Professional Skills in International Financial Surveillance: Assessing Change in IMF Policy Teams

In 2006, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) lauded Iceland's capacity to “withstand extreme, but plausible, shocks,” which was clearly an error in judgment. After the international financial crisis hit, IMF officials bemoaned the lack of professional market skills in FSAP teams. Importing these skills was difficult given IMF staff freezes, but postcrisis FSAP continued with heightened legitimacy inside and outside the IMF. This article provides an assessment of FSAP teams, focusing on the hiring of external experts and their professional skills. We use an Optimal Matching analysis of work roles in career histories to identify differences in policy teams and external experts' attributes. The article also draws on interviews with FSAP team members from 2008 to 2013. We demonstrate that changes in professional skills and team composition are a consequence of demands for professional insulation, institutional legitimation, and a view of professionalism as transnational organizational competence.     

The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.     

Back to Basics: The Great Recession and the Narrowing of IMF Policy Advice

This article contributes to the literature on the dynamics of change and continuity in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) policy paradigm. The IMF embarked on a process of “streamlining conditionality” during the 2000s, but many observers have argued that the IMF's policy paradigm from the 1990s remains intact. This article examines whether the scope of the IMF's policy advice to borrowers during the Great Recession narrowed in comparison to its advice to borrowers during the heyday of the Washington consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. The article uses qualitative content analysis to establish the frequency of a series of policy dialogue indicators in four sample sets of countries requesting IMF stand‐by arrangements over three decades. The evidence suggests that contemporary IMF policy advice to borrowers continues to stress the importance of fiscal consolidation, with reduced emphasis on promoting the structural economic reforms associated with the Washington consensus era.     

IMF Conditionality,Government Partisanship,and the Progress of Economic Reforms

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) often seeks to influence countries' domestic public policy via varying levels of conditionality—linking financial support to borrowing governments' commitment to policy reforms. When does extensive conditionality encourage domestic economic reforms and when does it impede them? We argue that, rather than universally benefiting or harming reforms, the effects of stricter IMF conditionality depend on domestic partisan politics. More IMF conditions can pressure left‐wing governments into undertaking more ambitious reforms with little resistance from partisan rivals on the right; under right governments, however, more conditions hinder reform implementation by heightening resistance from the left while simultaneously reducing leaders' ability to win their support through concessions or compromise. Using data on post‐communist IMF programs for the period 1994–2010, we find robust evidence supporting these claims, even after addressing the endogeneity of IMF programs via instrumental variables analysis.     

International Institutions and Domestic Compensation: The IMF and the Politics of Capital Account Liberalization

Certain governments have been faster than others in relaxing their restrictions on the cross‐border movement of capital. How can we explain the timing and extent of financial liberalization across countries since the 1970s? We argue that IMF stabilization programs provide a window of opportunity for governments to initiate financial reforms, but that policy makers are more likely to seize this opportunity when welfare expenditures are high. Large loans from the IMF shield policy makers from the costs of financial reform, while welfare expenditures provide credibility to the government's ex ante promises of compensation to individuals who are harmed by the reforms. We test this hypothesis on data for 87 countries from 1975 to 2002. We employ a spatial autoregressive error sample selection model which accounts for the nonrandom participation of countries in IMF programs as well as the processes of international policy diffusion. The results provide strong support for the interactive effect of IMF programs and domestic welfare expenditures on financial liberalization.     

IMF flexibility or neoliberal adaptation: A discursive content analysis of Article IV policy biases in Argentina

At the turn of the century, the consensus among scholars was that the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) policy preferences, which centered on deflation via austerity, privatization, and deregulation, were indicative of its neoliberal bias. However, a subsequent wave of literature has challenged this view by suggesting that the IMF has demonstrated flexibility. While these accounts arrive at their conclusion via different analytical and empirical focuses, this article posits that the flexibility or breath of ideas found within the discourse itself is key to gauging policy biases (previous study). Herein, this article contributes to the question of whether the IMF can be considered a “flexible” institution via its analysis on Argentina (1989–2006; 2016–2017). Extending a previous study's methods, this one provides a “discursive content analysis,” on the IMF–Argentine Article IV consultations. Ultimately, the findings show that policy discourse remained neoliberal throughout.     

Recalibrating Policy Orthodoxy: The IMF Since the Great Recession

This special issue reviews patterns of policy stability and change at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the Great Recession and attempts to explain their causes. The contributors show that the crisis ignited a reassessment regarding how the IMF would position itself as a pivotal player in global economic governance. Some new ideas and evidence definitely found their way into IMF decision making, but this process was often tempered by the nature of the institution and the powerful interests that control its governing structure. Where change did occur, its causal generators could be found in some combination between IMF staff politics, a string of innovations coming from academic and IMF economists, and the emerging economic powers' creative leveraging of institutional fora both within and inside the Fund.     

Agree to reform? The political economy of conditionality variation in International Monetary Fund lending, 1983–1997

Abstract.  This article analyzes variation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality. Conditions attached to IMF loans vary qualitatively and quantitatively across time and space, contrary to the allegations of inflexibility and insensitivity. This study theorizes that despite the IMF's official rules to determine conditionality by economic criteria, variation arises because the strategic interests of the five biggest contributors to the IMF (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany and France) interfere with IMF policy, which potentially compromises the effectiveness of its programs. This theory is tested empirically against 398 conditionality agreements contracted between 1983 and 1997 using an event-count method based on the Poisson distribution to obtain statistical results supportive of the theory.     

Effects of Exchange Rate Regime on IMF Program Participation

This article investigates the effect of a domestic policy choice, the exchange rate regime, on countries’ interaction with an international institution, their participation in International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending agreements. I hypothesize that the effect of the level of international reserves on a country's probability of participation in an IMF program depends on the exchange rate regime. A low level of international reserves threatens unfavorable economic and political outcomes only in countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. The level of reserves may thus be a significant determinant of participation in IMF programs only for countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. I use a dynamic univariate probit model of IMF program participation to assess empirically the effect of reserves in countries that maintain fixed, intermediate, and floating exchange rate regimes. The empirical results support my hypothesis: reserves have a significant effect only in countries that maintain a fixed exchange rate.     

The IMF's Rethink of Global Banks: Critical in Theory,Orthodox in Practice

The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) new financial interconnectedness agenda, developed in response to postcrisis calls from G20 to better understand systemic financial institutions, deploys a critical approach that stresses the spatial, political, and institutional dimensions of cross‐border financial networks. It portrays global banks as key nodes in those networks, “super‐spreaders” of systemic risk through complex business models that involve yield search, regulatory and tax arbitrage. Yet this critical view does not translate into its policy advice at country level. In regular surveillance of developing countries, the IMF remains committed to a benign view of transnational banking, even when confronted with growing cross‐border fragilities. During crises of cross‐border banking, the IMF tailors its conditionality to minimize domestic regulatory challenges to cross‐border banking models and to propose crisis measures that create new profit opportunities for transnational banks.     

IMF conditionality: theory and evidence

This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditionality, and those against the use of conditions. It summarizes the track record of program implementation and discusses the evidence of factors determining implementation. Whether proponents or critics of conditionality can be supported by existing data analysis is also investigated, as is the success of conditionality in terms of outcomes. The final section draws policy implications.     

Austerity versus Stimulus? Understanding Fiscal Policy Change at the International Monetary Fund Since the Great Recession

Since 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has become more open to the use of discretionary fiscal stimulus packages to deal with recessions, while changing its doctrine on the timing and content of fiscal consolidation. The article traces this evolution of the Fund's doctrine to staff politics, more diverse thinking in mainstream economics, and a careful framing of the message through the use of mainstream macroeconomic models. To map the changing contours of institutional views on fiscal policy through 2008–2013, the article undertakes a detailed content analysis of official publications from the Fiscal Affairs Department and the Research Department. The connection between these shifts and significant personnel shake‐ups is demonstrated through an extensive biographical analysis of the authors of all IMF studies cited in the official reports of the two departments. The findings contribute to the emerging debate on the sources of intellectual and policy change in international economic organizations.     

The Gnomes of Washington: Four Myths of the 1976 IMF Crisis

The IMF settlement of December 1976 looms large in popular and partisan views of the politics of the 1970s. It is argued here that conventional academic wisdom has come to embody several misleading myths about its impact on economic policy. Evidence is presented to challenge four such myths which suggest that the IMF forced the Labour government to launch an attack on public spending, introduce cash limits to control public spending, introduce monetary targets and abandon the pursuit of full employment through demand management.
Although the language of the [IMF] negotiations reflected the arcane terms of international finance… the decisions required of the British Government were profoundly political… behind the technical financial decisions lay fundamental differences over the appropriate balance between the private and public sectors, the priority between capital accumulation and social welfare, the relative weight to be given to incentives and equality… What was at issue was the future shape of the political economy of Great Britain.¹     

Contesting the Governance of Capital Flows at the IMF

Financial crises can trigger different actors to reassess their ideas, interests, and policies, and sometimes change them. The Global Financial Crisis triggered a reassessment at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) regarding the utility of capital account liberalization and the management of capital flows. In 2010, the IMF embarked upon an official reassessment of these issues and in 2012 published an official “institutional view” on capital account liberalization and managing capital flows that gives more caution toward capital account liberalization and endorses the use of capital controls in certain circumstances. This article traces the political process that yielded the IMF's new view and draws out lessons for thinking about policy change in global economic governance institutions.     

Introduction: a special issue in honoring Janos Kornai

Public Choice - We ask whether fiscal rules constrain incumbents from using fiscal policy tools for reelection purposes. Using data on fiscal rules provided by the IMF for a sample of 77 (advanced...     

Ukraine: risks to economic stabilisation

An agreement with the IMF offers sizeable external support and a path to transforming Ukraine's ailing economy and business climate. But it remains to be seen whether the country's new government will be willing and able to stick to the conditions of this far-reaching programme.     

“Donate your organs,donate life!” Explicitness in policy instruments

Behavioural research suggests that the intensity with which policy instruments indicate a direction of desired behavioural change affects how target populations respond to them. However, comparative research on policy instruments focuses on their calibration, restrictiveness, density and formal intensity, but does not account for the degree to which they specify the particular policy goal. Moving beyond nudging and “command and control” approaches, this paper adds the dimension of explicitness to existing taxonomies of policy instruments. The explicitness of an instrument results from two questions: first, does the instrument specify a direction of behavioural change? Second, does the instrument attach valence to this behaviour? The paper proposes a stepwise measurement procedure and links explicitness with policy outcomes. A comparative case study of organ donor policy in Switzerland and Spain illustrates how accounting for the explicitness dimension can improve our understanding of policy instruments and their effectiveness.     

Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in?the?UN General Assembly?

Using panel data for 188 countries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the United States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.     

Policy Adoption and the Redefinition of Operating Procedures: Comparison Cases at UMTA

Political scientists often consider the place of standard operating procedures (SOPS) in shaping bureaucratic responsiveness to “top-down” direction, but our writing only infrequently considers the processes and ease by which bureaucratic routines, decision standards, and SOPS adjust to produce nm outputs. This article explores the change of routines, decision standards, and SOPs from a behavioral perspective to portray bureaucratic behavior and policy as something other than a static function of extant SOPs or a fully and fluidly malleable function of internal preferences and external incentives. In particular, the role of two organizationally “bottom-up” factors — careerists' policy approval and their policy-relevant working schema — are explored to suggest how readily “top-down” preferences for policy translate into pragmatic working arrangements. The empirical basis for the article is a structured set of cases in the Urban Mass Transportation Administration through the latter 1970s and early 1980s.     

Government Constraints and Accountability: Economic Voting in Greece Before and During the IMF Intervention

Incumbent parties in Southern Europe experienced losses in their electoral support that came along with a series of economic reforms imposed by the EU and the IMF. However, recent theories of accountability would predict lower levels of economic voting given the limited room left for national governments to manoeuvre the economy. To resolve this puzzle, the paper presents and models quarterly vote intention time series data from Greece (2000–2012) and links it with the state of the economy. The empirical results show that after the bailout loan agreement Greek voters significantly shifted their assignment of responsibility for (economic) policy outcomes from the EU to the national government, which in turn heightened the impact of objective economic conditions on governing party support. The findings have implications for theories linking international structures, government constraints and democratic accountability.