ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: THE BRITISH DEBATE*

Abstract: This paper examines recent developments in the debate in Britain about the role of public enterprises which are wholly owned by the State, that is, the nationalized industries. The changing political and economic context surrounding public enterprise is briefly outlined and the successive attempts to give operational significance to concepts of accountability and performance are noted. In the light of this review recent developments in the framework of control are discussed. It is argued that the parliamentary system has failed to develop adequate criteria of accountability and performance for the nationalized industries, in part because of inherent difficulties common to systems of representative government, which in Britain have been exacerbated by a declining rate of economic growth and attendant attempts to reduce public expenditure.     

AMERICAN STATES AND THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEBATE

The current popular debate over industrial policy tends to be Indifferent to the possible relevance of economic policies in American states. The states are not only very active in this arena through their Industrial and economic development efforts, but also have untapped potential for influencing business decisions. As an integral part of the Amerlcan economic policy arena, states cannot and should not be ignored by industrial policy advocates. Some constitutional, policy, and programmatlc implications of this point are briefly discussed.     

REINTERPRETING THE DEBATE ON AUTONOMY IN PUBLIC SERVICE SCIENCE*

Abstract: The report of the Science Task Force of the Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration rekindled an old debate on autonomy versus accountability for government scientists. The rationale given there for allowing the natural science community great discretion in managing its own affairs while in receipt of very considerable public funds did not get much support in the debate. Unfortunately, the debate did little to illuminate the problems facing those charged with producing creative, but relevant research in public institutions. A more productive way of tackling the question of autonomy and accountability is to see whose interests are promoted by different stances on the issue. Some critics represent the quest for autonomy as simple power-seeking by professional elites. Yet the institutional setting for many supposedly autonomous scientists involved in successful innovation in industry often involves extensive interaction with non-scientists. User groups — such as the agricultural commodities research committees — influence scientists through a loosely coordinated network. In this situation a form of accountability exists, although it is not exerted through formal parliamentary mechanisms. The arrangements have some elements of corporatism. Autonomy is not prominent within this setting except elusively as a rationale used to blunt temporarily the impact of particular interest group demands that threaten the continuity required to realize investments in long-term research projects. In this case, autonomy is essentially a myth. However, to the extent that it allows scientific institutions to combine interaction in the practical world that their research must serve with some insulation from short-term political or interest group pressures, it may be valuable for successful research management. Science administrators sometimes regulate the research of their juniors quite closely, indicating that even individual “scientific autonomy” can be a very limited form of freedom. None the less, it can be managed in such a way as to allow creative talent to flourish within an accountable structure albeit one that departs from the conventional norms of responsible government.     

SUB‐NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL SPENDING IN INDONESIA: LEVEL,STRUCTURE, AND FINANCING

Sub‐national government capital spending is important for both public service delivery and economic development. Currently, Indonesian sub‐national public capital spending appears barely sufficient to cover the annual depreciation of its fixed assets. A substantial proportion of local government investment spending goes to create relatively unproductive assets, such as administrative office buildings. Sub‐national governments finance their capital acquisitions out of gross operating budgets and have thus far not used, to any great extent, either borrowed funds or their significant cash reserves for such purposes. Indonesian sub‐nationals need to spend more on capital than they do now and also need to focus that spending on more useful types of infrastructure. The major constraints to increasing capital spending at the sub‐national level are not related to a dearth of finance, but regulatory rigidities in budget preparation and implementation and, most importantly, a lack of capacity to plan, design and implement investment projects. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY'S TREATMENT OF ABORIGINAL POLYGYNY AND TRIBAL MARRIAGE: A SAGA OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEBATE

Abstract: Since the inclusion of Aborigines in the Australian social security system, the treatment of Aboriginal polygyny and tribal marriage by the Department of Social Security (DSS) has been a recurring minor issue of departmental, and at times extra-departmental, debate. This article traces the history of that debate from the early 1960s to the present day. Although the article is primarily historical, there is also some attempt made to analyse both the nature of the administrative processes involved and the types of administrative argument deployed in the debate.