Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?

The increasingly prosperous, mighty, and assertive China is arguably the most powerful country blocking democracy today. In addition to withholding democratic rights of one-fifth of the world's population, authoritarian China represents an alternative development model that has gained significant traction. China thus constitutes a challenge to democracy promoters. But does Beijing also countervail democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States? After a summary of the party-state's response to democracy promotion at home, we test the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders. We do so by focusing on the most likely cases in China's near-abroad: Myanmar and Hong Kong. Our analysis of Myanmar suggests that Beijing remains focused on securing economic and security interests irrespective of regime type when regime survival at home is not at risk. The case of Hong Kong, on the other hand, allows us to identify the tactics used by Beijing when there is a significant risk of democratic spillover. This case also demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is able to stifle United States and European Union democracy support when it wishes to do so.     

Is democracy the only game in town? Tension between immigrants' democratic desires and authoritarian imprints

This article borrows from the literature on transitional democracies to examine levels of support for democracy and non-democratic alternatives among immigrants travelling from partly and non-democratic countries to Canada. It evaluates how immigrants who grew up under authoritarian rule come to adapt to democracy. The findings indicate that immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries experience tensions in their adaptation to democracy, expressing strong democratic desires but also manifesting what could be interpreted as lasting imprints of their socialization under authoritarian rule. Immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries exhibit strong support for democracy (they almost all believe it is a good form of government, the best one, and understand democracy in broadly similar terms as the rest of the population). Yet, if democracy is the main game in town for the immigrants, it is not the only one; immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries are significantly more likely than people socialized in a democratic political system to support other forms of governments that are non-democratic. The article thus argues for the lasting impact of authoritarianism on people's democratic outlooks despite the presence of strong democratic desires.     

International Socialization in Difficult Environments: The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in Central Asia

This article explores the potential of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to be an agent of socialization in the five Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In drawing on both rationalist and constructivist approaches to international socialization it is argued that the organization's inability to provide tangible material and political incentives as well as Central Asia's indigenous culture and institutions impede successful socialization dynamics. Moreover, the power-oriented elites consider the bulk of the OSCE activities to be a threat to their grasp on power, not only making socialization almost impossible but also making OSCE–Central Asian cooperation increasingly difficult to sustain. Recommendations to increase the OSCE's influence in the region concentrate on a better understanding of the cost-benefit calculation of Central Asian governments as well as a more responsive attitude to traditional institutions in the OSCE's approach toward the region.     

Does China’s middle class prefer (liberal) democracy?

Many surveys show that China’s political regime, under the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rules, enjoys a high level of public support. However, it is still uncertain whether China’s emerging middle class will become the “agent of democratization” as suggested by modernization theory. Using the data of Asian Barometer Survey conducted in China in 2011, this article demonstrates that the relationship between class identity and preference for liberal democracy in China may be inverted U-shaped. The Chinese middle class shows a higher preference to features of liberal democratic regimes than its counterparts of the lower- and upper-class. Members of the Chinese middle class also tend to regard democracy as the best form of government. Thus, the middle class has the potential to initiate democratization in China if the Chinese government fails to keep satisfying the middle class’ quest for economic well-being and protection of property rights.     

Trade and Democracy: A Factor-Based Approach

We study the relationship between trade openness and democracy using a data set with capital-labor ratios, trade flows, and regime type for 142 countries between 1960 and 2007. We are among the first to test a prediction that emerges from the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006): Relative factor endowments determine whether trade promotes democracy or not. The statistical results from two-stage least squares estimation indicate that trade is positively associated with democracy among labor-abundant countries but that trade has a negative effect on democracy in capital-abundant countries. The results are not robust, however, and thus we conclude that the evidence in support of their argument is relatively weak.     

Who supports democracy? Evidence from a survey of Chinese students and scholars in the United States

Does the experience of living in the United States lead Chinese people to believe that China should pursue democracy? Our study produced mixed results, as we found that overseas study resulted in significant attitude changes by various means. Education in social sciences and consumption of foreign media were both associated with supportive attitudes toward democracy, and also led respondents to believe that Western liberal democracy is a good thing and to push for it. Conversely, living overseas had a negative effect on respondents’ support for Chinese democratization, as the longer they had lived in the United States, the better they understood Western democracy and were suspicious about whether China should pursue immediate democratization. Meanwhile, we also find Chinese media has a negative impact on public support for democracy, both instrumental and intrinsic. Finally, factors associated with attitudes toward democracy, such as traditional values, self-expression values, and perceived performance of the Chinese government, were also significant.     

东南亚华商在香港的经济活动分析

香港一直是东南亚华商投资与从事商贸活动的中心,也是东南亚与中国大陆进行经贸联系的中介,1980年代以来,香港更成为东南亚华人企业投资中国的桥梁。二战后,东南亚华商在香港的投资额越来越大,东南亚华人资本已成为香港经济的重要组成部分。尽管东南亚金融危机对东南亚华商在港企业造成了大冲击,但是大多数华人在港企业还是克服困难,度过了难关。     

Why do some Arab citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their country?

Why do some Arab citizens regard democracy favourably but see it as unsuitable for their country? Modernization theory contends that economic development creates modern citizens who demand democracy. Cultural theories see Islam and democracy as incompatible. Government performance theories argue that citizens who perceive the current authoritarian government as acting in a transparent manner will demand greater democracy. I argue that attitudes toward democracy are shaped by beliefs about its political, economic, and religious consequences, including those related to sectarianism. I test this consequence-based theory using Arab Barometer data from six nations. Sixty percent hold favourable views of democracy generally and for their country, while 7% reject democracy. Twenty-seven percent support democracy generally but see it as unsuitable for their country. Beliefs that democracy will have negative consequences and perceptions of poor government performance are the most important predictors of democracy's unsuitability. Modernization theory receives support, but Islamic identity and beliefs do not consistently predict attitudes in the expected direction. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of Arab public opinion and suggest that concerns about the consequences of free elections affect support for democracy as much as assessments of the political and economic performance of the current authoritarian regime.     

Does economic inequality breed political inequality?

Does economic inequality generate political inequality? While there is a large literature on the effect of inequality on regime change and support for democracy, there is little research on its effect on political equality across socioeconomic positions. Yet democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts. While political power tends to be more evenly distributed in democracies than in autocracies, there is substantial variation in both regime types. This study argues that economic inequality should decrease political equality through multiple mechanisms: (1) it increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor; (2) it widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups; (3) it reduces participation; and (4) it depresses support for democracy. Using three measures of inequality and data on more than 140 countries between 1961 and 2008, it was found that economic inequality tends to increase political inequality, even when one controls for the level of democracy. Results hold when the sample is restricted by regime type. Finally, evidence in favour of the mechanisms is provided.     

迪拜与香港现代化比较

迪拜与香港均是世界著名的贸易、金融、旅游和物流中心,二者在战略地理位置、近现代史和发展现代化的历程等层面有很多相似之处。迪拜和香港的现代化进程都受到英国殖民统治的影响;凭借优越的地理位置,它们都从一个小渔村发展成世界著名的港口;移民为它们的经济建设做出了巨大贡献;转口贸易都曾是其经济结构中最重要的构成部分;目前服务业都是其经济构成中占比最高的部门。在发展现代化的道路上,二者都有值得相互借鉴的经验和教训。