依附型金融化与中东欧国家的去金融化改革

20世纪90年代以来的资本主义金融化进程使中东欧国家陷入依附型金融化困境.由于国内转型战略与加入欧盟的相互影响,中东欧国家形成了维谢格拉德国家的依附型出口拉动模式和波罗的海国家的依附型贷款拉动模式.2008年国际金融危机之后,中东欧国家试图通过去金融化和金融抑制改变其依附型金融地位.不同国家的去金融化程度有所差异,以匈牙利为代表的维谢格拉德国家偏重部门税和公司国有化,以拉脱维亚为代表的波罗的海国家坚持紧缩和内部贬值策略.总体上,这些国家只是改变了 一些经济机构,而没有从根本上挑战潜在的增长模式.长期来看,去金融化可能会减少中东欧国家生产性行业中的外国直接投资,金融民族主义既难以同全球金融资本相对抗,也无法摆脱其自身的依附地位.     

当前中东欧国家一体化面临的挑战

<正>从20世纪90年代初中东欧国家结束在经济互助委员会(经互会Comecon)内四十余年的区域经济合作,到21世纪初其中多数国家陆续融入欧盟区域一体化进程,乃至近年来经受国际金融危机、欧债危机的不断冲击,可以说中东欧国家为应对经济全球化搅动下国际格局的变化,走过一条充满挑战、漫长而复杂的发展道路。历史:中东欧国家曾经的一体化第二次世界大战结束后不久,冷战爆发,马歇尔计划出台以及西方经     

浅谈转轨研究中的理论范式之争

转轨学曾经是研究20世纪70年代南欧和拉丁美洲国家从独裁政治向民主政治转轨进程的重要理论工具,也是中东欧与独联体转轨研究中的主要理论之一。但是,它本身具有的理论缺陷导致其不能恰如其分地分析20世纪90年代以来发生在中东欧和独联体国家的政局剧变和转轨进程。学者们围绕转轨学在三个层面上展开了争论:如何界定转轨学,转轨学是否为研究原苏东国家的主要方法,转轨学是否已经过时。新一代转轨问题研究者面临着重大挑战:开发新的理论工具以解释与南欧和拉丁美洲转轨存在诸多差异的中东欧和独联体国家转轨进程。     

G20机制的构建及其在后危机时代的角色定位

为加强在国际经济金融问题上的协调与合作,世界20个主要经济体在布雷顿森林体系框架内建立了发达国家与新兴市场国家的非正式对话的机制,并逐步形成了"领导人峰会-协调人会议-部长级会议-工作组会议"的G20机制架构。随着国际经济形式的变化,G20机制的角色定位也发生了重大嬗变,由最初的维护国际金融体系稳定,防止金融危机发生,嬗变为应对不断恶化的国际金融经济危机,努力恢复全球经济增长。随着后危机时代的到来,G20机制的角色将逐步从应对国际金融危机嬗变到促进国际合作,推动世界经济强劲、可持续、平衡增长上来。     

中东欧现行政党制度及左翼政党地位初探

从1989年至今,中东欧国家经过十多年的政治、经济转轨,以多党议会民主制为特征的政党制度已初步确立.但由于特殊的政治、经济环境,中东欧国家的政党制度与西方相比仍有较大差异,作为中东欧政党格局重要构成力量的左翼政党,也面临着一系列的难题.     

入盟后中东欧国家的发展困境

加入欧盟后,中东欧国家面临新的发展困境。这些困境表现在认同、政治思潮、双边关系、增长模式、安全和地缘政治等方面。造成困境的原因包括中东欧国家发展中的自身问题、欧盟结构和政策,以及欧洲与大西洋之间关系的影响等。目前,政治思潮、双边关系和经济增长模式困境的消极性和危害已经凸显,其他困境的潜在消极性亦不时显现。正确认识和多方参与化解这些困境已经成为中东欧国家、欧盟甚至美国所面临的挑战。     

中东欧转轨二十年:经验与教训

<正>编者按冷战结束后,地缘政治上的东欧消失了,取而代之的是地理位置上的中东欧(东中欧和东南欧)。经过20年的发展,尽管随着一些中东欧国家陆续加入北约和欧盟,它们"返回欧洲"的梦想似乎已经成为现实,但如今的中东欧国家一方面因国小力微并没有形成统一的政治、经济和外交力量。然而,无论从地理位     

当前中东欧国家政局探析

<正>转型半个世纪以来,中东欧各国政治光谱基本正常波动,多党议会民主政治成为主流。转型初期,各国政党数量较多,但各政党生命周期不一。最初,各国多为右翼政治力量主导政坛;随后中左与中右政治力量轮流执政,但民粹或极端政党在国际金融危机、欧债危机中凸显。现在,多数国家基本稳定在数个主要政党或政党联合执政,不仅有中左、中右分野,也有中左、中右力量联合执政。2014—2016年,部分中东欧国     

转型三问 ——写在中东欧转型30年之际

20世纪90年代初以来的中东欧国家多领域转型和发展对国际政治产生了深远影响。评估30年来中东欧国家转型与发展的成果与质量,至少有3个基本问题需要回答:中东欧国家建立了何种资本主义、转型是否已经完结以及转型是否不可逆转。虽然不同的价值观和考察问题的不同角度使这些问题尚无共识,但问题的提出既有助于在理论上深化对中东欧的研究,也有利于在实践上更客观地认识中东欧,进而在知己知彼的基础上与中东欧国家发展关系和加强合作。     

中东欧经济转轨与全球化

苏东剧变后,中东欧国家毫无例外地摒弃了计划经济,实行市场经济。从1989年开始,这个转轨进程已经历时14年,并与全球化进程有着密切的关系。     

China–CEE Trade,Investment and Politics

Abstract

The growing and intensifying cooperation between China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries has generated extensive criticism by and concerns among EU institutions and Western European member states of the Union. According to diplomatic presumptions, China aims to gain political leverage in exchange for economic benefits in the EU through its CEE members. The following article attempts to evaluate the correlation between the quality of bilateral political relations and economic relations of China and CEE countries in order to draw conclusions on the importance or, on the contrary, the irrelevance of Chinese activity in the region.     

Introduction

Central Eastern Europe (further CEE) has been thoroughly reconstructed during nearly a quarter of century since the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war. The CEE countries turned to the West for economic and technological advancement, for political and administrative models as well as for protection. The authors coming from eight different countries look at the place and role of the former member states of the Warsaw Pact in the new European and international constellation. This concept of CEE includes most pro-western states of the former ‘Eastern block’: the four countries of Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). There were many tumultuous political developments in and around the region within the last decade, and especially during the last five years when the financial crisis started to take its toll. While the Atlantic link of Central and Eastern Europe is still strong, many commentators have pointed out its wearing strategic meaning. The balance between the focus on the USA and the EU has shifted in favour of Europe. However, this shift has rather been an incomplete one due to the region's own political and economic problems. The aim of this special issue is to analyse the new constellation by looking at the CEE countries themselves, at their ability to react and adapt, produce sound political strategies and act on as national actors: through bilateral ties, regional co-operation, NATO and the EU. Also, the main external actors - the USA, Russia and Germany - are looked at as they directly influence the way how the CEE countries shape their policies.     

Coming out of the shadow? Studies of local governments in Central and Eastern Europe in European academic research

This article is an analysis of the changing role of research on local governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) within mainstream European studies. It refers to dependency theory (Wallerstein, Prebish) as applied to scientific research. It classifies CEE as being in the semi-periphery of academic research. The empirical analysis consists of two parts: (1) qualitative review of the most important of the comparative studies of European local governments. It includes a discussion on the role of local governments and researchers from CEE in these studies; (2) quantitative based on an analysis of articles published in international journals and citations for those articles in Scopus. The analysis covers 14 countries (all new member states who joined the EU from 2004 onwards, plus the Balkan countries: Albania, Macedonia, and Serbia).     

中东欧的民粹主义基础及其影响——兼论中国与中东欧国家关系

中东欧民粹政党有大量社会底层支持者,农民是最有代表性的民粹主义基础。从历史制度主义的视角看,以农民为代表的中东欧民粹支持者与历史上保守势力的支持基础有类似的逻辑。在农业仍为关键产业的中东欧国家,当传统经济受到转型后突如其来的外部经济影响时,既有经济结构和生产关系受到严峻挑战,在本土保守势力的推动下,竞争力不足的中东欧国家呼吁保护传统经济,反对以西欧为代表的新自由主义的价值腐化、以威权整肃国内腐败、强调历史上的民族荣光、复兴宗教及家庭伦理等。这一思潮被民粹政党用以获取政治权力。在外部经济压力下,农民、城市底层民众、经济民族主义者、保守的政治精英、大文化中心论者共同构成支持民粹主义的基础,民粹政党的兴起是精英和大众共同推动的结果。中东欧民粹政党自该地区转型后就出现在政治舞台,其影响深度和广度是欧洲其他地区所不及的。有鉴于此,探索一条以民粹主义基础为导向的策略路径,整合政府、企业和民间机构三类实践主体,有助于强化中国在中东欧的影响力。积极推进民粹政党或执政党的对华合作,是中国强化和拓展中东欧地区利益的重要方向。     

China’s Economic Diplomacy in Central and Eastern Europe: A Case of Offensive Mercantilism?

Abstract

Since China launched the 16?+?1 forum for meetings with Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in 2012, European observers have struggled to understand the Chinese approach. In contrast to its oft-repeated claim of ‘win–win’ cooperation, some believe China is pursuing an assertive strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ designed to benefit China at Europe’s expense. China’s economic diplomacy in CEE is examined through the critical lens of Holslag’s ‘offensive mercantilism’ framework, finding it useful for assessing empirical aspects of China’s approach to CEE, but failing to find evidence for the assertion that China’s economic diplomacy is divisive and bad for Europe.     

Legacies of State Socialism: A Comparative Study of Elite Attitudes towards EU Economic Competitiveness in Western and Central Eastern Europe

Abstract

The elites of Western Europe prefer social security for all citizens as the major aim of the EU, while the preference of Central and Eastern European elites is for a more globally competitive European economy. This disparity between elite preferences may be accounted for by the distinct electorates and elites’ responsive strategic calculations, or by the process of socialisation Central and Eastern European elites undergo during exposure to the EU. This article argues that the predominant reason for the difference in elite attitudes towards economic competition is the lasting effect of state socialism in Central and Eastern European countries.     

中东欧地区大国博弈新态势--兼论中国-中东欧国家合作面临的挑战与机遇

在地缘安全、能源、价值观等方面,美国、以德国为主要代表的欧盟国家以及俄罗斯在中东欧地区有着广泛而重要的利益。三者的互动关系呈现美俄博弈主导中东欧安全形势,美德(欧)联合制俄但共识有限,美德(欧)对中国在中东欧的经济介入保持警惕但难以形成合力三个特征。随着中美竞争的持续,美德(欧)与以波兰、匈牙利为代表的中东欧国家在价值观上的分歧扩大,美德(欧)对俄罗斯的地缘政治攻势升级,中东欧地区的大国力量格局发生了新的变化。美国对中国的战略围堵压力持续加大,以德国为代表的欧盟国家对中东欧国家的控制力不断降低,俄罗斯反“守”为“攻”回应西方威胁,而德国新政府和新一届欧盟委员会对华政策更加突出价值观因素,导致中国—中东欧国家合作面临的地缘政治压力总体上有增无减。但是,美欧内部也并非铁板一块,以德国为代表的欧盟国家在中东欧控制力的弱化以及美欧与波兰、匈牙利等国关系的恶化,也为持续推进中国—中东欧国家合作带来了潜在机遇。以上因素作为影响中东欧国家对华政策的重要变量,需要密切关注。     

The changing nature of the transatlantic link: U.S. approaches and implications for Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines the changing security, economic and diplomatic components of the transatlantic link, with a particular focus on Washington's approach and implications for Central and Eastern Europe. The United States continues to play an essential role as security underwriter in the region, but the military dimension of the transatlantic relationship is transforming and will result in greater burdens on Europeans. Economic links between the U.S. and Central Europe are developing more strongly than generally understood, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is likely to drive both political and economic ties. Unconventional gas developments are enhancing U.S. engagement in European energy markets. Finally, the U.S. remains keen to engage its European partners on a broad agenda of global and regional issues and retains its own interests in working particularly with Central and Eastern European countries to lend stability to ‘wider Europe’.     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.     

Between willing and reluctant entrapment: CEE countries in NATO's non-European missions

The article focuses on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries' experiences related to Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, three non-European theatres of Western military operations, in predominantly Muslim lands, in the decade between 2001 and 2011. CEE countries readily became involved in two of these foreign missions (Afghanistan and Iraq) because of their deep ties to Western politico-economic structures, without direct security interests compelling them to do so, but not without normative convictions regarding what were seen by them as virtues of the two missions. In Libya, however, they were reluctant to join the Western intervention. In light of this, the article is interested in examining how political elites within the region relate to the generally constrained security policy agency that they have. A key argument advanced is that such agency may be located in how external hegemony is mediated in elite discourses of threat and legitimacy construction. This as well as the three case studies outlined in the article show that the seeming changes in CEE countries' behaviour in fact boil down to a simple set of rules guiding their behaviour. Having identified this “algorithm” as an implicit pattern of CEE foreign policy behaviour, originating in the intra-alliance security dilemma within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the article formulates its conclusions about the alliance policy of these countries largely within a neorealist framework.