Russian Archival Sources for the Study of the Iranian Communist Party: The Pre-Tudeh Years, 1917-1942

In recent decades, the field of history of Communism in Iran has been enriched by a number of studies that deal with different aspects of the subject. Still some core aspects, such as the role of the Comintern in the Iranian Communist movement, remain largely understudied. This could be partly explained by the inaccessibility of archival documents during the Soviet era. Yet, despite the opening of many former Soviet archives after 1991, access to certain archives still presents great difficulties. In the framework of a research conducted in Russian archives, an inventory has been located in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii / RGASPI) in Moscow. The inventory originates from the Comintern’s archive and consists of a large number of files and documents in various languages (primarily Russian, but also Persian and Azerbaijani) relevant to Communist activities in Iran. Given the importance of this inventory to the study of Communism in Iran, Iran-USSR relations and the extent of Soviet involvement in Iran in the late Qajar and early Pahlavi periods, we decided to translate and annotate it and to provide an introductory discussion of the highlights of Communist activity in Iran between the years 1917 and 1942.     

The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia

The Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) was set up by the regional members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, in July 1964 to strengthen their socio-economic development. However, a number of financial, political and administrative difficulties made progress under RCD slow. Despite assurances to the contrary, the probable impetus behind the formation of RCD was the unease with the politico-military aspects of CENTO. However, RCD's political significance grew steadily, and that of CENTO declined correspondingly. Nevertheless, recognizing that RCD could not provide an effective military substitute, Iran and Turkey still attached value to CENTO. After twelve unsatisfactory years, the three regional Heads of State held a summit in Izmir on 22 April 1976, making amendments to the 1964 declaration. The Treaty of Izmir was signed in 1977 as the legal framework for RCD. Yet, RCD was unsuccessful. In January 1985, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan established a new organisation called the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO).     

Art History, ‘National Art’ and Iranian Intellectuals in the 1960s

The 1960s were undoubtedly the most culturally productive period in the contemporary history of Iran. During these years, artistic trends as well as art historical practices attempted to present the idea of national art, while the intellectual atmosphere was charged with the conflicting ideologies of the Cold War. The Pahlavi state's cultural policies, based on its pro-Western and at the same time nationalist visions, were in contrast with most intellectuals' attitudes towards art, which mainly followed leftist ideologies. Within such an ideologically charged space, the idea of combining Euro-American modernism and traditional views formed the dominant discourse of modern Iranian art. This article maps the interconnections among artists, art historians and cultural custodians in 1960s Iran, and explores the ways in which nationalist, nativist, modernist and communist-Marxist ideologies influenced the artistic trends as well as art historical narratives. After focusing on the ways art history was introduced through Orientalist viewpoints in Iran, the article will shed light on the role of visual artists within the intellectual community of the 1960s. The idea of ‘national art’, epitomised in the movements of Saqqa khanih and Talar-i Iran, will then be analysed. Finally, the article will evaluate these artistic activities within their ideological framework.     

The campaign against the Anglo‐Iranian agreement of 1919

The Anglo‐Iranian agreement of 1919 was a major turning point both in the modern history of Iran and in her relations with Britain. It was the brainchild of Lord Curzon and the Foreign Office in which the other British government departments eventually acquiesced with reluctance, although the government of India retained its opposition to it. It failed because of the fears it created for the loss of Iran's independence, mainly as a result of the secrecy with which it had been negotiated, and the rigidity with which it was upheld. A vigorous campaign was conducted against it by Iranians as well as the United States, France and Russia. Yet it might not have failed had India, the India office, the Treasury and the War Office provided the requisite instruments for its success. Its failure resulted in the 1921 coup, the rise of Reza Khan and the Pahlavi state, and a new chapter in Anglo‐Iranian relations.     

Decolonization in Reverse: The Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–53

The decolonization process in the 1940s and 1950s in Middle Eastern states under Great Britain's informal influence did not aim at recognizing the same type of independence of these states as that enjoyed by Britain and the United States. In the 1940s Washington laid the groundwork for its leading role in Iran during and following the Iranian oil crisis, whilst London with the assistance of the Americans in part reasserted British influence after the crisis. The United States achieved a paramount position in Iran with the assistance of its oil companies and through cooperation with Great Britain, and at the expense of the latter and the Soviet Union.     

Iran‐western Europe relations on the Mend

The Islamic Republic of Iran and Western Europe have had an uneasy political but economically productive relationship for two decades. During this period Iran and France, and Iran and Britain, have broken relations, and then restored them. Also, the West European countries (European Union, EU) have twice collectively briefly recalled their ambassadors from Iran over its alleged involvement in terrorism in Europe. Economically and commercially, however, the EU and Iran have enjoyed a much better relationship. For example, trade between Iran and the EU reached $29 billion in 1996, including the most controversial oil agreement between France and Iran. The agreement was signed despite a strong objection from the US. Also, the skeleton of the Rushdie affair, which had haunted the two sides for so long, was finally put to rest when President Khatami declared that the affair was ‘completely finished’.     

Discordant Allies: Trans-Tasman Relations in the Aftermath of the ANZUS Treaty, 1951–1955

Contrary to popular belief, the conclusion of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty did little to encourage an immediate closer political relationship between Australia and New Zealand. The Tasman powers disagreed on major strategic issues and cooperation was minimal (and in some cases entirely absent). Focusing on the development of trans-Tasman relations between 1951 and 1955, this article examines Australian and New Zealand views pertaining to the scope and implementation of the ANZUS Treaty, proposals for the Five Power Staff Agency in Southeast Asia, the “United Action” proposal during the 1954 Indochina Crisis and the “Operation Oracle” project during the 1954–1955 Quemoy–Matsu Crisis. This article advances the conclusion that Australia and New Zealand mainly disagreed on these issues due to competing views about their respective political relationships with the United States and Britain. In other words, in the immediate post-treaty period, closer trans-Tasman political relations were ultimately hindered by strong divisions over accepting the United States instead of Britain as the cornerstone of their respective foreign policies.     

Britain and the abdication of Reza Shah

On the eve of the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in the Second World War, Sir Reader Bullard, the British minister in Tehran, urged on his government the desirability of removing the Iranian ruler, Reza Shah, from office. Association with the ‘universally detested’ shah, whom he described as a ‘greedy ignorant savage’, was detrimental to Britain's interests and its war effort. In the weeks that followed the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, Bullard continued to press for and to shape the ultimate British decision to force Reza Shah to abdicate and go into exile. Yet, this was not always Bullard's view of Britain's relationship with the Iranian ruler. When he presented his credentials 20 months earlier, Bullard described it as his ‘urgent duty’ to win Reza Shah's favour. Nor did Bullard's insistence that Britain depose the Shah initially find favour with the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, his Middle East staff at the Foreign Office, or with Churchill. This article traces the evolution of Bullard's own view of Reza Shah and the developments that led the Foreign Office, initially eager to win Reza Shah's favour and even ready to offer Reza Shah a ‘substantial bribe’ for his cooperation, to take steps to topple Reza Shah from the throne.     

21世纪的英国印度洋政策

随着印度洋战略地位的持续上升,曾是印度洋霸主的英国近年来也不断加强在印度洋的存在。英国在印度洋有着自己的安全、经济和殖民利益。在安全方面,英国认为需要应对伊朗带来的传统安全威胁和恐怖主义、海盗、人道主义灾难等非传统安全威胁。在经济方面,印度洋一些国家是英国的重要贸易伙伴,英国需要从海湾进口大量的液化气,海上运输线安全对英国至关重要。在殖民利益方面,英国设立了印度洋海外属地,并通过英联邦保持与前殖民地和附属国的联系。为了维护和增进这些利益,英国在印度洋采取了一系列措施。一是提升在印度洋的军事存在,如在巴林重建军事基地、帮助阿曼完善军事基地设施以及部署航母战斗群等。二是打击非传统安全威胁特别是海盗和恐怖主义。三是加强与印度洋沿岸重要国家,如沙特、印度和澳大利亚等的关系。四是强化与美国的合作,如延长迪戈加西亚军事基地的租赁期限、参加美国在印度洋的军事行动等。尽管这些举措有助于提升在印度洋的影响,但英国也面临一些挑战。一是实力与当年称霸印度洋时不可同日而语,脱欧以及新冠肺炎疫情更是对英国经济产生了重要影响。二是与毛里求斯存在领土争端,英国背负着殖民主义的压力。这些挑战会制约英国在印度洋目标的实现。总之,无论怎样调整印度洋政策,英国都不可能复制过去在印度洋的辉煌。     

‘This is a Prison…A Death in Life’: Reza Shah’s troubled exile on the Island of Mauritius

Reza Shah, the feared and powerful master of Iran for nearly two decades, spent the last years of his life in lonely exile, on the island of Mauritius, then in South Africa. His life in exile was hardly a happy one. The place and conditions of his exile were dictated not by himself but by the British, and the relationship between the two remained uneasy. Britain’s handling of Reza Shah – the degree and freedom and choice they were prepared to allow him and his family – were determined by the exigencies of war. Reza Shah sought to loosen the bonds of British control. In Tehran, his son and successor, Mohammad Reza Shah, also played a role. He used what leverage he had with the British to help ease the conditions of his father’s exile, while he endeavored to protect Iran’s interests under a difficult foreign occupation. The push-and-pull of cross-purposes entailed by this triangular relationship defined Reza Shah’s life in exile in both Mauritius and Johannesburg. This article examines the Mauritian period of his exile.     

From the Eastern Question to the Death of General Gordon: Representations of the Middle East in the Victorian Periodical Press, 1876–1885

After a tribute to the late Professor J. D. Pearson, this lecture advances the view that the Victorian periodical press was an extremely important medium for the exchange of ideas by the political and intellectual elite in Britain. Among the many topics covered in the press was British foreign policy and the author analyses almost 400 articles on the Middle East which appeared in 10 of the most influential periodicals during the years 1876-1885. Almost all the articles examined approach their subject with Britain's strategic position in the world as their prime, if sometimes unspoken, concern. Although some articles attempt to be fair in their view of Middle Eastern peoples and of Islam, the concept of racial superiority is very common, and reflects the contemporary writers' view of Britain as a civilizing influence in the Middle East.     

Obstructive or promoting? British views on German unification 1989/90

Six years after unification German public opinion still regards Britain as the ‘No‐saying’ nation which not only holds up further European integration but also never really wanted German unity to happen. This article argues that British attitudes to the process of German unification in 1989/90 were more diverse and generally more positive than an undue concentration on the views of Margaret Thatcher and her advisers may suggest. An analysis of Foreign Office policies and an examination of public and published opinion as well as of the debates in both Houses of Parliament reveal a constructive British stance on German unity and a substantial and real contribution of British diplomats to the Two‐plus‐Four process. Whereas the Foreign Office and Downing Street agreed on the major effects German unity would have on Britain's international standing, they differed about the way Britain should respond to the new challenges.     

战后日本“重返”东南亚与英国的应对

二战后,英国政府不希望日本经济复苏过快,并且不愿看到日本经济过多地染指东南亚。1954年英国促成日本加入由它倡导的科伦坡计划,以便把日本在东南亚的活动尽量纳入其可控范围之内。除此以外,在50年代和60年代前期,英国对日本在东南亚的企图进行了重重阻挠。但是进入60年代中后期,随着日本的经济飞速发展,国力日渐增强,英国已无力阻止日本进入东南亚。英国在日英首脑会晤的场合,不断敦促日本加强对东南亚国家的援助,而日本却一再敦促英国维持在东南亚的军事存在。     

Reconstructing the New Regulatory State in Germany: Telecommunications,Broadcasting and Banking

What was largely accomplished by the conservative governments in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s, that is, the re-modelling of the role of the state in the economy, seems under way now in Germany. However, it is not yet clear whether one may speak here of 'a new regulatory state' as well. In this article, an analytical framework is proposed to analyse the change of statehood, paying particular attention to regulation. It is argued that regulation is not a new form of governance, but rather a general form of state-societal interference. As such, it represents a valuable category for state analysis. Focusing on three sectors, namely telecommunications, broadcasting and banking, it is concluded that the kind of change we observe in Germany is, in many respects, both less spectacular than in Britain as well as much more heterogeneous and sector-specific. While the public interest has been amazingly constant, regulatory modes and institutions have been subject to major shifts. Yet, there is hardly any sign for the emergence of 'the' new regulatory state at the turn of the millennium.     

The Other from within: Pan-Turkist mythmaking and the expulsion of the Turkish left

The British sovereign bases on Cyprus, granted with the 1960 treaty establishing the Republic of Cyprus, played a key role in maintaining the fragile military structure of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Although Britain and the United States urged the alliance to play a more active role, CENTO degenerated into an organization with no assigned forces with the exception of RAF bombers carrying nuclear weapons, stationed on Cyprus. Thus, Britain's contribution in political and military terms became vital for CENTO's deterrence capability. The Shah of Iran, one of the key regional leaders, was interested in the RAF bombers on Cyprus; the FCO and the MoD were always cautious over how force restructuring would be presented to the Iranians. Eventually, the need for cutting defence spending for non-NATO purposes made Whitehall decide in 1975 to withdraw the bombers permanently based in Cyprus. Britain could not be the only power paying for this ‘alliance of the unwilling’, as CENTO could be called with the benefit of hindsight. In 1976, Whitehall started scaling down financial support of military exercises; by 1983 they had planned to spend nil on the alliance. The British disengagement policy proved the correct one since this alliance had only a few years of life left. After the fall of the Shah, CENTO collapsed in 1979.     

‘Strong,United and Independent’: the British Foreign Office,Anglo–Iranian Oil Company and the internationalization of Iranian politics at the dawn of the Cold War, 1945–46

This article challenges traditional accounts of the 1946 Cold War Crisis in Iran by moving beyond Soviet–American confrontation to focus on British policy. In contrast to the United States, Britain was a major stake-holding power in Iran due to the valuable holdings of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). By comparing the reactions of the AIOC and Foreign Office, continuity between the events of the 1946 Crisis and later developments in the Mosaddegh premiership becomes apparent. Soviet interference in Azerbaijan prompted great concern from representatives in Iran, but the central Foreign Office pursued a more cautious policy. Only concerns relating to the growth of domestic Iranian communism in the form of the Tudeh Party and the threat this entailed to the British concession prompted the Foreign Office and AIOC to take measures rendering them partially complicit in the internationalization of Iranian politics, setting an important precedent for future action. This article evaluates the policy-making process and its impact on Anglo–Iranian relations by utilizing records from the UK National Archives, British Petroleum Archive and diplomatic personal papers.     

Iran days in Egypt: Mosaddeq's Visit to Cairo in 1951

During Mohammad Mosaddeq’s tenure as the Iranian Prime Minister, the struggles for de-colonization took shape vis-à-vis the old superpowers, Britain and France, in Iran and the rest of the Middle East. Following the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Mohammad Mosaddeq became the first Middle Eastern Muslim leader that overcame Britain, albeit temporarily. Mosaddeq paid a price, overthrown in 1953 in an American and British-backed coup, but his struggle aroused interest around the world and received different interpretations, depending on the location. This article examines the way Mosaddeq was perceived in Egypt, where he visited in November 1951 for a highly significant four-day visit. The article examines the evolution of the anti-colonial struggle in Egypt and the emergence of a new vernacular framing of the struggles in the Middle East in one context.     

The Relations of the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with Israel

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan became independent upon the breakup of the Soviet Union. Neither of these republics developed strong nationalist identities and it has been the task of their former communist leaders who are still in power to develop such identities while suppressing internal divisions. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have had a history of tolerance toward their respective Jewish populations, from which many have immigrated to Israel (and the United States) in recent years to unite with family or for economic reasons. Those republics view Israel Diaspora Jews as a source of investment and technological know-how as well as an avenue for better relations with the United States. Conversely, Israel, while considering Russian sensitivities in its relations with Central Asia, values the region as a market for Israeli products, a source for hydrocarbon resources and a way to counteract Iran as well as to seek a more favourable attitude in disputes with the Arabs.     

Declining might in the limelight: European responses to new regional powers

The article analyses the responses of three established European powers, France, Britain and Germany, to a world of rising regional hegemons. It argues that Europe as a region remains unique as it consists of three regional powers of similar material and ideational power resources and is the most institutionalised region worldwide. The current transformation of world power configurations, debated in competing visions of global order, challenges Europe's central place. Facing gradual marginalisation, the foreign policy adaptations of Germany, Britain and France have been insufficient and remarkably static. Old foreign policy identities still play a significant part in European self-perceptions. However, views are gradually changing as the world becomes more heterogeneous. Among the emerging regional powers, China, India and Russia are perceived as decisive global players. Other rising powers are viewed as mainly regional and, hence, more manageable actors. Finally, the article calls for a general shift in European attitudes towards the non-European world and argues that European powers should overcome traditional Euro-centric world views. Rather, they should start to engage with rising powers in a serious discourse over common global responsibilities.     

De Gaulle and the question of Syria and Lebanon during the Second World War: Part I

This study examines political, economic, and strategic relations between Libya and Britain from the Second World War to the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ conflict in Libya. Analysing primary and secondary sources, this study attempts to determine if a connection exists between the British fighting in Libya during the Second World War and the British-led military intervention in the Libyan ‘Arab Spring’ revolt against Muammar Qaddafi's regime. Britain retained a strategic and economic presence in Libya in the period following the country's independence in 1951. The rise to power of Qaddafi in 1969, however, changed the course of bilateral ties. Qaddafi nationalized British assets in Libya, and implemented anti-Western policies. Ties with Britain were strained, reaching a low point during the 1980s and 1990s with Libya's persecution of political dissidents in Britain. A brief rapprochement between Tripoli and London from 2001 to 2011 brought normalization of ties and renewed British investment in the Libyan oil sector. However, in February 2011, Britain and its western partners aided Libyan rebels in their fight against Qaddafi, successfully toppling his regime. Today, as the struggle for power continues in Libya – with Islamist groups representing a serious force vying for power – many questions remain concerning the future direction of the Libyan state and society.