THE HARMONIZATION PRINCIPLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN CHINA

The agency theory has laid a foundation of knowledge for the review and design of corporate governance in large public corporations, but they are never exclusively symbiotic. Another insight to observe corporate governance is the adaptive efficiency demonstrated by the level of development of venture capital. Therefore, any proposal for corporate governance reform in large public corporations must be based on perspectives of both the agency theory and the adaptive efficiency theory. Otherwise, it is likely that improvements to one value (i.e. improvements by means of agency) will be at the expense of the other (i.e. improvements by means of adaptive efficiency). This theory is termed as the “harmonization principle.” Taking the Chinese State-Controlled Listed Companies (SCLCs) for example, the harmonization principle is applied to testing the reform measures for its corporate governance. With this demonstration, it intends to show the normative implication of the harmonization principle in the overhaul of corporate governance of large public corporations worldwide.     

Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This paper examines the cross-sectional relation between ownership structure and corporate performance of a sample of 434 manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchange. Following the agency theory and taking other influential factors into account, such as firm size, leverage ratio, variance of sales, growth of sale and firm age, the results suggest that there is a strong relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance, measured by Tobin's Q. A further classification of owners reveals that while shares held by state play a negative role in corporate governance, domestic institutional and managerial shareholdings improve the firms' performance.     

The Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This paper attempts to investigate the determinants of the capital structure of a sample of 972 listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China in 2003. Various theories, namely, the trade-off, pecking order and agency theories, are deployed to explain and predict the signs and significance of each factor identified by Ragan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001). Furthermore, we include institutional shareholdings, including state agency shareholdings, state-owned shareholdings and privately owned shareholdings, as corporate governance variables to examine the effects of corporate structure on the debt financing behaviours. As well documented, we find that profitability is negatively related to capital structure at a highly significant level. The size and risk of the firms are positively related to the debt ratio – but only in term of market value measures of capital structure. The years of the companies being listed on stock markets are positively related to capital structure, indicating the access of the firms to debt finance is more easily judged by book value. Tax is not a factor in influencing debt ratio. Ownership structure has a negative effect on the capital structure. The firms with higher institutional shareholdings tend to avoid using debt financing, a behaviour that can be explained by entrenchment effects. A further classification of the institutional shareholders reveals that, among the three groups of institutional shareholding, the state institutions, including state agency and state-owned institutions, were more averse to debt financing, particularly for state-owned institutions. There is no strong evidence indicating debt-averse behaviour by domestic institutional shareholders.     

英国行业性组织在公司治理中的作用

英国公司治理研究致力于解决因所有权和控制权分离而产生的经典代理问题,理论界和实务界分别提出了两种机制:董事会内部监督机制和"要素市场"外部治理机制来约束监督管理层,降低代理成本。在机构化持股时代,机构投资者越来越积极参与所投资组合公司的治理事务,代表机构投资者的行业性组织在一般性参与方面起着举足轻重的作用,机构监督已成为英国公司治理的新机制。     

Ownership structure, regulation and the market for corporate control in the EU banking sector

This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder control and hostile takeovers as corporate governance mechanisms in the EU banking sector against the background of the existing corporate governance regulations and different ownership structures of banks in the EU. The results indicate the there is trade-off in EU corporate governance regulation between better investor protection and a higher efficiency of the market for corporate control. The main problem is differences in the ownership structure of banks in the EU banking sector. This implies that EU corporate governance regulations should be customized to the specific ownership structure of banks and not toward harmonising national regulations.     

The Bonding Effects of Directors' Statutory Wage Liability: An Interactive Corporate Governance Explanation

Canadian corporate directors are personally liable to the corporation's employees for unpaid wages. The dominant rationale is the protection of vulnerable employees. A proposal under consideration to exonerate directors from this liability responds to claims that directors of financially troubled corporations resign prematurely, lessening the realized value potential of the firm. Scholars have also argued that a "liability chill" causes directors to make inefficient, risk‐averse investment decisions while the corporation is solvent. Paradoxically, exoneration may actually decrease the value of the firm because directors' liability for employees' wages increases efficiency in corporate governance by reducing agency costs. It serves as a bond by directors to corporate stakeholders that they will diligently restrain harmful managerial behavior.     

Product innovation and process innovation in SOEs: evidence from the Chinese transition

This paper offers an analysis of the influence of management behavior on the relationship between factors such as market, governance and resources of a firm, and the choice of the type of technological innovation in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The authors develop a structural equation model and 12 hypotheses and test the model and hypotheses using a sample of 274 SOEs in China. This study discovers that the choice of innovation types among Chinese SOEs depends on the turbulence in the environment, and on the organizational resources. The key contributions of the study include: testing existing theories of innovation in the context of Chinese SOEs; studying the factors that affect product innovation and process innovation in that context; and demonstrating that market forces and internal governance simultaneously influence SOE innovation.     

股价信号、项目价值与公司投资行为选择

资本市场和实体经济之间存在密切关系,资本市场资源配置效率决定了股价信号与公司投资的关系.将股价信号、项目价值与公司投资纳入一个统一的框架体系,利用逐步回归方法,对我国长江三角洲地区制造业上市公司资料的实证检验表明,股价信号对公司投资决策有一定的影响,在我国目前信息不对称、市场投机严重等不完全市场的条件下,对公司投资会产生过度的激励.     

论公司治理与公司控制人侵权责任的追究

完善的资本市场是影响公司治理的一个非常重要的外部因素,同时,健全的公司治理又是健康的资本市场不可或缺的组成部分。良好的公司治理机制需要多方面因素的合理组合。从公司法的角度看,追究大股东、董事、经理等公司控制人的侵权责任是我国当前完善公司治理机制的核心内容之一。     

A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short‐termism

In this article, we develop a novel understanding of stock market short‐termism as a social phenomenon. Contrary to formerly popular academic belief, short‐termism is a problem that is highly unlikely to be structurally self‐correcting. An important driver of short‐termism typically elided within standard legal‐academic analyses is the informational centricity of modern stock markets, and resulting pressure on corporate managers to generate fresh ‘news’ indicative of perceived business ‘progress’. We highlight the growing enthusiasm of policy‐makers for a discriminatory ‘two‐tiered’ approach to public company investor relations. Accordingly, long‐term and committed investors are expected to be brought into the company's governance ‘inner circle’, while other investors are implicitly relegated to lowertier ‘outsider’ status. We argue that this supports a discriminatory approach to the allocation of voting entitlements in newly listing companies, enabling committed investors to develop cooperative and sustained governance relations with management unencumbered by ‘outside’ stock market pressures for short‐term financial‐performance outcomes.     

Law or Finance: Evidence from Finland

Although it is widely acknowledged that the benefits of corporate governance reform could be substantial, systematic evidence on such reforms is scant. We both document and evaluate a contemporary corporate governance reform by constructing 18 measures of shareholder and creditor protection for Finland for the period 1980–2000. The measures reveal that shareholder protection has been strengthened whereas creditor protection has been weakened. We also demonstrate how the reform is consistent with a reorganisation of the Finnish financial market in which a bank-centred financial system shifted from relationship-based debt finance towards increasing dominance by the stock market. We find evidence that the development of shareholder protection has been a driver of the reorganisation, whereas the changes in creditor protection have mirrored market developments.     

Company Law and Corporate Governance Renewal in Transition Economies: The Bulgarian Dilemma

The main objective of company law and corporate governance structures is to provide rules and secure efficient functioning of decision-making mechanisms that maximise the value of enterprises and safeguard interests of various stakeholders. Company laws and corporate governance models in different countries have evolved in specific historical, cultural, market and legal conditions that prevent their direct transplantation elsewhere. Assessing available experiences, former centrally planned European economies, engaged in sweeping transformations, are challenged by the need to recreate a delicate balance between investor protection and business discretion of managers to work for corporate value maximisation and social welfare. This essay undertakes an explorative discussion on the possible choices and the costs and benefits related to principalagent problem resolution in economies in transition, with special emphasis on institutions and the case of Bulgaria.     

公司制度趋同理论检视下的中国公司治理评析

公司治理全球趋同理论是国际公司法学界在上世纪90年代发起的阶段性议题。趋同论与多元论的广泛交锋、股东中心主义模式与利益相关人模式的优劣权衡、竞争压力假说与路径依赖假说的鲜明对比、法律移植假说与境外上市推动假说的切磋琢磨等多处论战令人印象深刻,也广泛检视了现代公司治理领域的多项命题。该理论也是我国公司法近十年来立法演进与理念变革最重要的域外理论背景之一,为2005公司法修订、独立董事制度引入、股权分置改革、并购重组创新、境外上市、公司社会责任理念深化等公司治理标志性探索直接或间接贡献了理论资源。趋同论与本土论相互制约和共同影响下的近十年中国公司治理总体呈现出一定的英美化转向,与此同时,它也将长期接受来自诸如家族文化与官僚文化、习惯性漠视少数股东利益以及股权结构过度集中等与英美经验暂时难以化约的中国本土现实的挑战。跳出趋同或者多元的概念层面的争论,尊重公司治理规则的国际共识,拓展和优化对先进经验的学习路径,专注于本土问题的解决,也许是当下应当持有的态度。     

职代会的定位与功能重塑

职代会制度是我国颇具特色的一项职工参与制度。随着市场经济体制的建立以及企业治理制度的变革，职代会的地位和作用发生了变化，需要重新审视职代会的正当性。目前，有关职工参与的各种理论从不同角度论证了职代会的正当性，职代会对完善公司治理、加强公司监督、维护公司利益也具有积极作用。我国应通过完善职代会设立规则、职权设置，使传统的职代会与市场经济体制下的现代公司治理机制相契合，让职代会成为职工与企业协商沟通的主要平台，在新的体制环境下发挥协商和监督等功能。     

职工参与公司控制质疑——对“共决制”的理论与制度分析

职工参与公司控制会改变股东控制公司的传统公司治理模式。主张职工参与公司控制的学者认为 ,现代企业的职工不是向企业提供简单劳动 ,而是对公司做出了人力资本投资 ,因此 ,应该给与职工与股东相同的公司控制权。但给与职工控制权可能会增加公司集体决策的成本 ,不利于公司提高经营效率 ,“共决制”本身固有的弱点也可能使其无法达到预期的目标。德国的“共决制”与其公司治理特点有直接关系 ,不考虑我国的实际状况 ,盲目引进“共决制”可能会不利于我国公司的发展     

Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

勒斯勒尔草案股份公司治理规则及发展

德国学者赫尔曼·勒斯勒尔帮助日本制订了第一部公司法（草案）,其中关于股份公司的一般规则,特别是股份公司机关的法的构造奠定了日本公司治理结构的深厚基础,了解这些可以掌握公司法中董事会、监事会、股东大会的历史流变和股份公司治理结构的发展脉络,并体会公司治理仍存在的制度性困惑。     

从代理理论看对高管报酬的规范

从效益角度看,对企业高管报酬的数额讨论是没有意义的,要想制定一个理想的企业高管报酬数额的立法、行政和司法标准,将会产生适得其反的效果。对企业高管报酬方法规范的重点,应该是提高报酬与企业业绩的正相关关系。相比而言,企业高管报酬的披露制度更符合市场经济的规律,也更有利于资本市场的完善。     

Toward a Signaling Explanation of the Private Choice of Corporate Law

Corporate actors can choose their corporate domicile and haveconsiderable freedom to choose terms in corporate charters.Although contractarian corporate law literature almost alwaysanalyzes the private choice of corporate law through the lensof agency costs, this article considers the choice for its informationalcontent. A particular law may be chosen by an entrepreneur notbecause it reduces agency costs, but because it signals qualityto outside investors. The article considers the choice of aDelaware domicile. Higher expected litigation costs for relativelylow quality firms that accompany a Delaware domicile could implythat choosing Delaware signals a relatively high quality firm.Alternatively, the size and structure of the franchise tax inDelaware could give rise to a signal of quality from locatingthere. The article considers the ambiguous welfare implicationsof the signaling analysis and the debate over mandatory versusenabling rules in corporate law. It also suggests how the signalinganalysis might apply to the debate over the private choice ofa securities regulation domicile.     

中国保险基金的困境及其出路

当前，我国保险业又一次面临着巨大危机和困境，保险资金投资渠道狭窄，投资方式、投资工具单一，难以支持我国保险业全面应对加入WTO后年资保险公司纷至沓来的局面。中国保险基金必须加快和更大规模地进入资本市场，这既是保险业摆脱困境的必然选择和唯一出路，更是中国金融市场体系得以完善的必然要求和客观规律。中国证券市场、特别是股票市场当前还存在严重缺陷，保险基金大规模贸然入市风险很大。中国保险基金进入资本市场的途径主要有：成立各种形式的投资基金，大规模增加购买企业债券，提高购买金融债券和国债的比重等。