COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN THE REGULATION OF AUSTRALIA'S COMMON PROPERTY RENEWABLE RESOURCES1

Abstract: This paper examines the Northern Prawn Fishery of Australia as an illustration of the consistent failures of systems of open (“market”?) access to common property goods. The dilemmas of collective action explain both why those occurred and substantially why subsequent regulatory intervention has not succeeded either in its stated objectives. It is argued, unfashionably, that the endemic nature of these collective action dilemmas in the fishery means that in 1987 the regulatory schema proposed by the government (the allocative coercion option?) would have provided superior outcomes to allocations based on self-regulation by the industry.     

地利分配秩序中的农民维权及政府回应研究——以珠三角地区征地农民上访为例

进入新世纪以来,珠三角地区因征地历史遗留问题而导致的农民集体维权事件处于高发态势。尽管不少征地案件存在程序不规范等问题,但支撑农民的集体维权行动的根本动力,实际上是他们对地权增值的再分配主张。在维权过程中,农民以宗族为动员基础,以重新分配地利为主要目标,并采取了“挟”“闹”“诉”和“谋”等行动策略。地方政府则采用了“开口子”“给票子”“定调子”和“补漏子”等回应性治理策略。农民和村集体与地方政府之间的矛盾原本属于利益博弈的问题,但是农民通过维权方式将利益博弈问题转化为民生问题和权利话语。村庄微观政治通过信访渠道进入宏观政治领域。     

Bringing a Network Perspective to Chinese Internet Studies: An Exploratory Analysis

This paper adopts a network perspective to explore the ways digitally-mediated relationships prompt social and/or political participation in China. In the “chicken game scenario”, my analysis suggests that collective actions are facilitated by both weak and strong ties, which generate a fairly unified collective identity that is conductive to high-risk mobilization. In the “public crisis scenario”, it is generally weak ties that facilitate relatively lower-risk mobilization. In the “compromise scenario”, if collective actions do occur, they are generally low-risk and non-political. This appears to be largely due to the dominance of weak ties in the compromise scenario. The “banal scenario” is a black box that has yet to be sufficiently investigated in the future.     

Globalization and the Retreat of Citizen Participation in Collective Action: A Challenge for Public Administration

Globalization challenges the ability of contemporary public administration to encourage citizen participation in collective action through behaviors such as tax compliance and contributions to public goods. The authors introduce a new individual‐level approach to globalization, arguing that people vary in the extent to which they are globalized and that an individual's level of globalism (ILG) reflects attitudes and dispositions that influence the way he or she resolves the social dilemma of participation in collective action (i.e., the decision to contribute versus follow a “free‐ride” strategy). Using a four‐country sample, the article examines the relationship between ILG and collective action participation decisions in three behavioral experiments. Findings support the hypothesis that regardless of country‐level globalization, a more globalized individual complies less willingly with tax codes, donates less to local nongovernmental organizations, and prefers to adopt a free‐ride strategy in a public goods game. The consequences for public administration are discussed.     

Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer

In reply to Marquette and Peiffer's article “Grappling With the ‘Real Politics’ of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates Versus ‘Real‐World’ Functions,” this article employs three criticisms: Marquette and Peiffer's call to grapple with the “real politics of corruption” does not bring much new to the table, is conceptually flawed, and risks serving as an excuse for corrupt elites to pursue “business as usual.” In response, we reaffirm three insights gained from collective action‐based approaches toward corruption. Although corruption might solve individual‐level problems in the short term, it is still a de facto problem at the aggregate level, the tools derived from principal–agent theory will not solve the collective action problem of systemic corruption, and elites will be the least likely to implement reform. We conclude by calling for the continued fight against corruption—a fight informed by empirical and theoretical knowledge.     

Transparency in multilateral climate politics: Furthering (or distracting from) accountability?

This article analyzes the interplay between transparency and accountability in multilateral climate politics. The 2015 Paris Agreement calls for a “pledge‐and‐review” approach to collective climate action with an “enhanced transparency framework” as a key pillar of the Agreement. By making visible who is doing what, transparency is widely assumed to be vital to holding countries to account and building trust. We explore whether transparency is generating such effects in this context, by developing and applying an analytical framework to examine the link between transparency and accountability. We find that the scope and practices of climate transparency reflect (rather than necessarily reduce) broader conflicts over who should be held to account to whom and about what, with regard to responsibility and burden sharing for ambitious climate action. We conclude that the relationship between transparency and accountability is less straightforward than assumed, and that the transformative promise of transparency needs to be reconsidered in this light.     

Need or Greed? Conditions for Collective Action against Corruption

This article calls into question one of the implicit assumptions linking democratic accountability to reduced corruption, namely, that citizens will expose institutions rife with venality and mobilize for better government. Instead, mobilization may be contingent on the type of corruption. The study develops a distinction between need and greed corruption and suggest that citizens are more likely to engage in the fight against corruption when corruption is needed to gain access to “fair” treatment (need corruption) as opposed to special illicit advantages (greed corruption). Using data from the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the study suggest that need corruption mobilizes citizens, in particular if they perceive that fellow citizens will also engage, while greed corruption leads to secrecy, demobilization, and a propensity to “free ride” on other citizens’ anticorruption efforts. The study thereby contributes to a better understanding of fundamental conditions for collective action against corruption and explaining why greed corruption persists in societies with well‐established institutions for accountability.     

Reinventing political subjectivities: studying critical documentaries on the war on terror

This paper casts a look on media aspects of the anti-war-on-terror struggle in western countries. A peculiar warfare, the “war on terror” that officially begun in 2001, is a low-density global warfare, fought in different internal and external fronts . Within a liberal, increasingly post-political social terrain, where social affairs are objects of expert management lacking public accountability and legitimacy, the role, status and the identity of the contemporary citizen is in decline. New media “affordances” offer critical possibilities for challenging hegemonic political discourses, and addressing political alternatives for a broad range of social problems; a re-invention of citizenship through the construct of a new (collective) political subject is central in the reinvention of democracy today. Discourse analysis, drawing reflexively on post-structuralist discourse theory and critical discourse analysis, is deployed in the study of counter-war-on-terror discourses in different documentaries critical to the “war on terror”. Analysis looks at different constructions of “us” and “them” in the context of counter-hegemonic discourses today. Identity is central in the engagement, participation and orientation of citizens today. Identity is central in organising a collective centre and in initiating subjectivity to fragmented liberal, postmodern individuals.     

Capitalism,nature, socialism a theoretical introduction∗

This article expounds the traditional Marxist theory of the contradiction between forces and relations of production, over‐production of capital and economic crisis, and the process of crisis‐induced restructuring of productive forces and production relations into more transparently social, hence potentially socialist, forms. This exposition provides a point of departure for an “ecological Marxist”; theory of the contradiction between capitalist production relations and forces and the conditions of production, under‐production of capital and economic crisis, and the process of crisis‐induced restructuring of production conditions and the social relations thereof also into more transparently social, hence potentially socialist, forms. In short, there may be not one but two paths to socialism in late capitalist society.

While the two processes of capital over‐production and underproduction are by no means mutually exclusive, they may offset or compensate for one another in ways which create the appearance of relatively stable processes of capitalist development. Study of the combination of the two processes in the contemporary world may throw light on the decline of traditional labor and socialist movements and the rise of “new social movements”; as agencies of social transformation. In similar ways that traditional Marxism illuminates the practises of traditional labor movements, it may be that “ecological Marxism”; throws light on the practices of new social movements. Although ecology and nature; the politics of the body, feminism, and the family; and urban movements and related topics are usually discussed in post‐Marxist terms, the rhetoric deployed in this article is self‐consciously Marxist and designed to appeal to Marxist theorists and fellow travelers whose work remains within a “scientific”; discourse hence those who are least likely to be convinced by post‐Marxist discussions of the problem of capital's use and abuse of nature (including human nature) in the modern world. However, the emphasis in this article on a political economic “scientific”; discourse is tactical, not strategic. In reality, more or less autonomous social relationships, often non‐capitalist or anti‐capitalist, constitute “civil society,”; which needs to be addressed on its own practical and theoretical terms. In other words, social and collective action is not meant to be construed merely as derivative of systemic forces, as the last section of the article hopefully will make clear.     

Contested governance: The new repertoire of the Eurozone crisis

The austerity policies that EU policymakers adopted in response to the Eurozone crisis are often criticized as the product of institutionalized neoliberal ideas. This critique has merits, but tends to overlook institutional changes that do not neatly conform to well demarcated neoliberal ideas considered as “switchmen,” “paradigms,” or “blueprints.” This article offers an alternative reading of the Eurozone's institutional evolution that bridges pragmatist scholarship with cognitive and social psychology. The Eurozone crisis saw the emergence of a new and contested repertoire of governance. Policymakers agreed that “stronger governance” was necessary, but they struggled over how to perform that repertoire. This contest ultimately produced institutional changes that typically mixed austerity and unconventional policies. The advantage of thinking about ideas in terms of repertoires that actors perform is to afford a more granular view of institutions as sites of individual cognition, collective innovation, and political contestation.     

Terrorism, key assets, and critical infrastructures: to protect or to rebuild? That is the question

Both the choice between “stick” and “carrot” and the tension between “control” and “preservation of civil liberties” characterize the policy debate over counterterrorism. Arguing for the “carrot and preservation of civil liberties” viewpoint, Frey and Rohner (Def. Peace Econ. 18(3):245–252, 2007) propose strategic reconstruction as an alternative to protection. Our paper provides a comparative analysis of these two policies. First, we study the rationality of the public’s expectations, and we show that credible strategic reconstruction may deter terrorist attacks. Next, we derive conditions under which strategic reconstruction is more efficient than protection. Finally, we show that strategic reconstruction may reinforce the efficiency of protection.     

The endogenous public choice theorist

Public choice theory has effectively explored defects in collective action and political processes. However, little attention has been given to the fact that any recommendations as to how to improve the situation can only be realized on the basis of precisely those defective institutions. What turns up here can be identified as a problem of self-reference. Normative contributions by Buchanan and Hayek may serve as an example. In order to clear up the seemingly paradoxical situation, “endogenization” of the public choice theorist within an extended theory is suggested. A straight-forward extension is briefly outlined.     

Social movements and regulatory agencies: Toward a more adequate—and less pessimistic—Theory of “clientele capture”

Many regulatory agencies were established during the Progressive Era and the New Deal, in part out of faith in their capacity to regulate industry in an apolitical and “scientific” fashion. A number of observers—most notably Marver Bernstein—have noted that many regulatory agencies eventually become “captured” by the very interests they are supposedly regulating. This paper first examines the notion of “clientele capture,” focusing in particular on the development of an operational classification of regulatory policies. It then builds upon Bernstein's suggestion that the cycle of decay commences with the demise of the constituency supporting regulation. Through case studies an effort is made to explore (1) the conditions under which a regulatory agency is likely to actively attempt to develop a supportive constituency and (2) the conditions under which a constituency supportive of aggressive regulation is able to effectively monitor regulatory policy (and to be instrumental in preventing slippage) after the decline in public concern with the issue.     

Types of Economic Voting in Regional Elections: The 2012 Catalan Election as a Motivating Case

The standard assumption that economic voting (EV) is “jurisdiction-specific” inevitably leads to a breakdown between “national EV” and “regional EV”. This paper challenges this overly simplistic distinction by proposing a more complex typology, whereby national and regional incumbents may be assessed in both national and regional elections, according to either national or regional economic conditions. Accordingly, new and more sophisticated types of EV emerge, such as “second-order EV” or “coattail EV”. In this paper, some of these new types of EV are verified with a suitable case study. The 2012 Catalan election was carried out in the context of severe recession, but also under the impression – among many Catalans – that the economic policies of the Spanish government were harshly punishing Catalan economic interests. Binomial logistic regression models confirm that, under political circumstances such as these, voters may use regional elections to assess the national incumbents' economic performance, whereas regional incumbents may end up exonerated from poor economic performance. This case study may be illustrative for other regional elections around the world.     

Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens

This paper raises an old question and proposes a new answer. The question is, “Must public goods be produced by governments?” The consensus answer is “Yes,” on the grounds that transaction costs related to group size prevent all potential consumers of a public good from entering into voluntary arrangements to produce efficient levels of that good. Government intervention thus is required to achieve efficiency. Yet many obvious examples of public goods are not financed or even subsidized by government. Conspicuous examples of this phenomenon include the development of important innovations in technique in fields such as music (Bach and Beethoven), literature (Defoe, Dickens and Shakespeare, not excepting Homer or Adam Smith), and the visual arts (Cezanne), not to mention many crucial scientific discoveries. Indeed, the obvious public-good aspects of scientific knowledge induced many private societies to offer prizes for particular innovations. Two questions are raised by the private, voluntary provision of nonrival outputs or inputs: (1) what conditions contribute to this phenomenon, and (2) can voluntary provision come “close” to efficient provision? We suggest in this paper that, under certain conditions, the gains from many public goods whose benefits reach nationwide populations are largely realized at group sizes far smaller than even county or municipal jurisdictions.     

When groups contribute to a public good: The importance of institutional framework for making collective decisions

In this paper I discuss how the institutional framework for making collective decisions influences the outcome of a game where groups contribute to a public good. Representative democracy invites each group to act strategically in the election of representatives. I show that this strategic effect reinforces “the tragedy of the common.” The society — all groups taken together — has therefore incentives to restrict groups from making collective decisions through a system of representation.     

An analysis of the Latin Americanization of race in the United States: a reconnaissance of color stratification among Mexicans

Eduardo Bonilla-Silva has painted with broad strokes a portrait of the future of racial relations in the United States in his paper entitled, “We are all Americans: Toward a New System of Racial Stratification in the U.S.A.” [Race and Society (forthcoming)]. In essence, he sees the United States moving from a two-tier, black-white racial system toward a three-tier racial system where persons will be categorized as “white”, “honorary white”, or “collective black”. Additionally, Bonilla-Silva believes that we are moving from a system in which race is commonly taken into account, toward a system of “color-blind” racism. In this article, we closely examine Bonilla-Silva’s ideas, and although we appreciate the broad scale of his work and its challenge to traditional race relations, we make adjustments to his work, particularly concerning the location of Latinos in the U.S. racial hierarchy, which lead both to a better understanding of the current and future racial situation in the United States, and toward policy recommendations which could ameliorate the bleak situation in which we find ourselves concerning life chances of people of color.     

A novel understanding of experimentation in governance: co-producing innovations between “lab” and “field”

What do experiments do for governance? Along with pragmatist and performative conceptions, we argue that they do not test already existing conditions of governing, but actively transform such conditions. Experiments help to realize specific models of governance by co-producing collective knowledge and material practices. We analyze a series of experiments with “emissions trading” in the USA between 1968 and 2000. The historical perspective shows how different types of experiments worked together: experiments in the laboratory and in the field supported each other in creating epistemic and political authority. This “ping-pong between lab and field” produced subjects and objects, facts and values, knowledge and power and aligned them in a new socio-material configuration, thus realizing emissions trading as a new form of governance.     

Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits

Assesses the arguments for the use of market, or political, processes for making collective choices. The border between “what is mine” and “what is ours” is contested, but it is unguarded. Where should it lie? How would we know when it should be adjusted? I uncover an old paradox: A society can never use political means to guard against incursions across the border for political ends. Some other mechanism, such as constitutional or other extra-statutory rules, are required.     

Further evidence on the relationship between economic freedom and economic growth

Much of the literature on the power of elected officials and bureaucratic agencies argues, from an empirical perspective, that bureaus appears to exercise autonomy. In this paper, a theoretical model sets out the conditions under which the Congress, the President, and one agency (we use the U.S. Federal Reserve as an extended example) can dictate policy outcomes. The results of the paper include the “Congressional Dominance” theorem: If more than 2/3 of House members, and more than 2/3 of Senate members, agree on something, they get it. The theorem is obvious (the “proof” is in the U.S. Constitution), but often forgotten in the substantive literature. More realistic results are derived for situations where the preferences of members of Congress are more diverse. Powers of the President to influence policy with, and without, appointments are also analyzed.