The electoral consequences of corruption scandals in Spain

Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanish local elections (Jiménez Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 6(2):43–76, 2007; Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero 2011, Consecuencias electorales de la corrupción, 2003–2007. Estudios de Progreso, Fundación Alternativas; Costas et al. European Journal of Political Economy: 28(4):469-484, 2012) have found that voters do not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparative literature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small and does not prevent their reelection most of the times (Jiménez and Caínzos 2006, How far and why do corruption scandals cost votes? In Garrard, J. and Newell, J. (eds.) Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press). What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern. This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect of corruption scandal on the votes. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness to the incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our results provide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects of corruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.     

Patterns of electoral corruption in Peru: The April 2000 general election

In 2000 Alberto Fujimori became president of Peru fora third consecutive term via an election process of dubiouslegality. This article details the variety of underhand andfraudulent manoeuvres employed by Peru's ruling clique as itstrove to ensure that the regime maintained itself in power. Itopens with a review of the thinking behind the government's long-term national development strategy, before outlining itscontroversial behaviour during the election campaign,irregularities occurring on polling day, as well as when voteswere being counted.     

The working of electoral corruption: the Ekiti model of vote buying

Crime, Law and Social Change - In Nigeria, politicians and parties have developed a sophisticated vote-buying scheme, which we label, according to the state, where it happens, the Ekiti model of...     

Why voters do not throw the rascals out?— A conceptual framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption

One of the intriguing phenomena in democracy is the fact that politicians involved in, accused of or condemned for corruption in a court of law get re-elected by their constituents. In some cases, corruption does not seem to negatively affect the development of political careers. In this introductory article, we try to develop a multidimensional framework for analysing electoral punishment of corruption. First, we will look into various studies on electoral punishment and highlight their advancements and shortcomings. Then, we will propose a more dynamic account of electoral punishment of corruption that takes into account individual as well as macro level explanations. Finally, we will disaggregate these two analytical dimensions into various explanatory factors.     

The changing forms of corruption in China

Crime, Law and Social Change - China’s famed growth has created a paradox of huge proportions that is associated with how this development could happen despite the well documented issue of...     

The electoral connection of ministerial selection in the UK

Many studies have examined the determinants of ministerial selection. However, the effect of electoral incentives on government post allocation has so far not been studied in the literature. Drawing on data from the United Kingdom over the period 1992–2015, this article investigates the relationship between the selection of ministers and the electoral interests of the actors in this selection process – party leaders and members of parliament (MPs). The findings demonstrate that the greater the electoral safety of constituencies, the more likely are MPs to have a higher office. The results reveal a broader conception of party strategy in government formation than previously documented. The paper thus suggests that electorates can affect the allocation of ministerial positions in the UK.     

Japan,Korea, the Philippines,China: four syndromes of corruption

Both generalizations about “Asian corruption”, and claims about greater or lesser amounts of corruption, tend to overlook the many variations existing among and within Asian societies, and among the corruption problems they experience. I suggest that deeper influences in social, political and economic development, and contrasting institutional settings, create four distinctive syndromes of corruption, each with its own set of implications for relationships between wealth and power. Japan is an example of “influence markets” in which private interests buy or rent influence over relatively specific policy outcomes within a strong state. Korea is a case of “elite cartels”, in which collusion and corrupt incentives enable several kinds of elites to cooperate in governing, enriching themselves, and resisting rising political competition. The Philippines is marked by “oligarchs and clans”, with powerful families and their entourages plundering a weak state in a climate of uncertainty and insecurity. China experiences “official mogul” corruption, in which officials abuse state power with impunity, although that process is becoming increasingly fragmented. The four syndromes may help us understand why corruption and rapid growth have coexisted in some, but not all, Asian states for long periods of time, and may also help us understand why some of those states will adapt to new global realities only with some difficulty. They also show how “consensus”-driven reforms emanating from the west may not only be ineffective, but may actually make matters worse.     

The politics of conceptualizing corruption in reform China

It is significant to examine Chinese debates over corruption for several reasons. These debates confirm certain universal aspects of corruption that have been emphasized in the Western social science literature. They also suggest unique features of corruption that are useful for understanding the issue in the Chinese context. They further reveal how the conceptualization of corruption is politicized in the Chinese discourse,giving insight to the alignment of political and intellectual forces on the issue. Finally, Chinese analyses have heuristic values for general discussions of political corruption. This paper surveys Chinese debates over the definitions, sources, and consequences of corruption from the late 1980's to the late 1990's.     

Privatization in Argentina: The implications for corruption

The article analyzes the privatization program carried out under the Carlos Menem administration in Argentina between 1989 and 1995. It shows how, on many occasions, the divestiture of government-owned assets was often carried out within a very weak legal framework which, in turn, opened windows of opportunities for corrupt behavior and collusive practices involving high ranking government officials and private corporations. Based on their findings, the authors stress the crucial role that transparency plays for effective results to take place after government selloffs. Indeed, the Argentine case shows that there is a strong correlation between the legal and regulatory problems that often arise in the aftermath of state divestitures and privatizations that have been carried out hastily and under a cloud of corruption allegations.     

新时期反腐败对策探讨

腐败是社会公害,近几年来加大了打击力度,但仍屡禁不止。我们必须与时俱进不断地探索新的防腐败措施,消除特权从源头治腐;严肃法纪不徇私情加大腐败成本,警示世人;公共决策与行政行为公开化使腐败无机可乘;进一步完善监督机制,使监督收到实效。     

From corruption to extortion: Conceptualization of post-communist corruption

Moral outrage and lack of comparison distorts the understanding of the natureand politically determined functions of governmental corruption in post-communist transition. As post-communist societies move towards open market systems and corruption is no longer limited to the public sector, politics is transformed into a potent tool for illegal transactions. The political structureitself creates corrupt practices that become a structural feature of transition societies. This article offers first a critical discussion of both moral theories of corruption and the thesis that posits a link between corruption and democracy deficit in post-communist countries. Subsequently, it sketches a neo-functionalist approach that puts corruption in a specific social context.With respect to East/Central Europe, corruption is presented as a betrayal ofpublic trust that serves specific requirements of an emerging ``extortioniststate.' These requirements relate to the expansion of extortion opportunitiesand their institutionalization into a semblance of a Tule of law system.     

The electoral budget cycle on municipal police expenditure

This paper analyzes the effects of electoral cycles on municipal police expenditure. We use a database with information on Spanish municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants for the period 2001–2008. Our data show that incumbents increase police spending 1 year before the elections, thus we confirm an electoral budget cycle on police expenditure in Spain. We also find that conservative parties are associated with increased spending on public safety. Population has a positive and significant impact on police expenditures per capita, which indicates diseconomies of scale. The theory on sub-national government spending shows that intergovernmental transfers per capita and taxes per capita are believed to impact local expenditures. Our model fits this assumption, showing a significant and positive influence of both variables on police expenditures. Finally, our model reports a positive impact of both immigration and economic level on police spending.     

Political corruption in Brazil

This paper analyzes instances of political corruption in Brazil since the 1985 return to civilian rule, and concentrates on the impeachment of Pres. Fernando Collor in 1992, and the so-called Budgetgate episode in 1993/94. Linkages between political corruption and campaign financing are described, as well as recent legislation to inhibit same.Revised version of a paper presented to the Research Committee on Political Corruption and Campaign Finance, XVI Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, Germany, August, 1994.     

Combatting institutional corruption: The policy-centered approach

How can institutional corruption be combatted? While recent years have seen a growth in anti-corruption literature, examples of countries rooting out systemic corruption remain few. The lack of success stories has sparked an academic debate about the theoretical foundations of anti-corruption frameworks: primarily between proponents of the principal-agent framework and those seeing systemic corruption as the result of collective-action problems. Through an analysis of current principal-agent and collective action anti-corruption literature, this article adds two additional arguments to the debate: (a) the need to specify what one talks about when talking about systemic corruption and (b) the necessity to move beyond the principal-agent versus collective action frameworks dichotomy towards a policy-centered approach for how to combat institutional corruption. Having outlined how institutional corruption can be seen as one type of systemic corruption, this article shows how a policy-centered approach such as strengthening the appearance standard through an independent public commission can address theoretical mechanisms emphasized in each anti-corruption framework–thus arguing that the frameworks complement rather than rival each other. The article ends by arguing for an anti-corruption discourse acknowledging that a multifaceted problem such as corruption requires multiple frameworks rather than attempts for silver-bullet explanations.

     

Discretion and corruption: The Chilean judiciary

Corruption in the judiciary and its effects on the budget of that branch of government, the efficiency of justice (prompt or belated) and its quality (biased or impartial) are analyzed. The discretionary powers of the Supreme Court and those granted to judges to manage their courts, calendar and case load, and the hierarchical administrative structures of judiciaries, which function as a queueing system, may be used as a tool to maximize graft. These phenomena reveal links between institutional forms and incentives. Using the case of Chile and the exceptional emergence of corruption within the judiciary during the military dictatorship, the role of democracy as a punishing and preventive mechanism is highlighted.This article was written while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Orville Schell, Center for International Human Rights Law at Yale Law School, and under the auspices of the North-South Center of the University of Miami.     

The role of foundations in international anti-money laundering

Money laundering is a serious crime that destabilizes society.The author focuses on the measures undertaken by the internationalcommunity to combat money laundering and analyses a possibleabuse of foundations in such illegal schemes.