Reproductive choices and informed consent: fetal interests, women's identity, and relational autonomy

In this Article, I describe and examine the severe shortcomings in women's autonomy in the context of reproductive choices in the medical arena. The reproductive choices I explore are those choices that involve gestation: abortion, fertility treatments, and interventions during pregnancy. Due to state and medical interests in the fetus, I describe how information conveyed to patients making reproductive choices is biased towards fetal interests, relies on female stereotypes, and is still conveyed with the objective authority of the medical profession. Moreover, reproductive choices implicate women's values and identity interests that reach beyond medical concerns, which are not part of the informed consent doctrine at all. The narrow, individualistic informed consent torts doctrine intended to protect patient autonomy does not do enough in this context to balance bias nor does it mandate discussion of important identity interests and values. Accordingly, I argue that when faced with reproductive choices, women are not provided the balanced and comprehensive information needed to promote their autonomy. In response to the breakdown in patient autonomy I describe, instead of leaving women alone to make choices or regulating in order to protect them from their choices, a broader framework for supporting reproductive choices should be established. In light of the interdependence of woman and fetus, as well as the broader social context shaping these decisions, I argue that a more contextual, relational perspective of autonomy should be the goal of informed consent in the context of reproductive choices. I suggest a number of reforms that aim to optimize patient autonomy from a relational perspective. I suggest a broad, deliberative doctor-patient consultation and legal reforms that create more balance between the pull towards intervention and fetal protection on the one hand, and non-intervention and protection of women's personal identity interests on the other.     

From both sides now: informed consent, organ transplantation, and family-based disclosure

Drawing on the legal and social development of the right of individual patients to give informed consent to medical treatment, this article explores some implications of heroic life-saving measures in medicine that are made possibly by unprecedented advances in medical technology. Talcing cardiac transplantation as its primary example, the article examines the broader effects, both short-term and long-term, on family members as well as on the patient of this and similar types of heroic treatment. The author then offers a novel legal theory: where the heroic measure holds the risk of serious or life threatening changes, not just for the patients themselves but for their intimately connected family members as well, those members ought to have a legal right to participate in the informed consent process. The author sketches the contours of such a right and defends it in the face of various objections that may be made to it. I've looked at life from both sides now from win and lose, and still somehow it's life's illusions I recall. I really don't know life at all. (“Both Sides Now,” on Colors of the Day: The Best of Judy Collins, Electra Records 1972)     

Forced organ donation: the presumed consent to organ donation laws of the various states and the United States Constitution

The issues presented in this Comment pertain to whether there are substantive limits imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment upon the state legislatures which would defeat the recent, tentative steps of many states to pass laws authorizing presumed consent to organ donation. The final and perhaps least effective presumed consent law creates a presumption of consent to organ donation. The potential organ donor makes the choice whether to donate or not during his lifetime. This form of the presumed consent law would probably have the least impact on increasing the number of available donor organs. It permitted the coroner to harvest the eyes and corneas of deceased individuals if the coroner was unaware of objections from either the decedent or the family of the decedent. Presumed consent statutes should be found unconstitutional because they infringe upon a family's property interest in a deceased relative's corpse. However, due to the family's property interest in a relative's deceased body, as set forth in the next section, the result is that presumed consent statutes are unconstitutional. In order to find the presumed consent law unconstitutional, the Court would have to find that either: (a) the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty component included the family's right to determine what happens to a relative's body after death, or (b) that the property component included a vested state law property interest in the dead body.     

Assisting altruism: evaluating legally binding consent in organ donation policy

The growing need for organ and tissue transplants has led a number of states to enforce a policy that views a donor's declared intent to be an organ donor as legally binding. This allows health officials to harvest organs without the permission of the next of kin. Legally binding consent is controversial because of concerns that it may anger family members, lead to negative publicity, and discourage potential donors. We use interviews and a pooled time-series data set of cadaveric donation rates in U.S. states to evaluate the effectiveness of this policy. Our research indicates that enforcement of legally binding consent has marginally increased cadaveric donations while not significantly affecting donor registration. We also find evidence that the effect of the policy might be greater if it were more fully implemented and coordinated with efforts to improve public acceptance and awareness.     

Abortion, breast cancer, and informed consent

The purpose of this article is to show that the current level of scientific evidence linking induced abortion with increased breast cancer risk is sufficient to support an ethical and legal duty to disclose fully the risk to women who are considering induced abortion. The article examines the relationship between this evidence and the elements of a medical malpractice claim alleging failure to obtain informed consent. The first part focuses on the elements of informed consent, which require the plaintiff to establish that the physician had a duty to disclose information, which he failed to disclose, that this failure to disclose was a legal cause of the plaintiff's decision to undergo the procedure, and the procedure was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injury. The second part compares two prevalent standards for determining which risks a physician has a duty to disclose. Part three reviews the scientific evidence of the abortion/breast cancer (ABC) link and explains why it survives both the Frye and the Daubert tests for admissibility of expert testimony. The fourth part assesses the materiality of the risk posed by the ABC link. Parts five and six discuss evidentiary issues and the possibility of punitive damage awards.