Change beneath the surface: the 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly election

Preceded by a string of institutional crises and sustained political wrangling, the Northern Ireland Assembly election held in May 2016 cemented the grip of the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin over the province’s power-sharing institutions, while certifying the impasse of their intra-bloc rivals. Eighteen years after the Good Friday Agreement, the electoral campaign continued to feature emotionally charged ethnic appeals. Nonetheless, socioeconomic issues were at the fore of the political debate, contributing to the limited yet significant advance of non-sectarian actors. Beneath the surface of a mainly unaltered Assembly makeup and unchanged ethno-political geography, the vote resulted in a decline in support for the traditional governing parties, particularly in the nationalist camp. In the aftermath of the vote, the formation of an officially recognized Opposition has opened uncharted political waters.     

The Media in Northern Ireland: A Stormont Correspondent's View

During the troubles, the role of a Northern Ireland correspondent evolved from ambulance chaser to peace process ‘Kremlinologist’, keeping an eye on the subtle shifts within the political negotiations. Now the interest of the international media has waned and reporters have to generate fresh stories relevant to the local audience, against the backdrop of an adverse economic climate. Some stories may be Northern Ireland specific, dealing with the legacy of the troubles. Others involve economic and social issues common to other areas of the UK or Ireland. Knowledge of the conflict remains a prerequisite for covering Stormont politics, dissident republican attacks, or loyalist violence. However journalists should be mindful of the concerns of a younger generation who increasingly regard the paramilitary ceasefires and peace deals as history.     

That Awkward Region: Writing and Advising on the History of Northern Ireland

The history of Northern Ireland poses two particular challenges for the political historian. First, histories of the region are inextricably bound up with contemporary political positions: historical time becomes distorted as histories are refracted through the lens of modern political controversies. Second, the importance of historical ‘memory’ to contemporary politics leaves little room for doubt, uncertainty or academic expertise. The past is assumed to be known; what place is there for academic historians when politicians and many members of the public are so invested in their own readings of the past? This article explores these challenges through two case studies in which the author was involved: the Historical Advisory Panel established by the UK government for the centenary of Northern Ireland; and subsequent debates around the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. It illustrates the difficult relationship between academic, public and politicised histories, and considers the lessons for historians whose expertise places them at the interface of those different ‘pasts’.     

In Defence of Politics: Interpreting the Peace Process and the Future of Northern Ireland

The interpretation of the Northern Ireland peace process is highly controversial because it not only has implications for the future of Northern Ireland but ‘lessons’ are also drawn for dealing with terrorism and insurgency globally. This article reviews and critiques key interpretations of the peace process. ‘The Militarists’, Republican Dissidents and Neoconservatives, offer a ‘fundamentalist idealist’ interpretation which leads them to reject political compromise and continue to pursue victory by military means. ‘The Enthusiasts’ are leading figures in the Labour government who champion the outcome of the peace process and recommend ‘talking to terrorists’. ‘The Sceptics’ argue in defence of politics and support the pragmatic realism used to negotiate accommodation. They are critical of ‘The Militarists’ for misinterpreting the peace process and threatening to go back to ‘war’. ‘Sceptics’ welcome powersharing but criticise the ‘Enthusiasts’ for mishandling the peace process and undermining the moderate parties. This has left Northern Ireland with high levels of segregation and economic inequality that prevent the consolidation of peace.     

Beyond Unionism versus Nationalism: the Rise of the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland has always been a polity noted for its strong links between national identity, religion, and voting, and acute British unionist versus Irish nationalist divisions. The constitutional question of whether Northern Ireland should be part of the UK or a united Ireland dominates. Yet, recent surveys have suggested a sizeable and growing section of its electorate declares itself neither unionist nor nationalist. This development may have assisted the growth of the centrist Alliance Party, which rejects unionist and nationalist identities and claims to be neutral on Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. Alliance doubled its vote across three elections in 2019 and is now the third largest party in the region. This article examines the importance of ideological dealignment relative to other factors, such as Alliance’s opposition to Brexit, in explaining the rise of a non-binary party in a divided society.     

Political generations in Northern Ireland

Since the late 1980s, Northern Ireland has seen a radical electoral shift away from the historically dominant parties in the Catholic and Protestant blocs – the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), respectively – towards the traditionally more ‘extreme’ parties – Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This change in aggregate support has been accompanied by increasing differences between generations as older cohorts of UUP and SDLP supporters have been replaced by newer cohorts of DUP and Sinn Fein partisans. This is not a result of increased polarisation in values and attitudes (whether overtly political or simply communal intolerance) among younger cohorts who are, if anything, slightly more moderate than their forbears. Rather, this results from the changing political context in which new generations have been socialised – in particular the expanded choice sets facing voters as they have reached voting age. This in turn has positive implications for the consolidation of devolved democratic governance.     

Economic Aid: The End of Phase II and the Impact on Sustainable Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland

Abstract

Economic aid has been a critical component of the peace process in Northern Ireland allowing for community-based interventions, employment, social inclusion and regional stability. With the second round of funding coming to a close this essay explores the thoughts and perceptions of civil servants, fund administrators and community group leaders in Derry, Belfast and the Border Area to consider peoples reflections on the outcome of funding, concerns for the future once funding ends, what vital work is still needed and what strategies exist to continue the work of peace after the cessation of Phase II.     

Spacing commemorative-related violence in Northern Ireland: assessing the implications for a society in transition

This paper explores the geography of commemorative-related violence in Northern Ireland and considers its ramifications for a society in transition. Using original primary research, this article contributes to discussions on violence, space and memory through a spatial analysis of new quantitative archival data and existing archival material explored through a multi-disciplinary lens. It examines the complex relationship between the practices and processes of commemoration, the violence that it sometimes occasions and the places in which such violence exists. In unpacking this specific form of violence we consider the continued importance of both place and past in a post-conflict society.     

The Future of Northern Ireland: the Role of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement Institutions

Since the 2016 Brexit referendum a series of crises has gripped Northern Ireland's politics. This has had a destabilising effect across society, which has arguably been felt most acutely by political unionism. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA) of 1998 created a series of institutions to deal with political conflict in Northern Ireland, manage cross-border cooperation and normalise relations between the UK and Ireland. However, many aspects of it have been sparingly and ineffectually deployed, most notably the second and third strands dealing with north/south and east/west relations respectively. In this article, the authors argue that regular use of the institutional arrangements created by the Agreement would help to deal with the challenges currently facing Northern Ireland and help address unionist anxieties over the Protocol. Use of the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC), the British Irish Council (BIC) and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) should be prioritised. The unresolved issues arising from Brexit require a recommitment to the intergovernmental logic at the heart of the 1998 Agreement, despite the obstacles.     

The Continuing Volatility of Devolution in Northern Ireland: The Shadow of Direct Rule

Since the establishment of devolution in 1999, Northern Ireland's power‐sharing governments have been fragile and prone to crisis. However, following a decade of relative stability and cooperation between Nationalists and Unionists at Stormont, hopes were high that the devolved arrangements had finally become embedded and more resistant to collapse. This optimism was dashed when Sinn Féin brought down the devolved institutions in January 2017. A snap election once again returned the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin as the largest parties and their inability to form a government resulted in yet another political stalemate. This article begins by outlining the pattern of political crises in Northern Ireland and assesses both the trigger factors and the responses. It then goes beyond the most obvious explanation for this continuing instability—that of the deep sectarian based divisions—and points to a number of other reasons for the volatility. These include issues such as the incomplete implementation of previous agreements, the impact of broader UK policies and the shadow of Direct Rule.     

Brexit,the Belfast Agreement and Northern Ireland: Imperilling a Fragile Political Bargain

The major impact of the Belfast Agreement was to engineer a peaceful coexistence between nationalism and unionism that involved each bloc recognising it had sufficient power to thwart the political ambitions of the other side, but not enough to push through its own agenda. This paper argues that Brexit seriously damages this peaceful coexistence and could trigger what is termed an Ulster war of attrition in which Northern Ireland becomes entrapped in a political stalemate where each side strives to triumph without having sufficient power to do so. It also argues that to restore internal political stability in Northern Ireland, and to indemnify against the risk of disorderly relationships between the British and Irish governments in the future, the strategic importance of Strand 3 of the Belfast Agreement requires strengthening.     

Back to Stormont: The New Decade,New Approach Agreement and What it Means for Northern Ireland

The decision of the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin to once again share power in Northern Ireland has ended a three-year hiatus in the region’s devolved government. The deal which resurrects the devolved institutions—New Decade, New Approach—is not short of ambition. It introduces significant institutional reforms which place the institutions on a more sustainable footing and limit the potential for abuse of the Assembly’s infamous Petition of Concern. Nettles have been grasped on issues to do with language, culture, and identity that have long vexed political parties in Northern Ireland. Tucked away in the deal’s appendices are commitments to implement outstanding pledges made in previous agreements, plus ambitious plans for the new Northern Ireland Executive. However, as parties in the region were quick to discover, aspects of this deal are easier said than done. This article considers what New Decade, New Approach promises and, if fully implemented, what its implications are for politics and governance in Northern Ireland.     

Explaining the ‘quiet earthquake’: voting behaviour in the first election to the National Assembly for Wales

This paper examines voting behaviour in the inaugural election to the National Assembly for Wales (NAW), held in May 1999. We address two questions: (i) why did the election produce a ‘quiet earthquake’ in Welsh electoral politics, with the nationalist Plaid Cymru denying the Labour party their expected majority in the Assembly?; and (ii) what broader lessons does this case-study offer for the study of elections in the UK under devolution? Drawing on data from the Welsh National Assembly Election Study, we find that while some features of second-order election theories, such as lower turnout and a lower vote share for the governing party were manifest, contrary to the predictions of such theories the surge in electoral support for Plaid was largely prompted by Welsh-specific factors rather than UK-wide ones. The findings are argued to indicate limits to the applicability of second-order approaches to the study of devolved elections in the UK.     

Holding parties responsible at election time: Multi-level,multi-party government and electoral accountability

This paper highlights the crucial role played by party-specific responsibility attributions in performance-based voting. Three models of electoral accountability, which make distinct assumptions regarding citizens' ability to attribute responsibility to distinct governing parties, are tested in the challenging Northern Ireland context – an exemplar case of multi-level multi-party government in which expectations of performance based voting are low. The paper demonstrates the operation of party-attribution based electoral accountability, using data from the 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly Election Study. However, the findings are asymmetric: accountability operates in the Protestant/unionist bloc but not in the Catholic/nationalist bloc. This asymmetry may be explained by the absence of clear ethno-national ideological distinctions between the unionist parties (hence providing political space for performance based accountability to operate) but the continued relevance in the nationalist bloc of ethno-national difference (which limits the scope for performance politics). The implications of the findings for our understanding of the role of party-specific responsibility attribution in performance based models of voting, and for our evaluation of the quality of democracy in post-conflict consociational polities, are discussed.     

Security: Missing from the Northern Ireland Model

The Northern Ireland model is best defined as the framing of the political endgame of Northern Ireland’s conflict culminating in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, otherwise known as the Good Friday Agreement. The Northern Ireland model is popularly portrayed as a negotiated settlement. It focuses primarily on the bargain reached by Northern Irish political parties, assisted by British and Irish governments and mediated by US senator George Mitchell. Academics and officials alike use it to explain how the “Troubles” ended and peace was achieved. Conspicuously absent from this model is security. It also grossly understates the difficulty in dealing with a modern insurgency (the Provisionals) and leans too heavily toward skewed post-conflict thinking that views insurgents as “peacemakers” prevented from making peace because of a manifestly poor security response, particularly that of the police force and its intelligence agency (Special Branch). The perspective of politicians and diplomats who brokered the peace settlement prioritizes political negotiations at the expense of the security response; in so doing, the role of security is undermined and overlooked. Most contemporary academic works promote this outlook. Excluding security, however, thwarts a comprehensive analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict and renders any examination partial and unrepresentative. There is therefore a significant intellectual gap in our understanding of how peace was achieved, which this article redresses. Ultimately, it questions the Northern Ireland model’s capacity to assist in other relevant conflict contexts in any practical sense by arguing that a strategy where security pushed as politics pulled brought about peace. In other words, security played a crucial part because it forced the main protagonists into a situation out of which the Belfast Agreement emerged.     

Brexit and Strand Three of the 1998 Agreement: The Three Faces of East-West

Under Strand Three of the 1998 Belfast ‘Good Friday’ Agreement, institutions were set up to promote the ‘harmonious and mutually beneficial development’ of the ‘totality of relationships’ between the peoples and governments of Ireland and the UK, including its devolved administrations and Crown Dependencies. According to the text of the 1998 Agreement this ‘east-west’ dimension was to have two elements with corresponding institutions: an intergovernmental one reflected in the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIC) and an interjurisdictional one reflected in the British-Irish Council (BIC). These Strand Three institutions were designed to provide fora for, respectively, intergovernmental cooperation on ‘non-devolved Northern Ireland matters’ in the case of the BIIC and information exchange and cooperation ‘on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations’ in the case of the BIC. Nowhere in the 1998 Agreement text is the concept of ‘east-west’ used to refer to relations between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. Yet, in the wake of Brexit, and in the midst of controversy over the implications of the Protocol on Ireland / Northern Ireland, relations between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (GB–NI) have been newly framed as ‘east-west’. The creation of this new discursive face of ‘east-west’ relations marks an important, but little discussed, impact of Brexit on the political and constitutional landscape of the UK and Ireland. Against this backdrop, this article considers the impacts of Brexit, and the Protocol, on three faces of ‘east-west’ relations—the BIIC, the BIC and, newly, GB–NI—and discusses their implications for the future of Strand 3 institutions and the ‘totality of relationships’ they represent.     

Trust in elections and the institutional design of electoral authorities: Evidence from Latin America

It is often assumed that the institutional organization of electoral management bodies (EMB) has an impact on the credibility of elections, but this proposition has been difficult to verify empirically. I examine whether the degree of autonomy from the political process of EMB administrators affects attitudes towards elections among citizens and legislators by analyzing mass and elite surveys across Latin America. I conclude that levels of confidence in the electoral process among political elites are higher in countries with politically autonomous EMBs, but this effect is muted in the analysis of citizen attitudes. This association holds after controlling for individual-level determinants of trust in elections and for other relevant country-level predictors in multilevel statistical models.     

Personalized politics: Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics

What role do political party leaders play in individual vote choice? Recent literature argues that leaders are increasingly important for decisions at the ballot box. Moreover, scholars suggest leaders may be particularly consequential in volatile, under-institutionalized party systems, like those of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Accordingly, we investigate the extent to which leader evaluations matter for individual voting decisions, and whether these evaluations are more consequential than ideological proximities between voters and parties. We also explore whether leaders matter more for leader-centered, ideologically blurry, and populist parties. Through a comparison of the 2017 Czech and 2020 Slovak elections, we find that leader evaluations are strongly associated with voting decisions and that these evaluations tend to be more consequential than ideological proximity. We also show that leaders are more important for parties with strong “brands” – those that have most differentiated themselves from their competitors.