Beyond Rational Choice: the Hot/Cool Perspective of Criminal Decision Making

This paper proposes a general framework of criminal decision making that assumes both ‘cool’ cognition and ‘hot’ affect, i.e. feelings, to influence criminal choice. Drawing from judgment and decision making research and social psychology, the hot/cool perspective extends rational choice and deterrence theories by explaining how affect is likely to influence criminal decisions alongside cognitive considerations, such as the perceived costs and benefits of crime. It is shown how the hot/cool perspective offers a more realistic account of criminal decision making processes than existing decision models and approaches and also allows for the explanation of criminal behaviors that are difficult to explain in terms of rational choice.     

The theory of planned behavior and policing: how attitudes about behavior,subjective norms,and perceived behavioral control affect the discretionary enforcement decisions of police officers

This research used qualitative methods to investigate police officer decision-making processes within the context of the theory of planned behavior from the discipline of psychology. Interviews with police officers were conducted to elicit how the constructs of attitudes about enforcement behaviors, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control manifest themselves in a policing context and how they affect the enforcement decisions that police officers ultimately make. The results indicated that officer attitudes about enforcement behaviors impact the decisions officers make with the caution that the impact of these attitudes varies across varying situational contexts. In terms of subjective norms, officers were primarily concerned with supervisor expectations more than the expectations of coworkers or the community in general. Officer decisions are also impacted by perceived limits on their discretion with these perceived limits being largely conditioned by offense seriousness. Theoretical implications of the findings and directions for future research are discussed.     

Weak Enforcement,Strong Deterrence: Dialogues with Chinese Lawyers About Tax Evasion and Compliance

This article analyzes why Chinese lawyers report a high level of perceived deterrence in relation to tax evasion even though enforcement is weak. It finds that deterrence here originates from multiple sources, most directly through clients and more distantly through the firm and the state. Lawyers have highly contextual notions of detection probability and a vague understanding of sanction severity unfitting of the high deterrence found here. In the cases studied, deterrence arises out of a general fear lawyers have of state authorities and clients, as well as through personal morals and social norms in their firms. This shows a broader and deeper approach to deterrence, beyond certainty and severity of punishment for the violation studied, one in which the general perceived risk of such violation is central, whatever its source.     

Competing Normative Frameworks and the Limits of Deterrence Theory: Comments on Baker and Griffith's Ensuring Corporate Misconduct

This essay reviews the contributions to deterrence theory that Tom Baker and Sean Griffith make in Ensuring Corporate Misconduct (2010) and argues that their work highlights the limits of deterrence theory for shaping corporate conduct. Baker and Griffith extend the deterrence framework to account for the mediating effect of third‐party institutions, like insurers, on deterrence calculations, and they suggest how corporate governance decisions, such as what type of insurance coverage to purchase, encode signals about corporations' compliance motivations and capacity. Although these insights might prove useful for enhancing the efficacy of deterrence regimes aimed at white‐collar crime and other types of corporate misconduct, they suggest the difficulty of shaping corporate conduct that is influenced not only by the norms embodied in securities law, but also by the alternative normative system of shareholder value maximization. I discuss the failure of deterrence theory to address adequately noncompliant behavior that springs not solely from material self‐interest, but from adherence to an alternative set of norms, and I explore the possibility of viewing corporate compliance as a norm‐change project.     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

The Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social Norms as Moderators of Deterrence

In a survey of Australian citizens (valid N = 1,406), personal and social norms were found to moderate effects of deterrence on tax evasion. Personal, internalized norms of tax honesty were negatively related to tax evasion and moderated the effects of deterrence variables (i.e., sanction severity), suggesting deterrence effects only when individual ethics were weak. Perceived social norms, beyond those internalized as personal norms, were not directly related to tax evasion but moderated the effects of sanction severity. Only when social norms were seen as strongly in favor of tax honesty was sanction severity negatively related to tax evasion. This result held only for respondents who did not identify strongly as Australians. Hence, when internalized, norms delimit effects of deterrence; when considered external to one's self norms boost deterrence effects, giving social meaning to formal sanctions.     

Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Environmental Protection*

Based on interviews with facility managers in the electroplating and chemical industries, this study examines regulated firms’ perceptions of how various instrumental, normative, and social factors motivated their firms’ environmental actions. We found that “implicit general deterrence” (the overall effect of sustained inspection and enforcement activity) was far more important than either specific or general deterrence, and that deterrence in any form was of far greater concern to small and medium‐sized enterprises than it was to large ones. Most reputation‐sensitive firms in the environmentally sensitive chemical industry chose to go substantially beyond compliance for reasons that related to risk management and to the perceived need to protect their social license to operate. Almost half our respondents also provided normative explanations for why they complied. Overall, we conclude that there are various, often interwoven, strands that must be taken into account in understanding what motivates corporate environmental behavior, and how they play out depends very much on the size and sophistication of companies themselves and on the characteristics of the industry sector within which they are located.     

The "Compliance" Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement

Simple deterrence will often fail to produce compliance commitment because it does not directly address business perceptions of the morality of regulated behavior. Responsive regulation, by contrast, seeks to build moral commitment to compliance with the law. This article shows that a regulator can overcome the deterrence trap to improve compliance commitment with the skillful use of responsive regulatory techniques that "leverage" the deterrence impact of its enforcement strategies with moral judgments. But this leads it into the "compliance trap." The compliance trap occurs where there is a lack of political support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with cartel enforcement in Australia. In these circumstances, business offenders are likely to interpret the moral leveraging of responsive regulation as unfair or stigmatizing, and business perceptions of regulator unfairness are likely to have a negative influence on long-term compliance with the law. Moreover, big businesses that perceive regulatory enforcement as illegitimate are also likely to actively lobby for the political emasculation of the regulator. In these circumstances, most regulators are likely to avoid conflict by taking the easy option of enforcing the law "softly," and therefore ineffectively.     

When Do We Think About Detection? Structural Opportunity and Taxpaying Behavior

Past studies have generally found that perceptions of the likelihood of formal and informal sanctions have lower explanatory power of noncompliance with laws than do internalized norms. Using data from two telephone surveys, we examined a situational characteristic, structural opportunity, that may prod individuals to think about the likelihood of detection from the Internal Revenue Service for underreporting income. Structural opportunity is the degree to which an individual's economic or social situation provides ways to avoid detection. Individuals with high structural opportunity perceived a lower likelihood of IRS detection and indicated that they were less likely to feel guilty if they engaged in tax cheating. Our data also suggested that some individuals with high structural opportunity may be in social networks which condone tax cheating. As expected, structural opportunity provided a condition under which individuals took into consideration the perceived likelihood of formal and informal detection in formulating intentions to engage in tax cheating. Our findings suggest that an examination of the interaction between situational and individual characteristics will provide a more complete understanding of decisions to engage in illegal behavior. Implications for deterrence theory are discussed.     

Company Liability and Competition Law: Exposure of Company to Risk of Undesirable Behaviour of Directors

In order to protect the objectives of competition policy, companies as undertakings are primarily targeted for the competition law infringements based on the mixed approach of compliance and deterrence theories relying on the view that company directors are incentivised to comply with the rules of competition law by the internal compliance programmes and corporate fines are the consequences of incompliance. This enforcement strategy gives rise to a tension between corporate governance, company law and competition law, as the former two focus on the behaviour of individuals within the corporate structure, while the latter concerns the impact of the company’s behaviour in the market. The question that arises in this tension is whether or to what extent competition law actually considers the way in which the company is run internally while it seeks to promote these primary objectives. This article analyses the deterrent effectiveness of primary enforcement strategy employed in the UK competition law regime and argues that competition law does not tend to localise the source of conduct or particular decisions and does not aim to correct the right wrongdoer. Despite that lack of effectiveness of public enforcement strategy to deter further anti-competitive behaviour has led individual sanctions to be introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 in the UK, companies are still primarily targeted by corporate fines even though directors have intentionally breached the rules of competition law and this strategy is unlikely to deter directors from engaging with undesirable behaviour which exposes the company to risk of liability and loss.

     

Democracy,Law, Compliance

Professors Schauer and McAdams both seek a more or less sweepingly general theory of why we obey the law. But we should split, not lump. There are different reasons different actors in different social settings obey different laws–not only, but not least, out of regard for democratic decision making.     

Reforming Natural Gas Fracking Regulations in 2017–2018: How Should States Enforce Regulations?

While much scholarly work has been published on hydraulic fracturing regulatory frameworks, there is little discussion on the enforcement mechanisms of these regulations and statutes. This article explores state hydraulic fracturing regulations and the expansion of a criminal framework to enforce compliance. More specifically, this article takes a comparative look at fracking enforcement regimes in California and several states with the most hydraulic fracturing activities. First, the article discusses fracking's economic benefits and environmental issues. The article then analyzes federal regulations, (which essentially leaves the bulk of regulation and enforcement to state and local governments) and state enforcement systems in California and the four states with the most fracking wells (Texas, Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and Colorado). California, a state that is pushing for more renewable resources, has robust regulations under Senate Bill 4. In the end, states that rely heavily on fracking should reform the enforcement mechanisms to disincentive noncompliance. Regulatory regimes in the other states appear to have deficiencies that could be remedied by adopting stricter enforcement mechanisms—such as criminal sanctions—that would disincentivize noncompliance, which could lead to large-scale environmental disasters. This article postulates that a model system incorporating a variety of methods including increased criminal enforcement could provide for proper remedies, justice, and deterrence. An ideal enforcement framework for effective deterrence should focus on transparency, flexibility, trusted delegation, and proportionality.     

Reconocimiento y ejecución de sentencias mexicanas de divorcio en venezuela

Judges rule their decisions to enforce foreign divorce judgments and therefore to achieve procedural justice. Notwithstanding of that, the enforcement couldface different challenges, not only about its coercive enforcement —lacking of voluntarily compliance of the original decision— but also ju-risdictional/territorial limitations. These limitations are related with the existence of different locations among the place of the original subject matter, the place of its effects and, the place where the enforcement decision will be ruled. However, geographical boundaries should not affect vested rights. Therefore, it is crucial to grant mechanisms that will ensure the enforcement of foreign decisions. Based on two Venezuelan Supreme Court decisions, this document analyses issues related with the enforcement in Venezuela of Mexican divorce judgments, considering both the Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards and Venezuelan domestic rules.     

New Institutionalism and Naturalism in Socio‐Legal Analysis: Institutionalist Approaches to Regulatory Decision Making

Through drawing on the work particularly of sociological and organizational theorists socio-legal work has added considerably to an understanding of the uses of law and discretion, and shown the contingency of the operation of law on the economic, political and organizational context. Some important questions still remain unanswered, however. In particular, if in decision making law is not determinative, but rather decisions are shaped by other bureaucratic or organizational norms, political and economic pressures and an individual's own world views and interests, what role does law play? Further, what impact does the decision process, in which different norms or considerations all bear, have on law? In starting to answer these questions the article examines the models of decision processes and decision behavior which underly the different new institutionalist analyses, and suggests that whilst they provide some insights, they have their own limits.     

Computer Power and Legal Reasoning: A Case Study of Judicial Decision Prediction in Zoning Amendment Cases

While social scientists have long advocated the use of statistical methodology in legal analysis, its practical application has not been tested. Statistical models based on social science theories have been used to predict judicial decisions and explain court behavior, but the legal profession has failed to develop statistical models based on traditional legal theories and using data familiar to the lawyer. This article seeks to demonstrate by practical application of statistical methodologies, coupled with traditional legal research methods, that such research can produce important insight into a court's decision making and provide a useful model for predicting the probability of a favorable decision. The zoning amendment decisions of the Connecticut Supreme Court are the data base of this study, which also provides a comprehensive explanation of zoning amendment law in Connecticut as a backdrop against which to evaluate the insights gained by statistical analysis.     

Regulatory Styles,Motivational Postures and Nursing Home Compliance*

Using Kagan and Scholz (1984) typology of regulatory noncompliance, this study examined the perceptions of regulators and of regulatees toward the regulatory encounter to predict subsequent compliance with nursing home quality of care standards. Appraisals of both regulators and regulatees were not driven by motivational analyses of each other's actions, but rather by assessments of performance and social group identity. The regulators saw nursing homes in terms of one evaluative dimension ranging from responsible and not in need of intervention through to irresponsible and needing intervention. The corresponding reactions of nursing home managers involved seeing the regulators as cooperative and sympathetic through to police-like and coercive. On both sides of the regulatory encounter, criticism and reactions to criticism swamped nuanced analyses of motivational underpinnings and rational decision models in explaining compliance. The motivational complexity underlying the Kagan and Scholz typology was, however, apparent in the self-reported motivational postures of managers toward the regulatory process. The postures of managerial accommodation and capture to the regulatory culture were associated with compliance. Over time, resisters to the new regulatory regime became more compliant, particularly those whom inspectors judged as best left alone to adjust. In contrast were managers whose response to the regulatory process was disengagement. Their organizations experienced deterioration in compliance. The study fails to find that certain kinds of regulatory strategies such as deterrence, education and persuasion work better than others across the sample or with specific groups. Extant models focus excessively on how to play the regulatory game without recognizing the potential for players dropping out of the game. Understanding reasons for disengagement and processes for reengagement are fundamental to the application of behavioral decision theory models to the regulatory context.     

Perceived police legitimacy: investigating its association with college-based informal social controls

Research has found that when private citizens view law enforcement as legitimate authority figures, they are more likely to obey laws and voluntarily comply with police demands. Although procedural justice has shown to be an important predictor of perceived police legitimacy, a recent line of studies has found other significant correlates of this outcome, including media exposure, ethnic identity and strain. To date, however, few studies have explored the role collegiate-based informal social controls play in predicting law enforcement legitimacy evaluations. Using questionnaire data from a convenience sample of college students, linear regression equations were estimated to explore whether Hirschi's four social bond measures predict the obligation to obey and trust in police constructs of police legitimacy. Across both models and even after controlling for procedural justice, respondent beliefs were positively correlated with these measures. Theoretical and policy implications are discussed.     

Business Response to Regulation: An Economist's Perspective

This chapter presents an economist's perspective on the interrelationship of the compliance and enforcement decisions of business and regulators in the context of regulations governing occupational health. Assuming profit-maximizing firms and harm-minimizing enforcement agencies, it is argued that a degree of preventive activity would be undertaken by businesses even in the absence of regulation. However, if employees are not fully informed about the risks of the workplace, it is likely that the profit-maximizing level of prevention will be less than socially optimal, and consequently there will be a need for regulation. An enforcement agency which attempts to minimize harm through inducing compliance with regulatory standards will be faced with similar informational difficulties to individual employees, and this suggests some scope for cooperative gains with individual firms through negotiated compliance, rather than prosecution.     

The Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014: A Litany of Fundamental Flaws?

This article argues that the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 are fatally flawed notwithstanding the apparent rigour of the process which produced them. These Regulations were the product of considerable deliberation following a sensitively executed public inquiry yet, it is argued, they rely too heavily on the rhetoric of criminal law while failing to take into account the competing norms for compliance and the impact of NHS budget constraints. Further, they push the CQC towards a heavy‐handed deterrence approach to enforcement, which will increase hostility between regulatees and the inspectorate, and ultimately reduce the scope for developing the transparency about failures which is sorely needed in the NHS. This article challenges the contemporary wisdom that it is primarily knee‐jerk regulatory responses that suffer from fatal flaws of this nature.