Explaining high external efficacy in authoritarian countries: a comparison of China and Taiwan

We examine the puzzling phenomenon that authoritarian governments are perceived to be more responsive than democratic governments. By comparing China and Taiwan by both large-N statistical analyses and in-depth case studies, we show that the answer lies in the differences between democratic and authoritarian institutions. First, failing to elect one’s preferred candidate in democracies predisposes voters to critical assessment of government responsiveness. There is no such predisposition in authoritarian countries where elections are nonexistent or nominal. Second, elections incentivize democratic leaders to over-respond to certain groups. There is no such mechanism in authoritarian countries. Third, the solid and clear legitimacy established by electoral victories shield democratic leaders from particularistic demands made through unconventional channels. Without such legitimacy, authoritarian leaders are compelled to cement legitimacy by increasing responsiveness.     

Elite defection and grassroots democracy under competitive authoritarianism: evidence from Burkina Faso

One determinant of the success or failure of political revolutions is whether there is a split among the ruling elites. Elite defections in a competitive authoritarian regime can tip the balance in favour of regime change and democratization. This article examines when and why elites defect through the case of Burkina Faso. In October 2014, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso was forced to step down after 27 years in power and multiple term limits contraventions. We propose a new theory linking growth in democratic attitudes at the grassroots to elite defection from hegemonic parties. We argue that a broad increase in popular democratic attitudes can both decrease the costs and increase the benefits of elite defection, creating conditions that enable elites to rescind their loyalty to the regime. We support this argument with interviews with ruling-party defectors in Burkina Faso and two rounds of Afrobarometer survey data. Our findings demonstrate that democratic attitudes can grow under competitive authoritarian regimes, and that these citizen attitudes can impact regime change by increasing the likelihood of elite defection.     

Demand for democracy in resilient authoritarianism: evidence from rural China

This article investigates the sources of public demand for democratic institutions under authoritarian rule. While a growing body of literature recognizes that in authoritarian polities such as China, economic development does not lead to democratization in a linear fashion, our understanding of the sources of democratization in resilient authoritarianism remains limited. This article provides an empirical test of the three most compelling theories to subsequently emerge: modernization theory, social capital theory, and institutional theory. The results of a survey conducted in the countryside of Zhejiang and Sichuan provinces provide support for the institutional approach in understanding public demand for democracy in rural China, while the modernization theory and social capital theory are shown to be less useful. Specifically, results show that people working in the government system are core supporters of the regime, whereas income, education attainment, social trust, and one’s satisfaction with regime institutions turn out to be irrelevant and do not serve as direct sources of public demand for democracy. These results extend our understanding of the complex interaction between an authoritarian regime and its people, shedding new light on the democratic prospects for resilient authoritarianism.     

Fighting for the rule of law: civil resistance and the lawyers' movement in Pakistan

Pakistan, sometimes referred to as ‘the most dangerous place on earth’, is not typically thought of as a place where popular nonviolent resistance could take root, much less succeed. Citizen apathy, poor governance, and fear of regime repression and terrorist violence are barriers to effective civic activism inside Pakistan. Yet, over the past two years, Pakistan's authoritarian ruler was ousted and its independent judiciary restored following a massive grassroots campaign led by lawyers. The ‘men in black’, whose insistence on the rule of law and embrace of nonviolent struggle captured the hearts and minds of millions of Pakistanis, helped transform the country's political landscape in unexpected ways. The successes tallied by this nonviolent movement, this article will argue, can be attributed to the large-scale non-cooperation and civil disobedience that pressured two successive Pakistani regimes – one authoritarian and one democratic – to yield to its demands. Unity and mass participation, nonviolent discipline, and the creative use of nonviolent tactics were three key ingredients of success. While instability and Islamist extremism continue to plague Pakistan, the lawyers' movement highlights the steadily growing strength of Pakistani civil society have a potential to influence democratic change in the country.     

Parties,Party Systems and Democracy in the European Union

Since the late 1980s, research on political Islam has been much in vogue in Europe and the US. This phenomenon is typically viewed as an expression of religion rather than of politics. Precisely because of the assumed “religious” underpinnings of political Islam, most Western attempts to engage with Islamists often remain trapped in an attempt to test their “democratic credentials”. By focussing on what Islamists think about democracy, many studies have ignored the political, social and economic contexts in which Islamists operate. Accounting for the political underpinning of Islamist movements can both help understand their political evolution and open up fruitful avenues for comparative analysis. For this reason, attention is turned to Europe to seek best practices of external engagement with domestic opposition movements in authoritarian contexts, such as Western engagement with opposition actors in Franco's Spain, Kuchma's Ukraine and Shevardnadze's Georgia.     

Military extrication and temporary democracy: the case of Pakistan

Pakistan's 1988 transition to democracy defies most of the conventional wisdom on democratization as well as the bulk of the literature on democratic transitions. This peculiar case can be understood as a case of ‘temporary democracy’, in which democracy emerges as a short-term outcome that is not likely to be sustained. Pakistan's military leaders chose to democratize because of the high short-term costs of repression coupled with the low long-term costs of allowing democracy. The authoritarian elite agreed to allow democratization knowing that the prospects of democratic consolidation were dim. In this sense, the same factors that made the consolidation of Pakistan's democracy unlikely made the transition possible.     

From contention to social bargaining: labour unions and democratic consolidation in Spain

The main objective of this article is to examine how the links between trade unions and affiliated political parties of the left influenced the strategies of labour during the transition and the early years of democracy in Spain. It argues that political partisanship is a key factor for understanding the unions' strategies. After a period of intense labour conflict during the transition to democracy, labour mobilization decreased and Spain's unions and other social actors initiated distinctive processes of social bargaining, starting in 1979. The central argument is that the relationship of unions and political parties in the authoritarian and transition periods was a major factor in conditioning strategies in the post-authoritarian period. In the end, the consolidation of Spanish democracy has led to the strengthening of the main trade unions. Contrary to what happened in other historical periods they used this power to contribute to governability and the consolidation of the new democratic regime.     

What a Little Democracy Can Do: Comparing Trajectories of Reform in Malaysia and Indonesia

Economic crisis sparked political mobilization in both Malaysia and Indonesia in the late 1990s, but with very different results. Reformism in competitive electoral authoritarian Malaysia took a largely electoral route, yielding marginal, top-down institutional change and the enhancement of democratic norms. The hegemonic electoral authoritarian regime in neighbouring Indonesia, on the other hand, was toppled by a sudden upsurge of grass-roots protest, encouraged by elite factionalism. Changes to Indonesian political institutions and personnel since then have disappointed many reformers, and mounting cynicism endangers the entrenchment of democratic political culture. The article argues that a relatively more democratic system grants more space for autonomous challengers to organize and mobilize over the long term than a less open system does. Specifically, civil society agents in the former may accumulate both social capital and its organizational-level counterpart, coalitional capital, facilitating mobilization. Such a regime, though, is better able to contain or otherwise defuse protest than is a more autocratic variant. The latter is thus more vulnerable to dramatic collapse, despite its fragmented political opposition, and faces serious hurdles in subsequent democratic consolidation.     

Opportunities and constraints: comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the coloured revolutions

Nearly two years after removal of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, Tunisia and Egypt are still in transition: gains made by early 2013 remain tenuous, and whether democracy takes root remains to be seen. This article identifies variables affecting these states' prospects for democratic development by drawing lessons from the post-communist coloured revolutions of the early 2000s, when democratic forces had difficulty consolidating initial gains. Based on these cases, we suggest that choices available to political actors, in particular the ability of democratic opposition forces to maintain unity and support a common transition platform, and their success in removing old regime elites, will be crucial in the post-Arab Spring environment. However, we also examine structural variables, including the nature of the ousted authoritarian regime and external leverage, which point to differences between the coloured revolutions and MENA uprisings and suggest limits to cross-regional comparison.     

Grassroots Civil Groups: The Potential and Limits of Democratic Change in Argentina's Interior Provinces

While the current crisis in Argentina has many facets--economic, political and social--it originated and has been fuelled by the unfulfilled promise of a democracy in which political leaders are accountable to society. In the 1990s it was widely hoped that the growing number of grassroots civil groups would contribute to democratisation, particularly in the interior provinces where clientelism and patronage have long been thought to hamper local development and the country's progress as a whole. Those hopes faded as social unrest broke out in Argentina's interior provinces in the mid-1990s and the country began its slide towards collapse by the end of the decade. Yet the problem of political change in the interior provinces remains a central issue in Argentina's current crisis, and its future prospects. The ability of civil groups to contribute to democratic change in the interior provinces is constrained in different ways, depending on whether clientelism or patronage prevail in social relationships. Clientelistic and patronage-based societies differently condition the types of grassroots groups that arise, the scope of their activities and their potential for contributing to democratic change. Exploring these differences offers important insights into Argentina's current crisis and the potential and limitations of change in the interior.     

Authoritarian Regimes and Pro-Democracy Semi-Oppositions: The End of the Portuguese Dictatorship (1968–1974) in Comparative Perspective

This article discusses the conditions of failure and success of pro-democracy semi-oppositions to authoritarian regimes through a comparative study of the last phase of the Portuguese authoritarian regime (1968–1974). It specifies and reformulates Juan Linz's concept of semi-opposition. In Portugal, contrary to Linz's argument, the moderate pro-democracy semi-oppositions participated in the regime's electoral moments and tended to take the greatest possible advantage of these periods so as to discredit the regime and to demonstrate that it could not be transformed from within. In order to make sense of this paradox, scholars should look at the institutional legacies and frameworks of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, we argue that the Portuguese semi-opposition failed because the institutional heritage of the Estado Novo, at the moment of the leadership succession, provided no opportunities for a reformist democratizing coalition to assert itself and promoted instead the radicalization of the semi-opposition. Paradoxically, it was the more liberal institutional framework of the regime that made a political change guided by the democratic semi-opposition impracticable.     

External-Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change

This article presents an open model of democratization in the context of discussing some well-known approaches to the role of international factors in democratic transitions. The open model is applied to semi-peripheral states of the international system, more specifically the cases of political change in Spain, Portugal and Turkey in the aftermath of the Second World War. Starting from Dahl's conditions for democratic change, it is argued that the impact of external factors on democratization should be examined closely where the regime expects the internal costs of suppression to be lower than the internal costs of toleration, in other words where the internal balance of forces is unlikely to impel a willingness to democratize. Two new external variables are introduced to open Dahl's closed model: the expected external costs of suppression and toleration. It is shown that, in a democracy-promoting international environment, the leaders of an authoritarian state would base their decisions about whether to democratize on their expectations of both the internal costs of toleration and the external costs of suppression.     

Political leadership and the construction of competitive authoritarian regimes in Latin America: implications and prospects for democracy

Recent developments have raised new concerns regarding the prospects of democracy in Latin America, particularly in what are often defined, although not unanimously, as cases of competitive authoritarianism, including Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. In light of their significance and diffusion on a global level, understanding how these regimes emerge is important, especially when they replace democratic or imperfectly democratic regimes such as in the cases examined in this study. What explains the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes (CARs), particularly when the starting point is democratic or imperfectly democratic? What are the region’s democratic prospects after the emergence of various CARs in the last two decades? Through the comparative analysis of competitive authoritarian attempts in Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, I argue that the same passages and challenges required to transform a democratic regime into a CAR makes incumbents' features and strategies particularly important, especially the ability to weather potentially lethal institutional crises and limit the legitimacy costs associated with competitive authoritarian manipulations. Incumbents have proved more successful in these challenges and hence in their competitive authoritarian attempts when combining charisma and the elaboration of a democratic discourse including the diffusion of new democratic values.     

Explaining incumbent re-election in authoritarian elections: evidence from a Chinese county

Despite the burgeoning comparative literature on authoritarian elections, less is known about the dynamics of competition in authoritarian subnational elections where opposition is not allowed to organize into parties. Local elections without partisan competition in single-party authoritarian regimes provide considerable advantages to the incumbents and may well turn the incumbent advantage common in liberal democracies into incumbent dominance. What economic factors can break incumbent dominance in such competition without parties? With quantitative and qualitative evidence from grassroots elections in China, this article illustrates that economic growth and industrial economic structure offering more economic autonomy help to break incumbent dominance and increase the prospects of successful challenge to incumbency by non-party outsiders. The examination of the findings in a broad context in China and against the backdrop of local democratization in the developing world suggests that though we may observe successful challenge to incumbency, liberalization of the political system requires not only competition, but also a relatively autonomous economy to sustain liberalization prospects. The findings contribute to the literature on electoral authoritarianism, subnational democratization and China’s grassroots elections.     

Structural factors vs. regime change: Moldova's difficult quest for democracy

This article examines the state of and perspectives on democracy in the Republic of Moldova. The fall of its communist authoritarian regime in 2009 – sometimes compared to a colour revolution – went against the trend toward heavy authoritarianism now visible in the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, the regime change in Moldova does not necessarily imply a process of genuine democratic consolidation. This article argues that the future course of the Moldovan polity will be decided by structural domestic and geopolitical factors different from those that produced the regime change. Most of these structural factors do not favour democratization. Moldova's only chance to secure a genuinely democratic trajectory may therefore be dependent on its relationship with the European Union (EU). The article argues that nothing short of a process of accession to the EU can modify factors that are likely to prevent democratic consolidation. In its absence, the article contends that Moldova will either develop a Ukrainian-style hybrid regime or return to its authoritarian past.     

Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive?

Previous research has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. This runs counter to substantive comparative literature on democratization which finds that economic stress is connected with regime collapse and democratic liberalization. To solve this puzzle, we focus on the effects of “democratic sanctions” (those that explicitly aim to promote democracy) which have become the most common type of sanction issued against authoritarian states. We introduce a new data set of imposed sanctions in the period 1990–2010 that clearly separates sanctions according to the explicit goal of the sender. Our cross-sectional time-series analysis demonstrates that although sanctions as a whole do not generally increase the level of democracy, there is in fact a significant correlation between democratic sanctions and increased levels of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. A fundamental mechanism leading to this outcome is the increased instability of authoritarian rule as democratic sanctions are significantly associated with a higher probability of regime and leadership change.     

For Whom the Bell Tolls: Democracy and Development in South Asia

This paper suggests that there are many contrary pulls, some old, and others new, operating on socioeconomic development in the South Asian region. It argues that September 11th, 2001 has been a defining and defiling moment for the region, since the consequences of the terrorist attacks on the US will weaken democracy in the subcontinent. Consequently, the region will lose its historical advantage of not being militarised by outside poles, or interests, and this will undermine democratic mechanisms that facilitate alleviation of poverty and inequality. This paper investigates the disjunction between mainstream and grassroots perceptions of India's poverty, arguing that localised democratic government, attention to the institutional architecture of countries, and enabling participation of the poor and the discriminated offer the only way to deal with economic and social inequality.     

Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift Toward Competitive Authoritarianism

Turkey has always been considered an “illiberal democracy”, or in Freedom House’s terms, a “partly-free” country. In recent years, however, there has been a downward trend toward “competitive authoritarianism”. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favour of incumbents. One of the methods employed by competitive authoritarian leaders is the use of informal mechanisms of repression. This, in turn, requires a dependent and cooperative judiciary. Thus, in Turkey the year 2014 can be described as a period when the governing AKP (Justice and Development Party) made a sustained and systematic effort to establish its control over the judiciary by means of a series of laws of dubious constitutionality.     

Failure of authoritarian learning: explaining Burma/Myanmar’s electoral system

What explains why some authoritarian governments fail to take all the steps they can to preserve their positions of power during democratic transitions? This article examines this question using the example of the leading pro-military party in Myanmar, which lost badly to the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the transitioning elections of 2015. This article argues that a key to understanding how the military failed to perpetuate its power in the electoral sphere resides in its choice of electoral system. In 2010, the military junta chose an electoral system, first-past-the-post, that was distinctly ill-suited to preserve its power. We explore several hypotheses for why this occurred and ultimately conclude that the military and its allies did not understand electoral systems well enough to act strategically and that they overestimated their support relative to the NLD. This failure of authoritarian learning has important implications for understanding authoritarian politics, democratic transitions, and the challenges faced by authoritarian governments seeking to make such transitions.