Libya: fragile security,fragmented politics

A year and a half after the fall of Muammar Gadhafi, militia violence continues to plague Libya and the economy is in a moribund state. The country's development prospects are being thwarted by the fragmented nature of its government, which lacks constitutional legitimacy.     

Local government in Europe: Retrenchment,restructuring and British exceptionalism

This article compares the strategy of British governments towards elected local government following the onset of fiscal stress in the mid‐1970s with those of two other western European countries with a unitary system of government: France and Sweden. The conclusion reached is that, notwithstanding different national configurations of central‐local government relations and the distinctiveness of the British strategy, there are similar policy and institutional outcomes in each case. In so far as such outcomes are taking place irrespective of the party political or ideological complexion of governments, they are consistent with a neo‐Fordist interpretation of local government restructuring.     

Regulated restlessness: museums,liberal government and the historical sciences

The ways citizen participation and democracy are changing are poorly understood due to the dominance of theories inherited from the eioghteenth centruy: Democratic citizenship can be better understood if critical reflection is re-oriented around the games of concrete freedom here and now as recommended by Hannah Arendt, Ludwing Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault and Quentin Skinner. This orientation brings to light two distrinctive types of citizen freedom in the present: diverse forms of citizen participation and diverse practices of governance in which citizens participate.     

Logrolling under fragmented authoritarianism: theory and evidence from China

This paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of logrolling between interest groups on social welfare in a non-democratic political system. In particular, we focus on China, where bureaucratic interest groups are separate vertical organizations reaching down from Beijing to the provinces and cities. The key question in this paper is: what are the effects of the logrolling of parochial interest groups on state policies and social welfare in autocracies? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. The theory predicts a specific distortion in resource allocation because of logrolling, while the empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction. We find policy outcomes under logrolling are characterized by excessive spending on all the interest groups’ preferred goods and insufficient spending on public goods. We test the existence of logrolling between the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Health in China. Our result shows logrolling between the two ministries lead to inefficiencies in social security and health care policies.     

Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies

By applying the Revelation Principle, we focus on how a sponsor, who possesses political authority, could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts - that is, when they control information about the true costs of public services production. Our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement. In a two-types setting, and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms, we find that the agency is productively efficient. Under certain conditions, the agency is also allocatively efficient, while, under others, the low-cost bureau oversupplies and the high-cost agency undersupplies its output.     

Recasting Title IX: Addressing Gender Equity in the Science,Technology, Engineering,and Mathematics Professoriate

Questions of gender equity and the underrepresentation of women in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) professoriate in U.S. institutions of higher education have become central issues in debates on the role and makeup of the STEM workforce in today's innovation‐driven economy. In response, policy makers, advocacy groups, academics, and other stakeholders have called for the dedicated enforcement of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 as a tool for combating gender inequities in the academic workforce. Although previously applied primarily to gender bias in athletic programs and participation, Title IX was created to address myriad aspects of gender equity in educational institutions and, as such, currently is being invoked in the realm of STEM academic employment. Accordingly, we analyze Title IX relative to categories of potential regulatory development in light of the policy environment and related dynamics. Providing an historical overview of Title IX and its associated regulations as background, we characterize and delineate its relevance to gender disparities in the STEM professoriate, identifying areas for policy consideration and future application.     

Political competition,party polarization,and government performance

Lack of party competition may impair government efficiency. If the voters are ideologically predisposed to cast their votes in favor of one political party, they may reelect an underperforming incumbent. Party polarization may magnify this effect since the median voter faces a higher cost of selecting a better, but ideologically distant incumbent. Alternatively, if the electorate is evenly divided between parties, polarization may induce parties to invest more effort in improving their election prospects. The current paper analyzes efficiency in Norwegian local governments. Efficiency has been measured by means of panel data on government service output over a 10-year period. Electoral dominance has been measured as number of elections wherein one party bloc receives at least 60 % of the votes, measured over six consecutive elections. Party polarization is defined as the ideological distance between the two party blocs, and it is measured on basis of survey data on the ideological preferences of elected politicians. Lack of party competition reduces efficiency, the effect being stronger in governments where more party polarization exists. These agency losses are larger in high-revenue municipalities.     

Market imperfections,government imperfections,and policy mixes: policy innovations in Singapore

Proper roles for government and market in addressing policy problems may be assessed by considering the duality between market imperfections and government imperfections. The potential of government interventions or market mechanisms as core policy instruments can be eroded by fundamental deficiencies deeply rooted in either government or market as social institutions. The impacts of such deficiencies are much more extensive than postulated by the existing theories. Analysis here, based on policy innovations in land transport and health care in Singapore, suggests how policy mixes might become the norm of response for addressing policy problems found in a range of sectors. The analytical framework presented may help to distinguish among different policy mixes according to their effectiveness, but also provides some useful guiding principles for policy design.     

Addressing Public Risks: Extreme Events and Critical Infrastructures

We consider noncoercive means for harnessing the efforts of the private sector as partners with public authorities for addressing potential harms from widely dispersed risks. Our focus is the public and private sector approach in the United States to protecting the nation's critical infrastructures. We empirically address how two key elements of this approach—mobilization of attention and planning partnerships—work to foster “communities of interest” that pursue common sets of solutions for risk reduction. Our depiction of the varied communities of interest underscores differences in starting points in creating such communities, in the ability to mobilize and focus attention within them, and in the likelihood of sustaining efforts to address threats to critical infrastructures. The fundamental issue raised by our research is striking an appropriate balance between governmental and private sector roles in addressing risks for which it is hard to create and sustain protective actions.     

Designing property rights for water: mediating market,government, and corporation failures

Recent decades have seen an acceleration in public concern about the allocation of increasingly scarce water supplies. There are many reasons for this concern, such as growth in urban populations. In this article, we focus on how surface water’s special qualities (the combination of spillovers, rent-seeking behavior, and common pool resources) complicate the assignment of property rights in any legal framework. These characteristics make specific market structures necessary in order to efficiently allocate rights. The state usually designs those structures. Yet, just like markets can fail, so can governments fail to effectively allocate those rights. So designers often turn to quasi-judicial conservancy boards as a second-best solution. We argue that those boards may themselves fail through a form of “corporation failure.” We address these three types of failures, and offer an analysis of two cases that suggests that the likelihood conservancy boards will suffer from corporate failure depends on the actions of the boards and outside stakeholders (like governments).

Party system nationalization,presidential coalitions,and government spending

This paper argues that there is a strong relationship between geographical patterns of political parties' electoral performance and the composition of central government expenditures. When party system nationalization is high, the composition of spending will focus more on non-targetable expenditures, while targetable expenditures increase as the party system distribution of votes across different districts becomes less homogenous. However, the effect of party nationalization on spending type is conditioned by the size of the presidential coalition; targeted transfers will increase if the coalition size decreases, even if party nationalization is high. I find support for these hypotheses with an empirical analysis of district-level electoral and government expenditure data for several countries in Latin America between 1990 and 2006.     

Community government: voluntary agencies,social justice,and the responsibilization of citizens1

This paper analyzes the ways in which the Canadian voluntary sector has been created as a ‘community of service providers’. Drawing upon a governmentality perspective, we illustrate how governmental interventions have been largely successful in carrying out the voluntary agencies' responsibilization efforts within the sector. We trace this responsibilization project through fiscal policies and programmatic schemes, characteristic of advanced liberalism. Once invested with the task of governing, we argue that voluntary agencies take it upon themselves to train their volunteers to become responsible citizens. As a form of, what we call, community government, these voluntary agencies have therefore become doubly responsible: they provide social services to disadvantaged individuals and simultaneously train community members to assume their moral duties. Overall, this paper contributes to the growing literature on governmentality and citizenship studies by producing new insights into the links between the voluntary sector and ‘responsible citizenship’ under advanced liberalism.     

Globalism,exit, and free social riders: A dysfunctional integration theory

Abstract. This paper examines the role of capital disinvestment in the development of common EU policies, and suggests that mobile capital in low–tech sectors (where technology gains do not support high unit labour costs) is susceptible to high social costs, and will avoid them through exit. Integration theories have failed to assimilate the implications of this. While theorists have been busy making the case for either states or institutions as the key actors upon whom integrative outcomes in Europe depend, not enough attention has been paid to the influence of organized interests, and particularly whether they derive systemic power from the structure of the international economic system. Three points may be made. First, the relative power of interests changes with the internationalization of the economy. Second, the power of capital relative to labour is likely to vary along several axes: the degree of mobility, the level of international competition faced by the sector or firm, and the sensitivity to policy costs. Third, the dilemma posed by capital mobility to political bargains among socio–economic actors may help us get to the bottom of the long–standing debate among integration theorists regarding both the likely outcome of integrative efforts and the identity of the most relevant actors.