Strategic communication by regulatory agencies as a form of reputation management: A strategic agenda

This article develops a strategic agenda concerning regulatory agencies' strategic communication in light of the reputation literature. It highlights the main strands in this literature, presents the fundamental findings discovered so far, responds to the critiques that have recently surfaced, and offers guidance about where scholarship on strategic communication might most profitably head. The critiques discussed here centre on two aspects: (i) the claim that an agency's communication choices are to some extent driven by the distinctive logic of the media rather than by reputational concerns, and (ii) the argument that strategic communication provides only short-term solutions to emerging threats and is therefore overemphasized in the literature. Future agendas include, for example, the selection of audience segmentation strategies, and the management of competing and even contradictory communication for segmented audiences when agencies enjoy exclusive jurisdiction, as opposed to cases in which other agencies share the same stage.     

Ethno-Psychological Characteristics and Terror-Producing Countries: Linking Uncertainty Avoidance to Terrorist Acts in the 1970s

Most of the world's terrorism occurs in but a few of the world's countries. This study examines why. The extent to which Hofstede's cultural values relate to terrorism in the 1970s in 51 countries is analyzed. Uncertainty avoidance emerges as the single cultural value that is related to terrorism. Uncertainty avoidance, related to stress, may provide important prerequisites for group-induced aberrant behavior when formerly alienated group members find comfort in adhering to a collective belief system where dissent is discouraged, a sense of group purpose is reinforced, and rules are strictly imposed—apparently confirming the writings of terrorism psychologists.     

Hungary and the European Union: The political implications of societal security promotion

Hungary's constitutional commitment to support kin-nationals beyond its borders (nation policy) has been a central feature of its post-1989 foreign policy and highlights a particularly important national security concern—the societal security of national identity, culture, language and tradition. This article examines Hungary's societal security concerns and the policy methods it utilises, including its EU membership and the promotion of minority rights at the European level, to help combat these concerns. It is suggested that Hungary has found it somewhat difficult to balance its societal security policy objective with internal economic demands on its welfare system and its external foreign policy objective to maintain good neighbourly relations. This article also notes that Hungary's attempts to Europeanise, or rather ‘EU-ise’, minority and ethnic rights issues as a means to enhance societal security for the Hungarian nation has certain political consequences for the EU. This suggests that societal security provision is an issue that cannot be overlooked when trying to understand the longer-term implications of EU eastern enlargement.     

Reaching the Hard to Reach: Drawing Lessons From Research and Practice

Communicating with citizens, stakeholders, or service clients is challenging under normal circumstances. Reaching government audiences who are hard to reach because of language or culture differences, lifestyle unpredictability, mistrust, isolation, or other reasons compounds the difficulty. This article examines who the hard to reach are, addresses reasons why it is important for governments to reach them, explores research and experience, suggests effective approaches for reaching these audiences—drawing upon a social constructionist approach—and proposes lessons and guidelines for public sector communicators. Communication practice and research indicate that more effective strategies include: utilizing knowledge about target audiences; forming partnerships with agencies and individuals that interact with targeted populations; utilizing children to reach parents and older relatives; using ethnic media that effectively reach immigrant and ethnic minority households; and simplifying communication and using feedback techniques.     

DEWEY AND THE DIALOGICAL PROCESS: SPEAKING,LISTENING, AND TODAY'S MEDIA

This article examines John Dewey's understanding of the importance of communication in the development and transmission of shared community values, and consequently, in the maintenance of democratic practices. At the root of any community is the storehouse of its common goods, and the process by which such goods are designated as common is dialogue. Dialogue is characterized by two activities—speaking and active listening—both of which involve the will of the actors to participate. This kind of dialogue becomes especially important in a democratic society when there are differences and disagreements about what constitutes the good. In a diverse and plural society, the communicative practice of dialogue then becomes a critical process for the maintenance and enrichment of the fundamental democratic bond. Failure to sustain authentic dialogue leads to social fragmentation and isolation and to the erosion of democratic community. Do today's media of communication—television, radio, and, especially, the Internet—enhance or constrain the possibilities for the authentic communication necessary to sustain democracy?     

Wasted Words? The Limitations of U.S. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy

For America's foes in Afghanistan and the Middle East, triumph on the battlefield is less important than winning the battle of perceptions. In response, the United States has turned to Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy (SC-PD) to engage key audiences in ways that advance U.S. interests and to win the political-ideological contest for domestic and international legitimacy. But are these strategies effective? While winning hearts and minds is politically important, SC-PD—even at its best—is much less effective than other well-crafted and mutually supportive policies and strategies. Moreover, there are structural obstacles that greatly limit the effectiveness of SC-PD.     

Power,Interests and Coalitions: the political economy of mass privatisation in Turkey

This article argues that ethnicity has become increasingly salient in Afghan politics and society during the years of war, and discusses how the country's new institutions can be designed in a way that will contribute towards a reversal of this trend. The article examines a series of policy issues with a bearing on inclusion vs exclusion in inter‐ethnic relations: political institution building (institutions of government, electoral system, and centre–region relations), land rights, state religion, the census and the new identity document. For each of these the article discusses what outcome would best contribute to longer‐term stability and integration by stimulating inclusive, integrative identities—and what the problems and prospects are for these outcomes to be realised. The article specifically discusses warlords' role as spoilers, and the potential and limitations to the leverage on Afghan politics that is held by international actors, above all the USA.     

Public Perceptions of Privatization in Ethiopia: A Case for Public Good or Private Gain?

Ethiopia is one of the many countries in sub-Saharan Africa attempting to privatize various state-owned enterprises since 1994. This study examined public perceptions about Ethiopia's privatization policy and procedures. Results support the concerns over the public's inability to know about, be involved in and comment upon public policies affecting Ethiopia's future. Findings also support the literature that a privatization policy is effective only when institutional and technical capacities for proper implementation are in place. Further, findings raise questions about the efficacy of privatization in a national context where interests may be misrepresented.     

Super-optimizing china: reunification as an example

Whereas political issues and problems in China are complicated, efforts to “super-optimize” are essential and can be fruitful. The reunification issue is discussed to illustrate even highly politicized problems in China are amenable to super-optimum solutions. At the moment, some reunification options have been proposed: KMT-CCP negotiation on equal footing; KMT's military takeover; CCP's military takeover; the “one country, two systems” formula, convergence by democratization, and incremental convergence through trading and communication. Yet, neither parties find the alternatives desirable in terms of optimal satisfaction. By applying SOS rule # 2 (finding items that will provide large benefits to one side but only small costs to the other side), # 5 (combining the conservative and liberal alternatives where they are not mutually exclusive), and # 6 (removing the source of the conflict), reunification and democratization are made feasible and all parties concerned are better off. The specific proposals are that Taiwan should introduce a wholesale buy-out scheme that costs US$30 billion, that a new republic be established, and that legislative powers should be shared among the majoritarian and non-majoritarian institutions. Together, these arrangements could ensure stability and result in democratization.     

Stabilising Iraq's Water Supply: what the Euphrates and Tigris rivers can learn from the Indus

The future stability of the young and relatively weak Iraqi government rests on its ability to provide basic public goods—water, food, and electricity—to its populace, which is related directly to stabilising the quality and quantity of its available water supply. Since 98% of Iraq's water comes from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, both of which originate and flow through several countries before entering Iraq, stabilising the water supply becomes an international issue. In other words, to stabilise Iraq's water supply, there needs to be a comprehensive agreement between the states sharing the Euphrates and Tigris. As this article argues, an agreement is possible when states have an interest in co-operation, a neutral mediator facilitates the negotiations, and a river commission is established to maintain long-term co-operation. Due to important changes today the states sharing the Euphrates and Tigris rivers confront favourable conditions that can lead to an agreement.     

The Great Convergence and the Logic of One World

A great historical transition is underway from American‐led Globalization 1.0 to Globalization 2.0—the interdependence of plural identities where no one power or alliance of powers dominates. The G‐20 is floundering as the immediate global financial crisis has receded. The United Nations and the old Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO—have lost their vigor and are struggling to adjust to the global powershift with the rise of the emerging economies. While Europe is paralyzed as the historic project of integration stalls, the world's two largest economies—the United States and China—are as yet unable to figure out how to share power. The danger now is that the geopolitical vacuum will invite assertions of national self‐interest that will unravel the rules‐based order that enabled stability and prosperity over recent decades. America's leading geopolitical strategist, China's most outspoken strategic thinker and one of Asia's leading global thinkers from Singapore offer their reflections on this state of affairs.     

The Use of Information and Communication Technologies by Protesters and the Authorities in the Attempts at Colour Revolutions in Belarus 2001–2010

Information and communication technology have played an important role in the tactics of uprisings against non-democratic regimes worldwide. However, there has been little attention paid in studies so far of how authorities in those countries employ such information and communication technology. In this article we examine the evolution of such tactics as employed by one of the most ingrained authoritarian regimes—that of Belarus—during the decade 2001 to 2010. The political opposition's responses to the authorities' countermeasures are also investigated, followed by an analysis of the co-evolution of these opponents' tactics.     

What Does Dabiq Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Organizational Fractures within Dabiq Magazine

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)'s flagship English-language magazine, Dabiq, is a puzzle. The magazine is not, despite appearances, primarily designed for direct recruiting efforts or inciting violence against the West. In fact, the primary audiences of Dabiq are English-speaking second generation Muslims or converts, Western policymakers, and a third group of current or would-be members of ISIS who are not integrating with the organization itself. The third audience—those members who are failing to function within the organization—is strange to include in an English-language magazine. Why publish organizational weaknesses, in English? One possibility for this puzzle is that the fundamentalist hermeneutics of ISIS is reflected in their own media efforts. One of the assumptions that ISIS holds about their sacred texts is that each text carries a single meaning that reflects the author's original intent. There might be multiple applications of that intent, but each text can only have one intent, and therefore one meaning. Following this logic, a message meant for one person is unlikely to be of utility for another, and so this may be why ISIS exposes their weaknesses as part of the process of correcting their own members.     

Targeting Civilians in Ethno-Territorial Wars: Power- and Preference-Based Sources of Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Killing Strategies

In internal ethno-territorial conflicts, what explains why state or rebel group leaderships use civilian-targeting strategies—expulsion or mass killing strategies designed to punish enemy civilians or to decimate the enemy civilian presence on contested territory? One argument is that those living under the worst initial conditions—defined in terms of collective goods such as weak collective autonomy, policy outcomes, and material conditions—are most likely to target enemy group civilians. Another approach focuses on relative power—arguing that the enemy civilian population is targeted either because of weaker or stronger relative power. A third approach argues that differences in leadership preferences—in particular, more ideologically extreme or power-seeking preferences—are likely to drive direct assaults on enemy civilians. We examine these proposed mechanisms in terms of expected effects on benefits and costs in a simple ethno-territorial bargaining framework. We argue that relative power advantages and more extreme nationalist preferences seem most likely to predict decisions to target enemy civilian populations. We expect strongly power-seeking preferences to lead to civilian targeting more conditionally—where there is a greater internal political threat along with either greater relative power or a more moderate enemy. Last, we do not expect that variation in initial conditions will have a significant direct effect. We apply the framework to explain patterns of civilian targeting following the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991.

[Supplementary material is available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism for the following free supplemental resource: online appendix.]     

China and America in a Post‐Hegemonic Age

A great historical transition is underway from American‐led Globalization 1.0 to Globalization 2.0—the interdependence of plural identities where no one power or alliance of powers dominates. The G‐20 is floundering as the immediate global financial crisis has receded. The United Nations and the old Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO—have lost their vigor and are struggling to adjust to the global powershift with the rise of the emerging economies. While Europe is paralyzed as the historic project of integration stalls, the world's two largest economies—the United States and China—are as yet unable to figure out how to share power. The danger now is that the geopolitical vacuum will invite assertions of national self‐interest that will unravel the rules‐based order that enabled stability and prosperity over recent decades. America's leading geopolitical strategist, China's most outspoken strategic thinker and one of Asia's leading global thinkers from Singapore offer their reflections on this state of affairs.     

For A New Bipolarity: China and Russia vs. America

A great historical transition is underway from American‐led Globalization 1.0 to Globalization 2.0—the interdependence of plural identities where no one power or alliance of powers dominates. The G‐20 is floundering as the immediate global financial crisis has receded. The United Nations and the old Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO—have lost their vigor and are struggling to adjust to the global powershift with the rise of the emerging economies. While Europe is paralyzed as the historic project of integration stalls, the world's two largest economies—the United States and China—are as yet unable to figure out how to share power. The danger now is that the geopolitical vacuum will invite assertions of national self‐interest that will unravel the rules‐based order that enabled stability and prosperity over recent decades. America's leading geopolitical strategist, China's most outspoken strategic thinker and one of Asia's leading global thinkers from Singapore offer their reflections on this state of affairs.     

The state‐Moro armed conflict in the Philippines Unresolved national question or question of governance?

The continuing struggle of the Moro secessionist movement in the Philippines is one of Southeast Asia's longest armed conflicts. The tenacity of the conflict lies in two competing concerns: the assertion of self‐determination rights of the Moro separatist movement; and the affirmation of the Philippines’ sovereign right to territorial integrity. However, beneath these rights are crucial issues that remain unanswered both by the contending forces—problems where internecine violence and conflict emanate from. This article argues that self‐determination rights can be adequately exercised by people who have clearly defined their national identity and concept of a nation. Unfortunately, the Moro multi‐ethnic national identity has yet to be crystallised while the idea of a Bangsamoro (Bangsa Nation) remains weak. On the other hand, the state has yet to address the Moron’ legitimate demands of political autonomy, socio‐economic development, and social justice and discrimination. Without underestimating the ethnic component of secessionism, the article concludes that poor governance has prolonged, complicated, and further justified the Moros’ quest to secede from the Republic.     

The Role of Former Combatants in Preventing Youth Involvement in Terrorism in Northern Ireland: A Framework for Assessing Former Islamic State Combatants

The article engages with emerging debates on the potential role returning Islamic State fighters may have in preventing violence and whether nonviolent radical ideology acts as a conveyor-belt or firewall to violence. Rather than focusing on former combatant ideologies, it demonstrates how framing processes—not ideology per se—are more salient indicators of whether former combatants will act as conveyor-belts or firewalls to violence. The analytical framework developed for analyzing framing processes is then applied to the case of Northern Ireland. It argues that ideology shapes and constrains the type of antiviolence framing that may emerge, which provides a middle ground between the two perspectives in the literature. Furthermore, the article highlights the importance of network structures, incentives, and opportunities insofar as these can shape antiviolence framing and improve resonance among audiences. While recognizing the differences between cases, the framework is then used to argue that former Islamic State combatants can play a preventative role depending on whether their antiviolence framing is based on durable structural conditions, de-glamorizes violence, and is supported by networks that incentivize its diffusion—not on whether they have denounced their ideology.     

Why China Won't Follow Arab Revolt

Do China's mandarins have anything to fear from the winds of freedom that have blown away Arab autocrats? The short answer is no—for now. The Chinese government has performed for its people, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty during the same length of time Hosni Mubarak reigned in Egypt. Though many in the West would like to think so, it is not likely that the rising middle class in China will one day also fill Tiananmen Square in protest. In the immediate future, the chaos and economic drift that will now engulf the liberated Middle East will remind them again that China was right not to go down the path of Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika in Russia. And it is not as if they will have a chance. The authorities are determined never to allow any two people who vent virtually on the Net to meet in the street. In this section, we discuss the impact of the Arab revolt—and lack of it—on China's system of governance.