The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: Part III: Postpartum depression and the "appreciation" of wrongfulness

Whether or not the psychiatrist testifies on the ultimate issue in insanity defense cases, it is critically important that he familiarize himself with the applicable legal standards and interpretations in order properly to relate his clinical findings to the relevant criteria for insanity and thereby enhance the probative value of his testimony. This is the third in a series of articles which attempts to explicate judicial and statutory standards of insanity and correlate them with the psychiatrist's findings of psychopathology. This article analyzes the Model Penal Code formulation of insanity, with special emphasis on the all important distinction between "know" and "appreciate." This formulation permits the defendant possessed of mere surface knowledge or cognition to be exculpated, requiring that he have a deeper affective appreciation of the legal and moral import of the conduct involved if he is to be held criminally responsible. The Model Penal Code approach more readily lends itself to application as a standard of responsibility in cases involving affective disorders. An important disorder within this group, postpartum depression, is discussed in the context of raising the insanity defense in a case of infanticide.     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: Part II: A systematic analysis of exculpatory delusions

Although delusions are prima facie evidence of psychosis, their mere presence is not a sufficient condition for exculpation on the grounds of insanity. In most cases, a determination of insanity will depend on the specific content of the delusions and whether, as a result of these delusions, the defendant was unable to know or appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her act. Delusions may be subdivided into four types, according to their content: 1) delusions of being controlled, 2) delusions of grandiosity, 3) delusions of persecution, and 4) delusions of jealousy. An analysis is undertaken of these delusional subtypes in terms of their exculpatory effect within the jurisdictions which follow each of the three respective standards of wrongfulness (i.e., the illegality standard, the subjective moral standard, and the objective moral standard). The criminal law does not recognize a transcendent constancy in the legal insanity status of psychotic individuals whose offense was the result of their delusional ideation. In most such cases, exculpation is based primarily on the specific content of their delusions and how it comports with the law of the jurisdiction specific content of their delusions and how it comports with the law of the jurisdiction in which the act was committed (the lex loci delicti commissi).     

The psychiatrist's guide to right and wrong: Part IV: The insanity defense and the Ultimate Issue Rule

In the wake of Hinckley, widespread public dissatisfaction with the role of psychiatrists in insanity defense litigation prompted Congress in 1984 to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit psychiatric testimony on the ultimate legal issue of whether or not a defendant is insane. APA's Statement on the Insanity Defense served as the ably articulated premise for this evidentiary amendment. APA argued that in going beyond their psychiatric expertise by answering ultimate issue questions as to whether defendants are legally insane, experts are likely to confuse the jury and undermine public confidence in psychiatry. APA also asserted that there was an impermissible logical leap between scientific psychiatric inquiry and moral-legal conclusions on the ultimate issue of insanity. This article reviews the origins, history, and vicissitudes of the Ultimate Issue Rule and analyzes the Statement on the Insanity Defense from both a legal and psychiatric perspective on the issue of whether psychiatrists should answer the ultimate question in insanity cases. The analysis suggests that APA's conclusions are not supported on scientific or evidentiary grounds, but may be warranted as a policy consideration to safeguard the public image of psychiatry.     

行政诉讼司法变更权研究

行政诉讼司法变更权,是法院行政审判权的重要组成部分。确立司法变更权,是我国民主法制建设的要求。我国现行《行政诉讼法》规定的司法变更权是有限的,只适用于行政处罚案件。为了有效地监督和制约行政机关行使行政职权,更好地实现行政诉讼保护公民、法人和其他组织合法权益的目的,应当适当扩展司法变更权的范围。     

The judicial response to crime and the criminal: A utilitarian perspective

This paper examines the hypothesis that the sentencing decision of the criminal court is consistent with utilitarian principles and that the judiciary uses the length of incarceration as an instrument for the maximization of societal well-being. A theoretical model is developed, whose principal arguments are offender and offense attributes, resource costs, the availability of alternative sanctions, and the general crime rate. Four questions are considered: (i) How does a utilitarian court respond to a general increase in crime? (ii) How does the availability of alternative sanctions affect the length of incarceration ? (iii) How does a utilitarian court respond to offenders who are more likely to recidivate? (iv) How does the court respond to offenders who commit more serious offenses? The model is empirically evaluated, using cross-sectional data for the state of Georgia for individuals sentenced to prison in 1978 for a UCR index offense. The theoretical model provides few specific behavioral rules for the court to follow. Answers to the foregoing four questions are shown to depend upon both the efficacy of sanctions and the cost of the administration of those sanctions. It is not possible to predict, for example, how a utilitarian court should respond to a rise in crime or how it should respond to offenders who are likely to commit more serious offenses. The empirical analysis shows that, in fact, the sentence length varied inversely with the general offense rate, with the likelihood of imprisonment, and with the length of postprison probation. The evidence also indicates that sentences vary with the individual's original record but not with the offender's age or race. With the exception of possible gender bias, the court's sentencing behavior was consistent with utilitarian principles.     

Frustration: The mold of judicial philosophy

Abstract

The Framers understood the Constitution to be the fundamental expression of the rule of law over against the arbitrary, intemperate, and unjust “rule of men” that all too frequently existed in the political world, unfortunately both democratic as well as monarchical. Accordingly, the rule of law requires a well functioning political and legal system that includes legislative checks and balances, the separation of power between the President and Congress, an independent judiciary, federalism, etc. What happens when this “Madisonian” constitutional system, designed to express “the deliberate sense of the community,” runs into a Judicial branch that, in effect, claims we live under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what we say it is. Must the Judiciary itself be subject to the rule of law, and the decisions of a constitutional majority, or does their “independence” extend to being independent of the constraints of the rule of law and, thus, decent majority rule? How did the original John Marshall Court answer these questions, and what light do the leading cases and controversies shed on the relationship between the Marshall Court and the Madisonian System? Are we facing a situation of Marshall v. Madison?     

关于举证责任倒置与司法公正的思考

本文以侵权责任法的出台为契机,结合目前医患纠纷司法实践中备受社会广泛关注的举证责任倒置这一热点问题,仔细梳理了我国《民法通则》、《医疗事故处理条例》和《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定》等法律法规与司法解释的相关规定,援引国外相关案例进行剖析,并从举证责任分担规则上如何更能体现司法公正提出立法建议,以期对当前医患纠纷的司法解决体现公平公正有所裨益。