商业银行信息披露的司法困境与制度改进

考察诉至法院的案件可以发现,关于非公开信息披露的争议远比公开信息披露的争议多,涉及存贷款业务、理财产品、银行卡服务等各方面。但由于我国商业银行立法对信息披露规定不够细致,不同的法院在定性、责任分配等上面存有区别,为此需要司法机关及立法机关对商业银行信息披露进行更细致的规定。     

论证券市场信息披露的法律监管与新闻舆论监督

在证券市场中 ,上市公司信息披露的法律监管和新闻舆论监督都在追求保护投资者 ,尤其是中小投资者的利益。信息披露法律监管通过公众公共的法律制度来实现目标。舆论监督要以信息披露法律制度为基础 ,还需要舆论监督的参与。     

论商业银行信息披露法律制度的理论基础

发挥市场约束对银行监管的作用需要对商业银行信息披露进行法律制度化。商业银行信息披露法律制度有其经济学和法哲学的理论基础。经济学基础是有效市场假说、信息不对称理论、供需理论;法哲学基础是公平、安全、平等和效率。     

论违规披露、不披露重要信息罪的可能性失灵——以收益权凭证交易为例证

信息披露制度是金融监管法律制度的核心内容,需要刑法保护。为确保刑法调整信息披露制度的有效性,"违规披露、不披露重要信息罪"在原《刑法》条文的基础上,对主体、客观行为和行为结果都进行了修订完善。新的金融产品的出现使"违规披露、不披露重要信息罪"出现了漏洞,面临可能性失灵的现实问题,收益权凭证交易这一新型合成型资产证券化产品就是例证。创新资产证券化产品,监管部门要依据其交易特征,出台相应监管规则,注重完善信息披露制度,防止"违规披露、不披露重要信息罪"的可能性失灵。     

我国房地产投机治理的法律探析

受市场经济体制的自发性、盲目性的影响,房地产行业的投机行为也非常普遍,鉴于此,我们要通过多种方式来完善相关的法律,尽可能的规避房地产行业发展过程中的投机行为的发生,不仅要对两个主要的法律进行修订和完善、通过法律手段对相关概念进行准确的界定,还应该完善信息的披露过程,保证市场交易信息的畅通、真实,最后要有效的促成多种法律配合,尽力保障房地产市场的稳定运行。     

我国国有企业信息披露法律制度分析与完善

本文对我国国有企业信息披露法律制度现状进行了分析,指出其中存在的问题,并从法规制定、信息披露对象、信息披露的内容、法律监督几个方面,对我国国有企业信息披露法律制度提出了完善建议.     

论我国商业银行法信息披露制度的完善

我国商业银行法信息披露制度存在披露信息不充分、不准确、不透明等缺陷,在信息披露的程序、内容、方法、形式、监管机制等方面都有其局限性。本文借鉴我国证券法、保险法中信息披露制度的经验,在法律制度、监管机制、法律责任、具体内容等方面提出完善商业银行法信息披露制度的建议,以期推进我国商业银行法信息披露制度的规范化、制度化建设。     

从上市公司债务结构视角探索债权人利益的保护

一、我国上市公司债务结构综述 在现有的法律制度下，债权人不能参与公司的治理与监督，必须要建立上市公司与其控股股东对债权人的信息披露制度，防止公司侵害债权人利益。而我国目前上市公司专门针对债权人的信息披露制度在法律上是一个空白地带。     

美、英、日上市公司会计信息披露监管制度及启示

我国上市公司会计信息披露始于上交所和深交所成立后,经过二十多年的发展,我国上市公司信息披露制度有许多问题需要解决.本文通过研究市场经济比较发达的美、英、日三国会计信息披露法律监管体系,以提出对我国上市公司法律监管体系的完善建议.     

股东大会通讯表决的运行规则

通讯表决的有效运行需要法律规则的保障,这些规则主要是与议案内容有关信息的披露、通讯表决的具体行使方式与对特殊问题的处理规则。有关信息的充分披露是实行通讯表决的前提,应披露的主要信息及披露方式,由主管机关以规范性文件规定。股东以书面表决或电子表决不同方式行使表决权时,应明确规定具体行使方法与送达时间,并明确对临时动议或修正案与多重投票的处理规则。     

Regulating through information: disclosure laws and American health care

Efforts to reform the American health care system through direct government action have failed repeatedly. Nonetheless, an alternative strategy has emerged from these experiences: requiring insurance organizations and health care providers to disclose information to the public. In this Article, Professor Sage assesses the justifications for this type of regulation and its prospects. In particular, he identifies and analyzes four distinct rationales for disclosure. He finds that the most commonly articulated goal of mandatory disclosure laws--improving the efficiency of private purchasing decisions by giving purchasers complete information about price and quality--is the most complicated operationally. The other justifications--which he respectively terms the agency, performance, and democratic rationales--hold greater promise, but make different, sometimes conflicting assumptions about the sources and uses of information. These insights have implications not only for health care, but also for other regulated practices and industries.     

Mandatory accounting disclosure by small private companies

This article analyzes how mandatory accounting disclosure is grounded on different rationales for private and public companies. It also explores technological changes, such as computerised databases and the Internet, which have recently made disclosure of company accounts by small companies potentially less costly and more valuable, thanks to electronic filing and universal online access to credit information systems. These recent developments favour policies that would expand the scope of mandatory publication for small companies in countries where it is voluntary. They also encourage policies to reduce the costs and enhance the value of disclosure through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems. Survey and registry evidence on how the information in the accounts is valued and used by companies is consistent with these claims about the evolution of the tradeoff of costs and benefits that should guide policy in this area.     

我国司法信息公开制度的重构、检讨与展望

司法信息公开是言论自由与新闻自由所衍生的知情权的嬗变，而知情权的充分行使，又将表达阪、参与权、监督权置于其延展线上。尽管司法信息公开已经被国际社会所认可，但在我国却与司法公开之间薛在误读与曲解。以各国司法信息公开经验为视角，司法行政信息公开、司法程序信息公开、法官信息公开是司法信息公开制度架构中的“三驾马车”。而“三驾马车”并驾齐驱才是制度的应然选择。但是，当前我国司去信息公开制度的运行仍然困难重重，尽力而为，量力而行地完善我国司法信息公开制度是我国司法权力运阡的必然进程。     

To Disclose or not to Disclose? That is the Question in Collaborative Law

Collaborative Law (CL) is a dispute resolution process increasingly used in family law and divorce designed to encourage problem solving negotiations by parties represented by counsel. Many states have adapted legislation to authorize and facilitate CL and thousands of lawyers have been trained in the CL process. CL lawyers and participants sign a Participation Agreement in which they agree that the lawyers will be disqualified if the CL process terminates without settlement. They also promise full and voluntary disclosure of information. The extent of the obligation of disclosure is, however, unclear. Through analysis of an extended hypothetical divorce settlement negotiation, this article advocates that CL lawyers and clients should assume an obligation to disclose material facts without a request from the other side. Traditional legal ethics, based on an adversarial framework, requires only disclosure of information when requested by another party. In addition, in traditional legal ethics, a lawyer cannot disclose information obtained in the course of the lawyer‐client relationship without the client's consent even if material to the negotiation. Some authority regulating CL, however, suggests that CL participants and counsel should disclose material information without a specific request even if a client does not want the information disclosed. In that situation, the CL lawyer should encourage the client to disclose the information but if the client refuses to do so, withdraw from the representation. This Article reviews the arguments for and against an obligation of affirmative disclosure in CL. It suggests that affirmative disclosure obligations should be the subject of discussion between CL participants and lawyers and that CL Participation Agreements should be drafted to establish a clear obligation. Finally, this article identifies key areas for further discussion and research on CL disclosure obligations.     

Precontractual Duties of Disclosure: A Comparative and Economic Perspective

If during precontractual negotiations a person deliberately keeps quiet about facts which he knew or should have known were of particular importance to the other party that party may avoid the contract on the ground of deceit if, and only if, a duty of disclosure can be found to exist. What are the conditions that must be satisfied to assume the existence of such a duty of disclosure? The European legal systems merely offer vague formulas with little or no operational power. Can economic theory provide more precise criteria? The general principle should be that a negotiating party must proffer information in his possession which is material to the other party's decision. However, economic analysis suggests that a party should be allowed to withhold material information if the information is “productive” and was costly to obtain unless its acquisition and disclosure were owed under a contract for value. These rules are discussed in the light of a number of cases from various European jurisdictions.     

我国政府过程性信息公开的困局与纾解

在我国。政府过程性信息是否公开随着个案的陆续出现引发了较大的争议,相关立法、行政机关、司法机关对此存在着不同的判断。在城外一些国家信息公开的立法与实践中,均对过程性信息的公开有着充分的考虑和细致的制度规定,值得我国借鉴。为平衡公众知情权与行政机关的行政权。我国信息公开立法应将政府过程性信息列入免于公开的范围,但须制定公共利益的特别裁量标准,如公共政策的制定等影响面较大的政府行为,应最大程度地将政府过程性信息公开。     

论企业破产重整信息披露时间节点的规范与细化

企业破产重整中债权人与债务人利益的平衡依赖于破产法上的正当程序,知情权的实现是保障债权人等利害关系人利益的基本前提。本文通过对26家上市公司重整程序中的信息披露情况进行实证分析并结合制度比较后发现,目前我国企业破产法上关于重整程序中信息披露的时间没有明确的规定,在实践和立法上均存在不足。建议结合我国实际情况按照破产重整程序推进的逻辑完善我国破产法上信息披露制度,规范信息披露的时间节点,在重整程序启动前、重整计划草案表决前和重整计划执行三个阶段对信息披露的时间节点与内容进行规范与细化。     

“讨价还价”的背后——对现行市场销售模式的法理批判

当今,讨价还价已经成为市场销售的主要模式。讨价还价虽然与自愿和公平有联系,但并不反映自愿与公平;相反,讨价还价与欺诈联系在一起。从效率的角度看,讨价还价也不能反映真实的市场供需关系;相反,它极大地增加了市场的交易成本以及政府的决策成本和管理成本,也抑制了供应商的生产积极性。商品的价格不只是人与自然的关系,更反映了人与人之间的关系,因此,商品价格的确定就不只在于效率,更在于公平。商品价格的公平性就在于成本加合理利润,因此,成本与利润信息的充分披露可以保证消费者在讨价还价中免于欺诈。集团购买以及标准合同也在一定程度可以弥补消费者讨价还价能力的不足。而作为消除讨价还价的销售模式最为有效也最为现实的办法,莫过于以明码实价的方式代替明码标价的规定。对此,政府的价格调控措施必须有所作为。     

Legal parent versus biological parent: the impact of disclosure

This article addresses arguments regarding disclosure of information to donor-conceived individuals, showing that disclosure is entirely different from the recognition of parental rights and responsibilities for the gamete providers. It argues that disclosure of information is not equivalent to saying: "donors are parents". Instead, information release simply provides a basis for donors, donor-conceived individuals and recipient parents to exchange information about themselves. When a jurisdiction enacts laws that provide for such information release, these statutes are distinct from any other legal rights and responsibilities for any members of the donor-conceived community. In its first section, the article briefly explains the means for determining legal parentage before reviewing research on how parents tell their children about their means of conception. Next, it explores studies of why members of the donor-conceived world search, providing an empirical basis for the claim that disclosure does not equal parenthood. The article explores concerns about information release, and, in the final section, suggests possible approaches for protecting the rights of donor-conceived people while reinforcing the legal separation between social and biological parents.     

Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private Ordering

In 2016 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considered for the first time whether financial disclosure reform should address information on sustainability matters and other sources of nonfinancial risk. The resulting debate over these issues raised fundamental questions about how well the federal disclosure regime addresses emerging risks and about how well private ordering, through shareholder engagement, the work of private standard‐setters, and corporate voluntary disclosure, can fill the gaps. This article argues that the current model of nonfinancial risk disclosure, based largely on private ordering, is ineffective and undermines the SEC's mission to protect investors, facilitate capital formation, and promote fair, orderly, and efficient markets. This conclusion rests on evidence that the current state of sustainability disclosure is inadequate for investment analysis and that these deficiencies are largely problems of comparability and quality that cannot readily be addressed by private ordering. This article also highlights the costs of agency inaction to investors and to public companies, which have been largely ignored in the debate over the future of financial reporting. It concludes by proposing avenues for disclosure reform.