The Fiscal Consequences of Changing Federal and State Revenue Policies: The Case of Small Oregon Cities

This article examines the fiscal consequences for twelve, smallOregon cities of recent changes in federal and state intergovernmentalrevenue policies. Many small local governments have experienceddouble revenue reverses in recent years—reductions inown-source revenues because of economic decline as well as decreasesin intergovernmental revenues, especially federal aid. The twelvesmall cities are compared with all 241 cities in Oregon andthe 136 Oregon cities in the 1,000 to 49,999 population range.Using aggregate and interview data, a major finding is thatalthough stabilization and/or decline in federal-state revenuesharing and entitlement program funds have accentuated difficultlocal revenue situations, economic decline has been the moreimportant contributor to the fiscal stress of the twelve smallmunicipalities. Most of the twelve cities had limited fiscalcapacity—as indicated by low assessed property valuations—makingit difficult to produce sufficient revenue to meet basic publicservice needs. These cities were also unable to get citizenapproval of increases in property taxes.     

Riot and Reason: Crafting an Urban Policy Response

This article examines the federal policy response to urban problemsin the aftermath of the 1992 Los Angeles riot. Although thefederal government failed to enact a long-term urban aid initiativein 1992, a number of locally based comprehensive urban initiativeswere under way in several cities across the country. The futureof national urban policy, however, will require a reconceptualizationof the problems of inner cities, and ultimately will dependon significant restructuring of fiscal federalism relationshipsamong and between the federal, state, and local governments.     

The Federal Role in State Fiscal Stress

This article examines the extent to which the federal government'spolicies were responsible for the fiscal stress experiencedby most state governments in the early 1990s. Federal policieshave contributed considerably to recent state fiscal stress,particularly through the Medicaid program—the fastestgrowing part of state budgets—and the recession, whichdepressed revenue and increased welfare and Medicaid spending.Federal aid reductions have not been an important source ofrecent state fiscal stress. The real value of per capita federalaid other than for welfare programs fell considerably in the1980s, but the reductions were much greater for local governmentsthan for states. The largest reductions were in the early 1980s.Federal policies have affected state finances in several otherways—through tax policy, unfunded mandates, and the federalfailure to cope effectively with problems like health and poverty.Federal court rulings have also caused budget problems (as havestate court decisions). In some respects, state fiscal problemsare not a federal responsibility. Rising school enrollments,new corrections policies, and inelastic tax systems have createdfiscal stress for many states. Excessive state spending in the1980s has contributed to recent fiscal problems in some states,but not generally.     

Intergovernmental Structure and Fiscal Management Strategies: A Crossnational Analysis

Does intergovernmental structure have a systematic effect on the impacts of local governments' fiscal policy responses? Using empirical data from more than 800 local governments in five countries, the article concludes that intergovernmental structure is associated with the impact attributed to various fiscal management strategies. Such strategies have generally had greater impact in local governments in federal systems than those in unitary state systems. There are similarities between federal and unitary local governments regarding the fiscal management strategies that have least impact, and both types stress the importance of productivity gains via technology. But the differences in relative importance and level of impact are more striking than the similarities. In particular, fiscal management strategies involving the relations of the local government with other governments, such as obtaining intergovernmental revenue and shifting service provision to other governments, have greater impact in significantly more federal systems than in unitary state systems. These federal local governments also experience greater impacts from increasing user charges and raising local taxes. In contrast, local governments in unitary state systems place greater reliance on the more politically expeditious strategy of across–the–board expenditure reductions and on reductions of capital spending. These findings suggest that local governments in more decentralized systems have greater flexibility to manipulate relations with other governments in order to enhance their own fiscal situation. The data also suggest that the government's level of fiscal stress is not systematically associated with the level of impact from most fiscal management strategies, especially in the unitary state systems.     

Tragedy of the Fiscal Common?: Fiscal Stock Externalities in a Leviathan Model of Federalism

The paper deals with vertical tax competition between self-interested governments in a dynamic environment. In a federation, competition between the federal and the state governments arises when tax sources are not separated but pooled. Since dynamic inefficiencies will be stressed, the focus is on fiscal stock externalities rather than on flow externalities. The paper shows that the Leviathans in a federation tax the fiscal common resource more extensively than the single Leviathan in a unitary state. Furthermore, the positive impact of political stability on public consumption of the fiscal common will be discussed.     

When Mayors Matter: Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy

U.S. cities are limited in their ability to set policy. Can these constraints mute the impact of mayors’ partisanship on policy outcomes? We hypothesize that mayoral partisanship will more strongly affect outcomes in policy areas where there is less shared authority between local, state, and federal governments. To test this hypothesis, we create a novel dataset combining U.S. mayoral election returns from 1990 to 2006 with city fiscal data. Using regression discontinuity design, we find that cities that elect a Democratic mayor spend a smaller share of their budget on public safety, a policy area where local discretion is high, than otherwise similar cities that elect a Republican or an Independent. We find no differences on tax policy, social policy, and other areas that are characterized by significant overlapping authority. These results suggest that models of national policymaking are only partially applicable to U.S. cities. They also have implications for political accountability: mayors may not be able to influence the full range of policies that are nominally local responsibilities.     

Local interests,central leadership,and the passage of TRA86

The U.S. federalist public economy is an ever-evolving system of financing and expenditure responsibilities between local, state, and federal governments. The past decades have seen a significant centralization of responsibility for the financing of state and local public services through grants-in-aid and federal tax subsidies. This article advances a model of local constituent influence in central government fiscal policies which seeks to explain this trend, and then examines how strong executive branch and congressional leadership might begin to control the local pressures for central government financing. TRA86 is offered as one example in which this leaedership proved effective. The general lesson is that good fiscal policy in federalist public economies requires not only capable local governments, but central government political institutions with the strength to meet national needs as well.     

Deciding to Provide: Local Decisions on Providing Social Welfare

Fiscal federalism predicts local governments will avoid social welfare expenditures, owing to capital mobility across local jurisdictions. Yet Census of Governments data consistently show that many local governments provide one or more social welfare functions, and moreover many jurisdictions provide these functions without federal or state intergovernmental support. This article finds evidence that, while local expenditures are largely driven by fiscal capacity and federal and state assistance, local decisions on providing social welfare functions and participating in intergovernmental revenues are primarily affected by degree of capital mobility and by local political factors. Consequently, local governments exercise much greater autonomy over social welfare policymaking than fiscal federalism suggests.     

Creating Public Value with Tax and Spending Policies: The View from Public Economics

According to the framework rooted in public economics, governments can create public value by focusing tax and spending policies on remedying market failures and addressing concerns about fairness embodied in a social welfare function. By pursuing optimal tax and spending policies, governments navigate the omnipresent trade‐offs between equity and efficiency. Of course, in practice, the process by which policies are adopted does not resemble the planner's problem in social choice theory. In addition, real fiscal policies do not look much like the recommendations that arise from the optimal tax literature. Governments operate in public choice environments that are not conducive to focused remedying of market failure, and they suffer from their own tendencies to fail to achieve their objectives. Nevertheless, many of the tools are in place to help the federal and state governments focus tax and spending in ways that can maximize public value.     

Federalism and regional interest intermediation in Brazilian public policies

Brazil became a highly decentralized country following democratization and the 1988 Constitution. The consequences of decentralization at the federal level are quite clear: the federal government is facing financial constraints and difficulties in building governing coalitions, allowing the Presidents to govern and to implement public policies, especially those concerning fiscal control. At the level of the states, however, the results of decentralization are quite heterogeneous given the country's high degree of regional inequality. The article identifies the cleavages and tensions surrounding federal–state relations, as well as the mutual dependency of the states and the federal government. It argues that the Brazilian experience of political and financial decentralization has contributed to the prospects of democratic consolidation and has forced the federal government to negotiate and compromise with subnational governments the implementation of national policies. On the other hand, the Brazilian experience highlights the constraints of decentralization in countries with deep‐rooted regional disparities. Furthermore, the financial weakness of the federal government which has been brought about by decentralization and by fiscal control brings new tensions to the federal arrangements and to public policies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The failure to learn from others: Vertical fiscal imbalance,centralisation, and Australia's metropolitan knowledge deficit

This paper questions the routes to knowledge of metropolitan governance elsewhere in the world and then explains how and why these are rendered more difficult in Australia. The paper begins with the policy literature on the exchange of knowledge relevant to metropolitan governance. The paper next explains the constitutional and fiscal backdrop to metropolitan governance in Australia; the ‘unique’ role of state governments in the funding, planning, and management of cities, and the powers adopted by the federal government that are made possible by vertical fiscal imbalance and funding conditionality. The paper then explores horizontal knowledge exchange of metropolitan governance in the form of transnational municipal networks, corporations, international organisations, and consultants. The final section of the paper considers the thesis that were Australia's cities to function independently, as metropolitan governments, the potential for knowledge exchange would be optimised. Knowledge of smart city technologies is used for case study purposes.     

Life at the Bottom of the Fiscal Food Chain: Examining City and County Revenue Decisions

Any shifting of responsibilities from the state or federal governmentsto local governments would fall mostly on the shoulders of general-purposegovernments, namely, cities (municipalities) and counties. Thisstudy explores city and county revenue decisions associatedwith general funds—the governmental fund most likely tobe affected by state requirements for greater local financingresponsibility for new or devolved programs. The results suggestthat state control over local revenue authority affects decisionsregarding the imposition of financial burdens on residents,and that intergovernmental aid to cities and counties does notnecessarily mitigate those burdens. Despite evidence of healthyfinancial reserves, especially for cities, shifting responsibilitiesfrom the state to city or county governments could place citiesand counties in difficult fiscal positions. Given the importanceof own-source revenues to current budgets, and in view of thequestionable impact of intergovernmental aid on city and countyresidents' revenue burdens, questions persist about the abilityof city and county governments to maintain (and, if necessary,to expand) services during economic recession.     

The Rise of Competitive Federalism

This article challenges the prevailing view of increasing political and fiscal centralization in the federal government. Since 1978, the authors argue, the nation has entered a new era of "Competitive Federalism" with federal, state and local governments locked in a competitive struggle for taxpayer resources and support. The new era has emerged largely because of the loss of the tremendous fiscal advantage held by the federal government during its centralization period, 1929 to 1978. Although "deregulated" and free to move into any area of domestic policy, the federal government is constrained by necessary budget pressures and a "reformed" income tax structure. Competitive Federalism has emerged as a new balancing force between Washington, D.C. and the fifty state-local governments and will govern the federal system for the foreseeable future.     

The Economics of Nigerian Federalism: Selected Issues in Economic Management

Nigeria's economic difficulties are due primarily to public-sectormismanagement exacerbated by the dynamics of federalism andstate creation and by the growth in centralized federal power.Monetary policy has been inadequate, fiscal policy has rewardedstate governments but not brought their spending policies inline with their own resources and with national economic objectives,and resources have been consistently misallocated, largely becauseof the principle of "federal character." Recent efforts to deregulateand privatize the economy show promise, but the success of economicdevelopment will depend greatly on the future civilian or militarygovernance of Nigeria.     

Coping With the Loss of General Revenue Sharing in Ohio

The authors examine the impact of the loss of general revenue sharing on Ohio local governments. A study of seven large cities and surrounding counties found that the loss of the federal funds did not trigger any fiscal crises: it came as no surprise. Localities engaged in a number of coping strategies including cuts in spending and replacement of lost federal funds from local surpluses, increased debt, and some tax increases.     

New Federalism and Midwestern Cities: 1981-1985

President Ronald Reagan introduced a major new domestic initiativeduring his first term. The intent was to reduce the size andscope of the federal government and to increase the fiscal responsibilityof local governments. Mail questionnaires were sent to mayors,city managers, and finance officers in cities over 25,000 populationin Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin asking the respondentsto indicate their perception of the impact the Reagan programhad had on their cities in the previous year and their perceptionof its anticipated impact. Response rates were nearly 50 percentfor each survey. The respondents consistently overestimatedthe impact the Reagan program would have on their cities. Thefollowing analysis explores the relationship between perceivedeffects and city and respondent characteristics, such as size,partisan identification, and state. While the Reagan policieshave had a substantial impact on these cities, the impact isnot as negative as the respondents originally thought.     

THE RELATIVE RESPONSIVENESS OF STATE AND FEDERAL AID TO DISTRESSED CITIES

Both the states and the federal government distribute significant aid to cities. Federal agencies generally offer direct assistance to cities, bypassing the states. Many federal programs operate under the assumption that the federal government is more responsive to urban problems than are state governments. This paper demonstrates that this assumption is probably not true. Federal aid administered through the states has benefitted "distressed" cities more than federal assistance which goes directly to urban areas.     

State Rules and the County-City Arena: Competition for Land and Taxes in California's Central Valley

The vulnerabilities and strategies of county governments inthe American intergovernmental system are explored in this studyof California counties in the post-Proposition 13 era. The propertytax limitations of the 1978 ballot measure have combined witha number of other state fiscal, programmatic, and boundary rulesto constrain county finances. The rules encourage cities topursue growth policies, including annexations and redevelopment,that contribute to county constraints. However, the rules lsoprovide some intergovernmental tools for counties, as illustratedhere by case studies from three Central Valley counties. Employingtheir land-use powers and ability to block annexations, thecounties were recently successful, to varying degrees, in establishingrevenue-sharing agreements with their cities     

State support under the new federalism

The new federalism will reduce total intergovernmental revenues to local governments. The reduction will be due to both the transfer to the states of much of the federal aid which previously flowed directly to local governments and reductions in total federal aid levels. Pass-through requirements on the shifted aid will not affect this general result but may soften the impact in many states. Because of differences in the extent to which state governments substitute federal pass-through aid for state aid from own-source revenues and in the degree to which different sources of revenues are treated differently by the states, local revenue reductions will vary greatly from state to state. The losses for local governments will range from 100% of the shifted aid in some states to as little as 15–20% in others.     

Recent Trends in the Finances of the State and Local Sector

This article reviews recent trends in the finances of the state and local government sector. It finds that the sector has become increasingly self-sufficient, successfully managing its way in the eighties through the back-to-back recessions and the decentralization of the federal role in state and local fiscal affairs. The outlook for the sector now depends more on general economic trends and the actions of state and local governments, than trends in federal aid.