Institutional stepping stones for democracy: how and why multipartyism enhances democratic change

Scholars of electoral authoritarianism and comparative institutions have emphasized how authoritarian regimes implement multiparty elections to stabilize authoritarian rule and diffuse political opposition. Consequently, the literature has advised against the notion that multiparty elections constitute a general lever for democratization. This article presents evidence in support of a more positive understanding of multipartyism and democracy. We argue that multiparty elections create an institutional space for oppositional parties, instrumentally motivated to promote further positive democratic change. We hypothesize that multiparty regimes are (1) generally more likely to experience positive democratic change, and (2) more importantly, more likely to do so when faced by internal or external regime threats. We test these hypotheses using cross-section time-series data on 166 countries in the period 1973–2010. Our results show a general positive effect of multipartyism for democratic change, and that multiparty regimes are more likely to improve their levels of democracy when faced with demonstrations and economic crisis.     

Ideological radicalism and democratic experience in new democracies

In comparing publics’ ideological self-placements between established and new democracies, it has been observed that there is a higher proportion of citizens who express radical views in the latter countries. This is likely due to sharp differences with regard to evaluations of past authoritarian rule, the legitimacy of the new regime, or new institutional arrangements governing the distribution of power when countries embark on democratic transition. Studies on the attitudinal aspect of democratic consolidation lead one to expect a decrease in extreme views in new democracies with the passage of time, as questions of regime principles and institutions are settled, and citizens come to accept democracy as the “only game in town”. The present article investigates whether this proposition is applicable to “Third Wave” new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia by examining longitudinal public opinion data from 23 countries. In addition to the length of democratic regimes, We also analyse the impact of economic performance, quality of governance, and electoral systems on the proportion of radical citizens. Results show that while longer democratic experience does contribute to reducing extremist leanings, factors such as the level of corruption, rule of law, and plurality electoral rules play a more substantive role.     

Is democracy the only game in town? Tension between immigrants' democratic desires and authoritarian imprints

This article borrows from the literature on transitional democracies to examine levels of support for democracy and non-democratic alternatives among immigrants travelling from partly and non-democratic countries to Canada. It evaluates how immigrants who grew up under authoritarian rule come to adapt to democracy. The findings indicate that immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries experience tensions in their adaptation to democracy, expressing strong democratic desires but also manifesting what could be interpreted as lasting imprints of their socialization under authoritarian rule. Immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries exhibit strong support for democracy (they almost all believe it is a good form of government, the best one, and understand democracy in broadly similar terms as the rest of the population). Yet, if democracy is the main game in town for the immigrants, it is not the only one; immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries are significantly more likely than people socialized in a democratic political system to support other forms of governments that are non-democratic. The article thus argues for the lasting impact of authoritarianism on people's democratic outlooks despite the presence of strong democratic desires.     

Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive?

Previous research has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. This runs counter to substantive comparative literature on democratization which finds that economic stress is connected with regime collapse and democratic liberalization. To solve this puzzle, we focus on the effects of “democratic sanctions” (those that explicitly aim to promote democracy) which have become the most common type of sanction issued against authoritarian states. We introduce a new data set of imposed sanctions in the period 1990–2010 that clearly separates sanctions according to the explicit goal of the sender. Our cross-sectional time-series analysis demonstrates that although sanctions as a whole do not generally increase the level of democracy, there is in fact a significant correlation between democratic sanctions and increased levels of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. A fundamental mechanism leading to this outcome is the increased instability of authoritarian rule as democratic sanctions are significantly associated with a higher probability of regime and leadership change.     

Demand for democracy in resilient authoritarianism: evidence from rural China

This article investigates the sources of public demand for democratic institutions under authoritarian rule. While a growing body of literature recognizes that in authoritarian polities such as China, economic development does not lead to democratization in a linear fashion, our understanding of the sources of democratization in resilient authoritarianism remains limited. This article provides an empirical test of the three most compelling theories to subsequently emerge: modernization theory, social capital theory, and institutional theory. The results of a survey conducted in the countryside of Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces provide support for the institutional approach in understanding public demand for democracy in rural China, while the modernization theory and social capital theory are shown to be less useful. Specifically, results show that people working in the government system are core supporters of the regime, whereas income, education attainment, social trust, and one’s satisfaction with regime institutions turn out to be irrelevant and do not serve as direct sources of public demand for democracy. These results extend our understanding of the complex interaction between an authoritarian regime and its people, shedding new light on the democratic prospects for resilient authoritarianism.     

Military extrication and temporary democracy: the case of Pakistan

Pakistan's 1988 transition to democracy defies most of the conventional wisdom on democratization as well as the bulk of the literature on democratic transitions. This peculiar case can be understood as a case of ‘temporary democracy’, in which democracy emerges as a short-term outcome that is not likely to be sustained. Pakistan's military leaders chose to democratize because of the high short-term costs of repression coupled with the low long-term costs of allowing democracy. The authoritarian elite agreed to allow democratization knowing that the prospects of democratic consolidation were dim. In this sense, the same factors that made the consolidation of Pakistan's democracy unlikely made the transition possible.     

Revisiting elites,transitions and founding elections: An unexpected caller from Indonesia

This article assesses the usefulness of the literature on democratic transitions for analysing recent regime change in Indonesia. A first stage in this literature emphasized the autonomy of elite relations (whether unified or disunified) and the roles adopted by elites (for example, soft‐liners, minimalists and swingmen). A second stage contextualized elite behaviours, addressing such variables as economic crisis and the intrinsic properties of different modes of transition. However, some limitations in this conceptualization are revealed by attempts to apply it in the Indonesian case. Specifically, elite relations are difficult to classify empirically and role choices remain highly ambiguous. Further, the notion that economic crisis compels elites to democratize, and second, the argument that transition by opposition‐led ‘replacement’ leads to far‐reaching changes and authoritarian backlash, are unsupported by Indonesian data. Two principal conclusions are reached: Indonesian democracy has good prospects for consolidating, and the literature on transitions has limited capacity to explain this benign outcome.     

Democratization by decree: the case of Bhutan

The small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is one of the most recent recruits to the world's democratic nations after more than a century of rule by the Wangchuck dynasty. The first national democratic elections were held in 2007 and 2008 and mark the formal transition from authoritarian rule, albeit of an enlightened nature, to democracy. But most conventional explanations of democratic transition are unconvincing when applied to the Bhutanese experience. This article reviews these explanations and demonstrates their lack of fit with structures and events in Bhutan. The two causal factors which do seem to explain the democratic transition are the strong state and transformational leadership. This is an unusual combination which not only challenges orthodoxy but also extends our understanding of the ways in which democratization can occur, a paradoxical way where, without any elite or popular pressure, monarchical powers are directed towards enabling democratization.     

State of the world 2018: democracy facing global challenges*

This article analyses the state of democracy in the world in 2018, and recent developments building on the 2019 release of the V-Dem dataset. First, the trend of autocratization continues and 24 countries are now affected by what is established as a “third wave of autocratization”. Second, despite the global challenge of gradual autocratization, democratic regimes prevail in a majority of countries in the world (99 countries, 55%) in 2018. Thus, the state of the world is unmistakably more democratic compared to any point during the last century. At the same time, the number of electoral authoritarian regimes had increased to 55, or 31% of all countries. Third, the autocratization wave is disproportionally affecting democratic countries in Europe and the Americas, but also India’s large population. Fourth, freedom of expression and the media, and the rule of law are the areas under attack in most countries undergoing autocratization, but toxic polarization of the public sphere is a threat to democracy spreading across regimes. Finally, we present the first model to predict autocratization (“adverse regime transitions”) pointing to the top-10 most at-risk countries in the world.     

Does Democratization Alter the Policy Process? Trade Policymaking in Brazil

This article explores the implications of transitions to democracy for the economic policymaking process in developing countries. Democracy is supposed to give citizens oversight of their political leaders, while providing leaders with electoral incentives to respect citizens' preferences. Consequently, a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule ought to alter policymaking. Using the case of Brazilian trade policy, this article examines changed versus consistent patterns of post-transition interest aggregation, political participation, and economic goal-setting. Contrary to expectations of a notably enlarged role for the legislative houses, the study finds that Brazil's executive still dominates trade policymaking. However, significant and increasingly transparent interest aggregation occurs within the federal executive. Moreover, policy capture by sectoral special interests has decreased, while non-traditional civil society participants have gained some influence, and trade policy outcomes now are arguably more public-regarding. We find that Brazil's trade policy process has been incrementally democratized.     

Stuck in transition: electoral processes in Zambia 1991–2001

Zambia has held three multiparty elections since its restoration of democracy in 1991. This peaceful transition raised expectations of a smooth process towards democratic consolidation. But similar to experiences in other African countries and Eastern Europe, the Zambian democratic process has remained stuck in a ‘transitional zone’ between actual democracy and authoritarian systems. This article argues that Zambian elections fall short of the expectations of a democratic process due to the institutional uncertainty surrounding elections and the weakness of the Zambian Electoral Commission in particular. The continued uncertainty – of the rules and regulations guiding elections and electoral administration – has maintained the same party in power through three consecutive elections, despite an alarming economic record.     

Global Patterns and Postcommunist Dynamics

Many of the new democracies that have been formed since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 lack what had long been understood as preconditions for the democratic project: an earlier history of democratic politics, high personal incomes, a large middle class, and/or settled borders. The most distinctive aspects of this wave of democratic transitions are rapid regime change and the rise of democracies that exhibit a mixture of both authoritarian and democratic elements. This article explores what these new democracies can teach us about the factors that seem to encourage a transition from dictatorship to democracy, and what factors seem to contribute to its sustainability and institutionalization.     

Elections,Election Outcomes,and Democracy in Southern Africa

Elections and election outcomes are widely used as a convenient short cut to measuring democracy. If this were correct, information on elections and election outcomes would be a time- and cost-saving means of identifying regime type. However, this article shows that the influential democracy measures of Beck et al., Ferree and Singh, Przeworski et al., and Vanhanen fail to adequately identify regime type when applied to ten countries in Southern Africa. For most countries, it is not possible to distinguish democracies from non-democracies on the basis of elections and election outcomes. Multi-party elections are not always free, fair, and democratic; dominant parties and dominant party systems are not necessarily undemocratic; large election victories are not by themselves proof of foul play; and not all authoritarian regimes maintain their rule through overwhelming parliamentary or electoral majorities.     

Thickening Civil Society: Explaining the Development of Associational Life in Mexico

Scholarship has demonstrated the important role that associational life has played in democratic transitions, democratic consolidation, and making democracy work. Unfortunately, however, many countries that have recently completed the transition to democracy lack a strong history of autonomous associations. Given their importance, this research seeks to understand how nonprofit organizations emerge in current-day Mexico, a recent transition country with a traditionally weak associational life, historically controlled by the state. Through a comparison of four Mexican cities this research finds that a transition from one-party rule to competitive elections was necessary to break the incentives for clientelism. Even following the transition, however, the persistence of informal rules from the old regime operating in both government and society restricts the opportunities available to potential ‘public entrepreneurs’. As a result, such entrepreneurs are highly dependent on already existing social infrastructure to obtain necessary human, organizational, and financial resources.     

Ethnopolitical demography and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa

Ethnic fragmentation is largely presumed to be bad for democracy. However, many African countries belie this claim, as democracy has recently sprouted in several of its multiethnic states. We argue that African countries that have demographic patterns where the largest ethnopolitical group is at least a near-majority and is simultaneously divided into nested subgroups produce Africa's most democratic multiethnic societies. This large-divided-group pattern, which has gone largely unnoticed by previous scholars, facilitates transitions to democracy from authoritarian rule. The large group's size foments the broad-based multiethnic social agitation needed to pose a genuine threat to a ruling autocrat, while its internal divisions reassure minorities that they will not suffer permanent exclusion via ethnic dominance under an eventual democracy. We support our claim with cross-national quantitative evidence on ethnic fragmentation and regime type.     

Local actors in the driver's seat: Transatlantic democracy promotion under regime competition in the Arab world

In studies of political transition, scholars started to explore the effect of competition between foreign policies of antipodal regimes on the political trajectories of transition countries, notably between traditional Western donors such as the European Union and the United States of America and regional authoritarian powers such as Saudi Arabia. Drawing on existing accounts, this article studies the conditions under which external actors can effectively steer local elite towards democratic reforms despite illiberal regional powers’ potential counteractions. We argue that the reform-oriented political elites in the recipient country are the ultimate judges in this competition for influence. If democracy promotion is credible, they will decide in favour of democratization, but only if the expected costs and benefits of democratic engagement resist solicitation by authoritarian powers. A study of post-Arab Spring democracy promotion in Tunisia supports the pivotal role of the external donors’ credibility in times of complex donor constellations.     

Understanding support for democracy in new and old democracies in the Americas: the role of democratic experience

This article develops and evaluates a set of expectations regarding the mechanisms via which democratic experience could shape support for democracy. In line with previous studies, one straightforward possibility considered is that experience with democracy fosters greater affective support for democracy, making citizens of old democracies more supportive of this regime independently of government performance and other characteristics. Another possibility considered is that democratic experience mediates the importance of performance assessments in citizens’ judgments about democracy, decreasing the importance of economic performance assessments, while increasing that of political performance assessments. Statistical analyses of public opinion data from 23 countries in the Americas indicate that the effect of democratic experience on support for democracy is not statistically significant. Rather, democratic experience conditions the effects of performance assessments on support for democracy. The evidence also supports the assertion that experience with democracy, and not economic development, is what conditions the effects of performance assessments on support for democracy.     

Opportunities and constraints: comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the coloured revolutions

Nearly two years after removal of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia and Egypt are still in transition: gains made by early 2013 remain tenuous, and whether democracy takes root remains to be seen. This article identifies variables affecting these states' prospects for democratic development by drawing lessons from the post-communist coloured revolutions of the early 2000s, when democratic forces had difficulty consolidating initial gains. Based on these cases, we suggest that choices available to political actors, in particular the ability of democratic opposition forces to maintain unity and support a common transition platform, and their success in removing old regime elites, will be crucial in the post-Arab Spring environment. However, we also examine structural variables, including the nature of the ousted authoritarian regime and external leverage, which point to differences between the coloured revolutions and MENA uprisings and suggest limits to cross-regional comparison.     

Regime Change and Foreign Policy: Portugal,Indonesia and the Self-determination of East Timor

This article argues that the nature of interim governments is not a satisfactory explanation of foreign policy initiatives, or their absence, during particular types of transition to democracy. The proposal is rejected for two main reasons. On the one hand, both the Portuguese (1974-76) and Indonesian (1998-99) transitions to democracy provide evidence that contradicts the proposal. On the other hand, the proposition does not explain which foreign policy decisions are taken and the reasons why. This article argues that we should focus instead on the new individual and corporate evaluations and strategies that come about inside a country as a result of new elite alignments, following the installation of a democratic regime, which opens a window of opportunity for making foreign policy changes. Moreover, the perceptions of the international community also influence the decision-making of individual and corporate interests and their strategies. Where the preceding authoritarian regime pursued foreign policies that the international community regarded as illegitimate, then there will be incentives to change policy. This approach sheds more light on the case studies involving Portugal, Indonesia and East Timor, by identifying correctly the foreign policy initiatives that were taken during the regime transitions to democracy and by explaining the underlying reasons.