The Cold War and European integration, 1947-63

The author discusses the impact the Cold War had on European Integration and, in particular, on the American efforts in support of that initiative. He shows that the perceived Communist threat was an important but not the only motivating force behind America's endorsement of a unified Europe. The other motif he singles out independently of, although not unrelated to, the Cold War was the American aim to contain a renascent Germany. It was this purpose, he maintains, that determined the American long-term option for a supranational structure for an integrated Europe after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany.     

The anatomy of disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration in the republic of Congo1

This analysis begins with a general account of the political and humanitarian context of the Republic of Congo (RoC) before and after the signing of the Ceasefire Accords in 1999. In laying out the general context of the violence, it also briefly describes a number of interventions undertaken by the Government of Congo (GoC) and the international community to promote and ensure security. It reflects on the considerable confusion among stakeholders over the definitions, objectives and sequencing of each phase, from disarmament and demobilisation to reintegration (DDR)—a challenge not unique to actors in the RoC. This article offers a tentative glossary of terms to inform future efforts in the domain of DDR and closes with a consideration of the impacts and roles of key stakeholders in the DDR continuum, and some of the challenges they might face in the future.     

'Unfortunate Arabia': The United States, Great Britain and Yemen, 1955-63

As it emerged from a long, self-imposed diplomatic isolation after 1955 and then plunged into revolution and civil war in 1962, Yemen confronted its Arab neighbours, the United States, and Great Britain with difficult political challenges. This study of Anglo-American diplomacy concerning Yemen in the late 1950s and early 1960s reveals the very different British and American interests and priorities in Arabia at the height of the Cold War and underscores the different tactics employed by each nation in pursuit of its regional goals. It also points out the strikingly different attitudes of officials in Washington and London to the phenomenon of Arab nationalism. Further, it highlights the importance of stability in the southwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula to US and British strategies for ensuring the uninterrupted flow of Persian Gulf petroleum to the West. Finally, this examination of events in southwest Arabia demonstrates how traditional rivalries and animosities in the region shaped the conditions under which the United States and Britain attempted to pursue their interests there.     

The foreign office of the federal republic of Germany and the question of relations with communist states, 1953-55

The thaw in the Cold War following Joseph Stalin's death in March 1953 initiated a debate within the West German Foreign Office about intensifying relations with Eastern European communist states. Several veteran diplomats advocated expanding economic ties in particular. By 1955, however, the ministry's leadership around Foreign Minister Adenauer had won out with its more cautious course of limiting contacts to diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This early debate already highlighted most of the issues central to West German deliberations on expanding relations with communist states right up to Brandt's Neue Ostpolitik of the late 1960s and early 1970s.     

'Suez in reverse': The arab response to the iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.     

'Suez in reverse': The Arab response to the Iraqi bid for Kuwait, 1961-63

On 25 June 1961,';Abd al-Qarim Qassem, the ruler of Iraq, declared Kuwait to be an integral par of Iraq. The announcement ignited a crisis involving Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and aLL the Arab states. In retrospect, and in light of Saddam Husayn's subsequent invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, one may regard this event as a 'dress rehearsal'. Despite its being mainly an Arab crisis, most studies have focused on the role of the Western powers-in particular Britain. This article, in contrast, aims to shed new light on the conduct of the Arab states during the Arab world operated as a system with its own features and characteristics. The article shows that the crisis heralded the decline of President Nasser's central role in the Arab system - a trend that was reinforced with the demise of the Egyptain-Syrian merger shortly after. In addition, although the dialogue between the Arab rules was couched in pan-Arab terminology, the players acted according to thier own interests, thus strengthening the territorial Arab state.     

'The limits of international leadership': The Eisenhower administration, East-West trade and the cold war, 1953-54

This article examines the Eisenhower administration's trade policy towards the Soviet Union in 1953-54. It argues, contrary to previous scholarship on the subject, that the liberalization of East-West trade controls in August 1954 cannot be attributed solely to the presidential leadership of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Instead, whilst Eisenhower played a significant role in changing American embargo policy, it was the Churchill government which provided the impetus required for the revision of the international export control lists. Despite conflict and confrontation over the shape and contents of the new embargo between Washington and London, the two governments forged a compromise in the summer of 1954.     

Selling the 'Decent interval': Kissinger,triangular diplomacy,and the end of the Vietnam war, 1971-73

With the help of recently declassified documents, this article examines the link between triangular diplomacy and the Vietnam War. It argues that from the summer of 1971 to the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in January 1973 Kissinger tried to 'sell' a peace agreement to his Soviet and Chinese inter locutors by stressing the American willingness to accept a 'decent interval' solution: that is, the United States would not reenter the war provided that the collapse of the South Vietnamese goverment did not occur immediately after the last US ground troops returned home. While such a posture played a significant role in increasing Sino-Soviet pressure towards a negotiated settlement, Kissinger's policy also served to bolster the subsequent competition between Moscow and Beijing over influence in Indochina.     

Selling the 'Decent interval': kissinger, triangular diplomacy, and the end of the Vietnam war, 1971-73

With the help of recently declassified documents, this article examines the link between triangular diplomacy and the Vietnam War. It argues that from the summer of 1971 to the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in January 1973 Kissinger tried to 'sell' a peace agreement to his Soviet and Chinese inter locutors by stressing the American willingness to accept a 'decent interval' solution: that is, the United States would not reenter the war provided that the collapse of the South Vietnamese goverment did not occur immediately after the last US ground troops returned home. While such a posture played a significant role in increasing Sino-Soviet pressure towards a negotiated settlement, Kissinger's policy also served to bolster the subsequent competition between Moscow and Beijing over influence in Indochina.     

British cultural diplomacy and the cold war: 1946-61

Why was Britain so reluctant to use the tools of cultural diplomacy for the cold war? First, the habits of administration and the effects of war encouraged a compartmentalization of effort. There was no obvious point at which to construct an overview or a strategy which could match the Soviet enterprise. Second, the dissolution of the empire exposed the racism and ethnic tensions which had existed in both the United Kingdom and its colonies. Policymakers appeared to be pursuing incompatible objectives. They found it difficult to think about post-colonial influence except in terms of a policy for the Commonwealth, but also to construct such a line of action. The insubstantiality of cultural diplomacy is part of the trauma of losing great power status. Arab nationalism was the major force which prompted government into action on cultural affairs. Commitments were made before the military operations in Suez.     

A western cold war: the crisis in Iceland's relations with Britain, the United States, and NATO, 1971-74

The article explores the crisis in Iceland's relations with the Western Alliance following a left-wing government's decisions, in 1971, to expand Iceland's fishery limits and to demand the withdrawal of US military forces. This sparked a cod war with Britain and a diplomatic stand-off with the United States, with NATO in the middle. It analyzes the motives behind Iceland's behaviour - especially the tension between a pro Western foreign policy course and a domestic anti Western nationalism - the Western response within the context of alliance politics and the democratic peace theory, and the role of international mediation and domestic political realignments in diffusing the crisis.