Defining the limits of the North Korean Human Rights Act: A security and legal perspective

The introduction of the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (HR 4011 or the Act) was hailed by many in the U.S. Congress as a significant and much-needed legislative effort that would substantially improve the human rights conditions of North Korea, considered to be one of the most unpredictable and undemocratic regimes in the world today. The passage of HR 4011 effectively marked a new and notable phase within U.S. foreign policy, in which the issue of human rights was directly linked to the issue of North Korean nuclear non-proliferation in a Helsinki-style framework. Relating to the Act, this paper argues from cross-cultural, security, and legal perspectives that HR 4011 may encounter specific limitations, which may hinder the Act from reaching its stated objectives of furthering “respect for and protection of fundamental human rights in North Korea” and “to promote a more durable humanitarian solution to the plight of North Korean refugees.” Although improving human rights is a fundamentally important issue, linking human rights with DPRK nuclear non-proliferation through HR 4011’s explicit Helsinki-style approach may exacerbate rather than eradicate North Korean human rights violations as well as the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear standoff with the international community.     

Trends in North Korean foreign policy

North Korea’s foreign policy track record in the post-cold war era is mixed. Most notable setbacks are the diplomatic normalization between the Soviet Union (now Russia) and South Korea; the reversal of its UN policy that paved the way for the simultaneous admission of the two Korean states to the world organization; and the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea. On the credit side of Pyongyang’s diplomatic ledger are changes in its relations with Tokyo and Washington. While tangible results have yet to materialize, particularly in North Korea-Japan relations, the groundwork has nonetheless been laid for significant improvement. North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons development program has played a major role in the unfolding of its relations with the United States. Conceptually, North Korean foreign policy can be explained in terms of its quest for three interrelated goals: security, legitimacy, and development. In the post-cold war era security appears to have emerged as the most important of the three goals. North Korea is at a crossroads. The choices it makes in foreign policy will determine not only the direction of its domestic policy but, ultimately, the survival of the regime itself. The external players in Seoul, Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and Vienna (the IAEA) have varying degrees of leverage over Pyongyang’s policy as well.     

The insecurity of security: The PLA’s evolving doctrine and threat perceptions towards 2000

China currently enjoys a peaceful national security environment, yet the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for an unsettled future that involves various conflictual contingencies around China’s periphery. The PLA’s force structure, deployments, expenditures, and training are all being geared to a new doctrine that emphasizes peripheral defense in support of a diversified range of potential regional threats to China’s definitions of its national security. This articles examines these perceived threats and delineates the doctrinal changes in Chinese military thinking in recent years. It also discusses ways in which China’s new military posture may disrupt international politics in the Asian region. He is author ofThe Making of a Premier: Zhao Ziyang’s Provincial Career (1984) andBeautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990 (1991).     

Economic Interdependence and Security on the Korean Peninsula: The Impact of North Korean Special Economic Zones

Abstract

Given North Korea’s desire to maintain nuclear weapons—and barring its unexpected collapse—how can the US and its allies establish and maintain a peaceful Northeast Asia? Current US policy alternatives do not offer an effective means for removing North Korean nuclear weapons without creating many more serious problems that jeopardize a stable future for Northeast Asia. However, by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) through North Korea’s special economic zones, the United States and other nations can engage North Koreans at all levels of society and build a future environment of cooperation and stability. Such a long-term engagement policy will prove more successful than isolation, sanctions, or military force, and will bolster regional actors’ efforts to develop additional stability-inducing policies.     

作为反体制运动的韩国民族主义

本文试图站在历史的角度厘清现代韩国民族主义反体制的性质。历史上,韩国的民族主义是以抵抗国家反体制运动的身份确立自己的地位的。开港以后,当时的统治阶层们试图建立近代国家。这种尝试失败后,国家的权力被日本抢走。作为日益走向衰亡的国家的替代品,一部分知识分子鼓吹由精神构成的国家、国粹,而作为维持它的主体,则提出了民族或者同胞的概念。因此,民族成了建立国家的主体,并在殖民地时代以独立运动、在解放后的分裂局面下以统一运动的形态确立了自己的地位。     

Studying North Korea through North Korean migrants: lessons from the field

This article examines the use of North Korean defectors’ accounts as a source of information for studying the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Information from defectors fills a vital knowledge gap and improves our understanding of North Korean politics, economics, and society. Witness accounts and interview data collected from people who were born in North Korea but have since left have been widely used by journalists, government agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and academics. There are, however, serious methodological issues in collecting, organizing, and interpreting information derived from defectors’ accounts. Selection and demographic biases, power relations between researchers and interviewees, monetary incentives, and language barriers are among those issues. We propose focus group discussions and participatory observation as complementary methods of data collection to mitigate the shortfalls of relying on individual interviews.     

China,US and the North Korean issue

This article explores the strategic interests of China and the US in the North Korean issue. It examines their different perceptions of North Korea. For China, North Korea is needed as a friendly buffer state as well as a political ally. As the lone superpower and lynchpin of international security, the US wants to stop unpredictable North Korea from further developing its nuclear capabilities. The article then explores the shared goal of both great powers in promoting stability on the Korean peninsula and in preventing nuclear proliferation. It is argued that the interplay of Sino–US security interests has a huge impact on the evolution of the North Korean issue.     

The life of a Korean communist

Abstract

During thirty-six years of Japanese colonial rule, millions of Koreans left their homeland to live in exile in China and Russia. The best devoted themselves to a struggle against Japan that lasted until 1945. Beginning with the “Righteous Army” that resisted Japanese aggression before the annexation in 1910 and whose survivors retreated to fight in Manchuria, through the massive March First Independence Movement and the subsequent establishment of a provisional government in Shanghai in 1919, through years of terrorist attacks, armed battles, and guerrilla resistance in China, Koreans struggled and fought, suffered torture and ruin, rotted in prison, and died for the liberation of their country. This struggle produced numerous individuals with extraordinary careers of intense involvement in the revolutionary tides sweeping Asia in this century. Although there are many Korean language accounts of their lives, for decades only one book in English, Song of Ariran, has rendered the emotional flavor of their sacrifices and adventures. Ramparts Press has reissued this volume, first published in 1941, with useful editing and annotation by George Totten and further reminiscences by the original author, Helen Foster Snow (Nym Wales). It is the tale of the life of Kim San, a minor but by no means insignificant figure in the anti-Japanese struggle.     

AIDS, security and the military in Africa: A sober appraisal

This article examines four accepted wisdoms about HIV/AIDS andAfrican armies and in each case concludes that substantial revisionis necessary in the light of emerging evidence. First, it appearsthat military populations do not necessarily have a higher prevalenceof HIV than civilian populations. HIV levels in armies dependon many factors including the demographics of the army, itspattern of deployment, the nature and stage of the epidemicin the country concerned, and the measures taken to controlthe disease by the military authorities. Second, although theepidemic has the potential to undermine the functioning of nationalmilitaries, and may have done so in isolated instances, armiesin general are well placed to withstand the threat. Third, evidencethat war contributes to the spread of the virus is meagre andsuggests that we should be concerned primarily with specificrisks that conflict may entail including population mobilityand changing sexual networks. Lastly, the hypothesis that AIDShas the potential to disrupt national, regional, and internationalsecurity remains speculative. ^1. Roger Yeager, Craig Hendrix, and Stuart Kingma, ‘Internationalmilitary Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiencysyndrome policies and programs: strengths and limitations incurrent practice’, Military Medicine 165, 2 (2000), pp.87–92. ^2. S. Kingma, ‘AIDS prevention in military populations: learningthe lessons of history’, International AIDS Society Newsletter,4, March 1996, pp. 9–11. ^3. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military: UNAIDS point of view’,UNAIDS Best Practice Collection, May 1998 (http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/publications/irc-pub05/militarypv_en_pdf.pdf,9 January, 2005). ^4. A.E. Pettifor, H.V. Rees, A. Steffenson, L. Hlongwa-Madikizela,C. MacPhail, K. Vermaak, and I. Kleinschmidt, HIV and SexualBehaviour Among Young South Africans: A national survey of 15–24year olds (Reproductive Health Research Unit, University ofWitwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2004). ^5. According to a South African AIDS Law Project press releaseof 23 October 2003, ‘the SANDF has however excluded andcontinues to exclude job applicants with HIV from employmentin the SANDF’ (http://www.alp.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=229,16 April, 2005). ^6. Yigeremu Abebe, Ab Schaap, Girmatchew Mamo, Asheber Negussie,Birke Darimo, Dawit Wolday, and Eduard J. Sanders, ‘HIVprevalence in 72,000 urban and rural army recruits, Ethiopia’,AIDS 17, 12 (2003), pp. 1835–40. ^7. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^8. Olive Shisana, Leickness Simbayi, and E. Dorkenoo, ‘SouthAfrica’s first national population-based HIV/AIDS behaviouralrisks, sero-status and media impact survey (SABSSM) researchproject’ (Third Quarterly Progress Report, Household Survey2002, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 2002). ^9. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military’, UNAIDS TechnicalUpdate, 1998 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/aidsleadership/dls_AIDS_military_may14.pdf,July 21, 2004); ‘Military populations’ AIDS Briefs(http://www.heard.org.za/publications/AidsBriefs/sec/military.pdf,December 22, 2005). ^10. Tsadkan Gebre Tensae, ‘HIV/AIDS in the Ethiopian military:perceptions, strategies and impacts’ (unpublished paper,2002). ^11. A. Adefalolu, ‘HIV/AIDS as an occupational hazard to soldiers– ECOMOG experience’ (Paper presented at the 3rdAll Africa Congress of Armed Forces and Police Medical Services,Pretoria, 1999), pp. 4–11. ^12. M. Fleshman, ‘AIDS prevention in the ranks – UNtarget peacekeepers, combatants in war against the disease’,African Recovery 15, 1–2 (2004), pp. 9–10. ^13. The same was true in Thailand, where the army responded in advanceof the government. ^14. ‘HIV/AIDS and Uniformed Services: Analysing the Evidence’.Expert Meeting, Cape Town, December 6–7, 2004 called byUNAIDS and attended by Alan Whiteside. ^15. Edward Hooper, Slim (Bodley Head, London, 1990); Edward Hooper,The River: A journey to the source of HIV and AIDS (Penguin,London, 2000), pp. 42–9. ^16. Robert Shell, ‘The silent revolution: HIV/AIDS and militarybases in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Consolidating Democracy,Seminar Report Series (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, East London,2000), pp. 29–41. ^17. Reinhard Kaiser, Paul Spiegel, Peter Salama, William Brady,Elizabeth Bell, Kyle Bond, and Marie Downer, ‘HIV/AIDSseroprevalence and behavioral risk factor survey in Sierra Leone,April 2002’ (Center for Disease Control and Prevention,Atlanta, GA, 2002). ^18. C. Mulanga, S. Bazepeo, J. Mwamba, C. Butel, J.-W. Tshimpaka,M. Kashi, F. Lepira, M. Carael, M. Peeters, and E. Delaporte,‘Political and socio-economic instability: how does itaffect HIV? A case study in the Democratic Republic of Congo’,AIDS 18, 5 (2004), pp. 832–4. ^19. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^20. Tim Allen, ‘AIDS, security and democratic governance’,The Hague, 2–4 May 2005. Presentation at expert seminar. ^21. Paul Spiegel, ‘HIV/AIDS among conflict-affected and displacedpopulations: dispelling myths and taking action’, Disasters28, 4 (2004), pp. 322–39. ^22. African Rights, Rwanda: Broken bodies, torn spirits; livingwith genocide, rape and HIV/AIDS (African Rights, Kigali, 2004);V. Randell, ‘Sexual violence and genocide against Tutsiwomen. Propaganda and sexual violence in the Rwandan genocide:an argument for intersectionality in international law’,Columbia Human Rights Law Review 33, 3 (2002), pp. 733–55. ^23. Kaiser et al., ‘HIV/AIDS seroprevalence’. ^24. P. Fourie and M. Schönteich, ‘Africa’s newsecurity threat: HIV/AIDS and human security in southern Africa’,African Security Review 10, 4 (2001), pp. 29–44; M. Schönteich,‘AIDS and age: SA’s crime time bomb’, AIDSAnalysis Africa 10, 2 (1999), pp. 1–4. ^25. Rachel Bray, ‘Predicting the social consequences of orphanhoodin South Africa’ (Working Paper No. 29, Centre for SocialScience Research, University of Cape Town, 2003).     

Food security as a political issue: the 2009 elections in Malawi

African electorates are expected to use non-evaluative rationales, like patronage and ethnicity, when casting their vote. In famine-struck countries like Malawi it is however worthwhile to investigate how a salient political issue like food security influences voters’ decisions. At the turn of the millennium Malawi went through a series of famines. In 2005 the government changed its famine prevention strategy and started to subsidise fertilisers. The fertiliser programme was a political success and is used to explain the outcome of the 2009 elections. Although this explanation seems plausible, such analyses should be grounded in thorough analyses of the origin and implementation of the food policy. Through archival studies and fieldwork, this study reveals the importance of the opposition in changing the food policy and the politics of the implementation process. Hence, even if food security increased ahead of the 2009 elections, the election cannot be interpreted as a ‘national referendum’ on the incumbent's fertiliser programme.     

The Korean Communist movement

Abstract

The first full-scale war fought under the leadership of the United States after 1945 was that against the Korean people. The Korean War of 1950-53 remains, without the slightest doubt, the most important un-excavated event in modern imperialist and revolutionary history.     

Syngman rhee: The pawn as rook the struggle to end the Korean war

Abstract

A quarter century ago, in 1951–53, while trying to end the Korean war, the Truman and Eisenhower administrations struggled to keep Syngman Rhee, the president of the Republic of Korea [ROK] , from undermining the negotiations, wrecking the armistice, endangering the United Nations forces, and extending the war. Often it was unclear whether or not he would abide by the armistice and whether or not he would leave the ROK troops under the UN Command, or imperil the UN forces by withdrawing his own. General Mark Clark, the American and United Nations commander in the last year of war, aptly summarized the problems, “I found myself engaged in a two-front diplomatic battle ... with the ... Communists and with ... Rhee [, and] the biggest trouble came from Rhee.” As Rhee's price for acceding to the armistice of July 27, 1953, he secured from the Eisenhower administration generous economic aid, continued military assistance, and a mutual defense treaty, which has endured to the present. Before the armistice, however, military and political leaders in both administrations seriously considered toppling Rhee and installing a more tractable government.     

中韩在朝核问题上的政策协调:合作基础与行动路径

中韩两国是朝鲜半岛问题最为利益攸关的两个国家,两国在朝核问题上的主要基调都是以和平手段解决相关问题。但由于所关切利益的优先排序不同,中国反对以军事手段解决相关问题,更反对外部势力的武力介入。而韩国出于安全风险的考虑,不可避免地依赖于美韩同盟向朝鲜施加军事压力,对朝政策也没有完全摒弃制裁、威慑等硬手段。地缘上的联系决定了朝鲜核问题、稳定问题都是中韩共同面临的安全风险,两国可以通过加强沟通、增进理解,约束彼此盟友的行为,协调对朝经济合作与援助事宜等方式实现政策协调,防止朝核危机诱发的局势动荡和由此引起的中韩互不信任。     

Chinese security as Asia evolves: Constraints and ambiguities

Beijing’s weapons modernization, arms transfer, and arms control policies reflect priorities and internal and external constraints established in previous decades. Although Chinese perceptions of the evolving security environment in Asia have prompted some adjustments, PRC policies remain constricted by a security structure originally formed during the cold war, domestically driven security policymaking, and non-security factors, including economic and technological limitations imposed by the global market, the domestic economy and budgetary resources, and technological developments. Constraints notwithstanding, it is China’s policy ambiguities and opaque intentions that fuel suspicions throughout Asia that the PRC seeks to dominate the region.