Russian Non-Profit Organisations in Service Delivery: Neoliberal and Statist Social Policy Principles Intertwined

Abstract

The essay examines the social policy principles underlying state funding schemes that shape the functioning of non-profit organisations in service delivery in Russia. Scrutinising federal and regional financial tools, the analysis reveals that some non-profit organisations are engaged with a neoliberal logic promoting state funding based on competitive grant processes and a means-tested approach to clients, while others seek privileged access to state resources to secure a statist and stratified service provision for their members. The essay argues that neoliberal principles are extended through contracting-out and are undermining statist practices; however, a situation is emerging within competitive outsourcing procedures in which selected organisations are still receiving privileged treatment from the state.     

Corruption,Centralization and Competition: Evidence from Russian Public Procurement

ABSTRACT

This paper estimates the impact of corruption on the incentives of procurers to maintain honest competition in tenders. Customers, who procure for themselves, and Agencies, who procure for the customers in their region are considered. Basing on a large dataset of open auctions conducted by Russian regional-level authorities in 2011, the analysis shows that in highly corrupt regions, Agencies fail to arrange competitive tenders and most of auctions have one bidder. Customers attract more bidders for large contracts, but rebates are usually low. Therefore, procurement centralization may reduce the corruption of Customers, but cannot solve the problem of low competition.     

Russian Regions in Expanding Europe: The Pskov Connection

BARGAINING OVER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER between the federal government in Moscow and the 89 subjects of the Russian Federation is now widely considered as critical to the success of Russia's democratic and free market reforms, if not to Russia's enduring viability as a state.1 The key challenge to Moscow, and to Russia as a whole, is how to harmonise different levels of political control so that economic growth could be accelerated and social tensions eased in the regions. This challenge is aggravated by the absence of reliable institutions (understood as enforceable rules of the game) regulating centre-periphery relations and the ideological and organisational disarray at the centre itself. In the regions along Russia's post-Soviet borders in particular, this problem is further complicated by a tension between geopolitical insecurity and powerful incentives for trade and economic development coming from outside Russia's borders. Relations between Moscow and the outlying regions thus become a truly 'intermestic' issue, affecting both Russia's internal post-Soviet institution building and the mode of Russia's integration into the global economy. The politics that shape relations between the Russian regions and Moscow are therefore part and parcel of Russia's evolving relations with the outside world, and the policies of regional elites are part and parcel of an increasingly complex fabric of Russia's foreign relations.     

Social Capital and Access to Credit: Evidence from Uganda

We use a nationally representative survey in Uganda to study the links between social capital and financial access. Our results indicate a positive association between individual social capital and access to institutional credit, but no significant relationship between generalised trust and credit access. The effect of individual social capital is more pronounced for poorer people, in rural areas, and in areas where generalised trust is low. Individual social capital seems to promote access especially to semiformal and informal financial institutions.     

Political Competition and Local Social Spending: Evidence from Brazil

Electoral theories of democracy imply electoral competition insures accountability. Using data on local elections, socioeconomic factors, and municipal budgets from more than 5,000 municipalities in Brazil for the years 1996, 2000, and 2004, we find that municipalities with more competitive elections allocate less to social spending compared to municipalities with little political competition. We argue that previous theory on political competition and public goods obscures the critical role that financial resources play in shaping the dynamics of social spending and political competition. Municipalities with small budgets lack the resources necessary to engineer convincing electoral victories. Where resources are negligible, voter turnout is low, and incumbents rarely win reelection. Incumbent parties in municipalities with large financial resources win big. Armed with adequate resources, incumbent parties mobilize voters and win by large margins. This new argument and evidence reconcile contradictory findings in the existing literature on competition and public goods.     

Globalization and Labor in Four Developing Regions: An Institutional Approach

This paper is the introduction to a SCID special issue on “Global Pressures, National Response, and Labor Rights in Developing Countries.” We focus on the potentially conflicting demands that developing countries face from international institutions for better labor standards versus more labor flexibility. This is studied through a comparative analysis of four regions: Eastern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and the Middle East. The major international institutions we examine are the International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, and multinational corporations. This introductory paper presents a review of existing literature on labor standards and labor flexibility with particular focus on the role of international institutions in promoting the two processes and their impact on labor market outcomes. It also describes our project and its contribution to the debates, including a discussion of our main methodological innovation, namely, the construction of new indices for labor standards and flexibility. In empirical terms, it compares the indices across the four regions and provides an analysis of the impact of the indices on labor market outcomes.     

Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia

Authoritarian regimes often use fiscal policy to reward political supporters and to punish political opponents. In many authoritarian regimes with political institutions like parties, legislatures, and elections, elections become a focal point for budget expenditures and the distribution of government patronage. A time-series analysis of Malaysian fiscal expenditures from 1967 to 1997 shows that the ruling coalition systematically increases federal government spending before elections. In addition to marshalling private resources to distribute patronage, the Malaysian government manipulates the government’s official position. These findings have important implications for the growing literature on political institutions under autocratic regimes and the politics of patronage and redistribution in the developing world. They also suggest a new empirical domain for existing theories of political business cycles.     

Household Entrepreneurship and Social Networks: Panel Data Evidence from Vietnam

Using a unique panel of household businesses for Vietnam, this paper sheds light on the links between households’ and entrepreneurs’ social networks and business performance. We address two related questions. The first question asks if we can find evidence of a differentiated effect of employment of members of the family versus hired workers on the business performance. A second question tackles the respective effects of various dimensions of social networks on business technical efficiency. The hypothesis is that, beyond the channel of labour productivity, entrepreneurs that are confronted with an unfavourable social environment may produce less efficiently and realise a lower output than what could be possible with the same amount of resources. We find evidence of a marginal productivity differential between family and hired labour and highlight results consistent with the presence of adverse social network effects faced by households running a business, in particular ethnic minorities. We also stress the importance of professional networks for successful entrepreneurship.     

The Way Out of Russian Deadlock: Shift Power to the Regions

Aleksandr Lebed, the populist former general, is a leading candidate in the 2000 election for president of Russia. He is currently the governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory (Siberia), one of Russia's richest regions. His remarks are adapted from an exclusive interview he granted to Genrikh Borovik for NPQ in Moscow during the August crisis.