Interest-Based Negotiations in a Transformed Labor–Management Setting

The authors introduce a group of essays that evolved from a March 2003 symposium on the path-breaking new partnership and use of interest-based negotiation (IBN) at Kaiser Permanente (KP), one of the largest integrated health care programs in the United States. They briefly trace the history of the IBN approach (both success stories and failures); the growth of this phenomenon; and its use in collective bargaining settings. The KP case, the focus of the symposium (which was jointly sponsored by MIT's Institute for Work and Employment Relations and Harvard's Program on Negotiation), is by far the largest instance of the use of IBN in U.S. labor relations history.     

Kaiser Permanente: Using Interest-Based Negotiations to Craft a New Collective Bargaining Agreement

Building on a new labor–management partnership, Kaiser Permanente and its nearly seventy thousand union employees negotiated a five-year contract agreement in 2000 based on the principles of "interest-based negotiations." The people who made this remarkable achievement happen as well as the historic background of the case are described and analyzed. A key element to the success of this initiative was the back-and-forth work of many different groups, including joint labor–management committee, coalitions of unions, bargaining task groups focused on particular subject areas, and local and national leaders of the company and its unions. Using illustrative comments from actual participants in this complex, nearly year-long negotiation process, the authors explore how the parties crafted their agreement.     

The Shadow Negotiation and the Interest-Based Approach at Kaiser Permanente

As interesting and significant as the Kaiser Permanente case is in and of itself, there were many parallel negotiations that took place just below the surface of the overt negotiations. The author focuses on this "shadow negotiation," exploring a series of strategic moves that took place in the case, enabling the parties to craft their negotiation process. These shadow negotiations involved positioning moves, process moves, power moves, and appreciative moves. The parallel shadow negotiation was a significant factor in the success of the Kaiser Permanente negotiations.     

Tales of the Bazaar: Interest-Based Negotiation Across Cultures

Interest-based negotiation, as popularized by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991), is a favored negotiation style of many people in the United States and other parts of the developed world. The author, an American attorney who has traveled widely, assesses how that approach works in different cultural contexts. Using illustrations from his own experiences, the author shows how interest-based techniques work successfully, as well as the limitations of this approach in some situations.     

The Strategic Use of Interests,Rights, and Power to Resolve Disputes

To ensure success in resolving difficult disputes, negotiators mustmake strategic decisions about their negotiation approach. In this essay,we make practical recommendations for negotiation strategy based on Ury,Brett, and Goldberg's (1993) interests, rights, and power framework fordispute resolution and subsequent empirical research by Brett, Shapiro, andLytle (1998). We discuss how negotiations cycle through interests, rights,and power foci; the prevalence of reciprocity; and the one-sided,distributive outcomes that result from reciprocity of rights and powercommunications. We then turn to using interests, rights and powerstrategically in negotiations. We discuss choosing an opening stragegy,breaking conflict spirals of reciprocated rights and power communications,and when and how to use rights and power communications effectively innegotiations.     

Supplemental Joint Brainstorming: Navigating Past the Perils of Traditional Bargaining

Though decision makers in many domains use bargaining as their primary approach to negotiation, it has limited efficacy in multi-issue, nonquantifiable transactions. Nevertheless, many negotiators use back-and-forth bargaining rather than other approaches. The author explicates reasons for this choice and describes supplemental joint brainstorming, an innovative strategy to supplement the institutionally-entrenched bargaining approach to negotiation with interest-based negotiation.     

Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process

This article aims to broaden the theoretical foundations of the two-level games approach to understanding international negotiations by considering the conditions under which public opinion can act as a domestic constraint on the ability of international negotiators to reach agreement. In determining the role that public opinion plays, three factors are of central importance: (1) the preferences of the public relative to those of decision makers and other domestic constituents; (2) the intensity of the issue under negotiation; and (3) the power of the public to ratify a potential agreement. Evidence from the last decade of Anglo-Irish negotiations over the future and status of Northern Ireland shows that public opinion acts as a constraint on negotiators when the public has the power to directly ratify an international agreement. When the public's power to ratify an agreement is indirect, the intensity of the issue under negotiation will play a critical role in determining whether public preferences serve as a constraint on decision makers.     

Is Bigger Better? Activity and Success in Negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly

Theorists often claim that being bigger than one's counterparts offers advantages in multilateral negotiations. In this article, I examine that argument using data from negotiations in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The article analyzes and compares the activity levels of smaller and larger states in international negotiations, and sheds light on the conditions under which the latter “punch below their weight.” My analysis indicates that size directly affects participation, but not success rates. Bigger states can better formulate national positions on a broad range of issues, enabling their diplomats to more actively participate in negotiations, while smaller states are absent more often. Activity is conducive to success, which helps bigger states. But not every negotiation strategy is equally effective. In the UNGA's one‐state, one‐vote context, bigger states are not able to systematically exert disproportionate influence despite their often superior financial resources and bargaining strategies.     

Beyond contestation: conceptualizing negotiation in democracy promotion

ABSTRACT

This article presents an analytical framework that guides the contributions to this special issue and, in general terms, aims at enabling a systematic investigation of processes of negotiation in the international promotion of democracy. It first briefly introduces the rationale for studying democracy promotion negotiation, offers a definition, and locates the general approach within the academic literature, bringing together different strands of research, namely studies of negotiation in international relations as well as research on democratization and democracy promotion. The larger part of the article then discusses key concepts, analytical distinctions and theoretical propositions along the lines of the three research questions that are identified in the introduction to this special issue. More specifically, the article (1) offers a typology that facilitates a systematic empirical analysis of the issues that are discussed in democracy promotion negotiations; (2) takes initial steps towards a causal theory of democracy promotion negotiation by identifying and discussing a set of parameters that can be expected to shape such negotiations; and (3) introduces key distinctions and dimensions that help guide empirical research on the output and outcome of negotiations in democracy promotion.     

Does Interest-Based Bargaining (IBB) Really Make a Difference in Collective Bargaining Outcomes?

This study seeks to identify what specific kinds of compromises result from IBB, or interest-based bargaining, and what differentiates agreements that are reached using this method from the ones that are negotiated through more traditional forms of collective bargaining. The authors compare the changes to collective agreements in 19 cases that used interest-based bargaining and the changes to agreements in 19 cases that used more traditional forms of negotiation. Their analysis reveals that clauses dealing with joint governance and organizational innovation underwent more changes when the parties adopted the IBB approach. In addition, IBB has given rise to more union concessions.     

Ingredients of a Successful Track Two Negotiation

During three days in 2003, an Israeli–Palestinian group met in London to negotiate the draft of the “Geneva Initiative,” which offered a potential final status agreement between Israel and Palestine. In this article, I analyze the video recording of these unofficial negotiations and examine how the framing and conduct of the talks enabled significant progress toward reaching an agreement. I describe six main framing techniques used by the mediators: calling the meetings an “exercise,” which reduced restraints on the participants and enhanced their flexibility, avoiding deep historical issues to focus solely on future‐oriented pragmatic solutions, allowing the participants to discuss any topic they chose while deliberately avoiding crucial narrative issues, convincing the participants that this track two negotiation was crucial for the future of official Israeli–Palestinian relations, accentuating the parties' understandings and agreements with each other, and building a sense of superordinate group identity among the participants, to encourage cooperation. These components were the key “ingredients” for the first — and still the only — (unofficial) detailed proposal for an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement. They provide lessons that could improve the success of other track two negotiations.     

Third Parties and Culture

This essay describes the four broad themes that emerged from our discussionabout the role of process in cross-cultural negotiations and considerstheir implications for future research. First, we address the nature of theconflict, in particular whether a negotiation is classified as a dispute or atransactional exchange. Second, we contrast the role of cognition and rapportin negotiations and consider when rapport replaces the centrality ofcognition. We also discuss the extent to which negotiating processes createrelationships based on trust or power, and consider how cultural valuesinfluence the development of these underlying relationships. Finally, weconsider the role of culture in defining what is perceived as an optimal outcomeand raise the possibility that suboptimal outcomes may holdsymbolic value in cross-cultural negotiations.     

Process in Cross-Cultural Negotiations

This essay describes the four broad themes that emerged from our discussionabout the role of process in cross-cultural negotiations and considerstheir implications for future research. First, we address the nature of theconflict, in particular whether a negotiation is classified as a dispute or atransactional exchange. Second, we contrast the role of cognition and rapportin negotiations and consider when rapport replaces the centrality ofcognition. We also discuss the extent to which negotiating processes createrelationships based on trust or power, and consider how cultural valuesinfluence the development of these underlying relationships. Finally, weconsider the role of culture in defining what is perceived as an optimal outcomeand raise the possibility that suboptimal outcomes may holdsymbolic value in cross-cultural negotiations.     

Studying small states in international security affairs: a quantitative analysis

Todays’ international security architecture composed of international security treaties and international security norms has been established and formalized by negotiations. Owing to the great importance of international security negotiations for international security practices, this paper sheds light on negotiation activities. A study of 100 different international security negotiations shows that states vary considerably with respect to their negotiation activity. Some countries voice positions very often, while others remain completely silent. This is puzzling, as active negotiation participation is an expression of state sovereignty and a means to influence the shape of the international security architecture. The article distinguishes between capacity and incentives as driving forces of state activity in international security negotiations. The analysis reveals that, next to political and financial capacities, states that place high priority on military matters are more active, while smaller and poorer states are more likely to shelter under the security umbrella of larger counterparts.     

Negotiation: The Chinese Concept

It is no understatement to say that negotiation activity has skyrocketed in China in recent years; however, these negotiations are frequently unsatisfactory. Part of the reason for this lack of success is that Chinese people have a conception of negotiation that is fundamentally different from that of people in the West. Based on extensive interviews with Chinese and non-Chinese negotiators over a period of five years, the author explains the Chinese approach by using two metaphors: mobile warfare and the joint quest. Understanding this approach has significant implications for negotiation practice.     

Structural,Domestic, and Strategic Interests in the European Union: Negotiation Positions in the Council of Ministers

Preferences are a crucial element for analyzing decision making and negotiations, but knowledge about which factors determine these preferences is sparse. Some quantitative and qualitative studies of European Union (EU) negotiations have assumed that the negotiation conflict dimensions in intergovernmental negotiations reflect market‐versus‐regulation approaches as well as a north–south dimension. In this study, I demonstrate that these findings can be extended to show that the relevant determining factors for negotiation positions are economic structural variables and the degree to which a country benefits from the EU. Furthermore, the domestic interests of EU governments better explain a government's interest in some specific issues, such as consumer protection or fishery policies, than do their partisan preferences. Moreover, I am able to show that in frequent negotiations, such as EU Council of Ministers negotiations, sincere preferences dominate; however, some factors, such as extreme salience, can increase the likelihood that a minister will choose a less sincere strategic position such as an extreme position.     

When Negotiations Become Routine: Not Reinventing the Wheel While Thinking Outside the Box

In this article, we seek to apply the insights of recent research on routine to the context of repeated negotiations. To demonstrate the link between both concepts, we introduce an analytical framework in which we identify different negotiation situations in which routine can develop. We distinguish two dimensions of the negotiation process: a problem-solving dimension and a communication dimension. Our framework for analyzing the role of routine in negotiation is built around these two dimensions. We define those skills that we argue in repeated negotiations can help negotiators manage particular kinds of negotiations depending on the level and type of routinization that type of negotiation involves. Moreover, we demonstrate that our framework is inherently dynamic, which we illustrate with simplified business examples.     

Introduction: negotiating the promotion of democracy

ABSTRACT

This article makes the case for why we should turn to studying democracy promotion negotiation, outlines the research questions guiding this special issue, identifies overarching findings and summarizes the individual contributions. After outlining the rationale for more attention to the issue of negotiation, which we understand as a specific form of interaction between external and local actors in democracy promotion, we outline three basic assumptions informing our research: (1) Democracy promotion is an international practice that is necessarily accompanied by processes of negotiation. (2) These negotiation processes, in turn, have an impact upon the practice and outcome of democracy promotion. (3) For external democracy promotion to be mutually owned and effective, genuine negotiations between ‘promoters’ and ‘local actors’ are indispensable; the term ‘genuine’ here being understood as including a substantial exchange on diverging values and interests. The article, then, introduces the three research questions for this agenda, concerning the issues on the negotiation table, the parameters shaping negotiation processes, and the results of democracy promotion negotiation. We conclude by presenting an overview of the overarching findings of the special issue as well as with brief summaries of the individual contributions.     

Focal Points and Turning Points in Negotiation: A Comparative Analysis

In this article, we examine the roles of focal points and turning points in negotiation. Both concern impasses in negotiation, and negotiators can exploit them to move past impasses. Each term uses the word “point” differently, however. A focal point refers to a single salient coordinating concept shared by the parties. A turning point is a departure that takes place during the course of a negotiation, when the course seems to change. Precipitants precede turning points and consequences follow them. In this article, we focus on the relationship of these two negotiation concepts. We raise the following questions: Does the development of focal points precipitate departures, and, if so, how? Do departures lead to the development of focal points, and, if so, how? Are there circumstances in which focal points do not precipitate turning points and vice versa? Do negotiations that feature focal points create more or less durable agreements? Do negotiations that include turning points create more or less durable agreements? To help answer these questions, we have analyzed four cases. In the German Foundation Agreement negotiation, the development of focal points precipitated turning points. In the South African Interim Constitution negotiations, turning point departures precipitated the development of focal points. And in the negotiations to end the Burundi civil war and to reach the Nouméa Accord between France and New Caledonia, parties shared focal points that did not precipitate turning points. These case analyses provide insights into the role of focal points in producing effective and durable agreements. They also suggest opportunities for further research on the interaction between these concepts.