Elitist democracy and China's democratization: A gradualist approach towards democratic transition by a group of Chinese intellectuals

This article examines how a group of Chinese intellectuals experimented with the western concept of elitist democracy in a Chinese context in the late 1980s. Drawing insights from western theories on political development and political culture, they argued that China's lack of a civic culture meant an elitist democracy would be an historically necessary and inevitable stage during the process of democratization. To implement elitist democracy in China, the existing political institutions should be made more open to experts, technocrats and intellectuals. This political proposal was advanced, involuntarily, during the Tiananmen Movement of Spring 1989, but eventually suffered a great setback. Nevertheless, the article maintains that elitist democracy remains relevant to China's democratization in the future.     

The Construction of the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area: A Study of China's Active Involvement

The central argument of this paper is that China's economic diplomacy not only improves its political relations with ASEAN countries but also promotes regional economic co-operation and integration. This paper is organised into two parts. The first part starts with a review of Chinese foreign policy changes in order to show how Beijing adjusted its foreign policy to pursue its economic and political interests. It also examines China's political and institutional efforts to forge the coming Free Trade Area (FTA) with ASEAN. The second part studies China–ASEAN trade relations from three aspects: the adjustment of Chinese industrial structure, foreign direct investment to both sides and the formation of a production network with China at the centre. While difficulties and problems are unavoidable in the construction of CAFTA, with China's active efforts and the enhanced co-operation between China and ASEAN, the building of CAFTA is moving towards fulfilment.     

An Elemental Definition of Democracy and its Advantages for Comparing Political Regime Types

The way democracy is studied today is confusing due to the many definitions applied. More importantly, it is also flawed in that several cases are excluded as they suffer from the unfortunate circumstances that they have undergone a particular sequence of democratic developments according to a pattern not recognized. This article attempts to spark a debate that will hopefully lead to a new definition of democracy – one that is neutral in its view of the different elements of democracy, can be applied to regimes across the globe, and which also facilitates comparative studies of all kinds. To begin the debate, the article examines previous definitions – and particularly the use of diminished subtypes – before putting forward an alternative: the so-called ‘elemental definition’.     

美欧强化外资安全审查及其影响（英文）

The tightening of US and EU foreign investment security review provides a legal cover for protectionist policies and a shield from so-called "threat" of Chinese investments. China urgently needs to take effective measures to address its shortterm impacts and long-term influence, while protecting the legitimate rights and interests of investors in the process of further opening up.     

Troubled Waters: China's Claims and the South China Sea

Among China's unresolved frontier questions, the South China Sea has become the most complex and troubled, and arguably the most significant and disconcerting. The economic and security stakes are high and the stake-holding states numerous and diverse. The claims that China (and others) make about the region reflect such interests but they are, ultimately, legal claims. Beijing's assertions of rights to the disputed areas have rested on three conceptually distinct grounds. Each presents a different mix of challenge and accommodation to international legal norms and the interests of other states, including China's neighbors, near-neighbors and the United States.while China's behavior (as well as that of other interested states) has been more and less assertive at various times, China's three basic arguments claiming rights to the region have been comparatively stable. Both China's pattern of multiple legal arguments and fluctuating actions and rhetoric do little to resolve the debate over whether a rising China will be deeply disruptive of the regional and international order or whether it can—with sufficient skill and tolerable adjustments—be accommodated and integrated. Although China's stance on rights in the South China Sea may be partly the accidental product of conflicting agendas and shifting assessments, Beijing's embrace of three distinct lines of legal argument arguably constitutes a strategy that serves China's interests given the factual, legal and strategic environment that China faces.     

China's Energy Policy: from Self-sufficiency to Energy Efficiency

China's energy policy is traditionally based on self-sufficiency. While energy bottlenecks have often been cited as a limitation to China's economic growth, China has been successful at producing energy using its domestic coal – albeit putting a strain on transport and producing a high degree of pollution. Aggressively after 2001, China has started to search for external resources, both to supply its voracious appetite for oil and to insure its economy against possible geopolitical disruptions – including the threat of sanctions. This has given Chinese companies a life of their own, making them large international actors. Today, China is both saddled with new responsibilities for the developing countries in which it owns sizeable exploitation rights, and influenced by a new thinking on energy security, based on the idea of improving energy efficiency before developing resources. This offers opportunities for the West – and Japan – in cooperating with China, a huge energy importer, to lessen the dominance of producers, create business opportunities for energy efficiency equipment, and also to cap CO₂ and other emissions.     

Chinese Military Power: What Vexes the United States and Why?

The enhancement of Chinese military power over the past decade is generating ample debate over its meaning and consequences for American security interests. China's characterization in larger conceptions of U.S. national security strategy has experienced repeated shifts over the decades. China is now an arrived major power according to virtually all relevant power criteria, without U.S. policy makers conclusively resolving the implications of China's military modernization for American security interests. Comparable uncertainties bedevil Chinese thinking about American military power. The latent elements of strategic rivalry (if not outright confrontation) are beyond dispute, and could readily take deeper root in the bureaucratic processes of both countries. Without leaders in both systems fully imparting and communicating to one another their respective strategic equities in Asia and the Pacific, the emergence of a reconfigured regional security order fully accepted by both states remains very uncertain.     

Competing perspectives on democracy and democratization: assessing alternative models of democracy promoted in Central Asian states

This study examines alternative understandings of democracy and democracy promotion advanced by the US, EU, Russia and China in Central Asia using frame analysis. In the context of this study, ‘frames’ refer to the relatively cohesive sets of beliefs, categories and value judgements as well as specific ways in which these ideas are packaged for the targets of international democratization. The study assesses the implications of alternative representations of democracy promotion and competing models of governance for the prospects of democratization in Central Asia. It concludes that the substance of US and EU democracy promotion in Central Asia has neglected the cultural and political contexts of these states, while the Russian and Chinese models of governance and development have provided a better match to the interests of the ruling elites.     

Renegotiating ‘law and order’ : judicial reform and citizen responses in post-war Guatemala

This study examines reforms aimed at strengthening the rule of law in Guatemala implemented since the signing of the peace accords in December 1996. Despite nearly US$200 million in foreign aid to the justice sector, impunity remains the rule, the judicial process is subverted by military and criminal networks, citizen confidence in the judicial system remains low and recourse to non-judicial measures – the ‘privatisation of justice’- is on the increase. It is argued that the institutionally-focused approach to rule of law reform currently predominating in donor thinking ignores the historical context within which understandings of ‘law’, ‘justice’ and ‘rights’ are shaped. Institutions do matter, but only by understanding the role of law in long-run processes of state formation and the dynamic, inter-subjective nature of legal interactions can we begin to understand the specificities of socio-legal change.     

海权问题与中美关系述论

从近代到冷战时期,海权问题一直是重大战略问题。长期以来,我国在反对美国海洋霸权、维护我国海洋安全进行了不懈的斗争。冷战后,美国的太平洋海权战略安排具有遏制中国作为潜在对手挑战美国太平洋霸权的图谋,并集中体现在美日军事同盟、台湾问题、南海问题等具体领域对中国的海洋主权和海洋权益形成沉重的压力与挑战,对此中国应该引起高度重视。     

US democracy promotion: The Clinton and Bush administrations

Democracy promotion has been an element of US foreign policy for over five decades. On the assumption that democracy promotion abroad is more a Democratic than Republican issue, one could hypothesise that a recent President like Bill Clinton was more likely to champion democracy promotion than a Republican President like George W. Bush. We suggest in this article, however, that the Clinton and Bush records on this matter thus far are more similar than one might expect. Moreover, we argue that structural or enduring features of international relations and American politics make the US contribution to enlarging the democratic community quite modest most of the time. The consistent elevation of economic and military/security concerns over democratic progress has had a negative effect. We conclude by offering a few brief suggestions for promoting democracy abroad with a focus on long-term effects.     

No ‘return to the state’: dependency and developmentalism against neo-liberalism

In the emerging ‘post-Washington Consensus’ era, neo-liberalism is searching for alternatives that once again emphasise the state. Yet neither Latin American dependencia nor East Asian developmentalism – two development models actually practised ‘on the ground’ – shares the basic assumptions of the liberal, rationalist state. First, there persists a significant ontological divide over the purpose of the state. Developmentalists and dependentists advocate deep, dynamic state agency rather than the hands-off, liberal, ‘night-watchman’ state. Second, development theory has unfolded within a modern liberal framework of science, democracy, the interests of US foreign policy, and increasingly a commitment to poverty alleviation. Dependency and developmentalism reject these neo-liberal benchmarks in the interests of state consolidation and autonomy. The persistence of dependentist and developmentalist understandings of the state precludes a uniform, post-neoliberal reversal in development theory back to the state.     

Democracy promotion and China: blocker or bystander?

The increasingly prosperous, mighty, and assertive China is arguably the most powerful country blocking democracy today. In addition to withholding democratic rights of one-fifth of the world's population, authoritarian China represents an alternative development model that has gained significant traction. China thus constitutes a challenge to democracy promoters. But does Beijing also countervail democracy promotion by the European Union and the United States? After a summary of the party-state's response to democracy promotion at home, we test the hypothesis that geostrategic interests or a perceived risk of regime survival will lead the People's Republic to countervail democracy promotion outside its own borders. We do so by focusing on the most likely cases in China's near-abroad: Myanmar and Hong Kong. Our analysis of Myanmar suggests that Beijing remains focused on securing economic and security interests irrespective of regime type when regime survival at home is not at risk. The case of Hong Kong, on the other hand, allows us to identify the tactics used by Beijing when there is a significant risk of democratic spillover. This case also demonstrates that the People's Republic of China is able to stifle United States and European Union democracy support when it wishes to do so.     

The “Japan Card” in the United States Rapprochement with China, 1969–1972

United States rapprochement with China should be re-examined by taking into consideration the American negotiating approach towards Beijing regarding the role of Japan, the United States' major Asian ally and China's long-term rival in East Asia. Whilst announcing the Nixon Doctrine, which increased pressure on Japan to strengthen its defense and regional responsibilities, Nixon and Kissinger used the so-called “Japan Card,” Japan's possible military resurgence and China's long-term fear of it, as a tacit negotiating tool to justify to Chinese leaders the continued United States military presence in East Asia. This article examines the impact of the United States rapprochement with China on the American negotiating process with Chinese leaders for the continuation of the United States–Japan Security Treaty and to what extent it changed China's policy toward American relations with Japan.     

朝鲜北学派的新华夷观解析

中国传统的"华夷观"长期影响着朝鲜半岛,朝鲜各朝代的封建统治者也以"小中华"自居。"尊华攘夷"、"慕华贱夷"是朝鲜人传统的文化观念,这一文化观念严重影响了民族意识和民族文化的健康发展。自进入清代以来,朝鲜人自以为所谓华夷秩序大乱,华夏文明之真传移到了朝鲜,并因此而深感自豪;同时,自感传续华夏文明之真传的责任重大,虔诚地维护传统文化,唯恐有丝毫的亵渎。尽管当时由于地理大发现、西势东渐,人类文明格局发生了巨大变化,但朝鲜卫道士们一直将中华以外的文明视为"夷狄"之货,采取不屑一顾的态度。在如此僵化愚腐的意识氛围中,北学派的先驱洪大容率先提出了"华夷一也"的新观念,实现从"慕华贱夷"、"尊华攘夷"到"华夷一也"思想的飞跃。在东亚率先打破传统的"华夷观"是朝鲜北学派的一大特点,在朝鲜唤起了民族主体意识,为朝鲜学习世界先进文化,吸收新的世界文明做了理论准备。     

Concepts of dialogue as counterterrorism: narrating the self-reform of the Muslim Other

Since 9/11, the terrorist is often awarded the position of the radical Other: the personified existential threat to the West. The counterterrorism strategy presented by the Danish government describes itself as covering a ‘broad spectrum’ of efforts. It includes an ‘active foreign policy’ in relation to the Muslim world and an ‘active integration policy’ in relation to Muslim migrants. Both inside and outside the nation-state, efforts range from ‘hard power’ security strategies of elimination and control involving military, police and intelligence operations, to ‘soft power’ strategies of information, partnerships and dialogue. This article analyses Danish counterterrorism policy narratives to identify the concepts of dialogue implied and the positions awarded to less-than-radical Muslim Others. This article finds that Muslims might – especially after the Danish Muhammad cartoon affair – in counterterrorism dialogue find a position for talking back, even if it is still a position circumscribed by control and securitisation.     

How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's Foreign Policy Toward China

In the past 60 years, India-China relations have oscillated between friendship, hostility and indifference. In recent times, both countries have started competing for global economic gains and political status. In light of these events, the objective of this article is to analyze various strategies used by China against India, and India's policy response to these strategies. The article evaluates the process of foreign policy decision making in India, and traces the historical evolution of India's foreign policy towards China. It then deconstructs China's foreign policy towards India, and provides the rationale behind its strategies. The article suggests that after initial engagement with India on the question of boundary disputes, Chinese foreign policy has undergone a dramatic shift since 2007. It specifically evaluates the twin Chinese tactics of military incursions and denial of legitimacy to the Indian territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Based on an analysis of China's previous boundary disputes resolution record with neighbors, these tactics are identified as an extension of China's new strategy for resolving such disputes. The article concludes by suggesting various policy options available to India to counter China's new strategy on the Sino-Indian border.     

Is there a U.S.–China–India triangle? – Beijing’s official views

ABSTRACT

This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China’s official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime’s official media outlets would speak of China–India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia–India–China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China’s security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.     

Managing Military Transformations: Agency,Culture, and the U.S. Carrier Revolution

The marketplace of ideas within a mature democracy such as the United States is supposed to fairly reliably vet foreign policies through open, wide-ranging debate. It is widely recognized that the U.S. marketplace of ideas failed during the 2002-03 debate over going to war in Iraq. Examinations of this market failure have emphasized executive powers and public fear after 9/11 as the main reasons threat inflation succeeded; I show neither explains this case. The majority opposition was silenced throughout early 2002 and ultimately defeated in a struggle over the Iraq War Resolution by pressures to be patriotic. I contend that this silencing patriotism should not be considered ordinary patriotism for a democracy as it is anti-democratic. I discuss how two critical norms of behavior which silence debate of national security policies and cause deference to the executive branch on war powers became established as part of the militarized political culture that took root in the United States during the Cold War. Thus these norms, enforced by what I term to be militarized patriotism left over from the Cold War, silenced debate over Iraq and led to the failure of the marketplace of ideas.