Corruption, democracy and the World Bank

In this era of political conditionality and good governance, anti-corruptionhas emerged as a top priority (at least in theory) for all major donors. Thisis almost always linked to support for democratisation efforts, with onenotable exception – the World Bank. The Bank is constricted by anon-political mandate which forbids it supporting one particular politicalsystem through its lending and other activities. Nonetheless, the languageit uses (e.g., accountability, transparency, participation, etc.) and theprojects it supports seem to endorse the spirit of liberal democracy. I arguethat the Bank's mandate is in conflict with a politically sensitive issue likeanti-corruption, and that it is impossible to separate economic issues frompolitical ones in this instance; however, given the lack of consensus on therelationship between democracy, development and corruption, this may bethe best state of affairs for now.     

Does democracy breed integrity? Corruption in Taiwan during the democratic transformation period

Taiwan’s transformation from single-party authoritarianism to multiparty democracy has been considered one of the best cases among the third-wave democratizations. Has this best-case democratization created a clean government? Does democracy breed integrity? The purpose of this paper is to answer this research question by using corruption measurement data from the Corruption Perceptions Index, Governance Indicators, Global Corruption Barometer, and the Taiwan Integrity Survey. According to the data analyzed in this paper, the people of Taiwan doubt the integrity of their government. This is especially true of their elected officials and political appointees. The message from the data is clear: Taiwan’s democratic transformation has not improved but rather has blemished the integrity of the government. Taiwan needs to exert greater effort to promote integrity, fight corruption, and rebuild public trust in the government. The challenge remains for political leaders to prove that they are not actually fuelling corrupt practices, but doing the best they can to enhance transparency, accountability, and integrity. However, in addition to expecting self-control and strong commitment to integrity from their leaders, citizens must play a more active and aggressive role in building a system of integrity and ensuring good democratic governance.     

腐败与中国式经济增长——兼论腐败治理的社会基础

本文基于中国31个省域2002—2011年的面板数据,对中国腐败问题的影响因素及其与经济增长的相互作用进行了理论分析和实证检验。分析结果表明:公民受教育程度、公职人员工资水平对腐败的影响是一致而显著的,但财政分权、政府规模、地区投资水平与GDP增长率等变量对腐败程度的影响是不一致或不显著的;中国的高速经济增长主要来源于人口红利带来的人力资本增长和改革开放带来的固定资本投资的上升,绝非腐败的拉动使然;腐败与中国经济增长之间的关系是复杂而微妙的,二者并不存在显著的计量关系,更无必然的因果联系。最后,本文有针对性地提出腐败治理的政策建议,否定了依赖正式制度改革的制度万能论的腐败治理思路,认为只依赖正式制度的改革来治理腐败是不够的,教育和宗教等非正式制度的教化作用在腐败治理的过程中也不容忽视。     

我国人民民主面临的问题及对策——基于协商民主视角的分析

人民民主是社会主义民主的核心要义,是中国共产党和当代中国的理想和追求.我国设计了以人民代表大会制度为标志的一系列制度措施来实现人民民主,但在具体的政治实践中却面临种种问题.协商民主是强调讨论对话和审议的民主形式,恰好在某种程度上弥补了目前我国人民民主实践的不足.     

马来西亚:“被制度化了”的腐败

马来西亚执政联盟国民阵线几乎是"全球执政最久的政党之一",国家自独立以来从未政权轮替。然而,在今年5月的选举中,执政联盟交出了56年来的"最差答卷",这说明人民的信任正在逐渐流失。(图/CFP)     

Misunderstanding Corruption and Community: Comparative Cultural Politics of Corruption Regulation in the Pacific

This paper will take as its empirical foundation the author’s experience of corruption and regulation in small Pacific island states. The argument is that notions of corruption and strategies for its regulation suitable for modernized societies, which lack cultural specificity and community engagement, may in fact stimulate corruption relationships in transitional cultures. The other consequence of the imposition of inappropriate definitions and regulation strategies is a profound misunderstanding of communities of dependence. In fact, corruption control can misconstrue and exacerbate economic and political dependence environments, fostering the conditions for corruption which accompany socio-economic development. Two remedies are suggested. First, corruption requires an appreciation which is ‘community-centered’, while at the same time not being neutralized by disconnected cultural relativity. Second, an enterprise theory of corruption in modernized societies and international political/commercial entities may assist in the relevant translation of global anti-corruption policies in a way which advances good governance in traditional communities. This is so when corruption is conceived as dependant on phases of modernization, and the tensions which arise when the interests of societies at different phases intersect. Corporate citizenship and compliance with anti-corrupt business practices by major corporations with a commercial interest in these transitional economies may be more beneficial than deference to uniform international codes of governance.

腐败与无能

时势造英雄,同时也带出小人.造时势之功者是英雄,但享功业之成者未必是英雄.英雄横扫千军,天下无敌,但却完全有可能毁在一个小人手里,这早已由历史验证了千百回.英雄能够做到的,小人大多望尘莫及;英雄所以成为英雄,是因为常人与小人都智勇莫如;当然小人能够玩弄的,英雄未必能够懂得;英雄之所以成为英雄,概因他天生不会溜须拍马和苟且钻营.     

Corruption and organized crime: Lessons from history

The intention of this paper is to serve in part as a warning to the international community concerned about corruption, to keep the focus based on the critical analysis of empirically verifiable information. In ways similar to how theorists spoke about organized crime in the 1960's and 1970's, articles today attempt to refer to corruption as if there were one agreed upon definition. However, like the concept “organized crime”, the term “corruption” involves diverse processes which have different meanings within different societies. Corruption (or a focus on corruption), may be the means toward very diverse ends and each may have a different impact on the society. While in some societies corruption may correctly be seen to be the “cause” of forms of social disorganization, in other situations corruption may be the “result” of larger changes. Understanding the processes within a specific context allows one to understand the nature of the corruption. Corruption rhetoric may too easily become apolitical platform for ranking and evaluating nations as to their worth based on criteria that lose meaning when applied across jurisdictions. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Corruption and hold-up: the role of intermediaries

Corrupt contracts are illegal and, therefore, vulnerable to hold-up. That is, a bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a firm in exchange for a license may still choose not to grant the firm that license (hold-up). This paper develops a model to study the role that intermediaries play in preventing hold-up. There are two types of firms, good firms that are legally entitled to receive a license, and harmful firms that are not. Without intermediaries only good firms enter the market, and harmful firms do not enter because of hold-up. Intermediaries are legally permitted to help firms reduce their navigation costs of obtaining licenses. Thus, intermediaries increase entry of good firms. However, by utilizing the legal aspects of their transaction with good firms as leverage against the bureaucrat, intermediaries can prevent hold-up among harmful firms. Thus, intermediaries increase participation by both good and harmful firms and their welfare costs are ambiguous. Data obtained from occurrences of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are broadly consistent with our model.     

Fighting Corruption: The Peruvian Experience

In Peru the power system put in place by the former PresidentAlberto Fujimori created a network of illegality in which manycrimes were committed (e.g. various forms of human rights violations,including torture, murders, arms and drug trafficking and corruption).These offences were brought to light simultaneously by distinctbut intertwined investigations. In order to prosecute and punishthese crimes a special Anti-corruption System was established,which consisted of both special investigative authorities aswell as specialized anti-corruption courts. In addition, a specialsystem of Benefits for Effective Collaboration with the Prosecutionhas been put in place covering organized crime, as well as customand terrorist offences. In this respect, negotiated justiceconstitutes a very important instrument in the hands of thestate to fight organized crime. However, the prioritizationof the principles of expeditiousness and effectiveness, togetherwith very broad powers conferred on the prosecutors, impliesthe risk of undermining other equally important principles,such as the legality of evidence (legalidad de la prueba), respectfor the rights of the defence and the principle of equalitybefore the law. Finally, the author emphasizes the role thatcould be played by public international law to facilitate internationalcooperation for securing evidence and the arrest of accusedpersons, as well as to enable Peruvian authorities to identifyand seize the proceeds of crimes.