Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan

Over the last 20 years, Taiwan has witnessed an impressive transition from authoritarian one-party rule to liberal democracy. This included considerable changes in the relations between the civilian political elites and the armed forces. While under the emergency laws of the authoritarian regime the military had been a powerful political force, during democratization the elected civilians have managed to curb military political power and have successively widened their influence over former exclusively military prerogatives. This article argues that the development of Taiwan's civil–military relations can be explained as the result of civilians using increasingly robust strategies to enhance their influence over the military. This was made possible by a highly beneficial combination of historical conditions and factors inside and outside the military that strengthened the political power of the civilian elites and weakened the military's bargaining power. The article finds that even though partisan exploitation of civilian control instruments could potentially arouse civil–military conflict in the future, civil–military relations in general will most likely remain supportive of the further consolidation of Taiwan's democracy.     

Conclusion: agency,context and emergent post-uprising regimes

This conclusion summarizes the evidence explaining the divergent trajectories taken by post Arab uprising states in terms of multiple variables, each illustrated by an iconic case, namely: State Failure and Competitive governance (Syria), Regime Restoration and Hybrid Governance (Egypt) and Polyarchic Governance (Tunisia). Factors include the starting point: levels of opposition mobilization and regimes' resilience – a function of their patrimonial-bureaucratic balance; whether or not a transition coalition forms is crucial for democratization prospects. Context also matters for democratization, particularly political economic factors, such as a balance of class power and a productive economy; political culture (level of societal identity cleavages) and a minimum of international intervention. Finally, the balance of agency between democracy movements, Islamists, the military and workers shapes democratization prospects.     

The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes

Coup-proofing pertains to political leaders’ strategies that will prevent groups inside or outside the state apparatus from seizing power via a coup d’état. One particular form of these strategies divides a country’s military into rivaling organizations, thereby creating an artificial balance between and structural obstacles for the armed forces. Despite the general claim that this institutional coup-proofing is indeed effective, a recent empirical study does not obtain evidence for a negative impact on the risk of coup attempts or coup outcomes. The authors take this finding as a motivation for their re-evaluation of the effect of institutional coup-proofing on coup risk and outcomes. By developing an argument that rests on the concepts of collective action and polarization, it is contended that institutional coup-proofing and coups are characterized by a U-shaped relationship: Institutional coup-proofing is likely to lower the likelihood of coup onsets and successful outcomes, yet only until a tipping point of about two equally strong military organizations. After this turning point, the risk of coup onset as well as coup success may increase again. Using time-series cross-section data for 1975–1999, the authors find strong and robust support for their claims in terms of coup onset, but not coup outcomes.     

Pathways to democratization in personalist dictatorships

Personalist dictatorships make up an increasingly large proportion of the world's dictatorships. Moreover, they tend to be particularly resistant to democratization. Understanding the conditions that increase the likelihood of democratic transitions in personalist contexts, therefore, is critical for the study and practice of democratization in the contemporary era. This study argues that political party creation is a key factor. Though personalist dictators typically create parties to offset immediate threats to their power posed by the elite – and particularly the military – doing so encourages peaceful mass mobilization and a realignment of elite networks. These dynamics, in turn, enhance prospects of democratization. Using cross-national empirical tests that address the potential endogeneity of this relationship, we find support for the argument that personalist dictators who create their own political party are more likely to democratize than those who ally with a pre-existing party or rule without one.     

Notes on contributors

The process whereby queen Athaliah was deposed and replaced as monarch of Judah by the boy‐king Joash in the seventh century bce warrants analysis as a typical ‘coup d'etat’. The purpose of the present article is to interpret the relevant biblical narratives (II Kings II and 11 Chron. 23) in terms relevant to that political concept. Specifically, it posits that the organization and implementation of this highly successful coup can be illuminated by reference to modern political science literature on regime change. Thus read, the biblical records of the episode constitute a detailed ‘how to’ manual of political action.     

Defending democracy with international law: preventing coup attempts with democracy clauses

In recent decades many regional inter-governmental organizations have adopted agreements committing all member states to maintain democratic governments, and specifying punishments to be levied against member states that revert to authoritarianism. These treaties have a surprisingly high enforcement rate – nearly all states subject to them that have experienced governmental succession by coup have been suspended by the relevant IGO(s). However, relatively little is known about whether these treaties are deterring coups. This article offers an original theory of how these international agreements could deter coups d’état, focusing on the way that a predictably adverse international reaction complicates the incentives of potential coup participants. An analysis of the likelihood of coups for the period of 1991–2008 shows that states subject to democracy were on average less likely to experience coups, but that this finding was not statistically significant in most models. However, when restricting the analysis to democracies, middle-income states with democracy clauses were significantly less likely to experience coup attempts. Moreover, the African democracy regime appears to be particularly effective, significantly reducing the likelihood of coup attempts for middle-income states regardless of regime type.     

Authoritarian Regimes and Pro-Democracy Semi-Oppositions: The End of the Portuguese Dictatorship (1968–1974) in Comparative Perspective

This article discusses the conditions of failure and success of pro-democracy semi-oppositions to authoritarian regimes through a comparative study of the last phase of the Portuguese authoritarian regime (1968–1974). It specifies and reformulates Juan Linz's concept of semi-opposition. In Portugal, contrary to Linz's argument, the moderate pro-democracy semi-oppositions participated in the regime's electoral moments and tended to take the greatest possible advantage of these periods so as to discredit the regime and to demonstrate that it could not be transformed from within. In order to make sense of this paradox, scholars should look at the institutional legacies and frameworks of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, we argue that the Portuguese semi-opposition failed because the institutional heritage of the Estado Novo, at the moment of the leadership succession, provided no opportunities for a reformist democratizing coalition to assert itself and promoted instead the radicalization of the semi-opposition. Paradoxically, it was the more liberal institutional framework of the regime that made a political change guided by the democratic semi-opposition impracticable.     

The role of actors and institutions: The difficulties of democratic survival in Mali and Niger

Mali and Niger, two neighbouring countries in Francophone West Africa, offer a good opportunity for identifying key factors favouring the survival of a young democracy. While democracy has so far survived, just about, in Mali, it ended in Niger with a coup d'état in January 1996. Given comparable levels of poor economic development and similar troubled modern political histories, economic and societal preconditions do not provide clues to the different experiences of the two countries. Instead, the answer must be sought in the institutional choices made and in the interaction between key players during the democratic transition. An electoral system with proportional representation resulted in political instability in Niger, while a majoritarian system ensured a stable political majority in Mali. Political crisis in Niamey provided an opportunity for the army to retake power. While the military had been alienated from the Nigerien national conference, it had participated actively in and supervised the Malian conference. Mali and Niger provide tentative lessons for other ‘late democratizers’.     

军事政变和独裁交替下的泰国民主化道路——泰国民主化的特征与未来

比其他亚洲国家起步早的泰国民主化道路走得并不平坦,军事政变和政治独裁的交替似乎成为了近70多年来泰国政治的主线。这种奇特的政治现象和泰国的政治文化、宗教意识、教育水平、社会结构等因素密切联系在一起。最初由精英发起的泰国民主化运动,如果得不到整个国民的回应,没有获得成熟市民社会的支持,真正的民主主义也就不可能在泰国扎根。     

Democratization without a State: Democratic Regime-building in Kosovo

This article examines the relationship between democratization and the state with reference to recent political developments in the non-state entity of Kosovo. Existing analyses of the role of the state in democratic transitions provide critical insights into the politics of democratization, but have suffered from a lack of consensus regarding the concept of the state itself. This study distinguishes three separate dimensions of statehood – recognition, capacity and cohesion – and argues that each has separate implications for transition politics. Analysis of democratic political development in Kosovo suggests two conclusions: first, that international recognition of statehood should not be viewed as a prerequisite for democratization, and second, that problems of state capacity or state cohesion present far more fundamental challenges to successful democratic regime change.     

Indonesia's ‘democratic transition’ revisited: a clientelist model of political transition

This article presents an alternative theoretical framework to account for the political transition in Indonesia in 1998. Challenging the mainstream literature, which focuses on the presumed significance of civil society, the article claims that so-called democratization in Indonesia offered a mechanism through which to reorganize the distribution of patronage within the state. The transition was caused not by assertive civil society but Suharto's excessive centralization of patronage networks, which had the effect of alienating a significant proportion of the regime elite. Against this backdrop, democratization facilitated a decentralization of previously centralized patronage networks and a redistribution of spoils within the state towards elites that had been excluded from Suharto's inner circle.     

Political Liberalization in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Façade Democracy

In considering political liberalization in post-Bourguiba Tunisia since 1987, it is hard to argue the case for the reforms initiated by his successor, President Bin Ali, without noticing their limitations and even contradictions. In a world characterized by increasing democratization, the Tunisian example seems to buck the global trend, despite several noteworthy achievements - periodic elections, licensed political parties, sustained economic growth and stability. To a considerable extent the analysis of Bin Ali's 'façade democracy' here confirms this assessment, owing especially to the exclusionary and corporatist character of the democracy. Bin Ali's much hailed 'era of change' may well be not much different from the regime of his predecessor. Like Bourguiba, Bin Ali continues to exclude Islamists and other potentially formidable opposition from more secular forces from political participation and contestation. Similarly, the start of a presidential campaign by the ruling party to amend the constitution, in 2001, to enable Bin Ali to remain president beyond his constitutionally mandated second and last term which ends in 2004, gives a strong sense of déjà vu: Bourguiba's presidency-for-life.     

The Emerging Threat? South Africa's Extreme Right

In the run-up to South Africa's first non-racial election in 1994, extremist right-wing organizations, and their sympathizers in the state security forces, posed a real danger to the country's future democratic order. After 1994, violent, right-wing extremist activities virtually dissipated. However, during a single night in late 2002, eight bomb blasts rocked Soweto, South Africa's largest black township. An unknown organization, Boeremag (Boer force/power), claimed responsibility for the bombings. Some two dozen alleged Boeremag members, including serving military officers, were subsequently arrested and charged with terrorism-related offenses. The Boeremag makes an interesting case study of how the extreme white right in South Africa mixes politics and religion, and seeks to exploit popular grievances to garner support for the creation of a secessionist Afrikaner state. The South African white right does not have the resources, capacity, or support to successfully execute a coup d'état. The Boeremag serves as a reminder, however, that the extreme right can create instability and destruction on a significant scale in South Africa.     

Incomplete Democratization and the Outbreak of Military Disputes

Whereas most research on the democratic peace has focused on relations within pairs of states, research on the relationship between democratization and armed conflict has centered primarily on the behavior of individual states. Moreover, the existing literature has placed primary emphasis on explaining the effects of democratization on war, rather than military disputes more generally. In this article, we find that certain types of democratic transitions markedly increase the risk of such disputes within dyads, even when economic and political relations between states are taken into account. Particularly prone to violence are dyads in which either state undergoes an incomplete democratic transition; that is, a shift from an autocratic to a partially democratic (or anocratic) regime that stalls prior to the establishment of consolidated democratic institutions.     

Considerations on inequality and politics in Thailand

In Thailand, economic inequality has long been a fact of life. It is a “general inequality of condition” that can be seen to influence all aspects of social, economic, and political life. Yet inequality has not always been associated with political activism. Following the 2006 military coup, however, there has been a deliberate and politicized linking of inequality and politics. The article explores a complex of political events – elections, coup, constitution, and the political ascent of Thaksin Shinawatra – that has given rise to a relatively recent politicization of economic and political inequalities, now invoked in street politics – a rhetoric developed amongst pro-Thaksin red shirts that challenged the status quo and generates conflict over the nature of electoral democracy.     

Does substantive democratization create more committed democrats? Surprising evidence from Africa

A growing body of evidence holds that citizens support democracy when they believe the regime has provided individual freedoms and political rights. Put simply, citizens develop legitimacy attitudes by learning about democracy. These findings, however, are based on citizens' evaluations of the procedural elements of democracy. Democratization also entails substantive reforms that likely impact legitimacy attitudes. This article provides the first test of how the success – and failure – of substantive democratization shapes legitimacy attitudes. Using data from the second round of Afrobarometer surveys, I find surprising results. Citizens who judge the regime to be more successful in substantive democratization are actually less likely to be committed democrats. I conclude with possible explanations of these surprising findings and reflect on the challenges for both future research and for the new democracies facing this situation.     

Evaluating Democratic Progress Inside Russia: The Komi Republic and the Republic of Bashkortostan

This article compares and contrasts the political transitions in the two Russian Republics of Komi and Bashkortostan. It is argued that these republics are among many in Russia's weak federation whose behaviour is akin to nation-states. Two critical junctures occurring in the early 1990s profoundly affected the transition paths. Democratic transitions of the political regime had been completed in both republics by early 1995. Since then both have completed regime consolidation but not resulting in democracy. Political elites have cloaked their true intentions by seeming to want to participate in the 'spirit of the times', namely democratization in post-communist Europe, while in fact promoting undemocratic practices and only superficial accountability. The arrival of President Putin at the centre may prove to be a third critical juncture that jolts the regimes in the two republics into a period of uncertainty and a new transition.     

The economic transition in Central Asia: Implications for democracy

Ten years have now passed since the August coup of 1991 heralded the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whilst many of these states have successfully navigated themselves through the processes of democratic transition and consolidation, others have not. Although each of the states within the Central Asia region have held elections so that we can speak of some sort of formal democracy having been established, substantive democracy within these states is either absent or falls short of the mark. This article identifies the obstacles to democratic transition and consolidation arising from current economic circumstances and the leaders' appraisal of the political costs of further democratization.     

Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova's difficult quest for democracy

This article examines the state of and perspectives on democracy in the Republic of Moldova. The fall of its communist authoritarian regime in 2009 – sometimes compared to a colour revolution – went against the trend toward heavy authoritarianism now visible in the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, the regime change in Moldova does not necessarily imply a process of genuine democratic consolidation. This article argues that the future course of the Moldovan polity will be decided by structural domestic and geopolitical factors different from those that produced the regime change. Most of these structural factors do not favour democratization. Moldova's only chance to secure a genuinely democratic trajectory may therefore be dependent on its relationship with the European Union (EU). The article argues that nothing short of a process of accession to the EU can modify factors that are likely to prevent democratic consolidation. In its absence, the article contends that Moldova will either develop a Ukrainian-style hybrid regime or return to its authoritarian past.     

Online clustering,fear and uncertainty in Egypt’s transition

Does the uncertainty associated with post-authoritarian transitions cause political and social polarization? Does ubiquitous social media exacerbate these problems and thus make successful democratic transitions less likely? This article examines these questions in the case of Egypt between the 11 February 2011 fall of President Hosni Mubarak and the 3 July 2013 military coup, which overthrew President Mohamed el-Morsi. The analysis is based on a Twitter dataset including 62 million tweets by 7 million unique users. Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, we demonstrate how clusters of users form and evolve over time, the density of interactions between them, and the flow of particular types of information through the clustered network structure. We show that the Egyptian Twitter public developed into increasingly isolated clusters of the like-minded which shared information unevenly. We argue that the growing distance between these clusters encouraged political conflict and facilitated the spread of fear and hatred, which ultimately undermined the democratic transition and won popular support for the military coup.