The Politics of Punishment and the Siege of Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)Justice

Liberal legalism noncontroversially advocates procedural fairness and due process in institutions such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The visible conflicts come with the ebb and flow of international jurisdictional claims, suspicions of racial/ethnic and cultural biases in deliberations and decisions, prioritization of purposes in sentencing decisions, and the intrusion of institutional and international political debates into the liberal legal agenda. These conflicts threaten to create a legitimacy deficit in diffuse support for the ICTY. We examine these conflicts within the context of two surveys about the ICTY conducted in Sarajevo in 2000 and 2003. The results indicate that the citizens of Sarajevo increasingly believe that the ICTY is politically influenced by internationally appointed judges, peaking with the sentencing of Stanislav Galic for the siege of Sarajevo. This conflict focuses on issues of substantive rather than procedural justice and is increasingly articulated as a rejection of international political intervention that subverts the need for a local sense of justice. This may be a sequence of political conflict and disillusionment that is as inevitable as it is unavoidable.     

The invisible/visible claims to justice: sexual violence and the university camp(us)

If the relationship between international tribunals and reconciliation remains empirically under‐researched within the transitional justice literature, this is even truer in respect of hybrid and local courts. Seeking to address this gap, the purpose of this article is to explore whether the State Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) – and more particularly its War Crimes Chamber (WCC) – can contribute to reconciliation in BiH. Unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the State Court is located in the country itself. Hence, in theory at least, it has greater potential to involve local people and thus to facilitate the reconciliation process. In practice, however, the Court faces many of the same problems as the ICTY, including perceptions of bias and the difficulty of satisfying victims. What this ultimately demonstrates is that criminal trials are not a panacea or “magic bullet” and that reconciliation – both in BiH and in post‐conflict societies more generally – requires a comprehensive and holistic approach to transitional justice that does not over‐rely upon the administration of retributive justice. The State Court, therefore, is merely one potential path to reconciliation.     

Legal Aid,Self-Representation,And The Crisis At The Hague Tribunal

The unfolding of the case of Prosecutor v. Vojislav ŠeŠelj at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been dramatic and more than a little chaotic. The author argues that it is diagnostic of a broader crisis at the Tribunal. As an experiment in international justice, the ad hoc tribunal model has proved to be expensive and slow, but on several points also procedurally arbitrary, intellectually unconvincing, and vulnerable to improper political considerations. These problems have attained a critical mass in ŠeŠelj’s case, as illustrated here. The accused ŠeŠelj, an ultranationalist politician and former paramilitary leader, has vowed to bring the Tribunal to its knees. He is self- represented at trial. This privilege was twice reaffirmed in 2006 by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, having been twice revoked by a bench of trial judges. In 2007, the new pre-trial judge in the case (now presiding judge), Jean-Claude Antonetti, declared that a self-represented accused who can prove indigence is entitled to legal aid. He ordered the Registrar of the Tribunal to pay ŠeŠelj’s defence expenses from the Tribunal’s legal aid budget if ŠeŠelj could prove his indigence. The author argues that while there is good reason to disburse legal aid funds to an indigent accused who has been granted privileges of self-representation, this entitlement was not convincingly explained by Antonetti. Moreover, ŠeŠelj’s destructive aims were improperly set aside by Antonetti in reaching his decision on the public financing of his defence. The current situation, which represents the combined effort of the Appeals Chamber and Antonetti, allows ŠeŠelj to bully participants in the proceedings, issue thinly veiled threats to prospective witnesses and the public at large, and bend the trial procedure to the requirements of his political populism. The poor handling of this case by the Tribunal as a whole calls into question the ad hoc tribunal model of international criminal justice. In the period 2003–2007, the author was a legal advisor to ICTY trial judges, working for a short time on the Vojislav ŠeŠelj case prior to its transfer to Judge Antonetti.     

Early Reflections on Local Perceptions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

Resolution 1757 (2007) has come into force in challenging circumstancesin terms of Lebanese politics. At the time of writing, Lebanon'sgovernment is at a deadlock between two political alliancesknown as March 8 and March 14. While the latter has welcomedthe Resolution, the former has expressed reservations aboutthe impact of the Resolution's passage on Lebanese sovereignty.Further challenges to the legitimacy of the Special Tribunalfor Lebanon (‘STL’) are posed by (1) Lebanon's historicalcontext including its 15-year war followed by selective impunity;(2) the highly selective nature of the jurisdiction of the STLand (3) the political context and fears that the STL itselfwill act as an instrument for foreign powers. This article suggeststhat the UN and STL can address some of these legitimacy challengesthrough their operations, including the transparent selectionof judges and senior officials; attracting funding from a varietyof states; and effective outreach. Above all, the STL shouldbe differentiated from the other Tribunals. It should be seenas the logical next step to the International Independent InvestigativeCommission. In addition, the STL should strive to leave a lastinglegacy in Lebanon and in the field of international criminallaw.     

Constructing Achievement in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): A Corpus-Based Critical Discourse Analysis

The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN Security Council in 1993 to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan wars. As the first international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals set up after WWII, the ICTY has attracted immense interest among legal scholars since its inception, but has failed to garner the same level of attention from researchers in other disciplines, notably linguistics. This represents a significant research gap, as the Tribunal’s public discourse (notably its case law and Annual Reports) can open up interesting avenues of analysis to researchers of law, language, and legal discourse alike. On its official website, the Tribunal claims that it has “irreversibly changed the landscape of international humanitarian law” and lists six specific achievements: “Holding leaders accountable; bringing justice to victims; giving victims a voice; establishing the facts; developing international law and strengthening the rule of the law”. While a number of legal scholars have studied and critiqued the level of ‘achievement’ actually attained by the Tribunal against these metrics and others, of interest to linguists is the ways in which this work might be conveyed discursively. In this paper, we demonstrate how methods from the linguistic field of corpus-based critical discourse analysis can be utilised to explore the discursive construction of such achievements in the language of the ICTY.     

Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

This article addresses legal problems posed by Security CouncilResolution 1757 of 30 May 2007, establishing the Special Tribunalfor Lebanon (‘STL’). After describing the historicalbackground of the resolution (section 1) and the plan to establishthe STL as a treaty-based institution (section 2), the paperturns to an analysis of Resolution 1757 (section 3). The authorquestions whether the Council intended to bring the Lebanon-UNagreement into force as an international treaty, and holds thatthe UN Charter does not give the Council a power to unilaterallyimpose on a member state an obligation in the form of a treaty.The author argues that in Resolution 1757 the Council did notsubstitute a Chapter VII decision for the missing ratificationof the agreement by Lebanon, but instead established the STLby making the provisions of the agreement negotiated with Lebanonan integral part of a Chapter VII resolution. Section 4 thenquestions whether the Council was entitled to procure Lebanon'sconsent to be bound by a treaty by threatening unilaterallyto put those provisions into effect through a Chapter VII resolution.After discussing certain rules of the law of treaties concerningthe coercion of a state, the author concludes that it is notthat law but the UN Charter itself that prohibits the Councilfrom exerting pressure on a member state in order to make thatstate ratify a treaty.     

To Be (Present) or Not To Be (Present): Trials In Absentia before the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

One feature of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (‘STL’)differentiating it from other international criminal tribunals(except for the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal) isthat its Statute allows for trials in absentia. The Statutepermits such trials when an accused failed to appear in courtor even to appoint a defence lawyer, but only on the conditionthat, where the indictment could not be served or notified tothe accused, it was duly publicized through the media or communicatedto the state of residence or nationality of the accused. Followingthe case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Article22(3) of the STL Statute allows for retrial, except where anabsent defendant was represented at trial by counsel of hisor her own choosing. The author argues this right to retrialshould not be applied either where (i) the accused expresslywaived in writing his right to be present, but then failed toappoint counsel of his choosing; or (ii) a state's failure tohand the accused over to the STL does not cure the accused'srefusal to voluntarily surrender to the STL. She also arguesthat the right of retrial following trials in absentia oughtto accrue to Lebanese courts, notwithstanding Article 5(1) ofthe Statute, which seems to prohibit Lebanese courts retryingindividuals convicted by the STL. Finally, she takes into accountthe position of states that prohibit trials in absentia, butare requested to surrender a person convicted in absentia bythe STL for the purpose of executing his sentence, suggestingan ad hoc agreement between the state in question and the STLmay be required as a remedy.     

The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) represents a sui generisinternational tribunal on various levels. It is the first timea treaty-based Tribunal has been established through a resolutionof the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII. A furtherunique feature is its sole dependence on domestic substantivecrimes. The attempt to include crimes against humanity in theStatute did not succeed, despite the fact that the elementsof a crime against humanity seem to be discernable in the conductthat falls within the jurisdiction of the STL. References tointernational and regional terrorism instruments, such as theArab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, were alsoabandoned. The Tribunal will rely on Lebanese criminal provisionsregarding terrorism, illicit associations, crimes and offencesagainst life and personal integrity. Lebanese law provides anold but concrete definition of terrorism. This raises the questionof whether the Lebanese definition, with its strengths and weaknesses,could assist in the evolution of a well-structured definitionof international terrorism. The possibility of ‘internationalizing’the Lebanese definition will depend on two factors: the judges’approach in adopting the Tribunal's rules of evidence and procedure,and then more importantly their creativity in developing thejurisprudence of the Tribunal.     

Justice Presumed and Assistance Denied: The Yugoslav Tribunal as Obstruction to Economic Recovery

The value of the ICTY for stabilizing the Balkans is rarely questioned, but the Tribunal is unpopular with the majority of people there. More international funding is spent on the Tribunal than on improving health and other services in Bosnia, while “conditionality” based on cooperation with the Tribunal impedes the economic and democratic development of the region. Can a court that tries to keep the memory of massacres fresh for 20 years, that is overwhelmingly mistrusted by the very people to whom it claims to bring justice, and that has called for economic sanctions on a devastated region, really be a force for reconciliation and the building of stable political relations in the Balkans?     

The Enforcement of Arrest Warrants by International Forces: From the ICTY to the ICC

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia set a precedent in modernhistory for having a multinational military force being empoweredand directed to execute arrest warrants issued by an internationalcriminal tribunal. On legal grounds, the International CriminalTribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) attained this resultby relying on the broad wording of its governing Statute coupledwith the ICTY's own rule-making powers. In contrast, the draftersof the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute elaboratedon the nature of the cooperation from international forces insignificantly more details but at the same time opted for reducingthe ICC's powers vis-à-vis these forces. Therefore, theICC Statute now runs contrary to the ICTY's case law recognizinga judicial power to order an international force to executean ICTY arrest warrant. This deferential stance towards collectiveenterprises of states not only infringes upon the States Parties’general obligation to cooperate with the ICC, but, in the end,weakens the ICC's ability to enforce international criminaljustice.     

Damaska and the Faces of International Criminal Justice

Mirjan Damaka 's scholarly publications provide important insightsfor the analysis of systems of criminal justice at the internationallevel. This is particularly true for his major book: The Facesof Justice and State Authority – A Comparative Approachto the Legal Process. The book develops ideal types, or models,of the structure and the function of government. As far as thestructure of government, the ideal types of hierarchical andcoordinate officialdom are contrasted with one another. Withregard to the function of government in society, two other mutuallyexclusive ideal types are developed: the ideal type of the purelyreactive state and that of the purely activist state. In thepurely reactive state all state activities are essentially aform of dispute resolution between individual citizens. Consequently,all proceedings take the shape of a contest between two parties.In the reactive state, on the other hand, all law is an expressionof state policies. This entails that all proceedings are essentiallyan official inquiry enabling the state to implement its policies.The four ideal types call for several observations, one of thembeing that, at the international level, there is no authoritythat can be compared to a state. Setting up international criminal courts requires choices withregard to the structure and function of authority. Internationalhuman rights instruments provide no guidance as to the natureof the choices to be made. In particular, they do not indicatewhether the legal process should be structured as a contestbetween two parties or as an official inquiry. The same is truefor empirical evidence. An analysis of the structures of authority in internationalcriminal courts reveal that they represent hybrids of the hierarchicaland the coordinate ideal types of officialdom. The fact thatthese courts are unitary courts has a profound effect on evidentiaryarrangements. The most important issue raised by the exposition of ideal typesof The Faces of Justice concerns the relationship between thegoals of international criminal justice and the appropriatelegal process to serve their realization. Goals of a conflict-solvingnature are best served by a legal process structured as a contestbetween two parties and goals related to the implementationof policies by a legal process structured as an official inquiry.It is therefore essential to determine what goals are beingpursed by international criminal courts. One may distinguishhere between goals that international systems of justice mayor may not have in common with national systems of criminaljustice. The pursuit of the traditional goals of criminal justicecommon to international and national systems of justice doesnot provide compelling reasons to prefer either a contest modelor an inquest model of the legal process. This is different,however, for the idiosyncratic goals of international criminaljustice that set apart international systems of criminal justicefrom national systems. The pursuit of these goals makes it desirablethat historical facts are established as accurately as is possiblein the given circumstances. They are, therefore, best servedby a legal process that takes the shape of an official inquiry.In the hybrid type of procedure adopted by the ICTY there isinsufficient clarity about the procedural status of the peculiargoals of international criminal justice as well as about theuse of procedural means to pursue them. This entails that itis not really possible to determine whether this hybrid representsa success. Hybrid types of procedure cannot truly exist withoutadopting a view with regard to the impartiality of judges thatis inspired by standards enshrined in international human rightsinstrument rather than those that are characteristic for thelegal process shaped as a contest between two parties.     

The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia

If the impact of the ICTY in the countries of the former Yugoslaviawere to be measured exclusively by the poor public perceptionof the Tribunal that prevails, perhaps the best course of actionwould be to shut its doors without waiting for the end of itsmandate. The author tries, however, to show the more complexand multifaceted nature of the perception of the Tribunal atdifferent levels, in the different countries of the former Yugoslavia,as well as at different moments in time. His conclusion is thatthe ICTY should have done more to improve its image in the region,thereby making it more difficult for the local elites to distortand manipulate its message.     

Some Considerations on Faces of Justice by a 'Non-Specialist'

The author examines the well-known book by Mirjan Damaka aswell as other more recent books and writings of the distinguishedauthor against the specific background of the Italian experiencein reforming its system of criminal procedure with a view tocommenting upon sensitive issues in current international criminalproceedings. Three key factors in assessing the ‘real’nature of a procedural system are examined: (i) the role ofjudges in the proceedings; (ii) the rules on evidence and (iii)the duty to render reasoned decisions. Subsequently, the authortackles the issue of self-representation in international criminaljustice, in light of Damaka's categories (conflict-solving v.policy-implementing) and of the difficulties in transposingthem to the international level. Finally, the author warns thatthe analysis of international criminal justice should not beconfined in over-rigid models. The overriding concern must beto harmonize the ‘fair trial’ model with sensitivityto certain objectives of justice that cannot be possible objectsof compromise (as they may be where judicial authority operatespurely as arbiter of a dispute).     

前南国际刑事法庭刑事程序中的普通法和大陆法传统：油能溶于水吗

在前南刑事法庭刑事程序中,国际刑事案件的独特性使得越来越多的大陆法系传统因素开始注入普通法诉讼模式。两大法系之间的传统差异已经渐渐走向融合。这些不同的制度应灵活而和谐地相处,共同解决国际犯罪审判所特有的问题。     

The repentant defendant and the potential of international criminal justice

ABSTRACT

Repentant defendants are a more common feature of the international criminal trial than commonly thought, and offer interesting opportunities to conceptualize the possibility of restorative justice within what is otherwise a conventionally retributive framework. Repentance may arise at different stages of the trial and is an inherent part of the assessment at the plea bargain and sentencing stages. It must be understood as a particular performance from the accused, one that individualizes guilt and performs the sort of moral agency on which international criminal law is otherwise premised. Its force lies potentially in its power to break down some of the constitutive dichotomies of international criminal justice, including those between perpetrator/victim, international/domestic, and retributive/restorative justice. One needs to account, however, for the potential ambiguity of repentance and the fact that it may be subtly exonerating, as well as the fact that international criminal tribunals have reasons to encourage it that have nothing to do with restorative justice. Only if the sincerity of repentance can be ascertained and if it can be addressed to victims may the restorative potential of international criminal justice be realized.     

The Dissemination of Detainees Awaiting Trial Before International and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals

This paper will focus on the rights attributed to detainees who are facing charges before international and internationalized criminal courts. The question is whether their position merits a different approach compared to the position of detainees who are confronted with domestic criminal trials. In particular, this paper will address the question whether, and to what extent, international human rights have a direct effect on the position of the former detainees. Attention will focus on case law of the European Court of Human Rights vis-a-vis the rights of detainees and the impact thereof on the position of detainees who are held in custody on behalf of international and internationalized criminal courts. The author is Professor of International Criminal Law at Utrecht University (The Netherlands), defence counsel acting before the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, and a partner of the law firm Knoops & Partners Advocaten in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.     

Habermas on Democracy and Justice. Limits of a Sound Conception

Abstract . The author outlines limitations of the explanation capacity of Habermas's Discourse Philosophy, because of its problematic presuppositions. The main topics discussed are: (i) the legitimacy of legal systems; (ii) Habermas's concept of democracy; (iii) his theory of justice. Legitimacy cannot be based only on discourse processes, but it has to be defined by international law. Discourses in society are essential for democratic systems, but the discourses by themselves do not guarantee the optimal result as discourses may be disturbed by deceptive propaganda, by prejudices or by wrong political slogans. It is not convincing that discourse procedures guarantee impartiality and justice nor that in discourses better arguments always prevail.     

Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility

This article examines the role that command responsibility currentlyplays in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ad hoc tribunals rely in principleon a broad concept of command responsibility – which canbe applied to all superiors, including political and civilianones. However, in practice, accused persons have only rarelybeen successfully charged under this form of liability. Indeed,recent case law has gradually adopted a rigorous approach withrespect to the legal requirements of command responsibility.This has made it more difficult to establish criminal liabilityof superiors who have not directly participated in the commissionof international offences. The ad hoc tribunals have expressedan explicit preference for forms of ‘direct’ liabilitywhere the accused can be convicted both under ‘direct’and command responsibility. While the ICTY and ICTR have progressivelyinterpreted other international legal concepts to deal effectivelywith collective crimes committed by leaders of organized groups,they seem to have confined command responsibility to internationalcrimes perpetrated in typical military-like contexts.     

论全球化时代国际经济法的公平价值取向——兼论发展中国家及我国的角色定位与战略选择

晚近,随着经济全球化的迅猛发展,国际经济领域掀起一股席卷各个层次的、以自由化为中心的造法运动,并初步构建出一个全球自由市场秩序体系.然而,当前国际经济立法面临着公平价值缺失的困境,并由此引发自身的"合法性"危机.鉴于此,在当代自由主义理论内部对正义内涵的争论中,寻找一种可资国际经济法的公平价值重构的理念成为必要,罗尔斯的复数正义理论对此提供了某种启发.当然,在国际经济法的公平价值重构中,发展中国家及我国对自身的正确定位以及战略选择也是至关重要的.     

Any Other Contribution? Ascribing Liability for Cover-Ups of International Crimes

As the International Criminal Court (the Court or ICC) continues to develop the parameters of the various modes of liability set out in Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, recent developments raise questions as to whether the Court can consider participation in cover-ups or concealment of crimes as giving rise to individual criminal responsibility. It is only recently that international tribunals, and notably the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), have turned to consider how international criminal law approaches responsibility for cover-ups or concealment of crimes. In reviewing how and why the ICTY has addressed individual criminal liability for engaging in cover-ups, and in light of the ICC’s Mbarushimana decision, the aim of this paper is to suggest how the ICC might consider such issues in future cases. Having demonstrated the necessity of international criminal law accounting for cover-ups, the paper will discuss how the jurisprudence, in toto, excludes the possibility of holding to account individuals who contribute to the cover up of international crimes, by whatever means, or however grave, unless they were acting on the premise of a prior agreement with the principals. By way of conclusion the paper will suggest that an expansive interpretation of Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute may provide a means of addressing this gap.