IS JUSTICE “COLLAR-BLIND”?: PUNISHING MEDICAID PROVIDER FRAUD*

The question of punishment of white-collar criminals is addressed in this paper through an examination of sanctions imposed on health care providers convicted of defrauding California's Medicaid “Medi-Cal” system. Quantitative data were collected from Medi-Cal case files and, for comparative purposes, from a statewide data base maintained by the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics for grand theft arrestees. Qualitative data comprising interviews with Medi-Cal enforcement personnel supplement the analysis. The analysis of criminal sanctions reveals greater leniency in the punishment of Medi-Cal offenders than in the punishment of similarly charged non-white-collar offenders. The findings are related to recent debates regarding the severity of punishment for white-collar offenders.     

Deterrence and avoidance

This paper explores the effects of public enforcement, in general, and punishment, in particular, on crime levels if offenders can engage in avoidance activities. Avoidance reduces the probability or magnitude of punishment. In general, offenders can reduce their expected punishment either by substituting legal activities for criminal activities (the deterrence effect) or by increasing avoidance activities. This paper shows that increasing the direct costs of crime – by either increasing punishment or enforcement efforts – does not necessarily deter criminal activity and may actually trigger increased crime if avoidance is possible. Furthermore, this paper shows that increasing the opportunity costs of crime (e.g. by subsidizing legal alternatives or through educational and vocational programs) reduces both crime and avoidance and thus, in this respect, is advantageous. The conditions for these outcomes are identified, the economic mechanisms are explained, and an underlying intuitive approach for these results is proposed.     

Assaults Against Inspectors: The Dangers in Enforcing Corporate Crime

This survey of regulatory inspectors reveals a surprising number of threats and assaults being made against inspectors in the course of enforcing regulatory provisions. Contrary to conventional images of regulatory enforcement, inspectors in some agencies face violent resistance from regulatory offenders that is similar to the violent resistance encountered by police officers. These findings provide support for the contention that regulatory enforcement and policing should be conceptualized as overlapping forms of law enforcement rather than as distinct governmental activities.     

Regulatory justice: A re-examination of the influence of class position on the punishment of white-collar crime

The issue of class bias in response to white-collar crime offenders remains unresolved because of data limitations, research design problems, and debates over the conceptualization of core factors. One problem is that previous research failed to consider the full range of legal actions that can be taken against a violator of regulatory law; it typically focuses only on criminal sanctioning when addressing the issue of bias. Recent data on formal actions taken against federal securities offenders were used to reconsider the issue of bias. This analysis, however, examined the entire range of legal actions taken against offenders—civil, administrative, and criminal. I used a logistic regression analysis to determine the sampled offenders' likelihood of receiving a punitive sanction. Both principals and “contrepreneurs” were significantly less likely to receive a punitive response than managers and other legitimate actors in the workplace. Securities professionals (other than principals) were particularly vulnerable to punitive sanctions if they were affiliated with larger firms in the industry, as opposed to smaller firms. These findings suggest that the relationship between class and the punishment of white-collar offending is more complex than suggested previously.     

Punishment Drift: The Spread of Penal Harm and What We Should Do About It

It is well documented that the effects of legal punishment tend to drift to the family members, friends, and larger communities of convicted offenders. Instead of conceiving of punishment drift as incidental to legal punishment, or as merely foreseen but not intended by state authorities and thus permissible, I argue that efforts ought to be undertaken to limit or ameliorate it. Failure to confine punishment drift comes perilously close to punishment of the innocent and is at odds with other legal doctrines and broader penal practices that hold offenders, and offenders alone, responsible for their crimes. Numerous arguments urging tolerance of punishment drift, or more assertively defending it, are examined and found wanting.     

Sex offender punishment and the persistence of penal harm in the U.S

The U.S. has dramatically revised its approach to punishment in the last several decades. In particular, people convicted of sex crimes have experienced a remarkable expansion in social control through a wide-range of post-conviction interventions. While this expansion may be largely explained by general punishment trends, there appear to be unique factors that have prevented other penal reforms from similarly modulating sex offender punishment. In part, this continuation of a “penal harm” approach to sex offenders relates to the past under-valuing of sexual victimization. In the “bad old days,” the law and its agents sent mixed messages about sexual violence and sexual offending. Some sexual offending was mere nuisance, some was treatable, and a fraction “deserved” punishment equivalent to other serious criminal offending. In contrast, today's sex offender punishment schemes rarely distinguish formally among gradations of harm or dangerousness. After examining incarceration trends, this article explores the historical context of the current broad brush approach and reviews the unintended consequences. Altogether, this article reinforces the need to return to differentiation among sex offenders, but differentiation based on science and on the experience-based, guided discretion of experts in law enforcement, corrections, and treatment.     

犯罪控制的惩罚主义及其效果

1979年以来我国刑事立法和司法忽视或遗忘了刑法的特征与内在价值,高估了刑法影响人的行为的可能性,刑法一直保持着在功能化方向上的惯性,刑罚结构和刑罚适用面临着重刑主义的突出问题。我国的犯罪控制存在着惩罚主义的结构特征,然而惩罚主义的意愿和努力,并没能有效遏制犯罪规模和犯罪的总体严重程度迅猛发展的势头。在刑事政策和刑罚体系的主导思想没有做出重大调整前,刑罚轻缓化的改革仍然任重道远。     

VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT

Enforcement strategies that encourage "voluntary compliance" can improve regulatory efficiency by reducing unnecessary enforcement and compliance costs associated with legal confrontation between firms and agencies. This article analyzes the enforcement dilemma that causes confrontation and describes a "Tit for Tat" strategy capable of increasing socially beneficial cooperation. The strategy requires agencies to be reasonable toward cooperative firms, vengeful toward cheaters, unrelenting in pursuit of chronic evaders, but conciliatory toward repentant firms. Reforms in this neglected and poorly understood part of the regulatory process could yield considerable social benefits.     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Business Response to Regulation: An Economist's Perspective

This chapter presents an economist's perspective on the interrelationship of the compliance and enforcement decisions of business and regulators in the context of regulations governing occupational health. Assuming profit-maximizing firms and harm-minimizing enforcement agencies, it is argued that a degree of preventive activity would be undertaken by businesses even in the absence of regulation. However, if employees are not fully informed about the risks of the workplace, it is likely that the profit-maximizing level of prevention will be less than socially optimal, and consequently there will be a need for regulation. An enforcement agency which attempts to minimize harm through inducing compliance with regulatory standards will be faced with similar informational difficulties to individual employees, and this suggests some scope for cooperative gains with individual firms through negotiated compliance, rather than prosecution.     

Revisiting the Role of Negotiation and Trivialization in Environmental Law Enforcement

Using an empirical assessment of the use of enforcement undertakings by the Environment Agency and the engagement of the courts with the recently enacted sentencing guidelines for environmental offences, this article argues that the enforcement of environmental law is undergoing significant change. This change manifests itself in an increased reliance on written negotiated agreements in the form of enforcement undertakings by the Enivironment Agency and the willingness of the courts to hand down significant fines in cases against certain types of polluters. These new dynamics suggest that negotiation continues to play an important role in the enforcement of environmental law, albeit in a contractualized form. The application of the sentencing guidelines conversely suggests that environmental offences are no longer trivialized by the courts. Taken together, these emerging dynamics not only create specific incentives between agencies and offenders but also call into question established understandings and perceptions of regulatory enforcement.     

Retributivism: The Right and the Good

Victor Tadros claims that punishment must be justified either instrumentally or on the grounds that deserved punishment is intrinisically good. However, if we have deontic reasons to punish wrongdoers then these reasons could justify punishment non-instrumentally. Morever, even if the punishment of wrongdoers is intrinsically good this fact cannot contribute to the justication of punishment because goodness is not a reason-giving property. It follows that retributivism is both true and important only if we have deontic reasons to punish. Tadros also claims that the constitutive aim of punishment is to inflict harm or suffering on offenders. On the contrary, the constitutive aim of retributive punishment is to inflict (justified) wrongs on offenders that are proportionate to the (unjustified) wrongs they commit. Indeed, punishment should involve the least harmful wrong that is proportionate to the wrongfulness of the offense, adequate to facilitate recognition, and (perhaps) conducive to deterrence.     

对违法行为的分类治理研究——从提高违法成本角度分析

我国违法现象易发、多发,违法成本低是重要原因。对违法行为的处罚标准和查处概率都对违法成本产生重要影响。设定的处罚标准越高、查处概率越高,违法者的违法成本就越高。处罚标准高低是立法问题,查处概率高低则受执法人员数量、执法频率、执法技术水平、执法意愿等多种因素影响。为了提高违法成本,需根据情况适当提高处罚标准,增加执法人员,改进执法技术,但更重要的是提升执法者的执法意愿。     

Overview of penal response towards tax compliance in Nigeria

Tax offences and penalties are created to tackle tax non-compliance. Tax penalties bear civil liabilities while tax offences portends criminal sanctions. This paper employs the deterrence theory of penalty to determine whether tax penalties and enforcement agencies are effective in ensuring tax compliance in Nigeria. It is found that the dwindling economic situation in the country has diminished the deterrent effect of pecuniary tax sanctions. Hence, there is need to review the tax statutes. Corroborative effort between tax authorities would facilitate the probability of detection and punishment of tax offenders, thereby improving tax compliance in Nigeria.     

Restorative Justice in Business Regulation? The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's Use of Enforceable Undertakings

Enforceable undertakings are now used extensively by both the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and other Australian regulators to formalise decisions to forego enforcement litigation on the basis that offenders will correct their misconduct and comply in the future. A 'fairness' critique warns that regulators might exert undue pressure in negotiating enforceable undertakings and that the terms agreed might be inappropriately broad and not legally authorised. A 'bias' critique argues that enforceable undertakings favour business above the public interest in taking tough court action against business offences. The article draws on empirical research into the ACCC's use of enforceable undertakings to show how they are used in practice, and argues that, if appropriately implemented, enforceable undertakings can be a valuable 'restorative justice' alternative to traditional regulatory enforcement action, simultaneously addressing both fairness and bias concerns.     

When Social Norms and Pressures Are Not Enough: Environmental Performance in the Trucking Industry

Why do some business firms and not others work hard to advance regulatory values such as environmental protection and comply with regulations? Previous research indicates that business firms are influenced in that regard by a number of variables—not merely the perceived likelihood of legal punishment but also the risk of negative reactions by societal actors (which we call “social license pressures”) and the intensity of managers' commitment to norms of law‐abidingness and environmentalism. This article reports on a study of control of diesel emissions in the trucking industry, a highly competitive market with many small firms, mobile pollution sources, expensive “best control technologies,” and weak regulatory demands. In contrast to findings in studies of large firms, we found that social license pressures on small trucking firms are minimal. Trucking companies' environmental performance—good and bad—flows from managers' economic choices, which are influenced by their particular market niche. In such highly competitive, small‐firm market contexts, these findings imply, significant improvement in environmental performance is not likely without strong direct regulatory pressures.     

Criminal solicitation,entrapment, and the enforcement of law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.     

激情犯的基础理论与立法问题研究

虽然尚未进入中国的刑事立法与司法解释,但对于社会公众而言,激情犯早已不是陌生的话语.以激情犯为由要求对具体案件中的被告人从宽处罚的情形在司法实践中也屡见不鲜.但是激情犯所实施的都是严重侵害他人生命权或健康权的犯罪,欲将之用作对被告人从宽处罚的情节,必须遵循罪刑法定原则,通过立法对之进行严格的限定,否则结果可能会适得其反.首先参考国外刑事立法,介绍了激情犯的概念、特征、构成要件及处罚原则.此后,从情节适用的确定性与刑罚裁量的统一性两方面论述了对激情犯进行立法必要性,并立足于理论现行立法剖析了立法的可行性.最后,就激情犯的立法模式、认定标准、激情诱因及处罚原则等问题进行了探讨,并提出了具体的立法建议.     

Punishment and rehabilitation

Conclusion Despite partial amendments to criminal legislation the existing Czech criminal system is marked by its punitive character. Despite a slight change in attitudes towards punishment after 1990, the nature of penalties has not been adapted to the new goals. The punishment which fulfils the retributive, i.e. deterrent objective will not automatically become a means of re-education and rehabilitation merely because we change its objective in law. The new purpose of punishment requires changes in contents of punishment, i.e. searching for effective ways of handling offenders both outside and inside prisons. We have to renounce the idea that rehabilitation of offenders can be achieved by coercion. We have to respond to offending by imposing an adequate punishment which must be executed paying full respect to human rights and dignity. In this context, any offender must be able to exercise his or her right to request conditions and means for social reintegration (training, improvement of skills, medical treatment etcetera), if the offender is really interested in rehabilitation. We can only create conditions, we cannot reintegrate anybody by force. Rehabilitation in the Czech Republic continues to be more a good intention than a reality.     

A Mark for Peter

Abstract

This paper objects to certain forms of punishments, such as supermax confinement, on grounds that they are inappropriately contemptuous. Building on discussions in Kant and elsewhere, I flesh out what I take to be salient features of contempt, features that make contempt especially troubling as a form of moral regard and treatment. As problematic as contempt may be in the interpersonal context, I contend that it is especially troubling when a person is treated contemptuously by her political community's institutions—such as by certain forms of punishment. Punishment is contemptuous if it fails to respect offenders as moral persons, who as such are always capable of moral reform. Respect for offenders therefore requires, at least, that punishment not tend to undermine the prospect of offenders’ reform. I flesh out this constraint by considering various ways in which punishments may tend to undermine offenders’ reform. In particular, I discuss ways in which supermax confinement tends to violate the reform-based constraint. Finally, I address several potential objections to my account.