Obstacles to citizen participation by direct democracy in Latin America: a comparative regional analysis of legal frameworks and evidence from the Costa Rican case

Starting from the 1980s, institutions of direct democracy were introduced into most Latin American constitutions. To date, the practical application of these institutions remains almost exclusively restricted to the subtype of government plebiscites while the use of citizen initiated instruments remains scarce. To explain the region's low frequency of use of citizen initiated instruments of direct democracy this explorative study proceeds in three sections. The first recapitulates regulatory legislation on, and practical experience with direct democracy in Latin America. The second proposes and applies an index for the comparative measurement of legal obstacles provided by institutional frameworks and goes on to discuss further explanatory propositions on factors that may interact with these legal obstacles to obstruct direct democratic citizen participation. Finally, these hypotheses are tested through an interview-based study with actors involved in the recent practical experience with direct democracy in Costa Rica. The study concludes that the institutional design of citizen initiated instruments of direct democracy alone does not suffice to explain the frequency of their practical application. Rather than this, application frequency appears to be a function of the combined interactive effects of legal institutional factors with sociological and political party factors such as strategic action preferences and party elites' attitudes.     

The Barriers to Media Opening in Latin America

Despite the spread of electoral democracy, few Latin American media systems today encourage the deepening of democracy. We attribute this outcome to (a) generalized weakness in the rule of law, (b) holdover authoritarian legislation, (c) oligarchic ownership of media outlets, (d) uneven journalistic standards, and (e) limited audience access to diverse sources of information. Reforms designed to address these problems could include the appointment of special prosecutors to investigate crimes against journalists; replacement of criminal libel laws with civil procedures; legislation protecting journalists' sources and guaranteeing transparency in government; the establishment of nonpartisan boards to allocate broadcast concessions, administer state-owned stations, and distribute government advertising; user fees to expand public media; and various measures to enhance professional standards.     

美国的东南亚民主战略与《东盟宪章》背后的困境

冷战结束之后,美国大肆向全世界推销其民主制度和价值观,一直将民主外交作为其非常重要的外交手段之一。在世界各地,美国都通过扶持所谓的民主力量,大力施展其"软实力",推进全球民主战略。这其中,东南亚是美国长期重视的地区,为了抵消中国、日本等国在东南亚地区天然的地缘优势上的影响,美国更是在该地区推行民主战略方面下足了功夫。而东盟作为该地区发展最为成功、对团结东南亚国家贡献最大的组织,一直以来都在其现实需要与美国压力之间进行平衡,最终将不干涉内政和推进民主人权都写进了作为其重要里程牌的文件《东盟宪章》之中。然而,由于东盟成员国的经济发展水平和政治文化制度参差不齐,这种矛盾性的策略反而使其陷入困境。如何在发展多元化民主政治的同时维护其政治安全,达成其一体化目标,这是值得东盟进一步思考与实践的难题。     

Bringing direct democracy back in: toward a three-dimensional measure of democracy

Most procedural definitions and measurements of democracy are missing one crucial component: direct popular decision-making. This is an important gap that does not allow users of data to ascertain some important variation among democracies. Thus, I propose a new measure that is strongly anchored in a procedural definition of democracy but includes this missing dimension. The proposed measure is well rooted in the literature and introduces a dimension whereby citizens may become the masters of their political fate at any time and without the consent of elected authorities, while avoiding the inclusion of extraneous attributes that are not highlighted in democratic theory. Tests of the validity of the new indicator, using Latin American cases, show that there is enough room for its inclusion without the typical collinearity problems this literature faces. This indicator is not only sound, but it is empirically appealing as it performs better than others when testing relevant hypotheses.     

Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes

Although military rule disappeared in Latin America after 1990, other forms of authoritarianism persisted. Competitive authoritarianism, in which democratic institutions exist but incumbent abuse skews the playing field against opponents, emerged in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador during the post-Cold War period. This article seeks to explain the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. It argues that populism – the election of a personalistic outsider who mobilizes voters with an anti-establishment appeal – is a major catalyst for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism. Lacking experience with representative democratic institutions, possessing an electoral mandate to destroy the existing elite, and facing institutions of horizontal accountability controlled by that elite, populists have an incentive to launch plebiscitary attacks on institutions of horizontal accountability. Where they succeed, weak democracies almost invariably slide into competitive authoritarianism. The argument is demonstrated through a comparative analysis of all 14 elected presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela between 1990 and 2010.     

Hearing Campaign Appeals: The Accountability Implications of Presidential Campaign Tone

Citizen understanding of candidate priorities is highly consequential for both elections and postelection accountability and is especially key to the office of the presidency. I examine the impact of campaign advertising tone on citizen understanding of candidate agendas in the context of the 2000 presidential election. Merging data on political ads from the Wisconsin Advertising Project with individual survey data, I test whether citizens are more likely to accurately hear a positive campaign theme. The analysis provides empirical support for this benefit of positivity.     

Going beyond the Roman dictator: a comprehensive approach to emergency rule,with evidence from Latin America

The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on emergency rule, a practice that democratic theory has struggled to conceptualize. Accordingly, this article differs from existing approaches, which mainly focus on the constitutional design of regimes of exception and tend to identify the institution of the Roman dictator as their source. In contrast, we offer a comprehensive approach, considering other historical sources of emergency rule, going beyond the dichotomy of constitutional and de facto emergency, and focusing specifically on the types of emergency powers involved: executive, legislative and judicial. We propose a different way of conceptualizing emergency rule, following a political rather than a constitutional logic, and we illustrate this different conceptualization by offering evidence from Bolivia, Chile and Guatemala to demonstrate how this comprehensive approach works in practice.     

The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy

Two images of populism are well-established: it is either labelled as a pathological political phenomenon, or it is regarded as the most authentic form of political representation. In this article I argue that it is more fruitful to categorize populism as an ambivalence that, depending on the case, may constitute a threat to or a corrective for democracy. Unfolding my argument, I offer a roadmap for the understanding of the diverse and usually conflicting approaches to studying the relation between populism and democracy. In particular, three main approaches are identified and discussed: the liberal, the radical and the minimal. I stress that the latter is the most promising of them for the study of the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy. In fact, the minimal approach does not imply a specific concept of democracy, and facilitates the undertaking of cross-regional comparisons. This helps to recognize that populism interacts differently with the two dimensions of democracy that Robert Dahl distinguished: while populism might well represent a democratic corrective in terms of inclusiveness, it also might become a democratic threat concerning public contestation.     

Democracy's Effect on Terrorist Organizations: Regime Type and Armed Group Behavior in Chile

How does democracy influence terrorism? The regime-responsive school argues that lack of representation in autocracies motivates violence; the regime-permissive school posits that individual liberty in democracies allows it. The schools thus disagree about the democratic feature to which violence responds—representation or individual liberty. These arguments are problematic in two ways. First, neither accounts for the potentially competing effects of different democratic features. Second, treating terrorism as a set response to operating context ignores the operational processes behind violence, described in organizational theories of terrorism. This article develops a bridge between the regime-responsive and regime-permissive schools by applying organizational theories of terrorism to their key arguments. I argue that representation and individual liberty have independent, and sometimes competing, effects on armed groups' missions, hierarchies, and membership—collectively organizational capacity, the ability to survive and influence the environment. This explains the mixed effects of democracy on terrorism: both high-functioning democracy and repressive autocracy weaken organizational capacity, but decreased representation in a democracy or higher individual liberty in an autocracy removes organizational stresses. New research on Chile between 1965 and 1995—representing five government periods, with four armed groups operating—acts as an initial test of these relationships.     

Playing by the rules of the game: partisan use of recall referendums in Colombia

As a bottom-up mechanism of direct democracy, recall can be triggered by citizens to remove elected officials through a vote, which is expected to increase accountability. Contradicting this hope, previous research has suggested that intensive use of recall referendums became an instrument of party competition. However, empirical evidence is scant. Thus, focusing on the 107 attempts of activating recall in Colombia during the first half of 2017 this article seeks to understand if recall activations are more likely to reinforce democratic governance (by giving an institutional solution to exceptional problems of legitimacy) or are more likely to erode it (by becoming a weapon to escalate the partisan competition beyond regular elections). We created a dataset to identify who started the recall – partisan, mixed or civil society actors – and for what reasons. Then, we examined to what extent the effective number of parties in the council, the majority reached in the previous election, or the size of the municipality have an effect on the likelihood of recall attempts. The study finds that in Colombia, political leaders (and not specific parties) are the main actors promoting recall.     

Political leadership and the construction of competitive authoritarian regimes in Latin America: implications and prospects for democracy

Recent developments have raised new concerns regarding the prospects of democracy in Latin America, particularly in what are often defined, although not unanimously, as cases of competitive authoritarianism, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. In light of their significance and diffusion on a global level, understanding how these regimes emerge is important, especially when they replace democratic or imperfectly democratic regimes such as in the cases examined in this study. What explains the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs), particularly when the starting point is democratic or imperfectly democratic? What are the region’s democratic prospects after the emergence of various CARs in the last two decades? Through the comparative analysis of competitive authoritarian attempts in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, I argue that the same passages and challenges required to transform a democratic regime into a CAR makes incumbents' features and strategies particularly important, especially the ability to weather potentially lethal institutional crises and limit the legitimacy costs associated with competitive authoritarian manipulations. Incumbents have proved more successful in these challenges and hence in their competitive authoritarian attempts when combining charisma and the elaboration of a democratic discourse including the diffusion of new democratic values.     

Political Investment Cycles in Democracies and Autocracies

Extant research has shown considerable interest in whether host countries’ political uncertainty impedes foreign direct investment (FDI). Building upon the scholarly consensus on the adverse impact of political uncertainty on FDI, this article demonstrates that the extent to which investment climates are unpredictable varies cyclically, on the basis of election timing in democracies and leadership turnover in autocracies. The empirical results show that in presidential democracies, FDI tends to slowly increase after an executive election and then decline as the next executive election nears. However, I find that an electoral investment cycle is not found in parliamentary democracies where election timing is irregular, less predictable, and endogenous to domestic economic conditions. I also find that a similar political investment cycle exists in autocracies not through electoral cycle but through leadership tenure cycle. The level of FDI inflows tends to be relatively low early in autocrats’ tenure when political uncertainty is high and rise as autocratic leadership tenure increases over time but eventually wane again as autocratic leadership is destabilized in the late period of power transition. The findings indicate the existence of heterogeneous political investment cycles, depending on regime type.     

De-idealizing the democratic civil peace: on the political economy of democratic stabilization and pacification in Argentina and Ecuador

In the liberal concept of a ‘democratic civil peace’, an idealistic understanding of democratic stabilization and pacification prevails: democracy is seen to guarantee political stability and social peace by offering comprehensive representation and participation in political decisions while producing outcomes broadly in accordance with the common interest of society. This contrasts with the procedural quality and the material achievements of most, if not all, really existing democracies. South America is paradigmatic. Here, the legitimation of liberal democracy through both procedure and performance is weak and yet ‘third wave democracies’ have managed to survive even harsh economic and political crises. The article presents a conceptual framework to analyse historically specific patterns of democratic stabilization and pacification. Analyses of the processes of socio-political destabilization and re-stabilization in Argentina and Ecuador since the late 1990s show how a ‘de-idealized’ perspective on the democratic civil peace helps explain the viability of democratic regimes that systematically deviate from the ideal-type conditions for democratic survival that have been proposed in the literature.     

A comparative analysis of microfinance and conditional cash transfers in Latin America

This paper addresses the question of whether microfinance and conditional cash transfers can be effective in alleviating poverty in the Latin American region, and provides a comprehensive assessment of each of these programmes using data and evaluation reports from 19 countries in the Latin American region, analysed in the context of six operational and impact criteria. The research shows that microfinance may be better suited for those living on US$2 per day or higher, while conditional cash transfers may be more beneficial for those living in extreme poverty. Neither programme offers a ‘magic bullet’ solution for poverty eradication, but they can provide positive outcomes when prescribed in combination.

Une analyse comparative du microfinancement et des transferts conditionnels d'argent en Amérique latine

Ce document se penche sur la question de savoir si le microfinancement et les transferts conditionnels d'argent peuvent être efficaces au moment d'atténuer la pauvreté et il fournit une évaluation complète de chaque programme, en utilisant des données et des rapports d'évaluation provenant de dix-neuf pays de la région, analysés dans le contexte de six critères opérationnels et relatifs à l'impact. D'après les résultats des recherches, il est possible que le microfinancement convienne mieux à ceux qui vivent avec 2 dollars EU par jour ou plus, tandis que les transferts conditionnels d'argent pourraient profiter davantage à ceux qui vivent dans des conditions de pauvreté extrême. Aucun de ces deux types de programmes ne fournit une solution « balle magique » pour l'éradication de la pauvreté, mais ils peuvent donner des résultats positifs lorsqu'ils sont prescrits en tandem.

Uma análise comparativa de microfinanças e transferências condicionais de dinheiro na América Latina

Este artigo busca examinar se as microfinanças e as transferências condicionais de dinheiro podem ser eficientes para aliviar a pobreza e oferece uma avaliação abrangente de cada programa utilizando dados e relatórios de avaliação de dezenove países da região, analisados no contexto de seis critérios operacionais e de impacto. A pesquisa mostra que a microfinança pode ser mais adequada para aqueles que vivem com US$2 por dia ou mais, enquanto que as transferências condicionais de dinheiro podem ser mais benéficas para aqueles que estão vivendo em condições de pobreza extrema. Nenhum programa oferece uma solução “mágica” para a erradicação da pobreza, mas eles podem oferecer resultados positivos quando prescritos em conjunto.

Un análisis comparativo de las microfinanzas y las transferencias de efectivo condicionadas en América Latina

Este ensayo analiza si las microfinanzas y las transferencias de efectivo condicionadas pueden contribuir a la reducción de la pobreza y ofrece una evaluación completa de las dos modalidades. Utiliza para ello datos e informes de evaluación de 19 países de la región y analiza los resultados a la luz de seis criterios operativos y de impacto. La investigación demostró que las microfinanzas pueden funcionar mejor para las personas que sobreviven con US$2 o más por día, mientras que las transferencias de efectivo pueden beneficiar más a las que viven en extrema pobreza. Ninguna modalidad es por sí misma una solución para erradicar la pobreza pero pueden producir resultados positivos si se les da un uso combinado.     

Informal interference in the judiciary in new democracies: a comparison of six African and Latin American cases

This article focuses on the efforts of power holders – at the executive or the legislative level – to influence or curb court activity informally or extra-legally, an acknowledged but under-researched topic in studies of judicial politics. We first define informal judicial interference and operationalize the concept; we then explain how we collected information on the topic through systematic cross-country interviewing. Our concept focuses on judicial intervention actions exercised by political actors once judges are on the bench. We distinguish these actions according to type – direct or subtle – and further differentiate each type according to six different modes. We provide new empirical data on informal interference in six third-wave democracies, three in Africa (Benin, Madagascar, and Senegal) and three in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay). Our empirical findings, first, confirm the importance of informal practices in shaping political-judicial relations. Second, they point to long-standing legacies and to the level of socio-economic development as possible explanations for different performances in terms of the prevalence and severity of informal interference in the judiciary in these newly established democratic regimes     

Post-disaster emergency and reconstruction experiences in Asia and Latin America: an assessment

From United Nations emergency responses involving tent camps, to the reconstruction approach of FUNDASAL in El Salvador and the post-disaster provision of housing by Caritas in Asia, it is clear that a giant step has been taken in thinking about emergency shelter, as well as about how prevention and reconstruction are managed. This article evaluates some current good practices in Asia and Latin America in post-disaster emergency shelter that use local skills, materials, and tools, and participatory processes.     

Capital Account Liberalization,Financial Structure,and Access to Credit in Latin America

This article revisits the question of whether capital account liberalization improves access to credit by advancing and testing a theory of how the structure of the financial sector shapes the willingness and ability of banks and governments to repress the domestic financial sector. In a highly concentrated financial sector, banks and governments are more willing to reap the benefits of financial openness by suppressing liberalizing reforms to domestic financial policies, and they can also better coordinate with one another to stifle these reforms compared to when the financial sector is diffuse. Using a panel dataset of Latin American and Caribbean countries, I find that capital account liberalization leads to a decrease in loans to private firms and households and an increase in loans to governments and state-owned enterprises when the financial sector is highly concentrated. Only when the financial sector is diffuse does capital account liberalization lead to reforms in entry barriers, directed credit programs, and banking sector supervision, which extends to improved access to credit for private firms and households.     

Bringing the Company Back In: A Firm-Level Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment

The industry standard for studying multinational corporations (MNCs) has been to evaluate patterns in aggregate country-level measures of foreign direct investment (FDI). Though certainly related, these data are at best a proxy for the actual commercial and productive activities of multinationals that most political scientists purport to be interested in. Simply put, this is a very indirect way of testing theories about the sociopolitical and economic factors that motivate MNCs’ choice of host countries. This article introduces a new firm-level data set designed to get around this problem by permitting more direct analysis of multinationals’ foreign operations. It then revisits the relationship between regime type and direct investment, finding evidence that MNCs are more likely to establish new subsidiaries in democracies than in nondemocracies. However, further analysis reveals that the strength of this relationship varies by context. Specifically, MNCs rely on regime type as an indicator of political risk when they lack an existing relationship with the host state. In addition, those operating in extractive industries are generally less responsive to political institutions than those operating in manufacturing or services. These results suggest that firm- and sector-specific factors deserve greater consideration than they have been given in the existing literature.     

Direct democracy and subjective regime legitimacy in Europe

While much research focuses on the causes and consequences of direct democracy and regime legitimacy, little attention has been paid to the potential relationship between them. In an attempt to fill this void, this paper focuses on the legal provisions for direct democracy and its use. The key argument is that possibilities for the public’s direct involvement reflect high importance given to citizens, openness of the regime towards different modes of decision-making, and ways to avoid unpopular institutions. Consequently, citizens are likely to accept and support the regime, improving or maintaining its legitimacy. The cross-national analysis includes 38 European countries ranging from transition countries to established democracies. It uses bivariate statistical analysis and country-level data collected from legislation, secondary sources, and aggregate surveys.