Mainstreaming international governance: The environment,gender, and IO performance in the European Union

International organizations (IOs) have moved increasingly in recent years to adopt cross-cutting mandates that require the “mainstreaming” of particular issues, such as gender equality or environmental protection, across all IO policies. Successful IO performance with respect to such mandates, we hypothesize, is determined in large part by the use of hard or soft institutional measures to shape the incentives of sectoral officials whose cooperation is required for successful implementation. We test this hypothesis with respect to two such mandates—gender mainstreaming and environmental policy integration—in a single international organization, the European Union, demonstrating a strong causal link between the use of hard incentives and IO performance in these and related mandates.     

Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design

This article develops an analytical framework for studying international organization (IO) boards of directors and applies the framework to a sample of 12 international organizations. It argues that the boards of IOs are asked by their political masters to play four distinct roles: (1) political counterweight, (2) performance police, (3) democratic forum, and (4) strategic thinker. Because there are trade-offs among them, no IO board can play all four roles effectively. Policymakers must therefore choose among them, and they must make choices of institutional design accordingly. The article also shows how in practice, international organizations fall into three governance “models” based on the characteristics of their boards of directors. Each model has a different combination of strengths and weaknesses. The analysis suggests that because trade-offs are inescapable, state actors sometimes willingly surrender a measure of control in order to strengthen other aspects of institutional performance. IO autonomy is often not something that surprises or annoys governments, but rather something that was been built into the institutional design as the result of a conscious trade-off.     

Designing Police: Interpol and the Study of Change in International Organizations

On those rare occasions when scholars of international organizations (IOs) consider the issue of change, they typically highlight the centrality of states. Although states are important for understanding when and why there is a change in the tasks, mandate, and design of IO, IOs themselves can initiate change. Drawing from sociological institutional and resource dependence approaches, in this article we treat IOs as strategic actors that can choose among a set of strategies in order to pursue their goals in response to changing environmental pressures and constraints that potentially threaten their relevance and resource base. We delineate six strategies—acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, manipulation, and strategic social construction, and suggest that the strategic choice by IOs is contingent on the level of both organizational insecurity and the congruence between the content of environmental pressures and organizational culture. We emphasize how IOs must make a trade-off between acquiring the resources necessary to survive and be secure, on the one hand, and maintaining autonomy, on the other. We apply this framework to the case of Interpol, investigating how different calculations of these trade-offs led Interpol staff to adopt different strategies depending on its willingness to accept, resist, or initiate changes that demand conformity to external pressures.     

International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration

International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms “International Old Governance” (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate—including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call “Transnational New Governance” (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both “state failure”—the inadequacies of IOG—and “market failure”—the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions—we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant “orchestration deficit” that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance.     

Stability and change in international policy-making: A punctuated equilibrium approach

International organizations (IOs) have developed into important policy venues beyond the state. Yet our understanding of the broader dynamics of IO policy-making is limited. This article offers the first comparative analysis of macro patterns in IO policy-making. Theoretically, we draw on punctuated equilibrium theory to develop hypotheses about stability and change in the orientation of IO policy agendas. Empirically, we examine novel data on the policy output of five general-purpose IOs between 1980 and 2015, combining statistical analysis and comparative case illustrations. The analysis yields two central results. First, the policy agendas of all five IOs display patterns of punctuated equilibria, with longer periods of stability interrupted by shorter periods of dramatic change. Second, the level of institutional friction in decision-making contributes to variation in punctuations across IOs and within IOs over time. The results suggest four broader implications: (1) punctuated equilibrium theory applies to a broader empirical domain than previously thought; (2) patterns of change in IOs are more complex than conventionally expected; (3) institutional friction matters for IOs’ responsiveness to societal demands and problem pressures; and (4) deeper integration of punctuated equilibrium theory into the study of IOs can pave the way for a promising IR research agenda.     

Self-legitimation in the face of politicization: Why international organizations centralized public communication

International organizations (I0) have centralized their public communication to a large extent over recent decades by undertaking a broader codification of communication tasks as well as a departmentalization of these tasks within units of IO bureaucracies. The paper provides the first systematic analysis of this important development in institutional design using a novel data set on the organization of public communication in 48 IOs between 1950 and 2015. It identifies self-legitimation as a key driver of centralization in the face of increased levels of politicization, that is, public awareness and activism directed at IOs. Empirically, the study suggests that the centralization of public communication significantly increases as transnational civil society organizes and gains access to IO decision-making. Further, politicization in terms of contentious activism and public scandals substantially accounts for varying levels of centralization across IOs.     

Which type of international organizations can settle civil wars?

International organizations (IOs) take on an increasing share of civil war mediation around the world. The determinants of IO mediation effectiveness remain poorly understood, partly because prior research has not adequately captured the institutional heterogeneity of peace-brokering IOs. To explore how mediation effectiveness depends on institutional variation, I combine newly gathered data on the design of 13 peace-brokering IOs with existing data on 109 civil war mediation episodes in the 1975-2004 period. I find that IOs with institutionalized capabilities to deploy field missions, such as peacekeeping operations, outperform other IOs as mediators of civil wars, whereas information-gathering capacity does not yield a significant advantage. The results suggest that IO enforcement assistance has a forward-looking effect: the ability to credibly signal, ex ante, that peacekeeping or monitoring forces will be deployed to enforce an agreement, helps IOs shape negotiations long before forces are actually deployed. Reaffirming the credible commitment theory of conflict resolution, the study demonstrates that there is considerable variation among external guarantors, which explains why some IOs can shift civil war disputants away from violent bargaining strategies whereas other cannot.     

Who matters for memory: Sources of institutional memory in international organization crisis management

Scholarship on organizational learning has explored how international organizations (IOs) reform but has paid little attention to the origins of institutional memory. For IOs engaged in crisis management operations, acquiring knowledge about strategic errors is necessary for adopting reforms that could save lives. This study seeks to identify the sources that affect whether or not IO elites will contribute knowledge to an IO’s institutional memory in crisis management. The study employs a survey experiment in the field on 120 NATO elites who decide on and plan operations. Findings indicate that when the United States introduces knowledge of a strategic error, NATO elites are significantly less likely to share it. This deterrent effect on knowledge-sharing illustrates an unexpected way in which the US influences international crisis management. The study also finds that an IO’s secretariat can somewhat increase elites’ likelihood of contributing to the IO’s institutional memory.     

Issue linkage across international organizations: Does European countries’ temporary membership in the UN Security Council increase their receipts from the EU budget?

What explains the outcome of interstate negotiations in international organizations (IOs)? While existing research highlights member states’ power, preference intensity, and the IO’s institutional design, this paper introduces an additional source of bargaining power in IOs: Through issue linkage members of an IO leverage privileged positions in other IOs to obtain more favorable bargaining outcomes. Specifically, European Union members are more successful in bargaining over the EU budget while they hold a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Inside the UNSC EU members can promote security interests of other European countries, and they can use their influence to secure side-payments from the EU budget. The study tests this argument by investigating new EU budget data, and it shows that EU members obtain 1.7 billion Euro in additional net receipts during a two-year UNSC term, on average. Thus, bargaining processes in the EU and the UN are intricately linked.     

Interactions among intergovernmental organizations in the anti-corruption realm

This study focuses on interactions between intergovernmental organizations (IOs) working in the anti-corruption realm. It investigates the factors that enhance IO cooperation. Based on expectations derived primarily from the organization theory literature and, more specifically, from exchange theory, we develop a set of hypotheses regarding the relevance of IO financial resources, expertise, prestige, and bureaucratic culture on the likelihood that IOs will engage in cooperative behavior. The study tests these hypotheses on the formal and informal collaborative networks formed between seventeen IOs engaged in anti-corruption work. The results of the tests offer support for most of the hypotheses and suggest several additional arguments explaining the likelihood of inter-organizational collaboration.     

Regional International Organizations and Individual Immigration Attitudes: Results from Finite Mixture Models

When are individuals more likely to support immigration? We suggest here that regional international organizations (IOs; for example, the European Union) publicly release reports about the scale and benefits of immigration to member states in the region in which these IOs operate. We argue that unlike individuals who are uninformed about immigration, informed individuals who have more knowledge of the main regional IO in which their country participates will be more likely to employ immigration reports released by their regional IO to construct their immigration attitudes. They will also perceive that these reports are credible. The credibility of these reports helps individuals with more knowledge about their region’s main IO to view immigrants favorably, which translates to support for immigration. We test our prediction by developing a finite mixture model that statistically accounts for the econometric challenges that emerge when uninformed individuals “save face” by disproportionately opting for the middle “status quo” category in ordinal survey response variables of immigration support. Results from the finite mixture model corroborate our prediction and are more reliable than estimates from a standard ordered probit model.     

Reproduction Versus Transformation: The Case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

ABSTRACT

This article offers a constructive critique of Fehl and Freistein's argument that international organisations (IOs) significantly affect international stratification, either producing, reproducing or transforming inequality. It suggests that without reference to the specific purposes which individual IOs pursue and the forces driving global change, it is impossible to predict either when the goals of IOs and states might diverge, or when a particular IO might promote the reproduction of inequality on the one hand, or its transformation on the other. In particular, divergence between states on the one hand and IOs charged with the management of the global economy on the other is explained by the fact that the IOs concerned are committed to the reproduction of capital on a global scale, and therefore to the continuous transformation of global hierarchies. The argument is supported by a case study of IO support for China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).     

Legitimacy Deficits of International Organizations: design,drift, and decoupling at the UN Security Council

Despite ubiquitous calls for their reform, international organizations (IOs) often suffer from legitimacy deficits. What explains the emergence of legitimacy deficits and what effects do they produce? This article discusses the gradual emergence of legitimacy deficits through the concept of legitimacy drift. Legitimacy drift occurs when an organization loses legitimacy by failing to adapt itself to a changing environment. It identifies three sources of legitimacy drift: failure to live up to pre-existing standards (broken promises), changes in the standards of legitimacy by which organizations are assessed (shifting standards), and changes in an organization’s relevant public (audience shift). Legitimacy deficits typically prompt organizational responses. These include attempts at re-legitimation through institutional reform and operational adaptation, but also other ‘coping mechanisms’ such as promises of reform, the logic of confidence, and decoupling. Coping mechanisms are especially important where reform is blocked. This model is illustrated by the history of the United Nations Security Council, one of the oldest and most powerful IOs. A conclusion calls for bridging historical and sociological institutionalism to better understand IO legitimacy in time.     

The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations

Most international organizations (IOs) expand their membership over the course of their lifespan. Although these enlargements tend to be heralded as normatively positive — for the IOs themselves, for the new members, and for cooperative outcomes more generally — expansions can also lead to conflicts in the organization. What conditions lead to enlargement rounds that reshape an organization in unexpected ways? We argue that, depending upon the diversity of the initial group of countries, members may vote to admit new entrants that can tilt organizational decision-making in unexpected directions. We anticipate fewer enlargements with lesser impact on the character of the organization among organizations that have either a smaller range of founding members or a relatively even initial dispersion. We develop an agent-based model that accounts for the complex decision-making environment and social dynamics that typify IO accession processes. The model helps us explain how the nature of decision-making in organizations can shift following enlargement, likely changing the organization’s output and goals.     

Control,soft information,and the politics of international organizations staffing

This article offers insights into the aggregate patterns of the geographical distribution of professional staff in some of the major international organizations (IOs). Building on the principal-agent framework, I argue that powerful member states seek dominant positions in IOs’ secretariats, in an effort to increase their ability to control them. At the same time, it is often the weakest low-income countries that are the IOs’ primary clients. Over-representation of the most powerful states is likely to lead to functional and legitimation problems for the IOs, in particular with regard to the IOs’ lack of access to ‘soft’ information about the countries in which they operate. Using a newly created dataset covering 19 major bodies of the United Nations family, I identify two aggregate patterns in the geographical distribution of their professional staff. First, the most powerful states dominate IOs’ secretariats. Second, however, many IOs systematically deviate in their staffing practices from this overall pattern, as well as from the existing rules that formalize it, and relatively over-represent also low-income countries. What results is a curvilinear (U-shaped) pattern where both powerful and very poor states are over-represented in many IOs’ professional staff.     

Performance under ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping

This article argues that ambiguity—indeterminacy between alternative interpretations of a phenomenon—is inherent in the peace operations field, and makes defining and assessing the UN’s performance problematic. Applying Gutner and Thompson’s framework for international organization performance (IOP) research to UN peacekeeping, it argues further that the relationship between process performance and outcomes in peacekeeping is irreducibly ambiguous, and that ambiguity has significant implications for efforts to measure and improve peacekeeping performance. To demonstrate this, the article reviews methods employed by the UN to measure its peacekeeping performance, arguing that the primary method employed—results-based budgeting (RBB)—is inherently unable to cope with the challenges of performance ambiguity. Its adoption and continued use despite its evident shortcomings are due to RBB’s legitimacy in the wider organizational field of international public management in which the UN Secretariat, and UN peacekeeping, perform. Finally, the article considers recent efforts to improve process performance in UN peacekeeping, and discuss the ways in which so-called ‘integration’ reforms central to such efforts are a means of reducing and managing the ambiguity inherent in peacekeeping.     

Small states and the ‘throughput’ legitimacy of international organizations

Abstract

The unequal participation of member states in international organizations (IOs) undermines IOs’ legitimacy as global actors. Existing scholarship typically makes this assessment by referencing a combination of input—the interests IOs serve—and output—the decisions they take. This scholarship does not, however, pay enough attention to how IOs have responded to these concerns. We argue that IOs have used the participation of small states—whose membership most studies typically ignore—as an important means of generating what Vivian Schmidt calls ‘throughput’ legitimacy for their operations. We organize our analysis of ‘throughput’ legitimacy in IOs around four institutional mechanisms—(1) agenda setting; (2) leadership (s)election; (3) management and operation; and (4) service delivery—in which all states seek to exert influence. What emerges is an account of IOs seeking to balance ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ by way of ‘throughputs’. We conclude by arguing for an expanded focus on the means by which IOs generate ‘throughput’ legitimacy in future research.     

Controlling coalitions: Social lending at the multilateral development banks

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) dramatically increased social lending for health, education, and safety nets after 1985. Yet the great powers’ social policy preferences remained relatively static from 1980 to 2000. This contradicts the conventional view that powerful states control IOs. We argue that highly institutionalized IOs like MDBs require a complete model of possible member-state coalitions encompassing the preferences of all member states—not just major powers. We develop multiple measures of state preferences and include all member states in our coalitional model. We evaluate our model and alternatives with an analysis of more than 10,000 MDB loans from 1980 to 2000. We find that when we include all member states weighted by their voting shares, principal preferences are significantly related to lending outcomes.     

A question of sovereignty?

Taiwan's efforts to take part in international organisations (IOs) have received little backing from the international community owing to Taiwan's contested sovereignty. This article investigates under what circumstances and how the European Union (EU) supported Taiwan's participation in IOs and agreements by examining the role of the EU in three success stories: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The analysis of six factors that shaped the EU's approach shows that a strong EU interest in Taiwan's IO participation was a precondition for its support and that once this precondition was met, applicable membership/participation criteria and opportunities for circumventing or neutralising China's opposition then gained in importance. A supportive United States (US) stance could function as a trigger for EU support. Two counterintuitive findings are that the radicalisation of Taiwan's own strategy fostered increased EU activity in brokering compromises between Taiwan and China and that the EU's decision-making mechanisms did not play a decisive role in the formulation of its support policies.     

Organising Global Stratification: How International Organisations (Re)Produce Inequalities in International Society

ABSTRACT

The article makes the case for scrutinising international organisations (IOs) as key sites and agents of inequality reproduction and transformation in international society. Drawing on sociological inequality research and institutionalist approaches to International Relations, we argue that IOs reproduce and transform broader stratification patterns in their global social environment through intertwined processes of categorisation and distribution. We propose to capture these twin processes from three observation points, which highlight different material and symbolic practices operating within IOs and at the interface between IOs and their environment.