diplomatic documents were withheld, along with Cabinet papers, intelligence materials, and Defence Department records. The documents cover only the period from early 1974 to mid-1976 and do not document the Indonesian war and its human costs. What they do document is the process whereby Australia acquiesced in the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Above all, they show that secret briefings by the Indonesians kept the Australian government closely informed of Indonesian intentions and operations at every step. In the light of these secret briefings and related documents, it is clear that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's claim that he wanted to see a “genuine act of self-determination” by the East Timorese is and always was hollow. This was a fig leaf covering his desire to see East Timor incorporated into Indonesia as West Papua had been in the 1960s. Its patina of moral responsibility and legal respectability were his alibi or, as Richard Woolcott put it in late 1974, “escape clause,” if and when Indonesian actions led to accusations of Australian complicity with Jakarta. Mr. Whitlam was complicit. The record is clear.