Federalism in a Conservative Supreme Court

After years of maintaining an even balance on questions of federalism,the Supreme Court's views on the federal-state relationshiphave undergone a dramatic transformation with the recent changein the Court's composition. The new conservative majority hasproved willing to protect the states from direct regulationby the federal government in almost all circumstances. It remainsunclear, however, whether the Court will give increased protectionto state regulatory efforts-and whether the Court's new memberswill be willing to respect the autonomy of states that are exercisingtheir authority in an activist (and traditionally liberal) manner.     

The Supreme Court's New Constitutional Federalism: Implications for Public Administration

Since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has been issuing decisions that, taken together, constitute a new judicial federalism. This effort is rearranging intergovernmental relations as we have known them for several decades. However, the boundaries of this new doctrine and its implications for public administration are not well understood. This article analyzes the principal constitutional bases for the Court's actions and gauges the balance of this new judicial federalism. It then sorts out the implications for public administration and projects where the Court may be going with this doctrine in the future.     

The Supreme Court and the Federal System: Federalism from Warren to Burger

The question of the relation of the states to the federal governmentis the cardinal question of our constitutional system. It cannotbe settled by the opinion of any one generation, because itis a question of growth, and each successive stage of our politicaland economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a newquestion.¹     

State Merit Amicus Participation and Federalism Outcomes in the U.S. Supreme Court

Research suggests that merit amicus curiae participation correlateswith Supreme Court decision making and that states make frequentand effective use of this tool. To date, however, no study hasadequately examined the relationship between state amicus participationand the federalism values reflected in the Court's decisions.This article dev"Lelops and finds evidence for the assertionthat, when they cooperate in the amicus process, state participationis associated with an increase in the likelihood of rulingsfavoring state rather than national government power.     

Federalism Outcomes and Ideological Preferences: The U.S. Supreme Court and Preemption Cases

The record of the U.S. Supreme Court in decisions affectingfederal-state relations has been one of inconsistency betweenstates' rights and national supremacy. This inconsistency hasperplexed both legal and political science scholars who havehad great difficulty placing decision-making regarding federalismoutcomes by the Court in any sort of theoretical context. Contraryto much conventional wisdom, ideological preferences do notautomatically translate into federalism outcomes. We extendmodels of judicial decision-making in political environmentsby including state policy. State policy outcomes may be eithermore liberal or more conservative than the policy would be underfederal control. Thus, the ideological preferences of the justicesmay contradict their preferences toward nationalism or statesrights. Testing the model using 94 preemption cases, we findthat individual justices and most Courts are willing to sacrificetheir federalism values in the pursuit of some other policygoal. This finding has implications for both the federalismliterature and strategic models of Court behavior, as well asfor cases the Court is currently reviewing.     

Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game

A three-stage model isolates conditions under which an executive appointment to a collective choice body, such as a court or a regulatory agency, has an immediate bearing on policy. The model strikes a balance between previous formal models that predict either excessive gridlock or excessive policy responsiveness as a consequence of the politics of appointments. I test the model using approximately four decades of data on U.S. Supreme Court appointments. Two hypotheses summarize the unique predictions of the model and are strongly corroborated. A third, less distinctive hypothesis about strategic judicial retirements is weakly supported .     

Garcia: Of Federalism and Constitutional Values

In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985),a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court's justices did violenceto the principles of the U.S. Constitution by leaving the statesto take their Tenth Amendment complaints to the Congress. Inabdicating their proper constitutional role, the majority ofjustices ignored history, political realities, and constitutionalprinciple. The Constitution's institutional arrangements, ofwhich federalism is a key component, are an intrinsic part ofthe constitutional scheme by which government power is limitedand individual rights are protected.     

Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.     

破碎与重构:多元文化主义塑造加拿大国家认同

由于特殊的产生历史、异质的民族成份和复杂的国家形成背景,加拿大国家认同呈现出复杂性和典型性。加拿大国家认同问题在成为“自治领”后呈现出来,而“新法兰西化”“盎格鲁遵从”与“二元民族熔炉”均对国家认同产生了消极影响。在经历“加拿大第一运动”催生国家认同意识后,1971年以实行“多元文化主义”来统摄各族群的国家认同,使国家政权主导下的国家意识建构逐渐清晰。然而,魁北克问题掣肘国家统一、影响国家认同形塑。随着时代的变迁和国内族群人口结构的不断变化,加拿大构建“多元一体”的国家认同是其发展趋势。     

Coercive Federalism and the Search for Constitutional Limits

This article explores several constitutional bases for questioningthe federal government's use of unfunded mandates and otherforms of coercive intergovernmental regulation. The "anti-coercion"and "anti-commandeering" principles of the Tenth Amendment areproposed as general arguments against these forms of regulation.The constitutional requirement of "uniformity" attached to indirecttaxation, the "anti-discrimination rule" in the area of intergovernmentaltax immunity, and the "equality rule", which stems from theunwritten tradition of maintaining equality among the states,are developed as additional bases for striking down federallaws that distribute mandate burdens disproportionately amongthe states.     

From Constitutional to Treaty Federalism: A Comparative Perspective

Federalism in the European Union differs significantly fromthe American model. First, instead of relying on fixed constitutionalrights, the EU remains committed to a treaty-based process offlexible accommodation. Second, the federal system of constitutionalpower division has been replaced by the subsidiarity principle.The scope and dimension of Community action are tied to negotiatedcriteria of necessity and efficiency. Third, European federalismhas not adopted the American senate model. Member-state participationin the decision-making process is based on the German modelof weighted council representation. Regions and civic organizationshave gained an additional consultative voice. As a novel typeof federal polity, the EU may gain model character for a globalizingworld of nation-states whose interests appear loosely interconnectedby federal arrangements rather than firmly nested in a federalstate.     

German Federalism After Unification: The Legal/Constitutional Response

The collapse of communism in East Germany and the resultingGerman unification produced a new focus on the operation offederalism in a unified Germany and on certain reforms concerningfiscal federalism and various constitutional amendments. Theinitial decisions about financing the new Länder in theEast soon proved to be inadequate, and after much controversya new "solidarity pact" was concluded between the federal andLand governments in March 1993. To counter recent trends towardincreasing centralization, a constitutional commission proposeda number of amendments, now under consideration by the federalparliament, which would strengthen the Länder vis-à-visthe federal government. The Länder have also been concernedabout the growing interference by Brussels in their affairs.As a result of recent changes in the Basic Law, they have strengthenedtheir position in relationship to the federal government andthe European Union.     

Re-centralizing subsidiarity: Interpretations by the Italian Constitutional Court

Subsidiarity has become one of the key principles of European Union law since its introduction in the Treaty of Maastricht, but in recent years other federal or decentralized systems have cemented this principle into their constitutions: one example is Italy, where subsidiarity was encapsulated in art. 118 of the constitution as amended in 2001. This article surveys some of the contributions coming from Italian constitutionalism and adds to the debate on subsidiarity, especially with regards to the stimulating, yet controversial, interpretation of the principle offered by the Italian constitutional court, which permeated it with a “centralist” essence. The article explores how subsidiarity is construed beyond EU law and argues that, while revealing all the elasticity of this principle, the interpretation offered by the Italian constitutional judges presents some risky consequences.     

The West German Federal Constitutional Court as Guardian of the Federal System

The West German Federal Constitutional Court has generally actedas a guardian of the German federal system. The Court has preventedattempts by the federation to encroach upon the modest autonomyleft to the Länder. If a national solution for a problemseems indispensable, the Court favors techniques that compensatethe Länder for a loss of autonomy by granting them certainparticipation rights. Guided by that principle, the Court'sconstruction of the Basic Law has increased considerably thenumber of federal statutes that require the approval of theBunesrat. Thus the Court emphasizes today the idea of partnership.However, in a 1986 decision, the Court made clear that a certainamount of federal leadership is needed to keep the system running.In this decision, the Court reminded the federation expresslyof its responsibility for the whole.     

From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution

Finding the best means for ensuring equal opportunities for women and minorities has long been controversial and initial efforts to do so were addressed by executive orders, and later the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this paper argues, since its initial Bakke decision in 1978, it is the Supreme Court that has set policy in this area. In the twenty-five years between that decision and the recent Gratz and Grutter decisions, the court has shifted in its stance, in many cases declaring unconstitutional what it once sanctioned. That shift has not resulted from changes in laws or new amendments to the Constitution, nor can it be seen as reflecting public opinion, as that is not clear-cut. Rather, affirmative action policy has reflected the ideological stances of the justices sitting at the time a decision was rendered. The paper concludes with an assessment as to what this means for a democracy.     

Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court

It is conventional in research on the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court to rely on a survey question asking about confidence in the leaders of the Court to indicate something about the esteem with which that institution is regarded by the American people. The purpose of this article is to investigate the validity of this measure. Based on a nationally representative survey conducted in 2001, we compare confidence with several different measures of Court legitimacy. Our findings indicate that the confidence replies seem to reflect both short-term and long-term judgments about the Court, with the greater influence coming from satisfaction with how the Court is performing at the moment. We suggest a new set of indicators for measuring the legitimacy of the Court and offer some evidence on the structure of the variance in these items.