Criteria for Evaluation of Burden-sharing Rules in International Climate Policy

This article presents nine criteria for assessing, comparing, and ranking burden-sharing rules and conceptual frameworks used in climate policy negotiations and agreements. Three of the criteria are concerned with fairness principles and six criteria are operational requirements. The application of these criteria is illustrated in the context of six different burden-sharing schemes. The Multi-sector Convergence approach and the Triptych approach received highest average score of the six schemes. The Brazilian proposal received a similar total score, but unevenly distributed with a high score on fairness principles and low score on operational requirements. The European Union member countries employed the Triptych approach when they differentiated their national abatement targets prior to the 1997 Kyoto meeting. The Multi-sector Convergence approach was developed in a joint ECN (Netherlands Energy Research Foundation) and CICERO (Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo) project. It is a sector-based, global approach that comprises convergence of per capita emissions at the same level in all countries. Sector-based approaches have a distinct advantage compared to other approaches because they reflect the economic structure of countries rather well. Such approaches could play a useful role in future climate policy negotiations, not the least in discussions on binding climate targets for developing countries.     

The role of the Asia Pacific Partnership in discursive contestation of the international climate regime

After withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol, the US Bush Administration and the Australian Howard Government pursued an international climate change policy focussed on voluntary international agreements outside the UN climate negotiations. This strategy included the formation of several climate agreements directed at technology development, including the 2005 Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP). The APP provides a model for international climate change policy directed at voluntary national greenhouse gas intensity targets, technology development through sectoral public–private partnerships and technology diffusion through trade. This article situates the APP within these US and Australian inspired climate agreements formed outside the UN negotiations. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (in M. Pettenger (ed.) The social construction of climate change: power knowledge norms discourses, 2007) discourse analysis in relation to the international climate negotiations is used to explore differences between the APP and UN climate treaties. We find the APP embodies a discourse of what we call ‘deregulatory ecological modernisation’ that promotes limited public funding to ease informational failures in markets for cleaner technologies and management practices. The deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse is a deeply intensive market liberal approach to international climate change policy, which contests binding emission reduction targets and the development of a global carbon market. The USA, Australia, Japan and Canada represented a core group of countries that used the APP to promote the deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse and thereby contest any deepening of developed nations' emission reduction targets for the post-2012 period. However, with changes of leadership and new parties in power in the USA and Australia, it appears that the deregulatory ecological modernisation discourse has lost ground compared to a reengagement with discourses supportive of developed country emission reduction targets and equity-based adaptation and technology transfer assistance for developing nations.     

Burden Sharing and Fairness Principles in International Climate Policy

One of the major challenges facing participants in the global climate change negotiations is to find a scheme of burden sharing that can be accepted as "fair" by all or at least most governments. In this article we first explore which basic principles of fairness seem to be sufficiently widely recognized to serve as a normative basis for such a scheme. We then examine a set of proposals for differentiating obligations that have been submitted by governments in the negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol to see which principles have been honored. In the concluding section we discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of more specific burden sharing rules.     

Crafting the Copenhagen Consensus: Some Reflections

The 2007 Bali Climate Conference launched a 'meta-negotiation' of unprecedented scale and complexity. Culminating in 2009, climate change delegates must now define the next round of targets for the Kyoto Protocol developed country parties, and comparable provisions for the USA. Most dauntingly, negotiators must also devise a new architecture for further 'action' by developing countries under the Convention. This paper reflects on the key challenges involved in crafting a consensus at the climate conference in 2009 in Copenhagen. In particular, it explores options for reaching agreement with the USA and developing countries, suggesting a transition phase up to 2020. For developing countries, the paper outlines a possible 'choose and no-lose' approach, along with options for increased financing. The paper concludes by looking beyond 2009, emphasizing that, given the complexity of the negotiations, a work programme post-Copenhagen will be needed.     

Russia’s role in UNFCCC negotiations since the exit of the United States in 2001

The unexpected exit of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 signaled the exponential increase in the importance of the Russian Federation as a key player in international climate change politics. Until then a relatively minor player, Russia’s active participation in the evolution of the climate change regime is now considered a paramount and immediate necessity. A longitudinal study of Russian climate policy over the years is therefore a highly useful exercise as it allows for the better understanding of current developments and provides some basis for prediction of its future actions. The primary aim of this article is threefold: First, to offer a comprehensive account of Russian involvement in international climate negotiations. Secondly, to clarify the actual reasons behind Russia’s decision to delay its ratification of the Protocol for almost three long years, and finally, to try and map out the post-2012 positions of Russia on the road to the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties.     

‘US, China and the Economics of Climate Negotiations’

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B_?US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.     

The Long Way to the Copenhagen Accord: Climate Change Negotiations in 2009

The Copenhagen Summit did not conclude the 2 years negotiation process initiated in Bali in 2007. Ten official meetings among parties were not sufficient to reach a conclusion on the future of the international climate change regime after 2012. This paper summarizes the main issues addressed by the parties under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol tracks in the course of 2009, the longest year ever for climate change negotiations, and tries to explain the reasons behind the Summit's failures. Furthermore, an overview of the main points of the Copenhagen Accord is provided together with its implications and relation with the UNFCCC process.     

Who is driving Russian climate policy? Applying and adjusting veto players theory to a non-democracy

What is driving Russian climate policy? This article focuses on the veto player approach developed by George Tsebelis and its applicability for examining the power relations in climate change policy-making in Russia. It makes two original contributions: veto players analysis on Russian climate policy and proposals how to adjust to theory to be applied to non-democracies for comparison with democracies. After identifying the veto players and their preferences, and determining their equivalence in the decision-making process, two case studies are examined: the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the establishment of one of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation, in Russia. Regarding the power play between actors, the latter emerges as far more accessible than the former, where scholars can generally observe only the domestic debate—which, due to the absorption of democratic decision-making institutions by the president, is detached from the actual decision-making process. Three proposals are made for adjusting the veto players approach to facilitate qualitative analysis of Russian decision-making: (1) select cases which involve also lower-level actors in charge of policy implementation; (2) due to implementation problems, changes in the status quo must be sought deeper than in statute-level changes; and (3) note that motivations of actors beyond the actual policy substance can facilitate explanations of puzzling outcomes in the process.     

The Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol – Paving the Way for Ratification

This article provides a short account of the international climate negotiations that took place in Bonn from 16 to 27 July 2001. After the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change failed in November 2000, the Parties had decided to suspend the meeting. The ministers present at the resumed session successfully adopted the "Bonn Agreement to the Kyoto Protocol", a set of political compromises for the most contentious issues left open by the Kyoto Protocol. Although many details had been transferred to the Seventh Conference of the Parties, November 2001 in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Bonn Agreement already paved the way for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and its entry into force. The Marrakesh Accord adopted on 10 November 2001transforms, with a few exceptions, this political agreement into bindinglegal text.     

The Legality of the EU's Stand-Alone Approach to the Climate Impact of Aviation: The Express Role Given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol

The aviation sector is not yet covered by the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Taking into account the fact that aviation increasingly contributes to climate change, the European Commission adopted a proposal for legislation to include aviation in the EU ETS. The proposal foresees the inclusion of internal EU flights as well as external flights to and from the Union within the EU ETS. On 20 December 2007, EU Environment Ministers reached political agreement in the Environment Council on the basis of a new compromise text tabled by the Presidency. However, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as various stakeholders, does not consider that the EU has the competence to include aviation within the EU ETS. A crucial point concerning the legality of including aviation in the EU ETS is the fact that Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol states that the parties 'shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation . . . working through the International Civil Aviation Organization . . .'. This article reviews the legality of the EU's stand-alone approach, focusing on the European and international legal framework and taking into account the express role given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol.     

Elements for a Robust Climate Regime Post-2012: Options for Mitigation

This article addresses the current state of negotiations within the international climate change regime (including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol) and options to be included in a post-2012 carbon market framework, such as sectoral agreements, soft targets for developing countries and a larger consideration of sinks. The article reviews the different options focusing on their potential to spur mitigation of greenhouse gases in key areas such as energy production. The size and depth of the carbon market, as well as the stringency of the cap and the stabilization path chosen, are variables affecting the effectiveness of different options. The article thus makes a clear case for all large emitters to agree on a long-term stabilization goal to guide further negotiations on medium-term carbon market frameworks, and notes that options related to the consideration of sinks, for example, should maintain proportionality with the size of the carbon market to ensure that a sufficient 'pull' for technological developments in energy-related activities is maintained.     

Australian climate policy and the Asia Pacific partnership on clean development and climate (APP). From Howard to Rudd: continuity or change?

This article explains, first, why Australia’s government under John Howard, together with the United States Bush administration initiated the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) and, second, why the succeeding Rudd government continued to support this initiative. Climate policy under the conservative Howard government (1995–2007) in Australia was largely dictated by fossil fuel and mineral sector interests, and reflected a close alliance with the Bush administration. The Howard government shunned the Kyoto Protocol, refused to set national binding greenhouse gas reduction targets and preferred voluntary cooperative measures with industry. The APP was part of the Howard government’s strategy to demonstrate some policy movement on climate change while postponing serious action. Climate change was a key issue in the election of the Rudd Labor government in Australia in December 2007. The Rudd government quickly ratified Kyoto, adopted emission reduction targets, and moved to introduce emissions trading. The Rudd government’s decision to continue involvement with the APP, albeit with diminished funding, was a pragmatic one. The APP was supported by industry and provided bridges to China and India—both key countries in the post-2012 UNFCCC negotiations. Finally, in order to assess the long-term outlook of the APP, the article provides a preliminary assessment as to whether the APP advances technology transfer.

Graduation and Deepening: An Ambitious Post-2012 Climate Policy Scenario

In the second commitment period 2013–2017, the Kyoto Protocol structure is strengthened considerably. The current Annex B countries agree to reduction targets averaging 23% reductions from 1990 level. This induces non-Annex B countries to take up emissions targets according to a multi-tiered graduation system. Graduation is undertaken according to thresholds defined by per capita GDP and emissions. Compared to the current Annex B, coverage of emissions by absolute caps would increase by about 25%; large low-income countries such as India and China do not graduate. Therefore, large emitters above 50 million t. p.a. can utilise a policy-based Clean Development Mechanism. Sinks of all types – terrestrial, marine and geological can be used. To achieve this policy scenario, voter pressure due to extreme meteorological events and a coordination of all progressive forces in the international climate negotiations are necessary. Moreover, a judicious combination of carrots and sticks has to be developed to entice Non-Annex B countries to graduate.     

Challenges and Outcomes at the Ninth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

From 1 to 12 December 2003, the Ninth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention took place in Milan, Italy. This conference continued the laborious effort of developing an international climate regime by preparing for the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force. Some two dozen decisions were adopted on a wide range of options for responding to climate change. This paper assesses the progress achieved at the conference on a number of issues. Among these were operational details for implementing forestry projects under the Convention’s Clean Development Mechanism, and guidelines for reporting on greenhouse gas emissions and removals from agriculture, forestry and land-use change. Parties also decided on rules with respect to two funds, the Special Climate Change Fund and the Least Developed Country Fund. With respect to developing countries, Parties continued discussions on rules for building response capacity in light of the expected adverse effects of climate change and transferring environmentally sound technology. They also discussed how to incorporate scientific advice from the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change into the negotiations. Although Russia did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol prior to the conference, Milan demonstrated momentum and interest among Parties to support the climate regime. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the detailed discussions were able to contribute to preparing for the long term. To this end, this paper concludes that more discussion and leadership is required to bridge the North/South gap if a post-2012 climate regime is to stand.     

Friendly neighbor or Trojan Horse? Assessing the interaction of soft law initiatives and the UN climate regime

Current global climate governance is characterized by increasing institutional proliferation. Within the last 5 years several non-legally binding initiatives have emerged, including (i) the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate and various other public–private partnerships working on the policy implementation level and (ii) the Group of Eight Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, and Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change as high-level political processes. As a first step toward analyzing the relationship between these parallel initiatives and the UN climate regime, this article looks at the negotiations of four UN-hosted climate meetings in 2007–2008, providing an examination of the interaction of ‘soft law’ climate initiatives and the ‘hard law’ UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol process. The methodology of the study is based on participatory observations in the negotiations and document analysis of country and stakeholder positions. The analysis shows that the current multitude of processes in global climate governance entails potential institutional interaction. Deliberations of the key actors give some support to the claims of non-UN soft law being used to exert influence on the negotiations on a future climate regime within the UN context.

How Can the European Union Contribute to a COP-6 Agreement? An Overview for Policy Makers

During the 6th Conference of Parties (COP-6) in The Hague, the Netherlands, November 2000, crucial progress on a number of outstanding issues related to the Kyoto Protocol will have to be made to open the way for its early ratification, if not to save it from complete failure. Given the present lack of internal US political support for the Kyoto Protocol, the EU may play a pivotal role in making the Kyoto Protocol agreement a reality even without initial ratification of the US, if its able to provide sufficient leadership. In this overview article we discuss the main issues under negotiation, the problems of finding agreement and opportunities for the EU to catalyse a compromise agreement at COP-6, building on key scientific papers as included in this issue and discussions at the European Forum on Integrated Environmental Assessment Climate Policy Workshop in Amsterdam. Key elements are the inclusion of sinks, the use of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms as a supplement to domestic action and the international compliance system. Domestic implementation of climate policy is a major factor for the EU's credibility.     

Implications of EU Enlargement on the EU Greenhouse Gas 'Bubble' and Internal Burden Sharing

Currently, the EU-15 forms the only 'bubble' under the Kyoto Protocol and has negotiated an internal burden sharing. A strategic EU climate policy should include accession countries. Thus, even in the case of early ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, it would be sensible to form a bubble with all countries that are certain to be EU members during the commitment period 2008–2012. Of course due to Art. 4.4 of the Protocol the EU-15 has to stick to its own bubble. However, nothing prevents it from forming an implicit bubble including all first wave countries by inducing them to form a bubble on their own and transfer the surplus to the EU-15. Similarly, second wave countries should form a bubble of their own to co-ordinate JI and permit transfers to the EU. This would reduce the gap between business-as-usual and the target by about 50%. If ratification is delayed to a point where it is clear which second wave countries will be members by 2008, the bubble should be extended by those countries. When in 2005 target negotiations start for the second commitment period, the EU should negotiate a bubble consisting of all states being certain to be members by 2013.     

UNFCCC negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9): what the process says about the politics of CDM-sinks

One of the most contentious issues in the negotiations aimed at operationalizing the Kyoto Protocol was the treatment of sinks and, particularly, the eligibility of sinks projects in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This paper attempts to analyse the politics underlying these negotiations, drawing on methods of process tracing, key informant interviews, negotiating texts and secondary literature. Tracing the sinks debate and highlighting key lessons about the nature of global environmental agreements and their institutional arrangements is the first step to recounting the history of the politics of one of the major contemporary international environmental debates. The paper shows that the Kyoto Protocol negotiations on sinks and CDM-sinks were multilaterally supported as a practical solution, but went ‘off track’ due to actors’ interests and tradeoffs. As regards future negotiations on forest sinks in developing countries under the framework of the UNFCCC, the paper argues that these are likely to be influenced by similar constraints, and also by the conservation and development agenda of its supporters; as well as the experience gathered on the CDM and the interests and concerns of developing countries. We broadly frame the paper within the literature on global environmental politics.

Genesis of the CDM: the original policymaking goals of the 1997 Brazilian proposal and their evolution in the Kyoto protocol negotiations into the CDM

A body of literature is emerging applying critical consideration to the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism’s (‘CDM’) achievement of policy goals regarding sustainable development, geographical distribution of projects and related matters. This article places this literature in the context of the policymaking goals of the CDM’s Brazilian architects. The CDM arose from the Brazilian Proposal’s Clean Development Fund, and was negotiated between Brazil and the United States in the weeks preceding the Kyoto Conference of Parties. The CDM’s Brazilian architects continued to pursue their underlying policy goals by taking a leadership position in the Marrakesh Accords negotiations. During this period Brazil’s primary policy objectives comprised achieving meaningful mitigation of GHG emissions to avoid dangerous interference with the climate system, derailing a perceived US/IPCC initiative to allocate emissions cap obligations in the Kyoto Protocol on the basis of current emissions, and taking a leadership position both among the G-77 and China and in the multilateral climate negotiations as a whole. The CDM arose in this context from the G-77 and China’s desire to coerce the North’s compliance with the North’s emissions cap obligations through an alternative means of compliance. As a result, there was no focus on broad conceptions of sustainable development, or on broad distribution of CDM projects throughout the South. Instead, the CDM’s Brazilian architects envisioned that CDM-related sustainable development would arise exclusively from the presence of the CDM projects. Similarly, the Brazilian Proposal advocated allocation of the Clean Development Fund on a basis proportionate to each non-Annex I countries projected 1990–2010 greenhouse gas emissions. These views persisted through the evolution of the Clean Development Fund into the CDM and through Marrakesh Accords negotiations. This article argues that the CDM has largely met the policy goals of its Brazilian architects and that the pursuit of different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy goals necessitates corresponding refinements to the CDM, or any successor mechanism, specifically targeting those different, additional, refined or more nuanced policy objectives, lending support to the emerging literature proposing changes to the CDM to pursue corresponding policy objectives.     

Introduction: exploring and explaining the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate

This introduction lays the groundwork for this Special Issue by providing an overview of the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), and by introducing three main analytical themes. The first theme concerns the emergence and continuation of the APP. The contributions show that the emergence of the APP can be attributed to international factors, including the United States’ rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, and its search for an alternative arena for global climate governance, and other countries’ wish to maintain good relations with the US; as well as domestic factors, such as the presence of bureaucratic actors in favour of the Partnership, alignment with domestic priorities, and the potential for reaping economic benefits through participation. The second theme examines the nature of the Partnership, concluding that it falls on the very soft side of the hard–soft law continuum and that while being branded as a public–private partnership, governments remain in charge. Under the third theme, the influence which the APP exerts on the post-2012 United Nations (UN) climate change negotiations is scrutinised. The contributions show that at the very least, the APP is exerting some cognitive influence on the UN discussions through its promotion of a sectoral approach. The introduction concludes with outlining areas for future research.