Bureaucratic control and information processing: An institutional comparison

Standard models of bureaucratic control argue that politicians vulnerable to asymmetric information rely on third‐party monitoring to expand information supply. This solution to information asymmetry assumes that politicians can process all information that comes their way. However, advocates strategically oversupply information to crowd out rivals, making such a solution counterproductive. Using data on administrative reorganization in Hong Kong, we examine the alternative proposition that bureaucratic control is contingent not only on how information is obtained but also on how it is processed under two different institutional arrangements: one that splits attention across domain‐specific streams and one that concentrates attention in a single sequence. In both cases, bureaucrats refrain from major changes when politicians break from these arrangements. Moreover, bureaucratic action is significantly more likely to respond to changes in attention allocation when politicians process information in multiple streams.     

When Politics Matters: The Impact of Politicians' and Bureaucrats' Preferences on Salient and Nonsalient Policy Areas

For three decades, the “politics matters” literature has found that political ideology is an important explanation of public policy. However, this literature systematically fails to include the influence of the bureaucracy. In fact, it is almost impossible to identify a single study in this literature that controls for the influence of the permanent bureaucracy. In this article, we investigate whether politics still matters when bureaucratic preferences are taken into account. We do this in a simultaneous test of political and bureaucratic influences on public budgets, a policy measure often studied in the “politics matters” literature. We find that political preferences trump bureaucratic ones in policy areas salient to the public but not in less salient areas. This might be comforting news from a democratic perspective. However, as public budgets represent an easy case for political influence, it is food for thought that political preferences do not always prevail.     

Banishing Bureaucracy or Hatching a Hybrid? The CanadianFood Inspection Agency and the Politics of Reinventing Government

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) is a means to overcoming long-standing bureaucratic politics while attaining some major policy ends.Contrary to some of the new public management bravado of transforming the public sector, the CFIA is not a bureaucratic revolution in reshaping the Canadian State. Changes in scientific staffing, funding, and inspection have been more incremental than fundamental. Moreover, the CFIA is something less than the special and separate operating agency models discussed in the alternative service delivery literature in terms of autonomy and market orientation, but something more autonomous and entrepreneurial than traditional government departments. These organizational and managerial reforms are modest extensions providing a means for achieving economies and enhanced effectiveness in carrying out the mandate of safety, consumer protection, and market access for Canadian food, animal, plant, and forestry products.     

Political Control versus Bureaucratic Values: Reframing the Debate

The literature on political control of bureaucracy reveals that bureaucracies are highly responsive to political forces. This paper argues that the political control literature misses evidence from other academic literature that bears directly on this phenomenon. Specifically, researchers need to consider the values of the bureaucracy in any effort to assess the degree of political control. An empirical test is presented using a data set from public education. Results show bureaucratic values to be far more influential in explaining bureaucratic outputs and outcomes than political factors. These findings suggest that a reinterpretation of previous empirical research is urgently in order.     

Bureaucracy Versus Markets in Hospital Care: The Dutch Case

In this paper we analyze the bureaucratic negotiation processthat is implied by the budgeting system applied in Dutchhospital care. This system is based on centralized pricesetting while simultaneously allowing for decentralizednegotiations on volumes. We apply a variant of the bureaucracytheory, according to which the bureaucratic agency (in ourcase the joint hospitals) are not allowed to pricediscriminate, but will receive a flat price per unit ofoutput. We find that central price setting, where the insurercannot exploit its information on hospital costs, leads to asuboptimal supply of hospital care.     

Whole of Government: the Solution to Managing Crises?

The frequency and severity of natural disasters has placed a clear emphasis on the role of governments in responding to these crises. During the past decade, disaster events have had a significant impact on the relevant communities as well as raising questions regarding the role of government and the bureaucratic coordination of planning and response processes. These events have placed a renewed focus on the ability of governments to plan, prepare, and respond in an effective way to crises. They have also tended to indicate that there remain serious challenges to government coordination and that crises create a unique series of challenges for the public sector. At the heart of understanding how governments respond to crises are notions of bureaucratic coordination. It has been suggested that joined‐up or whole of government arrangements may provide an appropriate means in which to approach crisis management. As a result a number of key themes emerge including the nature of crisis management, role of leadership, understanding coordination, impact of organisational culture, and the interactions between individuals and institutions. This paper will consider these issues and provide a review of the relevant literature, to understand the synergies that exist in connected responses to crises.     

Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes

Democracies deliberately create “friction” in bureaucratic processes, using inefficiencies to mitigate the impact of government transitions and asymmetric information on leaders' ability to exert control. With far more centralized power, would authoritarians prefer less friction? We argue that they do not. In fact, excess friction is actively supplied to hinder bureaucratic coordination independent of or even in opposition to top-down control, leaving the central leaders the only player powerful enough to organize complex actions. Our analysis of data on the Chinese government indicates that bureaucrats are systematically sent to unfamiliar work environment, and that agencies that are more exposed to the resultant inefficiencies are also more likely to come under direct control by senior Politburo members. The pattern of targeted intervention indicates that bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes is predicated not only on centralized power in general but also the deliberate supply of friction to obstruct independent actions from the bottom up.     

The Politics–Bureaucracy Interface in Developing Countries

The political–bureaucratic interface has been the subject of much academic interest. However, research has tended to focus exclusively on wealthy institutionalized democracies, with little attention given to the political–administrative relationship in developing countries. However, recent evidence from reform processes in poorer nations increasingly highlights the importance of interactions between politicians and bureaucrats. This paper provides a systematic overview of the political–bureaucratic relationship in developing countries and in doing so makes two key contributions. First, it introduces a typology of political–bureaucratic relations based on four models—collaborative, collusive, intrusive, and integrated—discussing examples of each. Second, it analyses the main factors associated with different models of political–bureaucratic relations and considers how countries can move from one model of relations to another. The paper provides a much‐needed entry point for scholars and policymakers to better understanding the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in developing countries. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bureaucratic Professionalization and the Limits of the Political Control Thesis: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission

This article explores the political control thesis in light of the literature on bureaucratic politics and agency professionalization. It argues that existing studies of political control have been limited by a failure to analyze the impact of organizational factors on policy change. The article tests political-control and bureaucratic hypotheses through an analysis of changing enforcement priorities at the Federal Trade Commission, The results suggest that the growing role of economists in the agency, rather than congressional oversight or presidential appointments, is critical in explaining the changing antitrust priorities of the Federal Trade Commission.     

The Phenomenon of Collective Action: Modeling Institutions as Structures of Care

This essay develops a theory of how institutions can work through the web of social relationships that exist in a place rather than through formal, bureaucratic lines of authority. In contrast to models that characterize institutions as organizational structures, roles, and patterns of exchange, this model depicts institutions as constituted primarily through the active working and reworking of relationships. Rather than adopt the network literature's focus on the overall pattern of relationships and exchanges carried out between policy actors, the author focuses directly on the nature of the relationships themselves and portrays the institution as the playing out of these relationships, employing Carol Gilligan's notion of care. The model of care is used to analyze the evolution, unraveling, and restoration of resource management systems on the Turtle Islands in Southeast Asia. The model provides lessons for institution building, especially for community-centered governance.     

The Purse Strings and the Policy Process: Bureaucratic Shaping of Industry Policy Capacity after 1945

Much literature in public administration debates the role of the public servant in the policy-making process. Some literature acknowledges an integral role of the public servant in the process. However, this role often remains obscure, due to being couched in abstract terms. The hierarchical structuring of responsibilities and power within bureaucracies imparts the capacity for differential influence. This paper provides a case study of the role of the Public Service Board (power over staffing) and the Australian federal Treasury (power over the purse) in the shaping of the bureaucratic structure. The case study centres on the industry policy bureaucracy in the volatile decade after World War II. In shaping the bureaucratic capacity, the Board and the Treasury exerted a discretionary influence on the policy process itself.     

Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in Its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive's governing legitimacy. Inspired by Charles Tilly (1984), the authors compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular, configurations of assigned decision‐making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies, the elected government of Ireland's parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e., democratic) legitimacy, while the executive government of Hong Kong's administrative state favors output (i.e., performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.     

The Politics of Administrative Reform in East and Southeast Asia: From Gridlock to Continuous Self‐Improvement?

This article compares patterns and outcomes of administrative reform in four countries: Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. It focuses on the supply side, that is, on reform implementation. It is assumed that bureaucrats, upon whom implementation depends, have an interest in controlling the process. A distinction is made between two types of bureaucratic systems—autonomous and instrumental—according to structural features that increase the potential to block reforms. Four possible patterns of administrative reform are distinguished according to whether demand is high or low, and whether the bureaucracy can be classed as autonomous or instrumental. More broadly, it is argued that supply will be lower in autonomous bureaucratic systems. A comparative case study method is applied to test this model, and the proposition is not disconfirmed. Malaysia and Singapore, both classed as instrumental bureaucracies, demonstrate a predictable style of "continuous administrative self-improvement." The status of the bureaucracy in Thailand and Taiwan is in transition, and the model is used to analyze changes in reform patterns over time and to suggest future trajectories.     

What Do Bureaucrats Like Doing? Bureaucratic Preferences in Response to Institutional Reform

How do bureaucrats respond to administrative reform in relation to their overall administrative goals? The authors test the bureau‐shaping thesis, which holds that bureaucrats’ preferences for certain kinds of roles and tasks motivate their support for bureau reform. Drawing on attitudinal and behavioral data from a survey of English local government officials, the findings underscore how bureaucrats with different interests and motivations sort themselves into job types. Their preferences drive support for reform, which, in turn, strengthens the executive structure of English local government. Drawing on the literature on bureaucratic responses to institutional reform, the authors offer a more nuanced portrayal of bureaucratic preferences in line with the bureau‐shaping model. A key conclusion: political principals need improved empirical awareness of bureaucratic preferences when undertaking public institutional reforms.     

Back to the Future? Senior Federal Executives in the United States

Based on findings from the 1970s, research literature on senior government executives emphasized a growing integration of politics and administration. This integration was reflected in what we called the "Image IV" bureaucrat wherein political role traits combined with those of traditional bureaucratic ones. Although this was by no means a dominant trend, we were led to speculate that traditional divisions between political and bureaucratic roles were eroding. Data gathered from the 1980s and 1990s, however, lead us to infer that divisions between political and bureaucratic roles have reasserted themselves and that integration between them is being diminished rather than strengthened. We conclude that this may be because in an era of governmental austerity the demand for executive policy entrepreneurs has slackened while the political needs have shifted to those of managerial control over an inertial or even contracting state.     

Using organization theory to understand international organizations: Four models of multilateral decision making

This article addresses an enduring public management question: “Is organizational functioning a product of politics, management, or both?” It speaks to this issue by analyzing the decisional dynamics of the world's most inclusive, and prominent international organization: the United Nations. To assess the ability of international organizations to develop and implement international public policy, this study draws upon an extensive literature in organization theory to develop four models of multilateral decision making:

• •⊎ A Cognitive Ambiguity Model;
• •⊎ A Bounded Pragmatism Model;
• •⊎ An Organizational Expansion Model; and
• •⊎ A Political Interests Model.

In considering the obstacles to effective policy, this study asks whether policy is porduced by intellectual confusion, routine-based decision making, bureaucratic ego, or base political motives. This project closes by arguing for broad approaches to the politics/management continuum, and an integration of the four models. Only by weaving and practitioners distinct strands of organization theory, can scholars and practitioners fully appreciate the intellectual and political dynamics of publicly managed organizations, and thus, the aids and onstacles to their functioning.     

Bureaucratic Structure and Administrative Behaviour: Lessons from International Bureaucracies

This article contributes to a growing literature on international bureaucracy by exploring the relationship between bureaucratic structure and administrative behaviour. The ambition of this study is twofold: first, it explores the extent to which international bureaucracies combine two inherent behavioural logics: a logic of hierarchy and a logic of portfolio. Second, two key empirical lessons are used to modify four conventional claims in existing research. Drawing on a rich body of data from three international bureaucracies (the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat, and the WTO Secretariat), this study suggests that administrative behaviour among international civil servants is profoundly shaped by the bureaucratic structures of international bureaucracies. Variation in the abovementioned behavioural logics is conditioned by two aspects of bureaucratic structure: First, the accumulation of relevant organisational capacities at the executive centre of international bureaucracies, and second, the vertical and horizontal specialisation of international bureaucracies.     

Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats

This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers.We wish to thank the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois for its support of this research. Also, we thank Larry Kahn, Fran Blau, and Pablo Spiller for useful comments. Errors, of course, are ours.     

The effects of multiple objectives in the theory of public sector supply

This paper incorporates objectives of both legislators and bureaucrats in a model of public sector decisionmaking. Existing models assume that either bureaucrats control production information and decisions, (Niskanen-type models) or legislators control production decisions (legislative models). My model explicitly incorporates imperfect agent behavior and corresponding preferences of both legislators and bureaucrats to reflect the bilateral nature of appropriations. The analysis shows that output levels generally differ from politically and socially efficient levels and depend on the relative weights of legislative and bureaucratic interests. Accordingly, Niskanen-type and legislative models are viewed as special cases of this more general approach.     

From processing to analysing: Intensifying the use of microcomputers in development bureaucracies

This article examines constraints in development bureaucracies in intensifying the use of microcomputers as they move beyond processing applications to analysing applications. The work is based on the experience of several ministries of the Government of Kenya. Processing applications involve throughput of data and are relatively simple. Analysing applications, in contrast, are more complex and include data assembly, sensitivity analysis, and modelling. The article argues that processing applications are more compatible with the administrative cultures, bureaucratic functions, personnel skill levels and organizational structures of development bureaucracies. Analysing applications are less compatible because they require a level of training and motivation uncommon in development bureaucracies. Analysing applications are further thwarted by constraints in the supply of relevant information and the lack of demand for analysis by decision-makers. A four-cell matrix is developed which explains these constraints. The article concludes with several recommendations for encouraging microcomputer-based analysis, but cautions that processing applications will continue to dominate for the foreseeable future.