China’s view of the war threat and its foreign policy

In analyzing China’s foreign policy since 1949, people tend to take for granted the nature of China’s concern for its national security as the predominant factor in the development of its foreign policy without distinguishing changes in the functions of this factor. The evidence given in this article argues that at least as early as the late 1970s, leaders in Beijing, predominantly Deng Xiaoping, no longer held Mao’s view of the inevitability and imminence of world war, and of the Soviet threat to China’s national security. Therefore I propose that from the beginning of the Deng era in 1978, national status enhancement or muscle building through modernization had replaced national security as the persistent and principal theme in China’s foreign policy. We should not interpret the main reason for China’s increased push for the formation of an international antihegemony united front as its increasing concern about the Soviet threat to its national security. In turn, we may conclude that when China abandoned this united front foreign policy to adopt the Independent Foreign Policy in 1982, it was neither because of a new global reality that was shaping the reorientation of its foreign policy nor because only in 1982 did China rediscover the Soviet threat.     

Framing language policy in post-Soviet Azerbaijan: political symbolism and interethnic harmony

This article describes how the successive Azerbaijani governments of Heydar Aliyev (1993–2003) and Ilham Aliyev (2003–present) have pursued a largely symbolic language policy, enabling them to portray themselves as protectors of both a unique Azerbaijani identity and interethnic harmony while actually expending minimal resources. Given the demographic dominance of Azerbaijanis in Azerbaijan, language revitalization is framed as being inevitable and natural, requiring little state intervention. Indeed, the Aliyev governments have framed such symbolic policies as being preferable to the more nationalistic approach favoured by the pan-Turkic government of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (1992–93), the remnants of which have become the main opposition to the Aliyev governments. However, the Azerbaijani opposition has since largely adopted policies similar to those of the government; the difference between the two groups lies in how they portray the government's efforts.     

Libya's foreign policy in flux

This article provides a brief assessment of Libya’s oftenunpredictable foreign policy with regard to Africa. The firstsection presents a brief historical background to Libya’sinvolvement on the African continent and Colonel Gaddafi’smilitary interventionism in Africa. The next section assessesthe 1990s and Muammar Gaddafi’s popularity during thisperiod as well as his often extravagant economic involvementin Africa. The third section considers Gaddafi’s ambitiousrole in the African Union and his efforts to secure a unitedAfrica. The fourth section assesses Gaddafi’s dramaticforeign policy shift from rogue criminal to responsible statesman,following his historic decision to relinquish his country’sweapons of mass destruction (WMD) and an almost enthusiasticwillingness to welcome the West back after decades of antagonismand the subsequent wave of international praise as a consequence.Finally, it gives a brief assessment of the future of Libya’sforeign relations.     

Chinese foreign policy and American social science

Abstract

Karl Marx and Mao Tse-tung, C. Wright Mills, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Fei Hsiao-t'ung also described themselves as social scientists. Thus when Boardman contrasts radical scholarship with authentic social science he is merely using a debater's tactic, using a label to place his adversaries at a rhetorical disadvantage, trying to monopolize the term science for only his outlook on events.     

Japanese foreign policy: Inaction and reaction

Japan's tendency to simply react to international trends rather than to formulate its own policies is as prevalent today as during the Meiji period when the country was trying to catch up to the West, says Gerald Curtis, professor of political science at Columbia University. When international trends are murky, such as before World War II, this tendency can easily lead to disaster, Curtis says. Japan must break with the past and define its international role in the post‐Cold War era, Curtis argues, but the public debate required to achieve this is unlikely until Japan's domestic politics become more sharply defined.     

Trends in North Korean foreign policy

North Korea’s foreign policy track record in the post-cold war era is mixed. Most notable setbacks are the diplomatic normalization between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and South Korea; the reversal of its UN policy that paved the way for the simultaneous admission of the two Korean states to the world organization; and the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea. On the credit side of Pyongyang’s diplomatic ledger are changes in its relations with Tokyo and Washington. While tangible results have yet to materialize, particularly in North Korea-Japan relations, the groundwork has nonetheless been laid for significant improvement. North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons development program has played a major role in the unfolding of its relations with the United States. Conceptually, North Korean foreign policy can be explained in terms of its quest for three interrelated goals: security, legitimacy, and development. In the post-cold war era security appears to have emerged as the most important of the three goals. North Korea is at a crossroads. The choices it makes in foreign policy will determine not only the direction of its domestic policy but, ultimately, the survival of the regime itself. The external players in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Vienna (the IAEA) have varying degrees of leverage over Pyongyang’s policy as well.     

Environmental protection in Chinese foreign policy

The environmental aspect of Chinese foreign policy has been neglected in the study of Chinese foreign relations. Yet it has become increasingly important since the late 1980s. Beijing’s increased interest in environmental diplomacy is closely linked with its security, economic, environmental and foreign policy interests. Recognizing the seriousness of its deteriorating domestic environment, the growing international attention on the ecological threats, and the need to improve China’s image and international status, Beijing has begun to pay special attention to environmental diplomacy. Yet China’s priority of economic development, its limited resources, its concerns about sovereign infringement, and trade barriers determine the features of China’s practice in this area.     

Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy

Ten years after unification, Germany still maintains its post-Second World War foreign policy course based on transatlantic multilateralism and European integration despite changes in Germany's international and domestic contexts. This study argues that neither realist nor institutionalist explanations can explain the post-unification pattern of German foreign policy. Instead, continuity and change in this policy can be understood best through a role-theoretical approach based on the civilian power idealtype. Two causal pathways are developed which account for continuity in foreign policy orientation (goals) and strategies while explaining change in the choice of foreign policy instruments. First, the apparent success of Germany's traditional foreign policy role concept during and after unification helped to reify a broad foreign policy consensus around the goals and strategies of an ideal-type civilian power. Second, major foreign policy crises, such as the Yugoslavian wars, stirred the long held hierarchy between the core values of reticence vis-à-vis the use of force (never again German militarism) and the special German responsibility to prevent genocide (never again Auschwitz). The interaction between domestic and foreign expectations provides a promising source for explaining change and continuity in Germany's foreign policy role concept and behaviour.     

German foreign policy and transatlantic relations since unification

Looking at German foreign policy and transatlantic relations since unification, this article argues that fundamental views and principles about Germany's role in Europe and the world have endured. The integrationist impulse remains strong. As shown by Kosovo, Germans have put this multilateralism above qualms about the use of military force. This has also left Berlin and Washington continuing to share many objectives, not only traditional ones about power and peace in Europe, but also on a whole host of challenges that have come with globalisation, both in the wider world and in the multiplicity of commercial and civil relationships across the Atlantic.     

The debate over south Africa's foreign policy

South Africa is no exception to the rule that there tends to be continuity in a state's foreign policy even in the event of far‐reaching domestic political change. But given the new South Africa's debt to a global human rights campaign, the emphasis on ‘staking out the moral high ground’ in the rhetoric of the country's new decision‐makers and of commentators is not surprising. The article discusses the creative tension between the claims of morality and the constraints of realpolitik in the debate on the formulation of the new South Africa's foreign policy. It identifies both differences and overlaps in the approaches of realists and radicals to the conduct of the country's foreign policy.     

South Korea's search for an independent foreign policy

South Korea's independent foreign policy should be understood as a growing self-reliant attitude in the process of managing foreign affairs, and not as a strict policy target that must be achieved within a single term of a specific government. In theory, an instrumental approach, rather than an ideological adherence, toward the alliance system with the US is relevant for South Korea. Most importantly of all, the Korean dream of independent foreign policy will be hard to realize until Koreans abandon the dependent mind-set in terms of national security and foreign policy.     

Nigeria's foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa

This article explores how Nigeria's foreign policy has responded to transnational security challenges in West Africa. It engages in a conceptual overview of the discourse on transnational security and links this with a discussion of Nigeria's foreign policy towards West Africa. Of note is Nigeria's pursuit of a leadership role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in its quest for security, economic integration and development. Several questions are posed: What do Nigerian policymakers consider to be the most significant transnational threats in West Africa? How and through what legitimate policies and instruments do they respond to such threats? How important is ECOWAS to Nigeria's attempt to respond to transnational threats? And how effective have Nigeria's attempts to influence the ECOWAS agenda in this regard been? Although ECOWAS has remained central to Nigeria's responses to transnational security threats in the subregion, the country has not been able to match its rhetoric on addressing transnational security threats with far-reaching concrete achievements. It is suggested that social transformation of Nigeria's current foreign policy (that is, to one focused and committed to putting people at its centre) and a change in the policies of dominant global powers towards West Africa would enhance human emancipation and eliminate the numerous insecurities confronting the peoples of the subregion.     

Ghana's foreign policy and transnational security challenges in West Africa

This article focuses on Ghana's security culture as reflected in its foreign policy, and how it has influenced the way the country addresses transnational security challenges in the Economic Community of West African State subregion. In this sense, the article explores some of the linkages between national and subregional security cultures in West Africa and how effectively they have complemented each other in providing a holistic response to the transnational security challenges facing Ghana. The article argues that despite the existence of different subregional conventions and protocols made possible by an emerging subregional security culture, Ghana's strategies for addressing transnational security threats have not gone much beyond the rhetoric of addressing the problems. In reality, transnational criminal activities have not only intensified but have become more challenging. Several factors contribute to this including corrupt leadership and institutional practices, security lapses and lack of interagency coordination, and inadequate resources for addressing the problem. The article calls for adequately equipping the law enforcement agencies and the implementation of relevant laws to facilitate effective responses to transnational security challenges for Ghana and other countries in West Africa.