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1.
Bahl  Roy; Johannes  Linn 《Publius》1994,24(1):1-20
This article addresses the issue of fiscal decentralizationin developing countries, and the use of intergovernmental transfersto achieve this objective. We find that developing countrieshave more centralized fiscal structures and argue that thisis consistent with the theory of fiscal federalism. Economicdevelopment, however, does push the advantage toward decentralization.We also show that developing countries use a wide variety oftransfer instruments to fund local governments, and that theseinstruments give the national government varying degrees ofcontrol over local government finances.  相似文献   

2.
政绩晋升效应与地方财政民生支出——一个案例研究   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
在收入集权的财政体制下,中央财政通过转移支付将大量的财政资金下拨给地方政府来实施民生工程。这笔庞大的财政资金是否真的能够"达到它所希望到达的地方"?地方政府实施民生工程的动力在哪?用过程追踪的个案研究方法,通过江西省南昌市D区的个案研究发现,基于官员对职务晋升的追求,上级政府以政绩考核的方式推动着地方政府改变支出结构,将财政资金投入到民生工程中,以地区竞争的方式来获得上级的认可以求晋升。这一研究表明以"一票否决"资格赛为基础,规定考核任务为核心,"面子工程"获加分的"三位一体"式的政绩考核机制,有力地保障了民生工程的实施效果。但这种考核机制是否能够通行于其他政策的实施过程,还有待更进一步的研究。  相似文献   

3.
This article seeks to identify institutional causes behind policy-specific retrenchments in the Swedish welfare state. During the austerity period of the 1980s and 1990s, the Swedish welfare state simultaneously experienced retrenchments in some fields and stability or expansion in others. Elderlycare is an example of tremendous retrenchment and childcare one of continuous expansion. A comparison of both fields suggests that the divergent trends might be related to different policy-specific levels of institutional fragmentation in the implementation process. In elderlycare, implementation was strongly fragmented between the central and local government level, with the central government providing only weak overarching regulation and the local governments enjoying considerable local implementation discretion. As a consequence, in this field, local governments had enough discretion to impose local retrenchment measures in order to adapt to the conditions of austerity. In childcare, a similar development did not take place because in this field the municipal implementation autonomy was severely circumscribed by strong central state regulations. It is probable that the different institutional preconditions in both fields have been shaped intentionally by means of governmental institutional engineering. The decentralized decision-making structure in elderlycare might have allowed the central government to induce blame-avoidant retrenchments on the local government level.  相似文献   

4.
The Tunisian government has long admitted that its excessively centralized administrative and political systems have generated heavy costs in terms of inefficiency and citizen alienation. A major decentralizing reform effort was launched in the mid-1970s, the most important parts of which dealt with changes in local taxation powers, and in the sources and size of grants and loans which Tunisian communes receive from national sources. The result to date has been a modest increase in communal revenues from the new or increased taxes, and a more significant increase in central government grants to local governments. Smaller and more rural communes are heavily dependent on grants to undertake development actions, their tax base being negligible. The revised systefn generates more revenue, and distributes resources more equitably, than the previous arrangements. In theory, it gives a greatly increased latitude to elected communal councils. Nonetheless, the local governments-and the communes in particular-remain severely constrained by central government authorities. The conclusion is that the decentralization reform has been partial and halting, and will in all probability continue in the same manner.  相似文献   

5.
Restructuring of central and local government relations has occurred in a number of countries during the 1980s, and has been a striking phenomenon even in such different countries as Poland, Sweden and the US. In the first part of the article a resource framework is presented, designed to make basic comparisons of these relations between different countries. Five sets of resources are identified: constitutional-legal, regulatory, financial, political and professional resources. It is argued that local-government disposal of such resources provides a potential for local discretion. The applicability of the framework is illustrated by reference to a study of Poland, Sweden and the US, focusing on the restructuring of central and local government relations in these countries during the 1980s. The conclusion is that decentralization has occurred in all three cases, especially in terms of regulatory and other non-financial resources. However, in Sweden and the US this trend has been counterbalanced by centralization of financial control. In Poland the post-communist revolution has paved the way for a restoration of the pre-war local self-government system. Democratic elections at the local level are seen as crucial to break down the old, centralized party-state system, and to reintroduce a dual local government system. In all three cases economic pressure, related to the individual countries' positions in the world capitalist system, seems to have been the main driving force beind the decentralization processes. However, the forms, magnitude and effects of decentralization must be seen in relation to the specific political economies and histories of the three countries. Thus, to understand the causes, mechanisms and effects of central–local government restructuring in depth one has to relate the resource approach to a broader theoretical framework.  相似文献   

6.
Osaghae  Eghosa E. 《Publius》1990,20(1):83-98
The central argument in this article is that it is wrong toconceive of federalism as simply a degree of decentralization.Decentralization can only be applied meaningfully to federalismin matters that belong to the central government. Even then,unlike unitary decentralization, which is entirely at the discretionof the central government, federal decentralization is bothmandatory and guaranteed. Much more than this, however, thekey to distinguishing federal systems from nonfederal systems,which also have "degrees of decentralization," lies in the conceptof noncentralization by which is meant that matters belongingto the states cannot ordinarily be centralized unilaterally.It is this noncentralization, which opposes decentralization(because decentralization presupposes centralization), thatmakes federalism a highly distinct form of "decentralization."  相似文献   

7.
The centralized system of government in the People's Republic of Benin was established when the country was a French colony. During the 1970s and 1980s, the government system was reorganized to conform to the principles of the ruling Marxist–Leninist regime. Deteriorating economic conditions have negatively affected the public sector in recent years. The capital city of Cotonou, however, has managed to perform better than other urban governments despite facing serious economic problems and many constraints imposed by a strict system of central control over local authorities. This paper examines the nature of and reasons for Cotonou's performance.  相似文献   

8.
在2011年全国调查数据的基础上,尝试以民众对不同层级政府的评价差异解释差序政府信任产生和维系的原因。研究发现民众在对中央和地方政府在绩效、动机以及腐败程度等问题进行评价时显著青睐于中央政府,这种评价上的差异导致民众对中央政府的信任显著高于对地方政府的信任,从而产生了差序政府信任。  相似文献   

9.
Abstract

The UK has become a prime case for the implementation of the ‘new governance’ of partnership between central government and civil society. This perspective has become central to New Labour policies for both local socio-economic regeneration and democratic renewal in the United Kingdom. However, limitations in its redistribution of power, its transparency in the policy-making process, including the representativeness of civil society participants, and, in the effectiveness of its outcomes have all been alleged by academic critics. These issues are explored by contrasting a robust, British case of local, participatory governance in Bristol with a quite different, and more conventional approach to democratic renewal in the Italian city of Naples. Despite similar problems of socio-economic dereliction and similar schemes of regeneration in the two cases, the Italian approach emphasized the exclusive role of a renewed constitutional democracy, while in Bristol central government agencies promoted an accentuation of local trends to participation by local civil society organizations. Applying an analytical framework composed of national policies and regulations, institutional rules and norms, and the collective ‘identity’ factors identified by social capital theory, governance changes are here treated as ‘exogenous shocks’ and/or as opportunities for choice. However, over and above differences in these institutional frameworks the key factors are shown to be the longer-standing political cultures influencing local actors and their own repertoires of action; with repertoires influenced by objective validations of previous policy choices, or economic or electoral successes. The study finds that the achievements of the ‘inclusive’, participative governance approach do not significantly exceed those of an exclusivist, ‘neo-constitutionalism’, as practised by a more autonomous local government in Naples. Thus, on this evidence, enhanced civil society engagement still requires greater freedom from central government direction.  相似文献   

10.
This article examines the saga of local government restructuring in Canada's capital city. Specifically, it analyzes the interplay between provincial and local agendas for local government reform over many years, which culminated in provincial legislation and a one-year transition process to establish one municipality for the Ottawa city region. In doing so, the article addresses the extent to which the Ottawa transition demonstrates learning from other major urban restructuring efforts and the extent to which the Ottawa case provides new insights for future local government reform efforts. Key conclusions are that the key motivation for provincially initiated reform—cost saving through simplification of the local government structure in Ottawa—does not fully coincide with local needs and interests. Furthermore, the promise of financial savings has proven difficult to realize as a result of the local politics surrounding existing municipal debt and unresolved human resource management costs. Instead, future benefits from the amalgamation may lie in improved capacity to manage physical development, environmental sustainability, and cultural diversity.  相似文献   

11.
Renewed interest by the Indonesian government in decentralization and cost-recovery practices has led to both real and illusory reforms, though the distinction between the two is often not clear. This is particularly true with respect to infrastructure planning and finance. Recently, the allocation criteria for capital grants to local governments have been substantially revised, nearly every year, to reflect long lasting concerns regarding differences in interregional development needs and resources. In addition, the level of funding for local government investment has risen dramatically to support increased local responsibility in planning. Most development spending does not pass through local budgets, however. In either case, the project planning process has remained firmly under the direction of the central government's technical ministries. Infrastructure investment thus tends to be segmented, not only by sector, but also by funding source. The rate at which these two factors balance off in current practice does not indicate a strong commitment to effective decentralization. The article suggests that greater regional government participation in the national planning process would be beneficial. To deal with the fragmented nature of sectoral planning is more problematic, as a more integrated approach would in the long term require either a new layer of bureaucracy or a substantial reorganization of the technical ministries. In the shorter term, a gradual shift toward general purpose grants would also generate regional development plans more consistent with the goals of decentralization while maintaining substantial central control and oversight.  相似文献   

12.
This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London. In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non-local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non-local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state. Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before. Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site. In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans. The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs. Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long-term, non-issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.  相似文献   

13.
在我国单一制政体和复杂的府际关系下,社会政策的创新与扩散是一个涉面广泛、多元博弈的复杂政治过程。基于政策创新扩散理论,对中央、23个省级政府和4个直辖市的医药价格改革制度进行了案例追踪和文本比较分析。研究发现,地方医药价格改革政策扩散效应显著,随时间进程扩散呈现全国互动模型下的"S"型曲线;空间维度上,整体表现为由经济发达的东部沿海地区先行,逐步向中部、西部等其他地区推进;区域扩散和邻近效应显著,扩散存在势能差且具有一定的梯度性,沿动力源向周围政策势能低的省份扩散,呈现等级制模型;垂直影响和层级效应明显,体现政策变迁的互动性、动态性与复杂性;扩散内容以跟风模仿为主,学习性与创新能力不足。为提高地方政府政策持续创新力,中央政府应完善顶层设计并适当放权,拓展地方政府创新空间;地方政府应审时度势,积极提升再创新能力,发挥垂直影响的积极作用,加快政策扩散进程。  相似文献   

14.
Growing dissatisfaction with representative democracy and concomitantly, the increasing expectation that citizens assert more influence over public policy have seen the emergence of more participatory and deliberative forms of governance in public management practice. This article explores the attempt of the state government of Victoria, Australia to legislate for mandatory deliberative engagement as part of its local government strategic planning instruments. The ambition of the reform was significant; however, it was almost unanimously rejected by the local government sector. Based on analysis of the key themes that emerged from the submissions made during the 3-year Victorian Local Government Act Review process, we explore the limitations and barriers to implementing deliberative engagement practice at a local government level. We demonstrate that whilst the promise of participatory democracy might have been compelling, in the case of Victoria there were a series of contextual and capacity considerations that needed to be taken into account before the implementation of such reforms were pursued.  相似文献   

15.
Abstract Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.  相似文献   

16.
Reversing European trends toward the consolidation of local government and the imposition of stronger central controls, the French Socialist government undertook a major legislative programme to restructure French local government. This experience is examined in the light of early Socialist commitment to municipal Socialism and their return to power in the Fifth Republic using their local power base. Local reform posed three dilemmas for the Socialists: how to avoid turning local government over to the extreme left or autogestion forces in the party; how to meet the economic demands of locally elected officials without losing fiscal and financial control; and how to enhance decision‐making powers of elected officials at all three levels (municipal, département and region) while also achieving managerial reforms. Their pluralist response was a pragmatic blend of political, economic and budgetary concessions. Participation was enhanced by vigorous efforts to revive voluntary associations; contractual arrangements were devised to put economic programmes for unemployed youth, the elderly and industrial assistance more squarely in local hands; and new managerial methods were coupled to limits on prefectoral powers and budgetary initiatives. The reforms offer important new opportunities for the growth of local government while confirming Socialist dedication to republican ideals.  相似文献   

17.
We model the spatial allocation of resources over constituencies as an optimization problem in which governing parties face uncertainty about voter preferences, but seek to increase their chances of getting re-elected. We show that a rational government should allocate extra resources to marginal constituencies and especially favour opposition-held marginals. We test this hypothesis on data about central government grants to larger English local authorities. We consider whether Conservative controlled and 'flagship' local authorities also benefit. Our empirical results suggest that the government allocated around £500 million more to local authorities containing marginal constituencies and around £155 million more to 'flagship' local authorities than they could have been expected to get on the criteria of social need and population.  相似文献   

18.
Local government is subject to extensive lobbying, which is reasonable given the greater importance of the local public sector in large welfare states. Most of the scholarly attention has been focused on lobbying at the national level, often addressing the impact of interest groups on public policies. This article discusses a decision–making model where interest groups optimize their lobbying efforts given the way that different local governments and individual politicians respond to these activities. A number of propositions are tested on the basis of data from Norwegian local government. Contrary to prior theorizing, we do not find that representatives seeking re–election are contacted more frequently by interest groups. Interest groups target their lobbying activities toward politicians who are members of the relevant council committees, and they exert stronger pressure on members of the executive board and active representatives who perceive themselves as influential. Inter–municipal differences are also of importance: The lobbying activities are more intensive where electoral participation is low and in the larger urban municipalities, while the size of legislatures and the strength of the local political leadership affect lobbying efforts negatively. Interest groups tend to be more active in the richer local governments. The demands of the residential population impact weakly on lobbying efforts.  相似文献   

19.
This article examines a frontier research area: local energy conservation and intergovernmental relations. The vast potential for financial and energy savings by local governments through energy conservation is contrasted to a significant lack of meaningful programs by reviewing current local programs through examination of research efforts, intergovernmental trends in assistance and the legal foundation for local energy roles. Several items for the energy conservation research agenda are offered, especially a call for more research on the relationship between rising energy prices and development of energy programs. Other research foci are the impacts of intergovernmental technical assistance, organizational structures for incorporating energy conservation concerns into local government, state-local program coordination, citizen demand for conservation programs and the information dissemination networks in energy policy.  相似文献   

20.
In this paper, we use city‐level datasets of social assistance programmes over 280 cities between year 2003 and 2011 to verify the existence of the crowding out between social assistance programmes and unemployment insurance in China. In other words, the expansion of social assistance programmes is associated with a reduction in the enrolment of unemployment insurance. With verifying the existence of the crowding out, this article argues that the crowding out is a result of an ineffective coordination across government departments. In the process of ‘dual decentralization,’ in which the central government has delegated welfare provision responsibility to local governments, the misalignment of incentive and institutions between central and local governments explains the ineffective coordination. Different from many studies in the literature, this paper presents an adverse consequence of China's bureaucratic incentive system in social policy implementation. Also, while the conceptual framework ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ has highlighted the policy ineffectiveness in the economic policy area, this paper contributes to this literature by illustrating the policy ineffectiveness in the social policy areas. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

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