Mavericks or misconstruction? A reply to Campbell and Allan

In a jurisdiction without a codified constitution clearly demarcating the role of the courts, and given the centrality of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to the United Kingdom's constitutional framework, criticism of the courts for overstepping the mark – particularly in politically contentious cases – is par for the course. In their 2019 article, Professors David Campbell and James Allan offer a criticism of the Supreme Court for what they describe as its surreptitious creation of judicial supremacy at the expense of parliamentary sovereignty. In support of their claim, the authors examine two particularly significant judgments: R (Miller and another) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union and Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review. This reply discusses several problematic aspects of the authors’ critique of those judgments, demonstrating that, contrary to the authors’ claims, these cases do not provide evidence of a surreptitious attempt by the Supreme Court to expand its power.     

RR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions: Empowering Tribunals to Enforce the Human Rights Act 1998

In RR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions – follow-on litigation from the high-profile bedroom tax cases – the Supreme Court handed down a judgment which has significant implications for social security law, the interpretation of the Human Rights Act, the tribunals system, the judicial control of delegated legislation, and access to justice. Central, however, was the issue of the enforceability of human rights. We argue that the Supreme Court was not only justified in its interpretation of the Human Rights Act but that it has made the protections of the Act more easily enforceable.     

UK Abortion Law: Reform Proposals,Private Members’ Bills,Devolution and the Role of the Courts

UK abortion law remains unsettled, and subject to on‐going controversy and reform. This article offers a comprehensive critique of all reforms implemented or proposed since 2016. It examines reforms proposed in both Houses of Parliament and contextualises them within a public law analysis, showing both that the complex parliamentary processes relating to Private Members’ Bills have frustrated reform attempts, and that these attempts have been contradictory in their aims between the two Houses. Secondly, it examines the unique positions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to show the extent to which devolutionary settlements have influenced both reforms and executive involvement. Finally, it examines the potential impact of the courts on abortion law following Re Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission's Application for Judicial Review, showing that the Supreme Court's reframing of the debate in human rights terms is likely to affect abortion law, not only in Northern Ireland, but in the whole of the UK.     

Strasbourg,the House of Lords or Elected Politicians: Who decides about rights after Re P?

In Re P , the House of Lords decided that art 14 of the Adoption (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 which prohibited unmarried couples from being eligible to adopt, violated articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Apart from its significance for adoption law and anti-discrimination law, Re P is also important in understanding the constitutional role of the courts under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Re P recognizes that if Strasbourg has determined that an issue falls within states' margin of appreciation, this does not prevent municipal courts from enforcing those rights. This comment will discuss the meaning and scope of the courts' obligation under section 2 of the HRA, the status of the rights protected by the HRA and the appropriate role of the courts in a rights dispute which is subject to moral, social, religious or political controversy.     

O'Keeffe v Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide an Effective System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in Education

In O'Keeffe v Ireland, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that Ireland failed to protect the applicant from sexual abuse suffered as a child in an Irish National School in 1973 and violated her rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This note argues that the decision is important in expanding the Court's jurisprudence regarding positive obligations under Article 3 to child sexual abuse in a non‐state setting where there was no knowledge of a ‘real and immediate’ risk to the applicant. It also argues that the case raises concerns about the Court's methodology for the historical application of the Convention and about the interaction of Article 3 positive obligations with vicarious liability in common law tort regimes.     

Out of Many,One? Strasbourg's Ibrahim Decision on Article 6

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Ibrahim v United Kingdom on 13 September 2016. Relying on Salduz v Turkey, the applicants claimed, largely unsuccessfully, that denial of access to a lawyer during police questioning, and subsequent admission into evidence of statements made in the course of that questioning, violated fair trial rights protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The comment suggests that the decision's unusually emphatic statements about Article 6's ‘internal structure’ have consequences for assessing violations in future applications. Further, the decision creates greater room for public interest balancing in Article 6 cases. The decision may thus undermine the Article 6 guarantees.     

Making sense of the case law on Ombudsman schemes

This article analyses the case law on ombudsman schemes in the UK, with the purpose of identifying some of the key trends that underpin this branch of law pre-the first Supreme Court decision in this area, JR55 v Northern Ireland Commissioner for Complaints. While the law on ombudsman schemes remains based on legislation and the various grounds of administrative law available in judicial review, distinct bespoke principles have also been relied upon. These principles are beginning to provide consistent guidance on how the law should be used and interpreted in cases involving an ombudsman scheme. One task of the Supreme Court in JR55 will be to confirm these principles, or rationalize any departure from them.     

Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim Status,Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning

In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk of being subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. It concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of the Human Rights Watch case, and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally, against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.     

Mixed Messages in Bottles: the European Union,Devolution, and the Future of the Constitution

An unprecedented eleven‐member UK Supreme Court decided R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on 24 January 2017. The Government's argument, that it could start the process of withdrawing from the EU using a prerogative power instead of an Act of Parliament, was comprehensively defeated by an 8:3 majority. However, the Government also secured a unanimous verdict that it did not need the consent from the devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland before invoking Article 50 of the TEU. I explore the judicial argumentation in light of Philip Bobbitt's six modalities of constitutional argument, five of which feature, and one of which ought to have featured, in this seminal case.     

CASES: Special Advocates,Control Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial

In Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3), the House of Lords decided that Article 6 ECHR requires a ‘core irreducible minimum’ of procedural fairness such that ‘the controlled person must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to give effective instructions to the Special Advocate’. This case‐note will discuss the challenges facing Special Advocates in control order proceedings and the impact AF may have on the measure of procedural fairness owed to individuals in closed proceedings. It will also address the judicial use of sections 2 and 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in arriving at the outcome in AF.     

Standing and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission

On 7 June 2018, the UK Supreme Court held that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (NIHRC) did not have standing under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (NIA) and Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to challenge the legality of abortion law in Northern Ireland. This case note argues that while a literal reading of the NIA exposes its inconsistencies, a purposive reading of both the NIA and HRA indicates that the NIHRC should have had standing. The note seeks to highlight the unique democratic function of the NIHRC in a consociational setting in protecting rights that are not represented along ethno‐national lines. It also considers the negative ramifications that the judgment will have on women who have been victims of the legislative regime and seek to challenge the compatibility of Northern Irish abortion law with the HRA in the future.     

Recent legal developments

Abstract

THE CASE of R (Pretty) v. Director of Public Prosecutions, gave the House of Lords the opportunity to comment on the issues surrounding the application of the European Convention on Human Rights to the crime of assisted suicide in the case of the terminally ill. A conservative approach was taken in relation to both this issue and indeed in relation to the possibilities of judicial control of the Law Officers of the Crown.     

Towards a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights

The political settlement resulting from the Belfast Agreement recognisedthe fundamental importance of the issue of rights to a stable peace inNorthern Ireland. Indeed, the agreement provided for a Human RightsCommission, one of whose tasks is the drafting of a Bill of Rights thatwill reflect the political reality of the province. This paper arguesthat the proposed document will have to reflect an understanding ofrights and their protection resulting from the particular history ofNorthern Ireland. This specific understanding of rights appeared firstin the Anglo-Irish Agreement and has been gradually developed andconsolidated in the political agreements since. The planned NorthernIreland Bill of Rights will have to reflect this rights thinking. Thearticle also chronicles the recent work of the Northern Ireland HumanRights Commission in drafting the Bill of Rights to be presented to theSecretary of State for Northern Ireland in February 2002. Thereciprocal, if belated, moves in the Republic to set up its own humanrights commission will also be addressed as part of the process to drawup a Charter of Rights for the whole people of Ireland.     

Privacy,Data Retention and Domination: Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications

In Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, the European Court of Justice found the EU Data Retention Directive, which required the retention of communications data for up to two years, to be incompatible with Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data. It is argued in this note that the decision ought to be taken as one that is concerned with the exercise of arbitrary power, a concern that is captured by the concept of domination.     

Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial

This article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio‐legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect defendants to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty‐plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants.     

Abortion in Northern Ireland: Has the Rubicon Been Crossed?

On 7 June 2018, the Supreme Court delivered their long anticipated ruling on whether the abortion laws in Northern Ireland are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, a majority of the court held that, obiter, the current Northern Irish law was incompatible with the right to respect for private and family life, protected by Article 8 ECHR, “insofar as it prohibits abortion in cases of rape, incest and fatal foetal abnormality”. This Supreme Court decision, seen alongside the May 2018 Irish referendum liberalising abortion, and the 5 June 2018 Parliamentary debate seeking to liberalise abortion laws in Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, places renewed focus upon the abortion laws of Northern Ireland and Great Britain, which suggests that the ‘halfway house’ of the Abortion Act 1967 Act finally be close to being reformed to hand the decision of abortion to women themselves.     

Redfearn v UK: Political Association and Dismissal

In Redfearn v UK the European Court of Human Rights examined the question whether dismissal for membership of a political party is compatible with freedom of association under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court endorsed a strong commitment to multi‐party democracy and protection of employees against the domination of the employers. This note discusses the judgment and its implications for UK law, looking at three key issues: first, whether the law of unfair dismissal provides effective protection against action that poses a threat to the enjoyment of Convention rights; second, the grounds under which an employer may justify the lawfulness of a dismissal that interferes with a Convention right; third, the available remedies against the employer when there is a breach of a Convention right.     

An Equality and Human Rights Commission Worthy of the Name

The Human Rights Act 1998 came fully into force on 2 October 2000, enabling the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to be relied on directly in our domestic courts.¹ The Act lacked provision for a Human Rights Commission to advise and assist alleged victims in bringing proceedings for breaches of Convention rights, to research, intervene in court proceedings, and promote a culture of human rights, although such a Commission had been created for Northern Ireland. A White Paper has now been issued outlining plans for a Commission for Equality and Human Rights. This paper considers the future role and potential impact of the Commission and highlights opportunities that have been missed since October 2000 in its absence. We focus on its human rights aspects and summarize key conditions for the new Commission's success.     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.     

Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Austin claimed, unsuccessfully, that police kettling at a public protest in London amounted to a violation of her right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This case comment suggests that the court took an unexpected and unorthodox approach to the issue of ‘deprivation’ within Article 5. This decision may come to undermine the protections afforded by Article 5 and extend the current exceptions to Article 5 to an indefinite range of situations.