Waiting for Enron: The Unstable Equilibrium of Auditor Independence Regulation

A primary function of auditor independence regulation is to ensure that any financial incentives auditors may have to approve misleading or inaccurate accounting are outweighed by market and regulatory deterrents to compromising an auditor's independence. This article is an inquiry into the current state of this incentive equilibrium in the United Kingdom: the possible costs and benefits that may be incurred by auditors if they elect to acquiesce to management's demands to accept problematic accounting. It argues that the equilibrium position currently incentivizes a rational auditor to acquiesce. On the one hand, the article demonstrates that the recent evolution of audit firm revenue streams has provided auditors with a substantial incentive to compromise their independence and provided management with credible sanctions to pressurize them to do so. On the other hand, the article shows that regulatory and market costs of acquiescence do not counterbalance the benefits of acquiescence.     

中国影子银行的金融监管研究——运用市场约束优化政府监管

金融危机爆发以来,加强影子银行监管的呼声空前高涨,监管当局试图修正监管规则,以适应最新的金融产品结构和业务的变化.但是,影子银行凭借其创新性、自由化、复杂化,开创了一条“创新—监管制止—再创新”的监管套利模式,而政府监管总是滞后于金融创新.为提高影子银行监管的有效性,需引入市场约束规则,充分发挥市场主体的作用.市场约束可以在一定程度上弥补官方监管的缺陷,即逐步在以政府监管为主的体系中运用市场约束,以实现政府监管与市场约束的最佳配合.     

司法政策与监管政策的竞争——基于信用卡纠纷裁判的观察

政策对司法裁判产生实然的影响,当司法政策与监管政策发生竞争时,作为裁判者的地方法院面临选择困境。信用卡民事纠纷实证研究表明,法院对费率限定的司法政策与费率约定监管政策的认同基本抗衡并受到政策解释路径的影响。改进政策在技术层面的适用,应发挥抽象规则的威慑力,关注政策可能的不利后果,加强个案裁判说理论证。而从根本上化解政策竞争,需要建立司法权与监管权协调机制。一方面,加强职能履行过程的协调,适用法律对政策竞争予以解释,运用消极司法审查发挥个案裁判灵活性;另一方面,加强政策制定程序的协调,横向上明确规范性文件征求意见程序,纵向上完善规范性文件备案审查程序,从而超越政策竞争,实现协同治理。     

Moving the Goalposts: Financial Market Regulation in Hong Kong and the Crash of October 1987

The article examines the operation of the Hong Kong stock and futures exchanges during the crash of October 1987 and in particular the controversial decision to close the exchanges. It argues that the closure decision exposes a serious conflict of interest and abuse of power on the part of the major decision makers and fundamental flaws in Hong Kong's self-regulatory system. Moreover, these events raise broader questions about the strengths and weaknesses of different regulatory regimes and about the value of different theoretical explanations of regulatory behavior. In particular, it is argued that the most influential theory concerning the regulation of financial markets—that of certain Chicago School economists—raises as many questions as it answers, and that an alternative view which locates cultural and organizational factors at its core provides a more satisfactory explanation of the events of October 1987.     

The Changing Role of Central Banks and the Role of Competition in Financial Regulation during (and in the Aftermath of) the Financial Crisis

Rescue cases involving guarantees (contrasted with restructuring cases) during the recent Financial Crisis, have illustrated the prominent position that the goal of promoting financial stability has assumed over that of the prevention or limitation of possible distortions of competition which may arise when granting State aid. The importance attached to maintaining and promoting financial stability—as well as the need to facilitate rescue and restructuring measures aimed at preventing systemically relevant financial institutions from failure, demonstrate how far authorities are willing to overlook certain competition policies. However, increased government and central bank intervention also simultaneously trigger the usual concerns—which include moral hazard and the danger of serving as long‐term substitutes for market discipline. How far central banks and governments should intervene and how far distortions of competition should be permitted ultimately depends on how systemically relevant a financial institution is.     

标准壁垒与市场化竞争

北京的七月是火红的季节,火红的季节里发生红火的事情。7月17日,信息设备资源共享协同服务标准化工作组召开会议,联想、TCL、康佳、海信、长城五大企业负责人共同出席,信息产业部副部长娄勤俭指出,企业应成为标准制定的主体(具体请参见《中国电子报》2003年8月5日第3版)。此次标准化工作组的建立,昭示着我国的企业逐渐转变竞争观念,希望参与到标准的制定过程中来,掌握市场主动权,更好地与国外同行竞争。标准是游戏规则,技术标准的背后是专利,专利的背后是巨大的经济利益。在国际贸易过程中,存在着关税壁垒和非关税壁垒。随着贸易的自由化…     

限制与促进竞争的经济管制

邮政垄断、打烊时间规定、手工业学徒满师考试合格证书、劳工解雇保护、药品经营义务、特价销售折扣———这些关键词来源于完全不同的经济领域 ,但却有共同之处 ,即揭示了政府经济管制的领域 ,揭示了政府对市场领域的干预 ,而这些产业近期又面临着管制的解除。只要注意一下日常的报纸和新闻报道就会很清楚地感受到由此而呈现出来的政策上的情绪化。本文并不想对此进行个案研究 ,而是希望结合具体化讨论来对这一问题进行体系上和结构上的分析。自从 2 0世纪 80年代以来 ,在欧洲就开始了广泛的解除管制运动。发端于美国的这场运动首先波及英…     

试论金融衍生市场中的投资者教育

投资者是金融市场乃至金融衍生品市场发展的基础.因此,应重视保护投资者利益.由于金融衍生品的复杂性和特殊性,决定了加大投资者教育力度的必要性.金融衍生品市场是一把双刃剑,它既是一个风险转移市场同时也会带来不同于传统金融风险的新风险,投资者教育的核心是客观揭示风险.而该职责应由政府监管机构和自律组织担任.     

市场竞争中的弱势群体与经济学

中国经济学向何处去是本文的中心议题。文章认为,中国经济学是反映中国经济建设和经济改革实践并为之服务的知识体系,既要开展“国民财富的性质和原因的研究”,又要开展“国民财富的增长和办法的研究”;所以,历史上的这两项研究成果,中国经济学都必须批判地继承和发展;任务的特殊性,决定中国经济学的研究对象既不能定位于生产关系,又不能定位于生产力,应当定位于市场的活动主体:研究对象是家庭、企业的生产和交换活动过程及其条件;研究对象的综合性,又要求研究方法的多样性。中国经济学要想不辱使命,必须从市场竞争中的弱势群体的立场上出发,因为这既是经济科学的优良传统,又是中国全面建设小康社会的着力点。     

信息交换与限制竞争的法律规制研究

本文是对行业协会中的信息交换进行反垄断的法律分析。首先 ,本文对行业协会信息交换的种类及其利弊进行分析 ,然后就各国对信息交换的法律规制进行了详细的介绍 ,最后 ,作者对我国信息交换的法律规制进行了制度设计和构想。     

Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of Political Competition

One of the most prominent explanations of the creation and maintenance of independent judiciary is the “insurance theory” that proposes a positive relationship between political competition and judicial independence. But, does intense political competition inevitably lead to higher levels of judicial independence across all types of democracies? Conducting a large‐N cross‐country analysis over 97 democratic countries, this study shows that as democratic quality across countries changes, the impact of political competition on judicial independence changes as well. The empirical findings reveal that while in advanced democracies high levels of political competition enhances judicial independence, in developing democracies political competition significantly hampers the independence of the courts.     

竞争政策规制与多边规则

当世界贸易大量增长,跨国投资快速增加,多国性企业逐渐在国际经济活动中扮演重要角色之后,贸易法和竞争法传统上互不跨越之界限早已不复存在。在国际社会已对贸易立法进行了多边规制之时,结合贸易、竞争政策和国内放松管制之间的互补关系,对竞争政策规制与多边规则进行探析具有一定的现实意义。     

金融危机与竞争政策:经济学的视角

这次全球金融危机对英国来说,是个体系性问题,不仅有资金流动性问题,还有偿付能力问题.重树人们的信心已经不足以解决问题,需要对金融体制进行彻底地修复.为此,英国政府采取了一系列的银行业拯救计划,这些计划和措施是行之有效并且与竞争法原则是相契合的,对竞争并没有构成重大威胁.国务秘书以维护金融稳定这一所谓的公共利益为由,用干预的形式允许劳埃德银行收购苏格兰哈里法克斯银行,是一个政策错误.并且,这种合并将会实质性减少竞争,造成经营的高成本,从经济学角度看也是错误的.     

The Making of a Market Economy in China: Transformation of Government Regulation of Market Development

Abstract:  The making of a market economy in China occurred when the domestic legal system was largely underdeveloped. It is the administrative bureaucratic system that has played a leading role in the making of a market economy in China. In recent years, the Chinese Government has strived to establish a market economy based on the rule of law and has undertaken legal measures to rationalise government regulation of market economy development. However, the administrative bureaucratic system headed by the central government remains a strong party leading the market economy construction in China. This article argues that the administrative bureaucratic system and market economy development have evolved into a social institution. To transform the regulation of market economy development towards the rule of law is a social institutional change and is a slow and incremental process, as it is imbedded in the various formal and informal constraints in Chinese society.     

市场竞争中的弱势群体融资难问题研究

市场竞争中的弱势群体指中西部农村生活未达到小康的广大农户、中小企业和个体工商户、失业人员。融资难是市场竞争中的弱势群体生存和发展道路上的主要障碍。小额信用贷款模式创造的联户担保、共同承担风险的经济声誉机构 ,是一种全新的经济运行机制 ,是市场竞争中的弱势群体自身克服信用度低、解决生存和发展道路上融资难的根本办法。新的经济运行机制的创造必将改变金融发展史 ,所以 ,金融市场的动员资金、配置资金和分散风险的三大功能的具体内容 ,必须补充、丰富和发展。     

房地产市场税收调控的合法性:困境与重构

近年来的房地产市场税收调控措施,普遍存在合法性问题。根源在于,税收法定主义与税收调控之间存在逻辑与现实的悖论,传统税收法定主义逻辑不适宜解释和构建税收调控的合法性。在合法性控制上,财政税与调控税的合法性标准应有所不同。鉴于税收宏观调控的不确定性,应对其施以灵活性的合法性机制,一方面是税收调控法定主义,赋予行政机关一定的税收立法权,完善税收授权立法制度;另一方面是建立税收调控决策程序的三方参与机制,拓展税收调控的合法性框架。