Ennahda Islamists and the Test of Government in Tunisia

After winning the 2011 elections, the Ennahda Islamist Party was the majority partner in successive coalition governments, whose poor performance – namely in the economic and security fields – disappointed the people’s high post-revolutionary expectations. Opponents accused Ennahda of incompetence, greed for power and double talk. Many of the Ennahda-led governments’ failures were due to factors beyond their control, but some did indeed depend on Ennahda’s own political weaknesses. Nevertheless, Ennahda contributed positively to the overall development of Tunisia’s political transition thanks to its moderation and pragmatism and its contribution remains paramount for the democratic consolidation of Tunisia and other political Islamic actors.     

To govern,or not to govern? Opportunity and post-coup military behaviour in Egypt 2011–2014

This article examines Egyptian military behaviour in 2011 and 2013 to address the question of why officers remain in power following some successful coups, and allow for a transition to civilian rule after others. My evidence suggests that in post-1970 cases where international factors fail to exert sufficient pressure, outcome variation is influenced by levels of corporate opportunity, defined here as the ease with which the army can use control of the state to expand its corporate interests. Drawing on the existing literature, I posit consensus against military rule, high popular support for democracy, strong civil society, the presence of a strong opposition party, and low levels of cohesion among officers as factors which constrain opportunity. Prior research suggests that when the level of opportunity is high, controlling the state becomes a high-risk/low-reward endeavour, making it likely that officers will allow for a transition to civilian rule. My study contributes to the existing scholarship by using original data gathered through interviews with Egyptian officers, as well as other experts on the Egyptian military, to argue that low consensus against military rule, low support for democracy, and high organizational cohesion are jointly sufficient to produce governing intervention.     

Between Scylla and Charybdis: religion,the military and support for democracy among Egyptians, 2011–2014

Democracy as a form of civilian rule must navigate a path between clerical and military powers, both of which are highly engaged in the politics of post-Mubarak Egypt. The authors ask in this article how mass support for democracy changed in Egypt between 2011 and 2014, and how this support is connected with views on religion and the role of the military. This question is important for understanding the prospects for democracy in a major state in the Arab world. It is also of comparative interest because of what change in the social and ideological drivers of mass attitudes may tell us about the nature of democratic support more generally. The authors’ analysis is based on nationally representative surveys of Egyptians in 2011 after the country’s first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections and in 2014 after the removal of the Islamist President Morsi. The findings indicate that Egyptians in large numbers favour both democracy and unfettered military intervention in politics. The authors also observe important shifts in the social bases of support for democracy away from religion but also from economic aspiration. Negative political experience with democratic procedures in 2011–2013 seems to be the strongest factor behind the observed decrease in democratic support.     

Can oil-reliant countries democratize? An assessment of the role of civil society in Algeria

A cursory look around the world shows that few oil-reliant countries can be categorized as democracies, particularly those in the Middle East. In fact, many studies have suggested that oil wealth hinders democratization. The recent “Arab Spring” and subsequent political instability in oil-producing states such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria gives rise to questions regarding the prospects for democracy in these types of countries. This article provides an analysis of the possible role that civil society may play in democratization in oil-reliant states by looking at the case of Algeria. I argue that the seemingly meaningless and artificial acts of “liberalization” initiated by the Algerian government in the late 1980s, which initially allowed civic associations to form, have provided an opening for some civic associations to organize and oppose the government. This process of liberalization, regardless of how empty it may have seemed at first, has “opened floodgates” that now cannot be closed. Thus, the recent protests in Algeria, and continued opposition to the government, can be seen as directly facilitated by the government's prior liberalization and opening of the system to civic associations.     

Italy's changing defence policy

After the fall of Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) decided to act as a stabilising force, to abandon the street and to lend democratic legitimacy to the political process designed by the army. The outcome of this strategy was that the MB was first ‘burned’ politically and then harshly repressed after having exhausted its stabilising role. The main mistakes the Brothers made were, first, to turn their back on several opportunities to spearhead the revolt by leading popular forces and, second, to keep their strategy for change gradualist and conservative, seeking compromises with parts of the former regime even though the turmoil and expectations in the country required a much bolder strategy.     

Why do some Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country?

Why do some Arab citizens regard democracy favourably but see it as unsuitable for their country? Modernization theory contends that economic development creates modern citizens who demand democracy. Cultural theories see Islam and democracy as incompatible. Government performance theories argue that citizens who perceive the current authoritarian government as acting in a transparent manner will demand greater democracy. I argue that attitudes toward democracy are shaped by beliefs about its political, economic, and religious consequences, including those related to sectarianism. I test this consequence-based theory using Arab Barometer data from six nations. Sixty percent hold favourable views of democracy generally and for their country, while 7% reject democracy. Twenty-seven percent support democracy generally but see it as unsuitable for their country. Beliefs that democracy will have negative consequences and perceptions of poor government performance are the most important predictors of democracy's unsuitability. Modernization theory receives support, but Islamic identity and beliefs do not consistently predict attitudes in the expected direction. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of Arab public opinion and suggest that concerns about the consequences of free elections affect support for democracy as much as assessments of the political and economic performance of the current authoritarian regime.     

Reflections on self-reflections – On framing the analytical implications of the Arab uprisings for the study of Arab politics

The Arab uprisings have not only impacted large parts of the Arab world. They have also left their mark on scholarship about Arab politics. Following the unexpected events, scholars have been engaged in a self-reflective debate on whether their assumptions and theoretical approaches to Arab politics have proven inadequate and their reasoning flawed, and if some kind of rethink is necessary for how this is supposed to take place. The present article, which belongs in the realms of meta-studies, reflects on these self-reflections. By presenting and evaluating some of the specific positions within this more inward-looking part of the Arab uprisings debate, the article brings attention to how this line of more self-reflective questions can – and has been – addressed within very different kinds of “frames” and how these are associated with very different ways of discussing the analytical applications of the Arab uprisings for Arab politics. More specifically, the article identifies three kinds of framing: (i) a who-has-been-vindicated-and-made-obsolete framing, where the core interest is in picking winners and losers among the last decades’ (post)democratization currents in Middle East studies; (ii) a how-do-we-synthesize-and-upgrade framing, where the ambition is to revise and combine insights from the analytical toolboxes of both authoritarian resilience and democratization; and finally (iii) a how-do-we-get-beyond-the-democratization/authoritarianism-paradogma framing, which perceives the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to engage in a more basic reflection about how (Arab) politics has been and should be debated and whether it is time to make the study of Arab politics into a “genuine science of politics” instead of being reduced mainly to topics of democratization and authoritarian resilience.     

Neither episodic,nor destined to failure? The endurance of Hungarian populism after 2010

The Palestinian Authority's (PA) claim to embody the spirit of the “Arab Spring”, through its recent “state-building” agenda – including its elevation to “non-member observer status” at the United Nations – is disingenuous. This conclusion rests on three key arguments outlined in this article. First, this article identifies a continuation of broader patterns of authoritarianism represented by the PA's lack of adherence to democratic practices, the deprivation of access for the Palestinian population to basic resources and the wider issue of the continued absence of Palestinian sovereignty. Second, it identifies the intensification of some authoritarian practices within Palestine, particularly in the areas of security and policing, for example by the use of force against protestors. Finally, this article identifies that civil-society groups and opposition supporters throughout 2011–2012 have more genuinely embodied evidence of resistance to authoritarianism in popular demonstrations against the PA.     

How can opposition support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt

While many observers of politics in the Arab world hold that the emergence of political opposition would be a harbinger of democratization, this article argues that opposition can contribute to the stability and resilience of authoritarian regimes. Based on an empirical analysis of contemporary Egyptian politics, it is shown that, despite the repressive nature of the Egyptian state, political opposition has emerged in various societal contexts: political parties, human rights associations and a popular Islamist current. In order to understand this development, it is important to investigate authoritarian survival strategies ‘beyond coercion’. While militant resistance from radical Islamists has been successfully oppressed during the 1990s, the Egyptian incumbents reacted to the challenge of societal dissent by co-opting opposition forces. As a consequence, political opposition in Egypt serves functions entirely different from those in liberal democracies. It contributes to the legitimacy of the Egyptian state. Moreover, by tolerating controlled opposition, societal dissent can be better observed, channelled and moderated. From a more general perspective, political dissent exists in various settings: it prevails not only among opposition, but also within the political elite leading to a delicate juggling act of competing ideas and interests performed at the helm of the polity.