Predictions, Patterns, and Policymaking: A Regional Study of Devolution

This article examines state welfare policy choices since thepassage of the Personal Responsibility and Work OpportunityReconciliation Act(PRWORA) of 1996. IT argues that neither priorpredictions nor existing explanations of welfare policymakingfully capture the realities of reform. Using data from nationalstudies and comparisons of policymaking in six states, thisstudy demonstrates that diversity, not uniformity, characterizesstate responses to devolution. Accounting for these choicesrequires an understanding of the context of policymaking. Conventionalanalyses of welfare reform have ignored the institutional structuresthrough which policy is formulated and thus miss an importantdeterminant of choices: the actions of administrative officials.Analyses that ignore institutional settings, and the actionsof administrators within such settings, will continue to missmuch that is crucial to our efforts to understand policy decisions.     

Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.     

Devolution and Celtic nationalism in the UK

Other than the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices, the UK is exceptional in lacking a uniform level of government or administration between central and local government. There have been various attempts to fill this gap. The most important arose because of an upsurge of Celtic nationalism in the early 1960s which resulted in the Scotland and Wales Acts of 1978. Neither was implemented, however, and both were rescinded in 1979. Whether this issue will return is problematic: the British political tradition is indelibly unitary as is its socio‐economic structure. In addition, moderate Celtic aspirations may have been met by unobtrusive devolutionary changes such as language concessions, the strengthening of the Offices and various symbolic changes in the field of sport.     

Implications of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 for the "Devolution Revolution"

From an economist's perspective, the fiscal and administrativegoals of the so-called "devolution revolution" include lessfederal intergovernmental aid, especially if fiscally equalizing;the substitution of block grants for matching grants; greateradministrative flexibility for the states; and fewer underfundedmandates. This article uses these devolulionary yardsticks toanalyze the major provisions of the federal Balanced BudgetAct of 1997. These provisions fall far short of a "devolutionrevolution." The act increases the level of federal assistance,leaves Medicaid as an open-ended entitlement, and preservesa strong role for the federal government in shaping intergovernmentalgrants. The article discusses the political forces moderatingthe act's devolutionary impact.     

The Dilemma of Developing Financial Accountability without Election – A Study of China's Recent Budget Reforms

Until recently, the discussion on political accountability focused on accountability in democratic systems with free and regular elections. Using China as a case study, this article contends that there exists a possibility of financial accountability without election. However, as election serves the important function of potentially changing the chain of accountability, the route of creating financial accountability without election has its limitations.     

Deficits and Devolution in the 104th Congress

Deficit reduction was an important impetus for the devolutioninitiatives thai moved through the 104th Congress, but it wasnot the only cause. Other objectives, notably building an alliancewith Republican governors and transforming the American welfarestate, also helped to drive devolution. Although the Republicandeficit and devolution agendas appeared mutually reinforcingat first, arguments over the terms of devolution (e.g., entitlementstatus, program mandates, and funding formulas) helped to slowdown and build opposition to those agendas. The use of omnibuslegislation helped to gel Republican proposals through the Congressin 1995, but packaging together popular and highly unpopularprovisions in a single bill ultimately provided President BillClinton with political cover to veto the legislation. The unpopularityof Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Clinton'spledge to "end welfare as we know it" propelled a more limiteddevolution agenda focused on AFDC in the lead-up to the 1996presidential election. Devolution ofMedicaid was dropped, however,while Food Stamps and child nutrition programs experienced budgetcuts but little devolution.     

Devolution of the Small Cities CDBG Program in Mississippi

In 1982 responsibility for HUD's Small Cities Community DevelopmentBlock Grant program was transferred to state governments aspart of President Reagan's New Federalism initiatives. Devolutionwas designed to (1) implement a new vision of American federalism,(2) shift control over a significant source of financial resourcesfor nonmetropolitan areas, and (3) end the bypassing of stategovernment officials in community development decisionmaking.This article uses the eleven year (1975–1985) historyof Small Cities CDBG awards in Mississippi to assess the consequencesof the program's devolution. Changes in the pattern of stateCDBG awards indicate that the program's devolution produceda policy redirection that channeled CDBG funds to a larger numberof the smallest municipalities and permitted more local discretionin project design. As a result, HUD no longer dictated communitydevelopment policy to small cities. Instead, community developmentpriorities in Mississippi emerged out of an award process thatinvolved interaction among state and local officials.     

The Politics of Civil Service and Administrative Reforms in Development—Explaining Within‐Country Variation of Reform Outcomes in Georgia after the Rose Revolution

This article examines the role of politics as a determinant of civil service and administrative (CSA) reform outcomes in Georgia. The majority of existing studies on CSA reforms face several methodological challenges, which make it difficult to understand the influence of politics in more detail. Based on literature review findings, the article proposes a model for within‐country comparisons that allows one to control for a number of variables such as context and policy design. Comparing CSA reform outcomes in the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs in Georgia after the 2003 Rose Revolution through a matched case study, the article shows that certain countrywide legal adjustments, anti‐corruption measures and context variables are necessary but insufficient conditions for successful reform. While in general Georgia has achieved considerable success in its CSA reform efforts, the President's leverage over reform implementation, leadership at the ministry level and the politics of foreign aid have led to significant variation in reform outcomes across the analysed institutions. In addition to this, institutional constraints reflecting inherent differences between policy sectors explain another part of the variation in outcomes in Georgia. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Limits of Devolution: Localism,Economics and Post‐democracy

This article challenges the narrowly founded but untroubled consensus about the alleged benefits of the Conservative government's devolution programme. It suggests that too much attention has been paid to purported benefits and too little regard to the potential risks, and draws attention to international evidence that suggests that the distribution of the benefits of devolution is crucially dependent on its design. It critically examines the case for the currently offered model of devolution and finds the underpinning economic model and limited forms of democratic accountability are likely to produce regressive social outcomes and the reinforcement of existing local elites. It calls for a wider public debate and fuller democratic scrutiny of the model of devolution on offer.     

Environmental Federalism Revisited: Second‐Order Devolution in Air Quality Regulation

In this paper we examine states' use of local clean air agencies and provide a preliminary assessment of what causes states to devolve air quality policy authority to the local level. Data from a unique comparative state survey shows that states vary widely in the number of local clean air agencies they employ and the amount of authority these agencies have to set standards, monitor air quality, and enforce regulations. Multivariate analyses suggest that second‐order devolution is partly driven by a general propensity to decentralize policy authority, but that policy‐specific factors relating to the problem and interest group environment affect devolution as well. These findings indicate that local agencies play an important role in U.S. air quality regulation, and that the dynamics of state devolution to local agencies deserve further study.     

A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the United Kingdom

A system of asymmetric devolution was established for the firsttime in Great Britain in 1999. Its advocates hoped it wouldstrengthen public support for the maintenance of the UnitedKingdom, whereas its critics feared it would have the oppositeeffect. This article examines which of these two perspectivesappears to have been correct by looking at trends in nationalidentity and constitutional preferences in each of England,Scotland, and Wales following the advent of devolution. It findsthat although there may have been some erosion of British nationalidentity and although there are some pressures for further changes,a system of asymmetric devolution appears to be the only constitutionalstructure capable of enjoying public support throughout GreatBritain.