Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

The Spectre of Addis in Contracts of Employment in Canada and the UK

This article examines the legacy of the 1909 House of Lordsdecision in Addis in both Canada and the UK by closely analysinga key case from each jurisdiction: Wallace v United Grain Growersand Johnson v Unisys. It underlines the continuing strong tendencyto treat wrongful dismissal solely as breach of the notice termand considers the remedial consequences of that stance.     

Regarding/Disregarding: The Judicial Rhetoric of President Barak and the International Court of Justice's Wall Advisory Opinion

In Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel (September 2005), Israel'sHigh Court addressed the effect which it should give to theInternational Court's Legal consequences of the constructionof a wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion.This had declared the wall illegal but, while affirming thatit shared the International Court of Justice's normative rulings,the High Court reiterated that it thought the wall a lawfulsecurity measure. Rather than dissect the substantive treatmentof the issues involved, this article examines the structureand rhetorical techniques employed by President Barak in hisleading judgment in Mara'abe. He effected a skilful practicaldisregard of the International Court's normative findings throughan elision of argument by relying on the doctrine of res judicata—aconcept that has no relevance whatsoever to advisory opinions.     

A useful resource when advising on publishing contracts

The journalist and former Punch editor, Alan Coren, once wrotean article in The Times about his desire to write a best-sellingpublishing contract. This followed a spate of stories in thepress about the large advances then being paid by publishersto ‘trophy’ authors such as Martin Amis. When preparinghis best-selling contract, Mr Coren would have benefited greatlyfrom the precedents in Clark's Publishing Agreements. Originally published in 1980, Clark is now in its seventh edition.It consists mainly of about 25–30 template agreementsfor use in the publishing of books, journals, and related materials,including a substantial section on     

'Trade mark use' in Europe: revisiting Arsenal in the light of Opel and Picasso

Legal context: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in the case ofArsenal Football Club v. Reed led to uncertainty regarding thepractical scope of a trade mark proprietor's property rights. Key points: The uncertainty resulted from a failure of the ECJ to addressclearly the issue of what constitutes infringing trade markuse. The ECJ ignored the question of the High Court as to whetheruse of a trade mark as an indication of origin is necessaryfor establishing infringement. They instead established an ambiguousstandard for what constitutes infringing trade mark use, suggestingthat only use that jeopardises the essential function of a trademark is an infringing use. This ambiguity has had problematicimplications for subsequent interpretations of trade mark law,particularly in the Court of Appeal in Arsenal and the Houseof Lords in R v Johnstone. Two relatively new ECJ cases may help clarify the issue. InOPEL, the ECJ suggested that infringing use of a trade markmust be use that is perceived by the relevant public as a designationof origin. The Picasso decision limits the effect of the Arsenaldecision on the relevance of confusion in non-sale situationsto the facts of Arsenal. In particular, it stresses the pointthat when assessing likelihood of confusion in the context ofan opposition to an application for registration the court shouldfocus on the perception of the relevant public at the pointof sale. Practical significance: The benefit of these two cases is that they create some clarityfor legal practitioners and the Courts when addressing the questionof what constitutes infringing trade mark use.     

Comment on Forni's "Using Stationarity Tests in Antitrust Market Definition"

Economic analyses of prospective mergers must typically be undertakenwith limited data. Often prices are the only available data,so it is tempting to use their time series alone. Certainly,simple and robust measures of the extent of the market basedon limited data would aid merger analysis immensely. However,a couple of examples show how Forni's suggested methodologycan lead one astray. Consider a differentiated products market with demand systemln D_i(p_i, p_j) = 1 – ln p_i + ln p_j, i, j = 1, 2, i j,with associated constant marginal costs c₁ = _t c, c₂     

Profit Neutrality in Licensing: The Boundary Between Antitrust Law and Patent Law

We address the patent/antitrust conflict in licensing and developthree guiding principles for deciding acceptable terms of license.Profit neutrality holds that patent rewards should not dependon the rightholder’s ability to work the patent himself.Derived reward holds that the patentholder’s profits shouldbe earned, if at all, from the social value created by the invention.Minimalism holds that licenses should not be more restrictivethan necessary to achieve neutrality. We argue that these principlesare economically sound and rationalize some key decisions ofthe twentieth century such as General Electric and Line Material.     

Evaluating the Role of Brown v. Board of Education in School Equalization, Desegregation, and the Income of African Americans

The public profile of the Brown v. Board of Education decisiontends to overshadow the well-established fact that racial disparitiesin school resources in the South began narrowing 20 years beforethe Brown decision and that school desegregation did not beginon a large scale in the Deep South until ten years after theBrown decision. We instead view Brown as a highly visible markerof public policy’s mid-century reversal on matters ofrace. When we examine the labor market outcomes of male workersin 1990, we find that southern-born blacks who would have finishedtheir schooling just before effective desegregation occurredin the South fared poorly compared to southern-born blacks whofollowed behind them in school by just a few years, relativeto northern-born blacks in same age cohorts.     

Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law

Non-refoulement is a principle of international law that precludesstates from returning a person to a place where he or she mightbe tortured or face persecution. The principle, codified inArticle 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, is subject to a numberof exceptions. This article examines the status of non-refoulementin international law in respect to three key areas: refugeelaw, human rights law and international customary law. The findingssuggest that while a prohibition on refoulement is part of internationalhuman rights law and international customary law, the evidencethat non-refoulement has acquired the status of a jus cogensnorm is less than convincing.     

Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright law: from Betamax to Grokster

Legal context: Dual use technology, or technology which can be used for bothinfringing and non-infringing uses, raises interesting issuesin the area of copyright law. This note analyses inter aliathe two US Supreme Court decisions on dual use technology, separatedby a gap of over 20 years—Sony v Universal Studios (1984)and MGM v Grokster (2005). Key points: Sony lays down the famous ‘Betamax’ defence—ifthe technology is ‘capable of substantial non-infringinguses’, then it cannot be challenged as infringing. Thistest had stood the test of time, and it is only recently inGrokster that there arose an occasion to reconsider its application.The Court in Grokster, borrowing from the jurisprudence developedin Patent law, recognized a novel test of liability—basedon the active ‘inducement’ to infringe. The flawin Grokster is that despite its attempt to develop new standardsfor a digital age, the ruling leaves areas of uncertainty. Practical significance: Dual use technology has become ubiquitous in this age—fromthe iPod to YouTube to P2P software, all are capable of beingused in lawful as well as unlawful ways. Legal pronouncementshave the potential to impact not just the development of law,but also innovation in technology. Some believe that the ‘brightline’ of Sony has been muddled thereby threatening technologicalinnovation. Others, me included, believe that Sony is inapplicablein the face of new technology, and hail the decision in Groksteras a positive step forward in what it actually decides. However,in what it does not decide, Grokster still represents a lostopportunity by the Court to clear up the muddled waters.     

Can We Protect How We Do What We Do? A Consideration of Business Method Patents in Australia and Europe

In the long history of monopolies, business method patents area novel and recent edition. In the Digital Age, where time ismoney and speed is everything, innovative methods for undertakingbusiness are as important to a business as the products or servicesit provides to its clients. In recent years several reviews,conducted in both Australia and internationally,⁴ have questionedthe appropriateness of patenting business methods. This paperreviews the availability of business method patents in Australiain light of the 2006 decision of the Full Court of the FederalCourt in Grant v Commissioner of Patents,⁵ which confirmed theneed in Australia for a ‘useful product’ to issuefrom the working of a method (business or otherwise) in orderfor the method to be patentable. This paper will review argumentsboth criticising and defending business method patents and considerwhether business methods warrant special treatment.     

Helsinki Court of Appeals prohibits the screening and distribution of the motion picture 'Man Exposed' (Riisuttu mies)

In Kirjoituksia Ruudun Takaa Oy v Lasihelmi Filmi Oy, Case S06/2018 the Helsinki Court of Appeals held that a producer hadinfringed a screenwriter's copyrights; the screening and distributionof the film Man Exposed (Riisuttu mies) was thus prohibitedunder threat of a EUR 100,000 fine.     

Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin's Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robes

In an article entitled ‘Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What thePhilosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law’,I argued that in Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived hisinterpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theoryof meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin's fallacy’.In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that hecommitted the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact thathe considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’,‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—inLaw's Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each,he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning,which he describes as the view that ‘the doctrinal conceptof law is an interpretive concept’. In this Reply, I arguethat Dworkin's argument that he does not commit Dworkin's fallacyis itself an example of the fallacy and that Dworkin's fallacypervades Justice in Robes just as much as it did Law's Empire.     

A clash of appeals over patentability

In Duns Licensing, the Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) of theEPO has delivered an opinion that expressly criticizes the decisionof the Court of Appeal for England and Wales in Macrossan/Aerotel[2007] RPC 7.     

State Immunity for Torture

The House of Lords’ ruling in Jones v Ministry of InteriorAl-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Saudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)and others sets an important precedent in the field of internationalcivil claims for torture. It was also the first to address indetail the ratio of the seminal judgment in Pinochet No. 3,a ruling that has given rise to much speculation as to the relationshipbetween State immunity, jus cogens norms and human rights. Thisarticle explores the significance of the Jones case, and, inthe light of that ruling, comments more generally upon the widerissue of the extent to which State immunity acts as a barrierto international legal actions for torture brought in domesticcourts in both the civil and criminal spheres.     

Rowling and Warner win lexicon battle, fair use proponents gain strategic advantage

Judge Robert B. Patterson found that the unofficial Harry PotterLexicon written by Steve Vander Ark and published by RDR Booksinfringed the copyright in the seven Harry Potter novels andtwo companion works (Fantastic Beasts and Where to Find Themand Quidditch Through the Ages) and that the defence of fairuse did not apply.     

The ongoing design duty in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd Casting the scope of copyright infringement even wider

The Australian Federal Court case of Universal Music AustraliaPty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (‘Sharman’)¹is the latest in a series of peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharingcases from various jurisdictions that has found the softwaredistributor/technology provider liable for copyright infringement.² Sharman followed a few months after the groundbreaking US SupremeCourt case of MGM Studios v Grokster Ltd ³ (‘Grokster’)that had acknowledged the Sony safe harbour for technology providersbut also introduced an inducement of infringement doctrine todeal with reprehensible conduct of infringers. While both cases involved similar technology and shared a numberof similarities on the facts and legal principles⁴, a closerexamination of Sharman shows that the net of copyright infringementin P2P filesharing is cast wider than that in Grokster. The effect of Sharman is an increased burden on the technologyprovider and the potentially tremendous consequences on innovationdue to the lack of a clear safe harbour as well as the wideningof the design obligation.     

A Critical Appraisal of 'Triple Divorce' in Islamic Law

The issue of the ‘triple divorce’ is regarded ashighly sensitive among the Muslims, not only in India but elsewhere.The Holy Qur’an is very cautious in matters of divorce.Three talaqs have to be spaced over a period of 3 months togive husband and wife time for reconciliation through the interventionof relatives and friends. Moreover, talaq can be pronouncedonly when the wife is in a state of tuhur, ie purity after menstruation.Yet, despite clear Qur’anic injunctions to the contrary,immediate triple divorce is permitted, destroying marital lifein one breath. The practice of immediate triple divorce is widespreadamong Sunni Muslims and has legal validity. Even then the juristscall it a talaq-e-Bidat (innovative form of divorce). The disputehas been highlighted by reports of some Muslims instantly divorcingtheir wives by mail, over the telephone, and even through mobilephone text messages. This article explains the different theoriesof divorce prevailing in the contemporary Muslim world and whatchecks and restraints have been imposed by Islam over the exerciseof husband's power of talaq. The article critically appraisesthe ‘innovative triple divorce’ by examining whetherit is sanctioned by the Holy Quran or the sunnah and if thereis a consensus of opinion (ijma) on the effectiveness of tripledivorce.     

Three IP blogs

Lessig Blog By Lawrence Lessig United States of America Archivedback to August 2002 http://www.lessig.org/blog/ Techno Llama ByAndres Guadamuz Scotland Archived back to October 2004 http://technollama.blogspot.com/ Patently-O:Patent Law Blog By Dennis Crouch United States of America Archivedback to April 2005 http://patentlaw.typepad.com/