Gender and transition in Southeast Asia: conceptual travel?

Theories and concepts of political transition have been influenced to a great deal by Western theoretical and conceptual reflection. The parameters of transition are usually based on two assumptions or expectations: The goal of transition is democracy or a democratic system, and both actors and affected persons are perceived as gender-neutral beings, i.e., there is no distinction made between male or female actors and persons concerned. This article problematizes the conventional concept of transition and attempts a gendered conceptualization. Empirically, it draws from studies and fieldwork during the periods of political transition in Indonesia (mostly accomplished) and Malaysia (ongoing). It addresses the impacts of transition on women in particular. The core argument is that conceptual reflections of transition need to integrate a gender-sensitive perspective, but at the same time attend to the fact that “women” is not an exhausting analytical category. As illustrated by the examples of Indonesia and Malaysia, a gender-sensitive approach thus requires to also take the pluralism and heterogeneity of “women” (as well as “men”) into account.     

The New Economic Bilateralism in Southeast Asia: Region-Convergent or Region-Divergent?

A new pattern of bilateralism is evident in Southeast Asianeconomic diplomacy, and this may be broadly viewed from extra-regionaland intra-regional perspectives. Regarding the former, an increasingnumber of states from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) group have engaged in the Asia-Pacific's new bilateralfree trade agreement project trend, and two ASEAN member states– Singapore and Thailand – have been at its forefront.Regarding the latter dimension, recent developments in intra-ASEANdiplomacy have revealed the emergence of a Singapore–Thailandbilateral axis or alliance on matters of Southeast Asian economicregionalism. These two dimensions of economic bilateralism arestudied in relation to their implications for Southeast Asianor ASEAN-led regionalism. In this context, region-convergentbilateralism can make positive contributions to the developmentof regionalism, whereas region-divergent bilateralism essentiallyundermines regional community-building endeavours. This formsthe conceptual framework for studying the impact of Singaporeand Thailand's active bilateral economic diplomacy upon ASEAN'sown regional economic projects, such as the ASEAN Free TradeArea (AFTA), and also on ASEAN as an organization for fosteringSoutheast Asian economic regionalism generally. It is contendedthat based on both the deeper strategic intentions behind Singapore'sand Thailand's foreign economic policies and wider internationalpolitical economy considerations the region-divergent outcomesare more likely to arise within Southeast Asia from the economicbilateralism they are currently championing.     

The End of Russian Power in Asia?

A U.S. initiative treating Russia as a serious East Asian partner, engaging in a real dialogue on security threats there, and a strong public expression of U.S. willingness to invest in the Russian Far East (RFE) in return for real guarantees of that investment, could well elicit a favorable Russian response. Such an initiative should also encourage concurrent Japanese and South Korean investment there, the author argues.     

The Maritime Channel in Southeast Asia andChina’s Strategic Pivots

With its transition from land power to sea power and the rapid expansionof its national interests, the security of maritime channels has become an importantagenda for China. China has shifted its focus from the dilemma of Malacca Strait to theconstruction of a sea-lane network in its bid to protect its maritime rights and interests.To build its sea power as a strong nation, China should follow its “21st CenturyMaritime Silk Road” strategy and establish its strategic pivots at harbors at SumatraIsland and Kalimantan Island in Indonesia so as to improve its ability to ensure itsnavigational safety.     

Why does Japan downplay human rights in Southeast Asia?

Japan makes little effort to promote human rights in SoutheastAsia, although it sees itself as an advanced industrializeddemocracy. In comparison with the United States and the EuropeanUnion (EU), Tokyo's approach is less intrusive and coercive,and more tolerant and accommodative. What can be described asthe economic-interest explanation holds that Japan takes a non-intrusiveapproach in order to maintain favorable relations with the SoutheastAsian countries, so as to maximize its interests in the areasof trade and investment, and official development assistance(ODA). The present study finds that this line of argument isinsufficient, and thus puts forward an alternative explanation.The identity explanation holds that Japan has been sympatheticto the special concern of the Southeast Asian countries overstate sovereignty, and thus takes a non-intrusive approach.This is because while Japan sees itself as an advanced industrializeddemocracy it also identifies itself as an Asian country.     

The Change and Posture of the Security Situation in Northeastern Asia

The U. S. war against Iraq has greatly shaken the security situation in different quarters of Northeast Asia, especially North Korea. And the Taiwan issue is another flashpoint in the region. After the U.     

Security cooperation in and with Asia: towards a pragmatic turn in the EU’s security policy?

ABSTRACT

Since the adoption of the first EU-Asia Strategy in 1994, there has been persistent scepticism about the EU’s ability to play a significant role in Asian security. Yet, since the release of the 2012 Updated East Asia Policy Guidelines, the EU has declared its intent to make greater practical contributions to Asian security. Against these premises, this article attempts to reflect on the evolution of the EU’s security approach to Asia, with the ultimate goal of analysing to what degree, it represents a continuation or a departure from former EU policies in the region. In scrutinising these developments, this article argues that in light of the strategic changes, that have occurred in Europe and in Asia, the EU has started to revise its security approach to the region in more pragmatic terms. The pragmatic character of the EU is seen as looking into the changes of the content of the security discourse, which appears increasingly depoliticised and, into the new practices of cooperation, which unlike in the past, seek to empower local actors, are sensitive to local needs and, call for greater security collaboration between the EU and Asian countries, to cope with regional and global challenges.     

For Peace，Stability and Prosperity in Asia──The 9th Sino－Japanese Symposium of Asia Situation and Peace

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Intimate yet dysfunctional? The relationship between governance and conflict resolution in India and the European Union

The rise of India and the EU as global actors has sparked growing interest in their peace-building approaches. This paper compares the objectives and effects of the EU's and India's engagement in different conflict contexts within and alongside their borders. It examines whether their practices of conflict resolution or peace-building strive for more than conflict management or ‘governmentality’. This article asks whether there is sufficient consistency across either actors' governance interventions to even speak of a distinct ‘strategy’ or ‘governance culture’. It illustrates the close relationship between governance and conflict response initiatives but finds that the relationship is often dysfunctional.     

The European Union’s common foreign and security policy reforms and its implications for Northeast Asia

The European Union (EU) is at a turning point. With the bipolar order of the Cold War fast becoming a distant memory, the European Union must quickly establish itself on the global stage before it loses the opportunity to do so. With Northeast Asia fast emerging as a new economic giant and political center for world affairs, the EU must reform its Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to develop a reputation and image as a global actor of soft power, based on its long-standing values and peaceful diplomacy. However, despite major reforms in the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the EU has not been able to form cohesion amongst its members, thus hindering its progress in achieving such international recognition. This paper therefore analyses the reforms taken place so far and suggests further reforms that will build a strong foundation for a united and cohesive foreign policy. It will then look at how the reformed framework will allow the EU to establish itself as a global actor in political affairs, in particular in Northeast Asia.     

Transgovernmental networks and rationalist outputs? The partial social construction of EU foreign policy

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) foreign policy has gone beyond intergovernmentalism. It is largely formulated by (Brussels-based) national officials, in a process characterised by a high number of cooperative practices, diffuse sentiments of group loyalty and possibly argumentative procedures. Yet, in many cases, the most likely output of this process reflects the lowest common denominator of states’ positions or the preferences of the biggest states. The article intends to investigate this puzzle. In the first part, it corroborates its existence by using answers from an original database of 138 questionnaires and 37 interviews with EU negotiators. Next, it argues that cooperative practices remain often subordinated to nationally oriented ways of doing things. Consequentialist practices perform an anchoring function, in that they define the parameters around which (social) practices operate. The last section looks more closely at the sites of and meanings attached to EU foreign policy-making. By discussing national diplomats’ conspicuous leeway in Brussels, it also argues that negotiating practices are performed through a mix of partial agency and persistence of national dispositions. On the whole, changing practices is difficult, even in dense and largely autonomous settings such as EU foreign policy. The social construction of EU foreign policy occurs only to a partial extent.     

The Turbulence in West Asia and North Africa and China’s Response

Some tendencies and characteristics have become increasingly salient from the evolutionary trajectory of the turmoil in West Asia and North Africa region, with various powers embarked on a reshuffling,     

The reputational bases of India’s China policy: the forward policy and beyond

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes instances of the Indian leadership’s choice of an escalatory approach in its border dispute with China, first in the adoption of the Forward Policy in the lead up to the 1962 war, and more briefly the more recent decision in 2017 to take escalatory action in response to Chinese activity in the Doklam area in the trijunction of the India-China-Bhutan border region. In doing so, the paper demonstrates how a focus on reputation as an explanatory factor may allow us to make better sense of how Indian leaders have in the past and continue to in the present make decisions on key issues of national security concern.     

Do Russia and China promote autocracy in Central Asia?

The purpose of our paper is to contribute to the literature on autocracy promotion by analyzing Central Asia as the most-likely case, considering both Russia and China as relevant external actors. We develop a concept for our analysis based on the different strategies of Russia and China towards the region and present the results of a qualitative study of the main dimensions of autocracy promotion (regional organizations, economic cooperation, and interference and threat). Based on this qualitative study, we define variables measuring the potential for autocracy promotion and test our hypotheses using panel data for 24 post-communist countries. The somewhat surprising result of our analysis is that, in contrast to Russia's dominance mode of operation, China's doing-business approach towards its neighbors in Central Asia may have—although unintentionally—even positive effects in terms of improving governance and undermining autocratic structures.     

The rule of law ‐ meaning and significance for security policy and reform

Given Russia's history of legal expediency and the emphasis of Western policy on economic liberalization, it is not surprising that Russian reforms have yet to produce a functioning market economy and effective political institutions, including civil‐military control. A Western‐style economic and military model is fundamentally built on the rule of law as a supreme and impartial tool of conflict resolution and distribution of rights and power. Without it, government action cannot be predicted, destroying trust in the institutions and denying private and public activity a basis for long‐term planning which is based on trust and predictability. Without long‐term planning neither companies nor armies can be successful, giving rise to a pseudo‐legal state of de facto laws. For its economic, political and military reforms to be successful Russia needs to emphasize the building of the institutions for developing and predictably enforcing a set of laws, an effort that needs to receive priority support from Western partners.     

“The Greatest Success of British Diplomacy in East Asia in Recent Years”? British Diplomacy and the Ending of Confrontation, 1965–1966

Arthur de la Mare, an under-secretary of state at the British Foreign Office, wrote in 1967 that the ending of the Malaysia–Indonesia Confrontation of 1963–1966 was “the greatest success of British diplomacy in East Asia in recent years.” However, historians generally believe British influence in the process to end this conflict was extremely limited, as it has been widely accepted that this conflict ended through bilateral negotiations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. On one level, this view is accurate, but “Confrontation” took months to end and, during this process, British, American, and Malaysian officials hoped to encourage a change in leadership in Jakarta and an eventual end to the conflict. Confrontation was an anti-colonial and a regional dispute greatly affected by the Cold War environment in Southeast Asia and, therefore, not immune from international events or actors, especially the final phase of the conflict.