Budget Deficits and Coalition Governments

This paper shows that compromise between different ideologicalmotivations within multiparty governments may result in a biastoward running budget deficits even if all parties in thecoalition prefer balanced budgets. The deficit bias increases withthe degree of ``polarization'' of the ideological motivations andgenerally decreases with the degree of concentration of powerwithin the government. Although the analysis is conducted assuminga proportional representation electoral system, the results willalso apply to majoritarian systems if the winning party comprisesideologically different constituencies. The relationship betweenbudget deficits and multiparty governments is investigated usingdata from a sample of eight European Union countries for the period1971–1990. Analysis on pooled data is partly in line with the theory.Time series within country analysis is less favorable: we findclear support to the theory only in the case of Italy.     

Coalition Governments, Divided Governments, and Electoral Theory

For decades theorizing about party competition in two-party and multiparty democracies has proceeded along separate tracks. The former has assumed an idealized world in which one party wins full control of a system's governing institutions in a first-past-the-post election, while the latter posits a world in which elections conducted under a system of proportional representation split control of the parliament among the parties. The contemporary American experience with divided government suggests that the two lines of theorizing greatly exaggerate the differences between two-party and multi-party systems. Where a two-party system has a separation of powers based on independent elections, coalition governments involving shared control of the separate institutions may result. Under such conditions rational voting may be just as demanding in two-party systems as in multi-party systems, and the policy outputs of two-party systems may be no more coherent than the outputs of multi-party systems, contrary to traditional arguments.     

Party Organizational Elites in Norwegian Politics: Representativeness and Party Democracy*

The question raised is why ‘secondary’ representativeness of political elites, i.e. the degree of similarity in socio-demographic background between elite and electorate, is considered important in debates on democratic polities. Three answers are considered: to improve long-term ‘primary’ representtativity. i.e. the representation of public opinions; to build systemic legitimacy: and to encourage the participation of low-mobilized groups. From this perspective new data on the party organizational elites in Norway are presented: The party elites are socially skewed in terms of present position. but fairly broad based in terms of parental background. They reflect the traditional cleavage structures of Norwegian politics, even though the high shares of women and public employees indicate potentially emerging cleavage structures. Particularly the women in party positions are disproportionately recruited from the lower ranks of the public job market.     

The Norwegian Communist Party in the Immediate Postwar Period*

The main purpose of this article is to argue the importance of combining several approaches in studies of communist parties: socio-economic structures, competitive relations to other left wing parties, organizational implantation, and the role of political tradition. The present ecological analysis will particularly emphasize the organizational approach and the importance of political tradition. In keeping with Allardt's and Lipset's theories, socio-economic structure seemed to a great extent to be a necessary condition for communist strength in this period. Both significant employment in industry and/or forestry and a strong social democratic party turned out to be necessary conditions for communist strength, but only when we analysed the ‘historical’ and organizational dimensions in more detail were we able to determine more accurately the areas of strong electoral support of the Norwegian Communist Party.     

Aggregating Spending Preferences: An Empirical Analysis of Party Preferences in Norwegian Local Governments

To understand the role of political parties in public budgetmaking, we need separate data about spending preferences andbudgetary outcomes. In this paper we employ such data todiscriminate between different models of how competing partypreferences are transformed into policy outcomes. In the firststep of the analysis data on politicians' spending preferencesare used to estimate the desired allocation of each party. Inthe second step the desired allocations are used as inputs ina separate analysis of the decision-making process inNorwegian local councils.     

Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes

Recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size. Thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult. It combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament. A general indifferenceresult applies. An exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures. At the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled. If the formateur is strong, a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures.     

Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments

Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001. These predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties' minimal-integer voting weights. We calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties. In addition, we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts. We find that for parties that join (but did not form) the government, there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts. The party that forms the government (the formateur) receives a substantial "bonus" relative to its voting weight. The latter finding is more consistent with proposal-based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power.     

中央与地方政府及地方政府间利益关系分析

利益关系是中央与地方政府及地方政府间关系的核心。而在转型时期,地方政府自身特性发生了巨大变化,其经济人、政治人属性日渐增长,由此决定了中央与地方政府利益博弈关系更加激烈;地区利益的本位主义更是成了地方政府利益关系的本质特征,并导致了地方政府行为异化的现象。而要解决这些问题,必须在市场机制调节的基础上,依靠制度变迁,通过中央及地方政府的共同努力,实现彼此利益关系的均衡。     

行政主体间性：府际关系研究的新理路

信息化时代的我国府际关系路径繁杂,种类多样,涉及多元跨层级、跨部门、跨领域的政府机关时尤为突出.行政主体彼此不理解、缺信任,是府际争议发生的根源.后现代语境下的府际治理从新方向寻求理路,促成多元行政主体的磨合与角色互换,实现行政主体间关系的良性互动,这正是行政主体间性的体现.行政主体间性的目标和网络型政府不谋而合,正是一张张行政主体网络,凝结成了更宽泛的行政生态环境;行政主体间性促成行政主体间精诚合作和协商对话.行政主体间性,基于宪政角度打破了上级政府的话语垄断,延展了治理主体的涵盖范围和实现了多元共治,维护了多元行政主体的公共利益,是行之有效的协调和弥合府际关系争议的新理路.     

Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median,Ministerial Autonomy,and the Coalition Compromise

In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically composed of multiple political parties working together in a coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental challenge in policymaking—the preferences of coalition parties often diverge significantly, but the government can adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This fact raises a critical question that has far‐reaching implications for the quality of democratic representation: Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing answers to this question derived from the theoretical literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that coalition policies reflect a compromise between government parties rather than the preferences of the ministers proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the legislature.     

Improving Financial Management of the Governments of the Americas

Several factors have created an environment that encourages the development of improved financial management systems in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. Agency for International Development recently created the Latin American and Caribbean Regional Financial Management Improvement Project (LAC/RFMIP) which has several region-wide initiatives underway as well as country-specific activities. In addition, other donor/lender institutions, such as the United Nations, have major projects in progress in the region and a regional Donor Working Group composed of ten donor agencies meets regularly to coordinate activities. A comprehensive catalogue of all financial management improvements in the region has been prepared for the use of the Working Group. Finally, AID has drafted a long-term strategy for improving financial management which is being circulated for comments.     

Reluctant Coalitionists: The Conservative Party and the Establishment of the Coalition Government in May 2010

The Conservative party has been the real awkward partner in the Conservative‐Liberal Democrat coalition government because its backbench MPs have rebelled more frequently than their Liberal Democrat counterparts since May 2010. This reflected the fact that the Conservatives were reluctant coalitionists to begin with: they would have preferred to see a minority Conservative government, they had made far too many concessions to the Liberal Democrats, they had been bounced into accepting a coalition deal by a controlling party leadership, and they had lost out on those ministerial positions now held by Liberal Democrats. There was thus no great enthusiasm for the establishment of a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats in the parliamentary Conservative party in May 2010. Conservatives merely resigned themselves to an outcome which they had been given little opportunity to influence and which David Cameron had made it very difficult for them to reject.     

Intergovernmental Relations and the Advocacy Coalition Framework: The Operation of Federalism in Denver Water Politics

The relationship between intergovernmental relations and theformulation and implementation of public policies is not wellunderstood by scholars. Borrowing from the advocacy coalitionframework, this study contends that public policies reflectthe strategic choices of federal, state, and local actors operatingwithin policy subsystems. The success of various governmentalpolicy strategies is dependent on the autonomy of each actorand the level of policy fragmentation within the subsystem.These variables are defined, operationalized, and examined withinthe context of intergovernmental relations in Denver water politics.     

Citizen Involvement and Performance Management in Special-Purpose Governments

Performance management and citizen participation are being used by local governments to improve government accountability and responsiveness. In some cases, local governments are integrating these two trends. One area of local government in which this trend has not been assessed is special districts. This paper uses data from a study of nine special districts in the state of Texas to fill this void. To assess citizen participation in performance management among the districts, we interviewed district managers, analyzed minutes from governing board meetings, and conducted citizen focus groups in three regions of the state. Our findings suggest that although districts may not yet be in tune with the latest performance management trends, they are making efforts to engage citizens in other ways. We recommend ways that districts can build on these experiences and more effectively incorporate citizens in the development, analysis, and reporting of performance measures.     

The Norwegian Storting: The Central Assembly of the Periphery*

The overall impression of Norway given by Rokkan and Urwin in their classification of state-building and nation-building processes in western Europe is characterized by the domination of a strong centre over weak peripheries. In a comparative perspective this may be the most conspicuous tendency. The influence of the Norwegian periphery, however, is quite substantial. The aim of this article is to contribute to a more nuanced picture of centreperiphery relations in Norwegian politics. It takes a closer look at the representation of the periphery in the Norwegian parliament, and at the impact of geography on policy-making and other activities of MPs.