论无罪推定

推定是认定事实的特殊方法,它有三大要素构成。法国《人权宣言》第9条规定:"任何人在其未被宣告为犯罪以前应被推定为无罪"。这一推定并不具有推定的构成要件,且既不能发生法律效力,也不能执行,故为虚假推定。中国社科院林欣研究员认为:这个原则"应该译为‘无罪假定’"。法国《人权宣言》第9条的规定如果是无罪假定是可以成立的,也具有一定的价值。需要澄清几个问题:一是现代法治国家并没有普遍确立无罪推定原则;二是无罪推定并不能构成扼制刑讯逼供和保障人权的理由和根据;三是真正的无罪推定是指,不能证实有罪,应推定为无罪。     

The Prosecutor and the Presumption of Innocence

In what ways is the conduct of prosecutors constrained by the presumption of innocence? To address this question, I first develop an account of the presumption in the trial context, according to which it is a vital element in a moral assurance procedure for the justified infliction of legal punishment. Jurors must presume the factual innocence of defendants at the outset of trials and then be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the government’s evidence before they convict defendants. Prosecutors’ responsibilities to promote the integrity of this moral assurance procedure are then divided into pre-trial, during-trial, and post-trial phases. Since most charge adjudication is effected through plea bargaining, the ways in which plea procedures must be modified to conform to this moral assurance procedure, and thus honor the presumption of innocence, are also discussed.     

The Ideal of the Presumption of Innocence

This article clarifies and further defends the view that the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, protected by Article 6(2) of the European Convention of Human Rights has implications for the substantive law. It is shown that a ‘purely procedural’ conception of the presumption of innocence has absurd implications for the nature of the right. Objections to the moderate substantive view defended are considered, including the acceptability of male prohibits offences, the difficulty of ascertaining intentions of legislatures and the proper role of prosecutorial discretion.     

刑事法中的推定与无罪推定

作为一项重要的刑事法原则,无罪推定从本质上讲并不是推定,而是一种法律假定。设置无罪推定原则,其理由蕴涵着重要的逻辑理性——人人都享有的一种先定的权利——无罪免证权。刑事推定契合无罪推定的思想,与有罪推定存在本质上的区别,刑事法中设立推定并不有悖无罪推定原则。     

The Presumption of Innocence in the Trial Setting

The starting frame with which jurors begin trials and the approach which they should take toward the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and defense are distinguished. A robust interpretation of the starting frame, according to which jurors should begin trials by presuming the material innocence of defendants, is defended. Alternative starting frames which are less defendant‐friendly are shown to cohere less well with the notion that criminal trials should constitute stern tests of the government's case against those it has charged with crimes. The intuitive case for the robust presumption of innocence is supplemented with empirical evidence concerning the psychology of belief formation and preservation. Various objections to the proposed starting frame are addressed.     

Corporations and the Presumption of Innocence

Corporate behaviour is often regulated through the criminal law by means of reverse onus offences. Such offences are alleged to involve violations of the Presumption of Innocence. Such allegations almost always assume natural persons as defendants. The arguments supporting reverse onus offences are typically instrumental, to do with the importance of the social goals promoted and the ease of proof. The Presumption of Innocence is taken to be an autonomy right of natural persons and so not subject to being sidelined for reasons of law enforcement expediency. Corporations, however, are not natural persons: they have no autonomy right not to be treated as means. It may well be, then, that reverse onus offences are justified in the case of corporate defendants. I argue that the Presumption is not violated by such offences in the case of corporate defendants. I develop a broad concept of the criminal justice system as an allocative system, and argue that reverse onus offences properly allocate the burden of proof for corporations. Specifically, I argue that the normative demand for legal innocence is sufficiently met by the availability of a due diligence defence; that the responsibility of corporations when prohibited harms occur is properly a form of outcome-responsibility; and that taking into account issues of reciprocity, legitimacy and power reverse onus offences justly allocate the burden of proof in the case of corporate defendants.     

The Presumption of Innocence and the Human Rights Act

There has recently been a proliferation of case law dealing with potential inroads into the presumption of innocence in the criminal law of England and Wales, in the light of article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article is concerned with the nature of the presumption of innocence. It considers two central issues. The first is how the courts should address the question of when the presumption of innocence is interfered with. The second is the extent to which interference with the presumption of innocence may be justified on the grounds of proportionality. It is argued that the courts have not developed the appropriate concepts and principles properly to address these questions.     

The Dock on Trial: Courtroom Design and the Presumption of Innocence

This article examines the place of the criminal dock in courtroom design. Challenges to the use of the dock have been based upon the inability of the defendants to hear effectively, to communicate with counsel, to maintain their dignity, and to benefit from the presumption of innocence. Increasingly courts are incorporating secure docks, where defendants are partially or completely surrounded by glass (or in some countries, metal bars). To what extent do these changes and modifications undermine the right to the presumption of innocence? We present the results of an experimental mock jury study that was designed to test whether the placement of the accused influences jurors’ perceptions. We find that jurors are more likely to convict defendants when they are located in a traditional dock or a secure dock, compared to sitting next to their counsel at the bar table. We conclude by discussing the implications for trial procedures, counsel communications, and courtroom design.     

Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted.     

論「無罪推定」原則的歷史發展

「無罪推定」的法律概念源起於古希臘及古羅馬,作爲法律原則,它最早由法國的教會法法學家提出,再由義大利的刑法學家完善它的理論。作爲成文法,則最早出現於1789年的法國《人權和公民權利宣言》,現已是多個國際公約確認的基本人權,香港的《基本法》也有相關原則。中國的《刑事訴訟法》也提出未依法判決不得確定有罪及罪疑從無的原則。坦白從寬,抗拒從嚴。自古以來,不論中外,嫌     

Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Presumption of Innocence

A deferred prosecution agreement, or DPA, allows a corporation, instead of proceeding to trial on a criminal charge, to settle matters with the state by acknowledging the facts on which any charge would be based, pay a reduced fine, and agree to change the way they conduct business. Critics of DPAs have suggested that, because the defendant corporation must pay a fine and submit to structural reform without having been found guilty at trial, DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence. This paper argues that they do not. The paper appeals to the role of civic trust in a liberal political community. The obligations a corporation assumes in a DPA can be framed as a reasonable retributive response to a breach by that corporation of the community’s laws, and an appropriate reassurance by that corporation to the community that such breaches will not reoccur. This framing is sufficient to deny that DPAs violate the Presumption of Innocence.     

无罪推定原则研究

无罪推定原则作为刑事诉讼中的一个重要原则 ,对于确保被告人在审判中受到公平对待、参与法庭判决制作和保障人权具有重要意义。其思想在我国古代已有体现 ,但真正现代意义的无罪推定原则是近代资产阶级大革命胜利的成果。我国现行法律还没有确立完全意义的无罪推定 ,但吸收了其合理内核。在正确理解无罪推定原则时 ,我们应注意该原则与实事求是、沉默权、传统法律观念和配套法律制度等问题的关系     

The Presumption of Innocence and its Role in the Criminal Process

Many international instruments proclaim that those who face criminal prosecution ought to be afforded a ‘presumption of innocence’, and the importance and central role of this presumption is recognized by legal systems throughout the world. There is, however, little agreement about its meaning and extent of application. This article considers the purposes of legal presumptions in general and explores various, sometimes contradictory, conceptions of this most famous one. It is equated by many scholars to the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, it is merely a rule of evidence (albeit an important one), with no application pre- or post-trial. The article advocates adoption of a broader, normative approach, namely that the presumption reflects the relationship which ought to exist between citizen and State when a citizen is suspected of breaching the criminal law. As such, it should be promoted as a practical attitude to be adopted by the key protagonists in the justice system, for the duration of the criminal process.     

无罪推定与刑事证明责任的分配

本文对刑事证明责任的概念内涵作了考察和辨析,认为刑事证明责任的本质在于,控辩两造于口头辩论终结后,某一要件事实处于真伪不明状态时,而由某一方承担不利益后果的危险。文章进而探讨了刑事证明责任的分配与无罪推定原则的关系,指出犯罪构成要件的证明责任倒置违反了无罪推定原则,并且无罪推定原则的违反不能被正当化。因此,应当坚持无罪推定原则的绝对性,对犯罪构成要件、纯粹量刑要件、程序要件的证明责任作出合理的分配。     

20世纪50年代的无罪推定学术观点——关于杨兆龙无罪推定思想的研究

20世纪50年代仅有的几篇支持无罪推定的文章显示了诸多学术意义：极端意识形态对法律理性和法治进步的阻碍和迟滞影响未受到充分的理性批判，法学研究之法律逻辑学术基础薄弱，无罪推定的逻辑困惑仍未消除，杨兆龙先生关于无罪推定原则的研究所达到的深度尚未被超越，刑事诉讼法的修改是否能充分吸收无罪推定和沉默权原则，可能的保守倾向令人担忧。     

Criminal and Procedural Fairness: Some Challenges to the Presumption of Innocence

The presumption of innocence (POI) requires all judges, juries, and other officials in a trial, to presume and treat any accused of criminal wrongdoing as innocent, until he or she is proven guilty. Although a POI lacks an authoritative definition, this overarching principle of procedural fairness is so robust and vital for the exercise of legal power in matters of criminal law that one rarely finds anyone questioning its standing. In this article I examine the rationale behind the POI from a different perspective. The basic assumption is that this procedural standard captures the tenor of a broader principle which seeks to ensure fairness in criminal proceedings as well as in criminal law doctrine. I argue that honouring a principle of fairness is not exclusively a matter of criminal procedural law but also something that is deeply rooted in other areas of criminal law doctrine. Hence: not maintaining a principle of fairness in criminal law doctrine could lead to the POI being compromised or even undermined. In the article, I draw attention to three areas in which I believe that criminal law policies threaten a principle of fairness: criminalising remote harm, doctrine of ignorance of law and inversed presumptions of guilt. My conclusion is that some solutions to so called doctrinal problems in criminal law, are questionable and their practical consequences (on a general level) are, at least partially, equal to treating an individual (in a trial) as guilty for something for which he or she ought not to be accountable. Hence: gaining the support of a POI could thus work as principle for keeping the use of criminal law moderate and in accordance with a principle of fairness.     

无罪推定的法律效果比较研究——一种历时分析

无罪推定最初表现为一种富有人权保障价值的证据法原则。但由于产生背景和发展进路的不同,无罪推定在英美法系和大陆法系的功能定位和法律效果上有一定差别:前者将其作为审判阶段的证明规则,后者则以无罪推定的证据法内涵为基础,充分挖掘其程序法意义,将其塑造为具有多重法律效果的人权原则。二战后,无罪推定的国际化虽然推动了无罪推定法律效果限制和生效范围的一些共同基准的形成,但对各法系无罪推定法律效果的影响并不均衡。     

无罪推定原则在证据法中的体现

无罪推定是基于人生来无罪、也无犯罪基因这一常态而作出的一种假定。刑事诉讼程序是以证据为依据的动态逻辑证明过程并以证据为核心构件,因而,无罪推定原则在证据法中也具有重要意义。它在证据法中主要体现为以下具体规则：证据裁判主义、非法证据材料排除规则、无罪推定原则支配下的刑事诉讼证明与无罪推定原则下的证明责任。