The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act

There has recently been a proliferation of case law dealing with potential inroads into the presumption of innocence in the criminal law of England and Wales, in the light of article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article is concerned with the nature of the presumption of innocence. It considers two central issues. The first is how the courts should address the question of when the presumption of innocence is interfered with. The second is the extent to which interference with the presumption of innocence may be justified on the grounds of proportionality. It is argued that the courts have not developed the appropriate concepts and principles properly to address these questions.     

英国1998年人权法案

英国1998年人权法案@梁淑英~~     

The Human Rights Act: A View from Below

The paper is based on survey work undertaken in the Cynon valley, south Wales, an area of high social deprivation. We interviewed local solicitors to establish their understanding and usage of the Human Rights Act (HRA). Outside of south Wales there is evidence of growing awareness and involvement of specialist practitioners in human rights actions. This we call a top-down process. Our work starts at the other end: a bottom-up account of high-street, small-practice solicitors.     

Clashing Rights, the Welfare of the Child and the Human Rights Act

Under the Human Rights Act so far there has been until very recently little judicial or even academic recognition of the difference between resolving clashes of Convention rights and addressing conflicts between utilitarian concerns and such rights. This article has chosen to illustrate that failure of recognition and to consider methods of resolving the conflict between rights, by concentrating on one particular clash of rights – that between media free speech under Article 10 and the privacy of children under Article 8. It argues for presumptive equality for the two rights and for conducting a 'parallel analysis' of their application to the circumstances of a particular case. It contends that therefore the principle that the child's welfare is paramount must be abandoned in its present form, as must the presumptive priority accorded to Article 10 where that principle is not found to apply.     

The Human Rights Act 1998 and the individual's right to treatment

The right to demand treatment--even when life-saving--is not recognised by English common law. The courts have consistently stated that they do not have the jurisdiction to order a doctor to perform a particular treatment. This article considers whether the impending Human Rights Act 1998 can be interpreted so as to allow this right. While a general right to treatment is discussed the argument focuses on life-saving treatment. As an illustration, the David Glass case will be analysed and the impact of the Human Rights Act will be examined by considering how the judgment might have differed had the Act been in force.     

Accommodating Children's Rights in a Post Human Rights Act Era

This article considers why so little case law currently acknowledges that children have recognisable rights under the European Convention on Human Rights and argues that the family courts are not meeting the demands of the Human Rights Act 1998 in this regard. It suggests that a reinterpretation of the 'paramountcy principle' in the Children Act 1989 should be accompanied by a radically different judicial approach to evidence relating to children's best interests. The article considers the difficulties that such an approach might produce when applied to teenagers intent on refusing life-saving medical treatment. It further argues that the courts should call on the substantial body of rights jurisprudence to provide legal and moral support for this revised approach.     

Rights and Rhetoric: The Politics of Asylum and Human Rights Culture in the United Kingdom

No assessment of the state of human rights today could be complete without some consideration of the situation of asylum seekers and the political trends behind it. Four years after the implementation of the 1998 Act, asylum seekers are perhaps more denigrated in rhetoric and harsh practice than they were even before the first promise that rights would be 'brought home' for all 'people' in the United Kingdom. This piece looks at the undermining of the very concept of asylum, dehumanizing policies such as forced destitution, and attacks on access to legal process for those making asylum claims. It goes on to consider judicial attempts at coping with the arena in which high politics and fundamental rights seem in greatest tension. Finally it considers potential implications for the broader aspiration of building a human rights culture in this country.     

The Role of Parliamentary Intention in Adjudication under the Human Rights Act 1998

This essay gives more detailed content to the widespread viewthat the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) has changed the traditionalrole of parliamentary intention in statutory interpretation.It begins by outlining the various ways in which legislativeintent has featured in traditional (pre-HRA) statutory interpretation.This is followed by an examination of the interpretive principlesdeveloped by the senior judiciary under the HRA case-law, focusingon the extent to which they seem to depart from traditionalprinciples. It is argued that although the traditional roleof parliamentary intention is partly preserved post-HRA, theinterpretive obligation under s 3(1) HRA nonetheless shiftsthe interpretive focus away from what Parliament originallyintended in enacting the legislation under HRA scrutiny, towardsfulfilling the overriding goal of achieving compatibility withConvention rights. The final sections of the essay attempt toprovide an account of what is involved in this shift.     

1998年《人权法案》及其对英国宪法的影响

人权是一个必然的、永恒的、但却是历史的概念 ;换言之 ,是一个永远随着人类社会进步而发展的认识理性。中国人在追寻宣扬人权的同时 ,西方人也在做着类似的努力。李树忠之文至少可以给我们提供以下几方面的思考与启示 :第一 ,英国的“宪法性”规则同样是其法治实践的结果 ,且长久地存在和体现于法治实践中 ,在此情况下 ,英国人是如何实现了人权保护呢 ?其政治条件和法治机制是如何对此发生作用呢 ?第二 ,1 998年《人权法案》进入英国法治实践 ,在何种程度上发生了影响 ?它对英国的政治体制和法治机制能够带来什么样的变化 ?第三 ,《人权法案》的精神与权利宣示究竟有什么样的实质性效力 ,它与国内的公共权力、司法操作以及人权文化会发生何种联系 ?所有这些均可从此文中获取一、二信息与观点的传达。英国宪制之独特及其走入世界大流之状况 ,亦可由此知之点滴而激发自察 ,是故以首篇荐之读者     

The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal Profession

The purpose of this article is to consider the effect the United Kingdom’s currently prevailing legal culture is likely to have on the realization of cultural change presaged by the Human Rights Act. The article is in five parts. The first two address the preliminary questions: what is meant by ‘legal culture’ for these purposes, and what type of ‘human rights culture’ does the Human Rights Act envisage? The answers define the scope of the remainder of the article’s inquiry into the ways in which the Act itself and the culture of the United Kingdom legal profession and judiciary are likely to interact. The third part of the article identifies some examples of the sorts of culturally specific aspects of current legal practice which are likely to operate as serious practical constraints on the emergence of a human rights culture worthy of the name, before the fourth part considers what sorts of cultural changes will be required of judges and lawyers for the presaged cultural transformation to come about. Finally, the article asks whether there is any reason to believe that courts and lawyers can find from within their present culture the resources to bring about the necessary shift.